Meeting report

Opening remarks

The Chairperson pointed out that this was not the first time that the Committee had deliberated on the 1 Military hospital. It had come into focus sharply during the oversight visit to military bases, which had included 1 Military Hospital in Thaba Tshwane from 29 November to 1 December 2021. The Joint Standing Committee (JSC) was given a presentation and had commended what the Department had done at the time. Within a very short period, they had been able to redo the seventh floor, which was now a state-of-the-art facility, using the Covid funds' allocation. The portfolio committee (PC) had also been informed about the revamp that was started in 2006, which had already cost around half a billion rand at that time. However, the project remained incomplete. Members had requested the Auditor-General (AG) to undertake a forensic investigation of the project. It later transpired that the Chief of the Defence Force had already initiated an investigation into the project. It was then concluded that it would be a waste of resources to run a parallel process when there was already the same initiative that would deliver the same outcome.

The Chief had received the report in December 2020, and in the JSC meeting last year, the Committee had requested the Secretary of Defence (SecDef) to share the report with her counterpart in the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI). Both Departments had been requested to brief the Committee on consequence management. The Committee subsequently received a briefing from the Minister of Public Works, who indicated that she had already assigned officials from her Department to implement the findings of the forensic investigation. The SecDef and the Minister of Defence were not available at the time, so it had been agreed that their briefing would be postponed to the first meeting of the Committee this year. Since this was the first meeting of the year, the briefing by the Department featured on the agenda.

Ms Thandi Modise, Minister of Defence, acknowledged that the SecDef and herself had indeed been unavailable for last year's meeting, and apologised for that. She said that they would lead the discussion on the matter. They were not happy about what they had found and conceded that it was something that had happened a long time ago and that the Department should have been on its feet to prevent the matter from dragging for so many years. She apologised, and indicated that at the end of the briefing the Department would give its recommendations on what should be done in all the arms of the services, and areas where money was expended on behalf of the people.

Ms Gladys Kudjoe, South African Secretary for Defence, said the Chairperson had clearly outlined the sequence of the events. As a follow-up to some of the previous meetings on the same matter, the Department had shared its reports with the DPWI. The report that was shared was both a full report of 232 pages and an executive summary, which was 42 pages. The Department of Defence (DoD) had not redacted the report which was shared with the DPWI, because in the report there was a reference to the officials from both the DoD and the DPWI. Some companies that appeared there had been contracted by the DPWI, and there was one company that the DPWI at some stage had ceded to the DoD. Thus, the DoD thought the DPWI would be expected to implement the recommendations that came with the report. The report was also shared with the Committee and after protracted discussions, it was agreed that it had to be shared in a redacted form. That was the report the Committee had.

Since then, knowing that the Department would appear before the Committee today, she had had a discussion with her colleagues and within the DoD to decide whether the presentation would show the names of those implicated and the companies, or without the names of those companies. After deliberations within the DoD, it was agreed that those mentioned in the report would have been informed about the investigation and participated in it. Therefore, it made sense that the Department proceeded with the revelation of the names. A similar conversation had been held with the DPWI along the same lines as those held at the DoD, and the Director-General (DG) had agreed that the issue of fraud and corruption needed to be confronted head-on. The DG also supported the decision taken by the DoD to reveal the names of those implicated. The DoD had also contacted all the individuals implicated, except for one. They were all made aware of the decision and the implications of that. After that, letters were sent out to them as confirmation.

As the Chairperson had indicated earlier, the former Chief of Defence had initiated the investigation, and the Committee would receive the outcome. To prevent subjectivity from featuring in the report, it was thought better for the company that did the investigation to present the outcome.

Forensic investigation into repair and maintenance programme at 1 Military Hospital

Mr Herman De Beer, Managing Partner, Abacus Financial Crime Advisory, said his company had been tasked with conducting a forensic investigation into the repair and maintenance programme (RAMP) at 1 Military Hospital, including the subsequent refurbishment project.

Key issues

In 1999, the Department of Public Works had launched a RAMP. It was a slightly broader concept than normal maintenance, and the repair aspect was added. While repair and maintenance work began in 2006, construction works on the project had commenced in 2001. At the time, the project led by the DPW cost an estimated R232m.

Between 2010 and 2011, the RAMP expansion took place at an estimated cost of R156m. The investigation had been initiated because certain floors were unfinished and locked after the spending of the R431m towards March 2011. The initial phase, from 2012 to 2014, led by the DPW was later taken over by the Department of Defence, up until now.

In December 2000, SSI Engineers and Environmental Consultants had been appointed by the DPW as principal engineers for RAMP. In January 2001, Multi-Pro was appointed by the Department as the RAMP project manager. A status quo assessment by SSI on 1 Military Hospital was conducted between January and March of that year. In April 2001, a status quo report, including cost estimates issued by SSI, was produced. The project then went quiet for about four years.

In October 2005, the cost estimates for electrical and mechanical services were redone for structural and wet services by SSI, but a full status quo report was not again performed.

A tender for RAMP was issued by the DPW in July 2006 for the project to run until 2009

Key findings

Investigators found that the Department had failed in its oversight responsibility to ensure a complete status quo report before the appointment of contractors.

There had been a failure by the DPW and the DoD to appropriately plan the execution of the RAMP for 1 Military Hospital, as well as failures by the DPW to appoint a single principal agent to manage the RAMP, and oversight failure by the Department to effectively coordinate on-site execution.

On the RAMP expansion that occurred from 2010 to 2011, investigators found the most significant challenges. The first action determined was that on December 8, Superway and Fastmove contractors had both received an extension of 12 months to November 2010, despite the DPW terminating all RAMP projects in December 2009 because they believed it was inappropriate. Later, a company called Babereki was appointed project manager to replace Multi-Pro.

The period from December to May was the estimated completion phase for the first and second floor and kitchen area. From December 2009 to 2010, redesign and refurbishment were introduced. That was one of the main reasons why the RAMP expansion turned out to be a disaster.

On 31 March 2011, all the contractors and consultants left and the doors on the first floor were locked. The pharmacy was incomplete, and when Abacus arrived in 2019, those doors were locked. The first floor was the highly technical and complex area of the hospital housing X-rays, scanning devices and laboratories. A decision was taken to redesign and refurbish that particular floor. This led to design flaws, including passages leading to the theatre complex being too narrow to allow hospital beds to pass. The equipment bought also could not fit through the doors, and was never installed.

Approximately R20m worth of medical equipment, including scan, X-ray and mammogram machines, was purchased which later became obsolete. The procurement of medical equipment was regarded as fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The conclusion was that the relevant DoD officials be held accountable for the fruitless and wasteful expenditure. It was further recommended that all expenditure of R156m relating to the RAMP expansion be classified as fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

The cost estimate for the refurbishment required to restore 1 Military Hospital to what people thought it would be, was R1.4bn, and due to the lack of facilities on the first floor, certain outsourced work needed to take place, with patients moved to private facilities. The cost incurred for that was estimated to be more than R1bn.

Ms Kudjoe, in her concluding remarks, reminded Members that the implicated officials had been contacted, spoken to, and served with written letters to that effect. The other involvement with them had been by the DoD’s Inspector-General (IG).

Discussion

The Chairperson reminded Members that the SecDef had mentioned that the report they received about a week ago had been redacted, but following further consultations, they had resolved that the report be released with all the names. Of course, that was after the implicated officials were informed that the report would be released to the public. It was tabled in the JSC meeting, which was an open meeting. He had received the report last year around November but had not received instructions to release it because consultations still needed to be carried out before the release of the report. The report was kept confidential until a week ago when there was an agreement that it could be released. The DoD was not withholding the report from the Committee.

Mr S Marais (DA) said this was another shocker, and it seemed like 2021 was a year of shocks -- from one shocker to another, from bad to worse. He said the Committee was glad to receive the forensic report that was open to the public and it could see what had happened. He reminded Members that in their first visit, he had told them that there had not been any changes since his last visit to 1 Military Hospital in 2016, when there had been scans and high-tech machines packed in crates, so these could be the machines that had been declared obsolete now.

There were enormous findings and recommendations. When the DPWI gave its presentation, Minister De Lille had indicated that disciplinary processes had started, with internal investigations to hold people responsible accountable, but it seemed that nothing of that sort had commenced in the DoD. This was very questionable. Where were they in that process? The involvement of Colonel Du Preez and Mr Anthony Kritzinger, for instance, must have been authorised by someone. This work did not happen somewhere in the back corners, or far away from people to see what was happening. This was 1 Military Hospital’s first floor, where the theatres and pharmacy were located, and everyone saw that every single day. Somebody must have noticed that something was wrong and felt that intervention from the seniors was necessary.

Where did this leave the Committee? What had the DoD done so far? Was the works formation responsible? Who was giving the instructions? Was it the Surgeon-General who must take responsibility? The presentation indicated that in 2004, 1 Military Hospital was served with probation notices for non-compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), but nothing further was said about compliance in that regard. Where did it stand now in terms of compliance with the OHSA? Was it still non-compliance?

In the meantime the hospital was operational. It was a huge disappointment, but at the same time, it was something that had to be dealt with. There were some consequences and accountability that must take place, and then it had to be decided whether there was funding. Would the National Treasurer allocate the funds for all this work that had to be done, seeing that they did not know exactly where they stood? A lot of work still had to be done in terms of the recommendations of the report. The Committee did not know how much it would cost and what the eventual budget would be -- whether it would be that R1.4 billion, or more. He needed to know more than that, and the SecDef needed to give that information as the accounting officer, or whoever she assigns to do so. Referring to the IG's work, he said he suspected that investigation and disciplinary action would take place.

Mr T Mmutle (ANC) said he was worried about what the report had revealed. How had it come about that the end-user was not involved? Who had been the initiator of the said project? For example, one could not say one wants a pizza with certain ingredients, and then when they bring it, they change the ingredients along the way. The end-user, in this case, was supposed to be the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which was responsible for the design and the equipment, and had an idea of the outlook of the refurbished hospital. By the time the DPWI had been told the resources had been made available, it would have been decided internally what the project had to look like. However, the way this project was conducted revealed that resources were just availed without knowing what they were looking for. He said there was no way that one could initiate a project and not stay part of it until the end. The end-user must lead all the phases of the project, instructing what it wants.

The Committee needed clarity on what happened from those involved because this looked like a money-making scheme. Moving one engineer and replacing with another just escalates costs, yet there had been no progress on the actual work that needed to be done. Furthermore, equipment was procured which did not address what the structural contractor was doing. There was an issue on planning and internal control around this project that the Department needed to address. Steps had to be taken to correct what had happened.

Mr W Mafanya (EFF) said the Committee had been inept in sourcing this information, even when it had to do oversight. The Committee had also highlighted that it had not wanted to revisit 1 Military Hospital, because several issues raised at the time had not been attended to. Now that the report had outlined the kind of criminality that happened, there was no better way of explaining that there were people who had neglected their duties. The investigations had been done and the report was open for everyone to see. By tomorrow morning, it would be in the headlines of the media. It warranted proper investigations, where organisations like the Hawks get involved, and the Committee must write to the Minister to act on the Department because an amount close to R1 billion could not be lost without anything happening. A lot of damage had been caused, including losing capable professionals in the medical field. It had been highlighted back in 2015/2016 that a revamp would cost R1.4 billion, and during the Committee’s visit last year it was indicated that close to R2 billion would be needed. This was not about questioning the SecDef, because the Committee was aware of the criminality that had taken place, but he suggested that the Minister must take control and open criminal charges against those involved.

Mr D Ryder (Gauteng, DA) agreed with the previous speakers that there needed to be clear consequences. What was of importance was the welfare of the military personnel. There was nothing in the report that referred to the future of this project -- was it going to be based on the DoD or the DPWI? How were they going to get 1 Military hospital functional again? The reality was that the hospital was limping along on one leg, like some of its patients. There were two components to what was being discussed. One was to look at the rearview mirror, and fix what had gone wrong. The other was to look ahead, and fix what had gone wrong going forward. Answers were needed on both.

Mr M Shelembe (DA) said the report was comprehensive, but the question was whether those who were responsible were still in their positions of employment. If they were, it was time that the Minister ensured that criminal charges were opened against them. If not, it was not clear what was going to happen to them. The project had been initiated with a purpose and before any project was initiated, the Department had to have a clear plan as to who must be responsible for it. It was disturbing that the DoD's procurement seemed to be unfamiliar with the prescript when it came to the procurement of goods and services. The concern was how it had decided to purchase the medical equipment without seeing that it would end up sitting in the passage of the place where it was supposed to be installed. Was the DoD's procurement section now well capacitated? If not, it was risking the taxpayers' money by giving it to people who could not handle such money. A billion rand had just become fruitless expenditure, and it would be impossible to recover that money from those responsible. The Committee was there to represent the people and to protect the taxpayer's money. The hope was that the Minister would ensure that those responsible were charged accordingly, and even put behind bars. This matter dated back to 2004 and nothing had been done to charge those responsible for this corruption. The Minister must now do whatever possible to bring the responsible to book, because the officials themselves may not be able to do so, as some of them were implicated.

Ms A Beukes (ANC) said while the report was shocking, it was appreciated that it was finally available to the public. She insisted that there should be serious consequences against those involved, and there should be a follow-up on the implementation of the recommendations. The procurement process followed to appoint the project manager had been irregular, and the amount of R14.5 million must be viewed as irregular expenditure. The report had been handed to the IG in December 2020. What had been done since that time to recover these funds? The report had also confirmed a lack of leadership in oversight at the command structure of 1 Military Hospital. Were these people still with the SANDF? Had any disciplinary action been taken?

The Chairperson said the report indicated that at the time of drafting this report in September 2020, the first floor and the pharmacy section on floor two had remained locked and non-operational. Patients were still being transferred to private care facilities at a significant cost. This had been considered a jewel of the Defence Force at the time. The hospital had 500 beds, and its prime facility was meant to provide treatment to the President, Deputy President, their predecessors, foreign dignitaries, and members of the SANDF veterans and their families. It was also accredited by the United Nations and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) -- now the Southern African Development Community (SADC) -- for people who were referred to the hospital by them because they happened to be close to our borders. It had treated the Presidents of other countries as well, but today the first floor lay in ruins. There were some sections and units that had been on that floor that were no longer there, including 12 theatres, the intensive care unit (ICU), the casualty ward that catered for the emergency and trauma unit, a laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, and other auxiliary services.

All of these had been taken out when the project was started. This had led to some specialists leaving because the work they were meant to perform was no longer offered by the hospital. This had "literally" led to the hospital being a white elephant. It had cost the hospital skilled and experienced doctors. It was shocking to listen to a report about a project on which close to R1billion had been spent, but there was nothing to show for it.

What had been spoken about was an escalation of payments. The Committee had been told that as part of driving a project, the DPWI creates a steering committee on which the client department sits and participates in the development of the scope of the project and the execution of the project. They also participate in the other discussions of the external agencies and contractors as part of exercising oversight on the development of the project. Where was the DoD when all of this was happening? The Committee had to reject the statement that said in 2011 only 5% of the project was outstanding. This could not be true, especially after mentioning that the institution was dysfunctional because the core services it offered could not be offered there. He also disputed the claim by the DPWI in December that approximately 75 % of the RAMP scope of work had been completed. How on earth could that be the case, when the nerve of the institution had been destroyed and was hollow? So if the Committee says it was a disappointing picture it received tonight, it meant exactly that.  

Responses

Abacus Financial Crime Advisory

Mr De Beer said it was correct that there were steering committees in place, and they were ineffective. There were also overseers of people, like Mr Du Preez and others, who set a certain amount of accountability at that level. The three senior officials were part of the decision on the expansion project -- what the informal decision was and how it was going to be executed. It was too late for them to deal with that by the time they realised, in the short 15 months' time for the expansion project, what the results would be. He said the empowerment of the works formation was an important aspect to deal with. They could not hold all the capability, technology-wise or people-wise. They needed to be empowered to do what was needed in the Defence Force to look after the equipment installations and construction.

The Chairperson indicated that in the period between 2011 and 2016, it was not clear how much had been spent on the project. Information was given about the spending on only the first and second phases of the RAMP expansion, which was roughly R431million, but during the refurbishment period, there was no indication of how much was spent. Did he want to say something about that? Who was this DoD official who kept featuring in the report? It was not clear who he was, and Mr De Beer kept referring to him as "a senior official" in the redacted report and the presentation.

Mr De Beer responded that the senior official was General Fortuin, who was in the SANDF at the time and driving the decision-making on the expansion RAMP, particularly the refurbishment project until he left. Regarding the figures, he said that there was indeed no indication in the presentation, but if one looked at the figures of 2011, after the expansion project was closed in March 2011, the allocated money for Tectura and those people working with them was R35 million, and that budget had been depleted. On the advice work on what needed to be done with 1 Military Hospital, the health technology company that was appointed to advise the programme going forward had been allocated a budget of R29 million, and at the time of writing the report, that money had already been depleted. At the time of writing the report in 2020, there was no further budget for Tectura and LDM, the health tech company. If the two were added together, the budget was R64 million that had been utilised during this period and was purely for planning, design, and helping the Department to write a procurement document to appoint the actual contractors to fix what still needed to be fixed across the hospital, particularly the kitchen and pharmacy on floor one.

Secretary for Defence

Ms Kudjoe told the Committee that when she was in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), where she was responsible for Africa, part of her responsibilities had been liaising with the SANDF on those heads of state who wanted to be treated at 1 Military Hospital. They did not want to go anywhere in the world except to "1 Mil." When she came to the DoD in August 2020, she was looking forward to seeing the hospital but could see it was just a shadow of what it once was. The report talked about the project that had gone wrong, starting from the mandate. Even if this project struggled for 20 years, or it was looked at over a period of 15 years, at the point that the DPWI had come on board it had never done a RAMP on a military hospital. This was the first time that it was going there. The report said everything went wrong because the expectation had been a Roll-Royce of a military hospital, in compliance with the health regulations and fully functional. This was also what the DoD expected, but the DPWI had been treating it like any other RAMP.

She had managed to read the 42 pages of the executive summary, and everything that could go wrong had gone wrong. Even though there were project managers that were contracted by the DPWI to run the project, there was nobody managing anything. Anybody who could give instructions did so. It was unfortunate that some of them had found this out at the tail end and had to pick up the pieces and try to do the best that could be done under the circumstances. Even within the DoD, some of the officials who started might have already left and moved on to do other things, but at least there was still General Ledwaba who came from the works formation, and would be able to talk on some of the issues that had been raised.

There were clear recommendations and part of them were saying that even though the project was handed over at some point to the DoD, it was run by colleagues at works formation. One of the things mentioned to the Committee was that when work was being done on the seventh floor, part of that involved the DoD’s people understudying the professional team that was doing the work there. That was to acknowledge that the entity could not run the project, but it was something that was being worked on. General Ledwaba had worked out a programme that would indicate how the Department would do its scheme.

The report also indicated that there was no leadership, and even the leaders who were supposed to hold people accountable did not do so. The redesign of the third floor was given to a lab assistant who spent his time in the lab and did not design the floor. This explained why the equipment that was bought could not fit where it was supposed to be. Some of the things that were bought remained in boxes and became obsolete. In fact, the entity lost more than R1 billion, because some things that were supposed to be done at the hospital had to be outsourced, and the money that had been lost through outsourcing had not been discussed. The DoD currently had no funding to continue with the project, and even when the seventh floor was done, it was what the entity wanted to leave behind as a legacy project from the money that was given to the Department deal with the impact of the coronavirus. That was what was shown there, and the project showed that if one had the right management in place, proper oversight was not an impossible task.

The investigation was initiated in 2019, but the report came out only in 2020 with the current Chief of the Defence Force. When the investigation was initiated, it meant there was a concern, and the fact that the report showed the magnitude of the corruption indicated that the DoD had taken the step to work closely with its counterparts at the DPWI to pave the way forward.  Recommendations were made by colleagues from the military police and IG environment, and the IG was the one who found the company to assist with the investigation. That had been forwarded to the Hawks, and the case number was available.

She agreed that as a way forward, what went wrong needed to be fixed to ensure that past mistakes were not repeated. On the procurement process, she confirmed that there had been procurement processes in both the DoD and DPWI. However, if the entity got a report which said there was an off-the-record meeting, or there was a gentlemen's agreement, this meant that even if the procurement policies were in place, they were intent on not following them. Things did not go wrong because of the lack of procurement policies, but because they were not followed.

She said that even the senior people in the meeting today had been within the SANDF at the time, so they were the end-user. However, as mentioned in the report, whether it was those from the DPWI or the companies, what had been paid was way above what was required. She had mentioned earlier that the Department had contacted those people, and a bit of work had been done. Even during the time of the former Chief of the Defence Force, the Department had written about the matter indicating that action needed to be taken. Similarly, the new Chief of the Defence Force had also been contacted and requested to move on the matter. However, looking at the amount that was involved, how could one recover that money? The report was specific about which individuals should be accountable for what. It was justifiable that the entity should proceed with criminal action as suggested by Members when one considers the money involved. Where it was possible to salvage the money, the entity would have to salvage.

The Chairperson said the hospital lost its capability when the specialists left the institution. It lost its accreditation as a level four hospital, and it was outsourcing medical services at extremely expensive costs. He asked General Mnisi to tell the Committee where to from here.

SANDF

Maj Gen Eric Mnisi, Adjutant-General, SANDF, spoke in two capacities. One was his official capacity as the adjutant-general of the army, and the other was as a South African and as a taxpayer. He told the Committee that after receiving the report, the legal service division had duly advised the principal. He explained an international law (IL) concept of command responsibility, which meant that if a subordinate committed an offence without the commander knowing, the commander was absolved from that. But if the commander knew and failed to act, the commander was held accountable for the crime committed by the subordinate. It was an important principle in IL and if it was applied in the domestic context, it meant that if the commander failed to take action against an offence he was aware of, he got judged accordingly. Thus, after receiving the report, they had advised and collaborated with the military police and submitted the matter to the Hawks. The SANDF disciplinary action was only on those in uniform, and the action was criminal. Those that were now civilians and no longer in the Defence Force had to be prosecuted in the civilian courts.

The concern was that the National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA's) hands were full. There were a lot of serious and prominent criminal prosecutions on their hands, and this matter may fall between the cracks. However, because of what had happened in the environment of the Surgeon-General, that office had to become the complainant. Advice had been given and the matter forwarded to the Hawks, but there was no complainant, so the Surgeon- General should be the complainant. Secondly, not every single cent of the money lost would be recovered, but the report indicated that the wasteful and fruitless expenditure had occurred, and there was a Constitutional Court ruling from two years ago where the DPWI could apply and set the contractors aside and move on to recover the money that was in excess. This meant that there should be two processes -- the criminal side, and the litigation side -- and these processes could run concurrently.

As a South African and as a member of the SANDF, it was painful to see the state of 1Mil Hospital, with it losing its accreditation as one of the most advanced hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa. It had lost accreditation from the United Nations (UN), which used to send its people to the hospital. If there was no money to continue with the project as the SecDef had indicated, did it mean that 1Mil was doomed? If the country put more money into the project without taking action, the DoD would have failed the people of SA.

He said support would be given to the Chief of the Defence Force, the SecDef and the Minister because the military police and his division were supposed to. There was no command channel when it came to these things, but commanders were exposed to them and should take action promptly. They needed to assist the division for it to assist them. He was taking the liberty to say the matter had been submitted to the Hawks.

Lt Gen Jabu Mbuli, Chief of Logistics, SANDF, said his division was waiting for the report because Tectura was in the report and could not proceed until it was finalised. As indicated in the report, the matter had been referred to the NPA and the Hawks. This gave the entity leeway, as a criminal case had been opened against those responsible. The entity could not continue with the matter of 1Mil to avoid litigation. The report now allowed the work to be continued on the other floors.

On the issue of procurement, there was nothing that could have been done when people outside the process held private meetings on the side. Concerning specifications that got forwarded to the procurement centre, he said the specialist in the environment of health technologies was the one who would write the specifications for procurement, and then the procurement centre would work on those specifications. It bought the equipment as requested by the architecture of the building. Of course, there had been a delay with the health technologies, but when they were brought in, it was years after the project had already been derailed. The company had then assisted on what technology was required for these floors.

At one point, a lot of questions were raised in the finance committee over the invoices that had been received. The committee had suspended Tectura to get answers. Calling the officer who was bringing the invoices to appear before the finance committee had been the intervention of the logistics division.

Follow-up discussion

Mr Ryder said that General Mnisi’s comments on the budget going forward were very important. It was not within the Committee’s power, but recommendations had to be made to the Portfolio Committee (PC) on Defence that when the time for the Budget Review & Recommendations Reports (BRRR), and the reviews came, these matters could be taken into account and in-depth. The Committee could not find itself in a position again this year that it just rubber stamps the budget of the DoD to the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces when it was not going to achieve what was needed on the ground. That budget needed to be reworked from the ground up, because there was a new Minister and an opportunity to rethink things. The BRRR meeting in the JSC on Defence would be one of the most important engagements that had happened in the last 28 years of democracy. This was a very important issue and he was imploring those that sit on the JSC to have a serious in-depth discussion on the DoD budget allocation.

Mr Marais said he understood why the SecDef and IG were cautious in responding to questions, because of the nature of the matter. There were a lot of consequences and consequence management to deal with. The JSC was sitting with a hospital that was once the pride of Africa. He was not sure as to what would happen next week on the budget, but given the reality of what was witnessed on the primary objectives of the SANDF, the big names there. Both the SecDef and the Minister would have to come back to both the PC and the JSC on how to tackle the matter going forward.

What were the options if money was not available? If nothing was done for another ten years, there would be nothing left and everything done on the second floor would be a total waste, so both the Minister and the SecDef must prioritise feedback, and give a proper response and briefing to both the JSC and the PC. The Committee was now dealing with the budget, and a briefing would be important before finalising the budget, otherwise, more money would be wasted. Good money could not be thrown at bad projects and objectives, This was currently a bad project, because even given the nature of the technology, for instance, radiology equipment would cost the Department millions, as it was imported. Maybe it was a multi-departmental problem that needed to be tackled through collaboration with the Department of Health to find out how the facility could be utilised for the benefit of South Africans. He requested that the matter should be dealt with properly and responsibly because there was no way this project could move forward without the required money, and the kind of litigation that would follow would be time-consuming.

The Chairperson agreed that there must be a way forward, and pointed out that this was an eye-opener that inspired the Committee to start looking into what was happening at the other military hospitals -- 2 Mil and 3 Mil. It was not that the Committee had not been looking at them, but it had to pay special attention. On 1 Mil, it would not be too much to ask the DoD to update the Committee on what was being done to bring to book those implicated within the Department. An arrangement should be worked out so that it could brief the Committee quarterly on the progress and get information from the DPWI because they were here and the Minister had assured the Committee that she had started implementing consequence management.

There must be a report on the progress of the DPWI too, including what General Mnisi had said about applying to the court to set aside the contracts and recover the money that had been lost. He was raising this because, in a meeting, the chief of the works formation had said they could not move at the time because they were still held to the contracts. Those contractors were still waving their contracts at them. The Committee did not know the shenanigans or the facts about what those contracts were intended for in the matter that had just been explained now. That would then pave the way for the chief of the works formation to take over and appoint new contractors to deal with this.

However, the budget should be looked at to see if there was money to try and bring this institution back to its previous glory. It was critical because already almost R1 billion had been spent outsourcing patients to private service providers. It was not the time to give up on the hospital, as it was needed to provide service to the soldiers, the veterans, and their families. Who was the officer in charge at that time, and what had been his/her responsibility?

Minister Modise said the Department would not wash its hands of 1Mil Hospital, and it was not completely closed. Veterans and active soldiers still got treatment there. Certain sections were still not operational, but the radiology unit was up and running. The doctors had walked the Minister around, and the Department needed to ensure that they had functional spaces and the restoration of theatres. There was no intention to walk away from 1Mil Hospital -- it had to be restored to what it was. The entity was also keeping an eye on 2 Mil, which also required some repair and maintenance work. She would not comment on 3 Mil Hospital, because she had not visited it yet.

In response to Mr Ryder's first question, she said the report by Abacus did not state what was going to happen, as this was not the intention of the investigation. On receiving the report, the DoD team was supposed to sit down before even running to the Hawks, and look at things such as who had been responsible for this project, as asked by Chairperson. When the doors were locked, what did the head of service say? Was a report fielded, and what was the response? When the budgets overran, what did the main budget holder say? The SecDef was not there, but what did the predecessor say, and who was keeping an eye on the rands and cents? It had to be done stage by stage to find out who had closed their eyes when all this was happening. It could not be that such a huge amount had gone and the entity just says it may recover it or it may not.

She told Members that if they were not careful, the accounting officers would tell the politicians that they had no administrative roles, yet both their administrative and financial delegation must be in writing from the politicians. Therefore, that was why politicians had to take responsibility for the financial and administrative functions when they collapse. The politicians could not be there to decorate when things go right and when they collapse, take the consequences. She gave an example of her becoming the Premier of the North West Province, where she was met by a huge but empty show in Mafikeng. The heads of departments had come together and spent more than R6 million to arrange that. It was poorly organised, yet millions had already been spent. When she had asked about it, the Director-General had said it had nothing to do with her -- it was his role as the DG. She told him that it was not his money -- it came from the fiscus, so it was the people’s money. It was at that point that she had learnt to interfere with delegations to the head of departments because if one did not do that, it meant an accounting officer could spend whatever money he or she wanted to, and the politician could be reduced to nothing. It would not happen on her watch, and she would relook at the delegation.

That was why she needed to come and say that when the Chief of the Defence Force designated people for promotion, there must be an analysis of what was being designated. Was the person able to keep an eye on finances? Did the person’s training enable him/her to run a base or an arm of service? If that was not the case, then those people seeking promotion should start arming themselves in that area. Money could not be squandered at the bases, and the officer says he knows nothing about it because it was not his strength -- his skill was flying a plane and giving instructions to soldiers. When one takes responsibility, one needed to be trained to be accountable. A professional soldier did not just wear shiny boots but was one who should know every aspect of their responsibility.

There would be a follow-up from when the delegations were changed when certain companies were pulled out, and when other companies were replacing others. There should be a session where the Department would be able to say that these were the lessons learnt, and this was not going to happen again. There was a hospital during her time as the Premier of North-West that could tell the same story -- where equipment was ordered from China and sat in storage. There were costly X-ray machines that were not suitable for use in that hospital. This could not continue to happen in SA if they were serious about it. Internally, questions would be asked, like who did not open their eyes? If you did not understand, why did you not ask someone to enlighten you so that you could take appropriate action? This would help get to the bottom of things.

Minister Modise said next month's budget would not help the Department that much, because that process had started last year in July. The focus should now be to look at the coming budget and ask the extent to which the whole of the medical service would get attention. She also asked Chairperson to give the entity space in the future to come to brief the Committee on the progress made and the way forward. There should be interrogation of the delegations, right down to the basics, to know what the preparations were when people got responsibilities, whether they were uniformed or civilians. Who had been the chief financial officer (CFO) at that time, and why were they not keeping an eye on this? The entity needed to go back so that the current people should be reminded not to sit there and think they would be protected if they were not verifying rumours or what they were signing. If the Department did that, it would begin to create a circle that would revive financial responsibility and show Treasury and the country that it was responsible. The entity would regain the confidence of professionals. The SANDF had produced several young medical professionals and experts, which was very impressive for this country. The entity had lost the skills but had also produced them.

The investigations should not stop, and it should not be said that people had gone. She came from a school that said when one leaves the service and something smelly comes up, they could still be called to account. If those officers were found guilty, they must be stripped of their titles. If they did not do that, they would have a revolving door with people taking chances. They had to put their foot down. The Defence Force had to become professional, be accountable, respectable and trustworthy, and respect that which it was supposed to protect. The entity could not be a Defence Force that was supposed to protect the integrity and the sovereignty of the country, and yet it vandalised.

She assured the Committee that the entity would produce the best and most professional soldiers, regardless of race. This would also include looking at the military judges and police, to ensure that they were doing what they should be doing. The priority was to maintain a good name and reputation of the force. She would look at the procurement policies in place and the whole structure of the SANDF. When one went through the ranks, there must be a certainty that one was able to command people because one was trained to do so.

On whether all the people responsible were still in the Defence Force, the Minister said that some had left, but that would not prevent them from being brought to book. She reminded the Chairperson to give the entity an opportunity, when it was ready, to update Members on the progress made and the way forward for the entity. She also indicated that in Parliament, the DoD had requested that the DPWI should not run the contract alone. For every contract that DoD gets into with DPWI, it would have a person from Defence who was also responsible, so that if things go wrong there was someone to hold accountable in the Department.

The Chairperson said the entity would be invited back to the Committee. It had already proposed that its visits be quarterly so that it keeps the Committee abreast on how it was implementing consequence management on those implicated. He thanked the Abacus team for the presentation which he said had been an eye-opener.

Air Force Base (AFB) Waterkloof fire

Brig Gen Emmanuel Mokoena, Officer Commanding, AFB Waterkloof, gave a presentation on the investigation into the fire which occurred at the base last month.

He said the preliminary findings indicated that the fire was an accident, the result of a component failure. A component failure in the pipe system had caused a fuel leak that had been ignited by a spark from the pump wiring. The start of the fire had been captured on video, which further indicated that there was no sabotage of the fuel system.

The base firefighters had reacted to the fire and managed to extinguish it in less than one hour. This swift action prevented over 240 000 litres of fuel from catching fire, which would have led to an explosion. Their action had saved the base and the neighbouring communities that might have been affected. Based on the above; the SAAF leadership had decided to reward these members accordingly

Precautionary measures

The following measures had been implemented to prevent a recurrence:

• A certificate of essentiality request had been generated to ensure an expedited process for the repairs of the infrastructure;
• Installation of an automatic fire suppression system;
• Increased frequency of maintenance. The Committee was assured that the site was properly maintained. As it was a closed and under pressure system, it was shut down once every five years and the parts were dismantled and put on a test bench to ensure that they were still running correctly, and the bearings were correct. Tanks also got serviced, and in November 2019 a new system was installed, including new pumps. This would give them close to three years before the system was shut down for a complete overhaul.
• Increased inspection of the site. The monthly inspection had been changed to a weekly inspection. The section heads report on the conditions of the site, and engineers were also sent to check on the site because it was a more technical area. This was just a visual inspection -- a full-service inspection was done every five years.
• Install cameras that were monitored day and night by the fire section.

Discussion

The Chairperson said there had been a sigh of relief that no foul play was suspected, that it was a technical fault, and that the fire had been brought under control before it could cause extensive damage to the base.

Mr Marais agreed it was good that it had been determined that there was not something sinister going on. When the inspections were done, both visual and in-depth inspections, was there a register for everyone to know what had been seen or found because this was not long after 2019, and it was strange that there was a technical fault? Was it because of the poor quality of pipes? Why had they determined that there was a technical fault? Was dolomite a big problem at the base, and had dolomite challenges added to this? Had they foreseen this? Waterkloof Air Force base was one of the strategic installations where budget should not be a problem, but from an accounting point of view, how was that going to be done? Was money available for that? Was money specially allocated at this stage to do that? What the Committee had been told was necessary should be supported all the way, although it would cost thousands if it had to be done properly.

Mr Mmutle applauded the team that had managed to speedily and effectively extinguish the fire and keep it under control. On the serviceability and maintenance of tanks, he asked if they would be able to replace pipes timeously according to their life span and so forth. Were they also experiencing a challenge as a result of budgetary constraints? If that was the case, the Department needed to prioritise maintenance, because such an unforeseen and unfortunate event must be prevented at all costs. Failure to do so may cause massive damage and an escalation of costs to repair the damage. Were they facing challenges with the maintenance of parts that needed to be replaced on the pipeline and the whole system?

Mr Ryder also commended the fire team for a job well done, and asked about the age of the pipes and the tanks specifically, because maintenance could be done as many times as one would like. However, if the problem was fixed instead of changing the whole system entirely, then it became an issue. It all boiled down to the issue of budget priorities and what would be done with the budget allocated to the entity.

Referring to the informal settlements in the area, he said people found the bush a safe place because there was police protection, and Waterkloof was a military base that provided protection. Was this a problem? Was there a threat to their perimeter fence? If the army could not stop land invasions, who on earth could? Surely perimeters should be controlled and people should be kept away, but was it a problem?

The Chairperson agreed with Mr Ryder, pointing out that when the Committee visited the base, they had noticed an informal settlement that had developed around the base. Usually, for security purposes, the base should be in a zone that was not occupied by civilians, but that zone had been invaded and was no longer a free zone, which was a dangerous situation for the base. It was not the only base that had been invaded, but in this instance, it had been reported that the invasion had interfered with the rail infrastructure so much that fuel now had to be tankered into the base. It was not clear what the motive for interfering with the rail was, but it could be that they wanted to sell the metal. Dealing with the issue of scrap yards should be prioritised, as they not only affected households but the government as well.

DoD's response

Brig Gen Mokoena said there was a directorate for base support systems (DBSS) to handle inspection records. The entity also did not have a problem with money to maintain the fuel system. It was budgeted for by the DBSS, and the entity was reminded of the time the inspection would be due because fuel needed to be pumped from one tank to the other to service the whole system. There were records, and both the base and the DBSS kept the records of the servicing.

The reason for the technical fault was not yet known. The board of inquiry would meet with the engineers next week to give details of what could have caused the fault. In two weeks time, the board of inquiry would be sent to the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Air Command, with all the details of the engineering part of the failure.

He said there was already a contractor assigned to deal with the dolomite problem. He did not think the dolomite problem may be the cause of the failure, but it could not be ruled out completely.

On the budget to repair the damage, he indicated that the base would not carry that responsibility, as the delegation at the base was limited to R100 000, and seven pumps had to be changed and repairs made to some installations. This would be elevated to the DBSS who would see how to manage it, and if need be, they would contact the works formation. The SANDF just needed to compile all the requirements.

On the squatter camp close to the base, he said there had been a good working relationship with the City of Tshwane since he took over last year. A group of security personnel had been sent to inspect and remove those people but to no avail. There was also a court order that prevented them from removing those settled near the SPCA. The ones along the R21 on the east were removed regularly, but they kept coming back because they built temporary structures which could be easily replaced. He had now included removing these squatters as part of a patrol so that they did not interfere with the wall, the pipe and railway.

He said the SANDF had no problem with maintaining the storage tanks because the DBSS was doing so. They had a Special Security Officer (SSO) appointed to do that.

On the age of the equipment, he said the pumps and the fittings around them were still new -- only two years old. The tanks, because they were underground, were old but well maintained. There was a company that came and scrubs and calibrates them, so their maintenance was of a high standard. The threat of the squatters was there because they stripped the rail that made accessing the fuel easier. They may also be planning to steal the metal as well because the base was full of metal objects, which was why patrols had been increased, both inside and outside. The vegetation around the base was also going to be cut very low to ensure that people were visible from afar so that the patrol could pick them up if they were moving towards the base.

Minister said Brig Gen Mokoena had done well. The base that Mr Marais was looking for was the Wallmansthal military base, where several vehicles and equipment had been lost in a fire. She also commented on an informal settlement near the base, pointing out that security was not the only issue. Keeping these settlements away was to help prevent soldiers from being accused of being too fraternal with the communities because it could lead to many other problems. There must be a strategy that did not imply that the SANDF was better than the community it was protecting, but that it needed to keep its distance.

She said she was happy with the proceedings, and said that as soon as the inquiry report was ready, the DoD would furnish the Committee with it.

The meeting was adjourned.