Nuclear New Build Request for Information: DMRE Update

Meeting report

Introductory Remarks by the Chairperson

The Chairperson opened the virtual meeting, welcoming the Members, support staff as well as the delegation from the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. He then invited the secretary to run through attendance and apologies.

Nuclear New Build Request for Information: DMRE Briefing

Mr Zizamele Mbambo, Deputy Director-General (DDG): Nuclear Energy, DMRE, led the briefing. The DMRE was providing a progress report of the market response, based on Decision eight of the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2019 and the Request for Information (RFI) issued by DMRE. The bidders who responded had collectively supplied over 240 of the 454 reactors in operation globally. The majority of small modular reactors (SMRs) were in the design stage with plans to be operational by 2030. The technology also had possibilities for hybrid or multi-functional systems that could also be used for: water desalination, synthetic fuels of district heating. The costs and funding models was an on-going matter, especially since of the 25 responses received, only 11 of these provided overnight costs for the programme. There were various financing and ownership structure options. By 2030, DMRE needs to guarantee an option that would provide 2500MW. Following the RFI, the Department committed to developing an optimal implementation strategy and make recommendations for Government to take key strategic decisions.

Discussion

The Chairperson opened the floor for Members to engage the presentation.

Mr K Mileham (DA) asked the DDG and DMRE team what they saw to be the role of Eskom in the rollout of the nuclear new build, given Eskom’s financial situation and difficulties. Over the weekend he had heard a fair amount about the nuclear waste disposal liability that Eskom had in its books but did not actually have cash that it was transferring to the National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute. Had this been factored into the costs? If not, would they consider ring fencing that funding so that it is ‘actual, physical investment cash’ that is on hold for nuclear waste disposal? On this, would they be looking at speeding up the high-level waste disposal element, which was only scheduled to come online in 2050? What would DMRE do to make that a realistic solution in the short term?

Mr Mileham also wanted to know more about small modular reactors. He noted that there were only two plants that were furthest ahead; this appeared to be the Chinese and the Americans. What was the timeframe from a demo-plant being obstructed and operational to commercialisation? In other words, how long would it take to go from an up-and-running plant to a commercial plant that could be sold and deployed around the world?

It was indicated by the presenting team that there was some interest in possibilities in partnering with South Africa in some technology (pebble-bed modularly reactors). What cost was associated with this, and what needed to happen for this to take place? Did they still have the skills for this to take place? Have they not lost a lot of those skills to other countries?

He was curious about the estimated timeframe until the operationalisation of any nuclear new-build. When will the Department look at procuring and/or going online? How did they align the fact that in the Minister’s performance agreement, he had committed to procuring 2500MW of nuclear new-build by 2024 when the IRP made no provision for procurement of nuclear new-generation? The IRP only made provision for 1 860 MW of life extension at Koeberg.

Which sites was the DMRE considering and what was the status of these? Did they have to go through new identification and environmental processes and the like? It was mentioned in the presentation that one of the hiccups for SMRs was licensing and that there was a protracted licensing process. He was really concerned that there was no defined global regulatory environment – that people were still feeling their way around SMRs. What exactly would they be looking at in terms of this? How long were they talking for the regulatory process? Would South Africa effectively not be acting as the guinea pig for the rest of the world if they went down this route?

On slide 19, it was said that innovative financing solutions were proposed by the market for 2500MW of new build that may not require upfront development by the state. The slide then said that this was especially noting that:” “most of the project development was at an advanced stage.” What did this last bit mean? How could this be at an advanced stage if this was just an RFI?

On financing options (slide 12), it was said that the nuclear special project vehicle is being funded with debt and equity, with “sovereign support from South Africa to make the project bankable”.  What did they mean by ‘sovereign support’? How much sovereign support was this and where would it be found, given that the fiscus was extremely constrained?

Finally, Mr Mileham asked what would be the public participation process going forward on the proposed nuclear new-build (NNB), given that the last attempt to do this was delayed in the courts primarily around the lack of public participation in that decision-making process. 

Mr V Zungula (ATM) asked if there were any local bidders (slide five)? If yes, could they provide the details? Which local companies were identified by shareholding to participate in the local reservation and what was the process to obtain these companies (slide six)? Was Eskom ready with the interface between the NNB and the existing infrastructure (slide eight)?

Lastly, what stopped a syndication of the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and the Reserve Bank financing the NNB so that the ownership was fully South African?

Mr J Lorimer (DA) asked about the decision-making process. Which partner/s would they be going with? Could DMRE provide further information? A decision like this had many factors – the type of reactors, how long it took to build, the degree of localisation and what kind of funding they would organise. He asked how important each of these factors were, relatively and particularly? What importance would they be attaching to the issue of localisation?

Ms P Madokwe (EFF) was interested in the demographics of the potential vendor companies. What proportion was local? What proportion was black-owned? What proportion of companies employed individuals with disabilities? Secondly, notwithstanding that the companies providing services would want to collaborate with local companies, what initiatives were there by government or DMRE in particular to capacitate companies with the aforementioned demographics that showed potential but did not yet make the cut for some reason? She noted that many skills and technology would be outsourced and took this as skills shortage being the cause. Did the IRP explore the possibility of starting academic programmes to give skills that would meet this need instead of having to rely on foreign companies?

Mr M Wolmarans (ANC) said that the report was by and large informative what had been done so far. He aligned himself with the questions, especially from Mr Mileham and Mr Zungula. He said he would not delve much into issues they had already raised.

Concerning this programme (NNB), there was site identification and everything that went with it legislatively. Can the DMRE expand on whether a site had been identified and what work was happening around there? The approach was with multi-functional reactors as far as capacity and work-related usage was concerned (Slide eight). For example, South Africa had a number of issues around water use. There were companies who had multi-functionality, such as desalination of water. If the DMRE went for this multi-functionality concept, would it not disadvantage the provinces where desalination was not necessary or possible, or would it still be considered multi-functional?

About the Eskom issue and given the background, he envisaged partnership and role of Eskom with the identification and construction. Did Eskom participate or give a proposal in this process? In the numerous interactions with the subject, it seemed like DMRE had considered partnerships with other countries. For example, as far back as 2015, there were exchange programmes and bursaries to build external capacity. With the first aspect of the NNB either being nullified or affected by the court outcomes, what happened to the skills development programmes? Could they expand on whether they would still be doing this? When DMRE said ‘they were ready’ and they had the skills required, what would it mean when the High Court outcome is announced?

Given the entire programme (NNB) from start to finish and the many months it would take to complete, would this include local industrialists? Previously disadvantaged and black industrialists were given multiple pronouncements both by the Presidency and different ministries with regards to building black industrialists and localisation of a number of programmes. To what extent would this programme support those initiatives?

Ms V Malinga (ANC) asked who would own the plant. Who would have the shareholding rights on the plant? Were they taking a public-private partnership (PPP) route or would it be a state-owned entity? It was said that out of the 80, only 25 responded.  Among the 25 companies that showed appetite, did they meet the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) norm? Would they have this plant running by 2030, given that the current was 2021 and what the DDG outlined as the process in constructing this nuclear plant?

Responses

DDG Mbambo began his response requesting his team to add inputs if he missed any questions.

The Role of Eskom

The Department saw the role of Eskom still as an important buyer of electricity. At a stage of developing the programme and its commercial part that was led by DMRE and various entities of the state that would be engaged on how they participate. At this stage, DMRE was investigating the possibilities of implementing the NNB. As such, they were looking into the various options presented. These would then be weighed up with pros and cons on how the state could best take up the NNB programme. The balance sheet of the state needed to be taken into account, with the best approach to make the NNB financeable and implementable. This was the reason it was. It was critical at this stage for DMRE to take leadership in developing. Eskom was very important to be recognised as a party into the project.

Industry Norms

When the plant was operational, there were certain issues with putting aside the decommissioning funds that would ensure that, in the long term when the plant was decommissioned, there was no need to put a lot of upfront investment – as the investment would already be made. This was also part of the discussion on the levelled cost of energy, operational costs, decommissioning costs, fuel, maintenance, etc., when the plant was being assessed. Eskom was also doing this; they had decommissioning plants and had set aside funds.

Ring-fencing

The National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute (NRWDI) was an entity of the state whose mandate was to manage the high-level waste in the long term. DMRE was at an advanced stage of processing the bill to ensure they could manage high-level waste. Importantly, South Africa had a national waste repository site located in Vaalputs, Northern Cape. NRWDI had also been designated as the implementer of the central interim storage facility. This was a project that ensured temporary storage of radioactive waste. The NRWDI was developing the pre-feasibility study for this project, which was designed to ensure safe storage for the high-level waste in the interim. In the long term, they would be investigating in terms of their mandate: the long-term disposal facility for high-level radioactive waste. This was a deep geological repository. There were processes in place that the country was dealing with. Low-to-medium waste was stored at Vaalputs safely.

Cost of Partnership and Skills Issue

He confirmed that South Africa still had many nuclear professionals that were part of the Pebble-Bed Nuclear Reactor (PBNR), applying their skills in various jurisdictions all over the world because of the skills they acquired. South Africa was the lead in this area. There were still experts in the country applying their knowledge in this part of technology – so there were sufficient nuclear technical skills applied in the PBNR. With cost, this would be determined at the stage of negotiation with different parties – determining how the cost could be structured along with the implication of this, etc. This could be assessed at that stage.

Procurement Plan

When the DMRE planned to procure, Mr Mileham had raised the Minister’s agreement for 2024 by when it was envisaged that the procurement would be completed. This was correct in terms of DMRE’s strategic plan, which they were pursuing. All the work they were doing was to ensure they realised this commitment and that the work began. All the work could only begin once they had taken a commercial decision. For then, they had been dealing with a non-commercial RFI that helped to provide further information for planning.

Sites Considered

South Africa started the siting work as disposable early as around 2007. There was thus already a lot of work that had been done to characterise the sites, assess environmental impact, etc. There was a site in the Eastern Cape that was started quite extensively by Eskom. There was also a site in Koeberg/Duinefontein started extensively with work that was on-going. In DMRE’s view sufficient information had been gathered in understanding the characteristics of the sites that could potentially be used for a nuclear power plant. This was of course subject to regulation by the regulatory bodies. The progress made did not exclude other sites being studied in future to assess feasibility for a nuclear power plant. The other options for studying other sites inland could happen, going forward.

SMR Global Licensing Regime

New designs took about five to six years to license, depending on how successfully the designer could provide a safety case that would prove to the regulator that the design could be safely constructed and operated. There was also a group of regulators looking into various small modular reactors in the generation. The South African regulator participated in this global forum, where regulators studied various designs being considered. Though it could take five to six years to license a small modular reactor, it depended on if the design could prove its safety element in the country of origin.

Project Stage

In terms of preparation for the NNB, much work had been done over 10-12 years, looking into various elements, etc. All of this work was supporting the finalisation of making technical recommendations. Going forward, they would be assisting in supporting decision-making.

Sovereign Support with Balance Sheet

The DMRE team had reported on various options provided by different companies. Sovereign support of the programme was key. Normally, this came with guarantees from the state, which vendors typically sought when the programme was being deployed. These were indicative and depended on the regulatory regime prevailing. It was important for Members to recognise that they were dealing with nuclear technology, which was a future technology. The DMRE were looking ten years down the line, which could have a completely changed regulatory framework by then. There were various possibilities that mitigated possibilities for the state to provide guarantees – the market structure of electricity, for example, was a variable subject to change with time.  There were many other examples provided by stakeholder companies. There were multiple options, with various permutations that they would study and provide recommendations for government in implementation. It was not meant to indicate that it would ‘burden the state balance sheet ‘ in terms of immediately requiring sovereign support.

Public Participation

A very important element of any infrastructure project was public participation, defined also by various legislations governing entities. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) included extensive consultation with the stakeholders, who provided their inputs. The nuclear licensing process also provided an opportunity for the public to participate when the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) had to take its own decisions around the project. There was also a public participation process lead by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) that became a process allowing for public participation. These were not just possible, but the legislated process which would take place. At the time, the NERSA process was busy with its public hearings.

Localisation

The Nuclear Energy Policy of South Africa indicated that South Africa wanted to become self-sufficient in all the value chains of the NNB for peaceful purposes. This was an area that, as they were dealing with the programme, they were monitoring the market to understand the extent to which South African countries would localise.

Potential Syndicate of PIC

This was an issue that would be dealt with going forward, when the NNB went into the commercial phase. At this point, they would ascertain how the structures would be put together, bearing in mind the model accepted, the parties involved and the financing approach.

Programme Aspects as per RFI

All aspects played key and pivotal roles to enable DMRE to understand what the market offered. Localisation was very important, as they wanted to participate in the entire nuclear value chain. They wanted to industrialise South Africa. Local content needed to be in line with the policies and local infrastructure when projects of this nature were being implemented in the country.

Demographics of Local Companies Participating

He asked the team to reflect of this. This was an area they needed to assess closely as they finalised reports. They agreed it was an important element. Support for black industrialists, as per Mr Wolmarans’ question, was not only a policy prescript of nuclear energy, but also a prescript of South Africa. Going forward, further development of an energy policy would include a transformation strategy, which would assist and ensure addressing the localisation and participation of black industrialists, as per South Africa’s policy. DMRE would look into ensuring this area was active in the programme.

Academic Possibilities for Skills

When DMRE was busy with the nuclear project, there were various programmes whereby various professionals went into different countries to study nuclear engineering. Those initiatives were continuing to ensure DMRE was ready for NNB. In South Africa, there was quite an extensive academic programme for nuclear training. Various universities were offering degrees for nuclear engineering and nuclear science at postgraduate level. DMRE would also make sure they dealt with skills development. Skills development was being initiated, as this was a key area for capacity to host and takeover the programme as South Africa.

Water desalination

In DMRE’s view, they did not think desalination would not disadvantage inland provinces in terms of having the ability to host some of these nuclear power plants. Although nuclear power plants required much water for cooling and were located across the coast, some designs allowed for the plant to be located more inland, provided there was a cooling tower. It would thus not disadvantage inland provinces as potential sites could still be studied, especially for small modular reactors.

Plant Ownership

The ownership of the NNB plant, along with BBBEE compliance would be investigated further in future. What the Department demonstrated in the presentation was that they had studied various permutations as part of acknowledging that they were in a different space in terms of the strength of the balance sheet of the utility. In the final analysis, they would make a recommendation that would be the optimal ownership structure. For example, that government could own the plant without burdening the state with what was required. They would also look at possibilities with international benchmarks, along with what would be appropriate with South Africa. In terms of BBBEE, nuclear vendor companies were mainly international companies. As a result, their BBBEE status was an area that needed to be looked into extensively as the commercialisation process began especially how they would partner with black local industrialists and how they then would comply with requirements. When it came to BBBEE requirements, they wanted to make sure the NNB benefited South Africans, especially with localisations. With the multi-disciplinary team, they also had the Department of Trade Industry and Competition (DTIC) that was also part of the project. Development strategies also part of the programme localisation would be looked into and finalised going forward.

Mr Mbambo handed over to Mr Jeetesh Keshaw, Specialist: Nuclear Technology, DMRE to give input.

Demonstration to Commercialisation Timeframe

Mr Keshaw said that the criteria the DMRE applied were conservative. Many vendors might claim to have had a commercial plant, though the basic criteria were that: the plant needed to operate commercially and supply electricity to the grid within specification of what it was set to operate. It could take between two to three years to show this. Secondly, the plant needed to be sold as a commercial offering, to a binding offer, to a customer. For example, it might be a minimum of three years for a demo plant to become commercial and sold to a commercial customer.

On the suggestion that South Africa might be a ‘guinea pig’, Mr Keshaw said that innovation and ‘guinea pig’ were the same and there were two ways of looking at it. If they wanted to innovate and move forward as a country and continent, then they need to ‘bite the bullet’. They would not take the risk of being a guinea pig, because South Africa had vast experience in nuclear technology. South Africa was one of the pioneers in terms of developing radioisotopes for the international markets, and also in terms of converting reactors high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. South Africa was thus not a guinea pig in the nuclear space.

Follow-up discussion

The Chairperson first welcomed Prof T Msimang (IFP), who was new to the Portfolio Committee, before asking follow-up questions.

He asked Members to accept his apology for potentially confusing them, due to his difficulties as chair, which he wanted to be clarified. The first problem the Chairperson had was a principle matter. At the centre of the NNB was the principle of the Nuclear IRP process, which DMRE said that it would be at the pace and scale that the country could afford. It was sometimes easy to take things out of context. Was the ‘pace and scale’ comparative or absolute? For example, was it the pace and scale the country could afford, comparatively to something, or was it at the pace and scale to which an authority/authoritative decision deemed it affordable? This is why he apologised for potential confusion, because this needed to be clarified by himself as the Chairperson. He assumed at some point that the ‘pace and scale’ was comparative to other routes. He asked Mr Mbambo to clarify his confusion.

Secondly, in the presentation including the six-month period of license issuing, surely the rate or cost needed to be factored in? If something was going to happen beyond six years, it meant the Committee was making a decision whereby many, if not all of them, would be long gone in the decision-making process to Parliament. It would then become the responsibility of those taking decisions. If the licensing regime could change at any given moment, should they not please from the onset that there were certain things that needed to be confirmed, this is where ability came in. At the extent of cost implications, he needed definite confidence that if they took one action, including the questions of escalations, these were subject to the basis or progress and that it was important to remember other role players. This was also with the issue of public participation; NERSA was among these. If they followed this route, the entity concerned might be concerned by past losses made; how would they get certainty that an entity like Eskom would be able to meet some of its responsibility? In the Northern Cape, the site’s capacity had the potential to not deliver the required exercise, for example. Would he be correct if he said that at this stage, they were at an exploratory stage that would require close monitoring and, from time to time, would require close monitoring with proper space for a proper exercise to be conducted by the Committee? Some of the fact-finding missions were at a progress level.

Mr Mileham also made a follow-up. He agreed with the Chairperson in the clarity he was seeking. He was concerned that on the one hand, the DMRE had an approved policy document in the IRP, speaking to what procurement could take place at the time. In this document, there was no nuclear bill. The 2500MW NNB they were discussing in the meeting, from an exploratory or investigative perspective, was absolutely not a problem. However, as soon as they moved to procurement, it moved to the realm of contradicting the IRP. Mr Mbambo had been very clear that the ministerial performance agreement did hold the minister responsible for procuring 2500MW nuclear energy 2024. This was problematic because the IRP did not make provision for this.

On a second matter, if they were to pursue a new nuclear bill: should they not expedite the creation of high-level waste disposal at Vaalputs? In other words, it was projected that they would only be able to start disposing or storing high-level waste at Vaalputs from 2050 onwards. If this was the case, they should not be pursuing the NNB, because they were talking about on-site storage, risk of contamination and a whole lot of issues around this matter.

Regarding ring-fencing funds for nuclear waste disposal, he welcomed the DG advising the status of the Draft Funding Bill for Nuclear Waste disposal and when this would be tabled before the Committee. One of the issues raised was that as far as Eskom was concerned, the actual, physical money of R16.5 Billion for nuclear waste disposal did not exist. Not only was this a liability on their balance sheet, they also knew that Eskom was R480 Billion in the red. If they were to have to decommission Koeberg in 2024 because there was no life extension (for arguments sake) and they were required to dispose of the nuclear waste, they would have to find R16.5 billion that they do not have. Would they, as part of this process, ensure that the nuclear waste disposal liability was set aside in terms of hard investment cash? This would mean that every year they would need to put aside the money into an investment account to ensure the money actually existed and did not just reflect as a balance sheet entry that their operator reflected without being able to pay.

Follow-up responses

Mr Mbambo said that the Chairperson was correct in saying that they were at an exploratory stage, which was why they were providing a progress report to the Committee of the technical investigation they were undertaking to determine the feasibility of the NNB for South Africa as indicated in the IRP. As the Committee required, DMRE would update them on their progress. They indicated upfront that the Request for Information (RFI) was a non-binding process that sought to test the market appetite for the NNB, so that it could inform government and DMRE on the market thinking for the viability of the NNB.

There was a policy principle that nuclear energy was part of the energy mix, as contained in the IRP 2019. South Africa had been using nuclear power for more than 30 years, which was being generated at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (WC). It was therefore part of the energy mix and provided clean, base-load power, which the country required. As they went forward, they were going into a just transition, where they were trying to reduce their carbon footprint. The IRP had identified that nuclear energy should be part of the energy mix. They would require clean energy sources and Nuclear Energy provided this base-load. The next question was about how and when this could be done, especially whether the country could afford it at the pace and scale. This investigation would be to understand the possibilities in the market. For example, could it be financed by the balance sheet of the state, the balance sheet of the utility or off the balance sheet of the state through innovative financing methods? The team found that in the international market, by the different companies, there were possibilities that the programme could be financed outside the balance sheet of the state. All of this, however, needed to be thoroughly investigated and weighed in terms of pros and cons and what the state would want as the appropriate mechanism to deploy the NNB. The risk they were facing as a country was that after 2030, when the country would commission 2500MW of electricity, there was a need for the country to start the preparation for power plants, recognising that nuclear was a long-term technology. Other base-load technologies, such as clean coal technologies, were also relevant, with other technologies the county was committed to – as contained in the IRP. This was a source that required much preparation, especially so that when other plants were decommissioned, the nuclear power plant could be commissioned to the grid and could generate electricity for the country to secure energy supply.

He said that the Chairperson was also correct about the cost of the project. At this stage, DMRE was not stipulating the cost of the project. Various stakeholders were carrying out their functions and regulator performances – these were key state entities. These roles would further be defined and determined in future from a cost and country preparation; they were not yet at this stage. Rather, they were providing a progress report of the market response.  Nuclear, in its nature, was a long-term project that required government support to be closely monitored. They were at a non-commercial binding stage, where they were still investigating the feasibility of the project and not yet procuring services. Looking into the IRP, there was no nuclear in the tables, though the Committee needed to recognise that the IRP contained nine decisions that were being implemented at various stages. Decision number eight spoke precisely to the 2500MW, which meant preparation needed to be started as early as possible to ensure that post-2030, the nuclear plant could come online. It took six to ten years to construct a nuclear power plant. This was why it was important to start preparations now. Many decisions that would inform the pace and scale the country could implement could only happen once the market and possibilities, etc., were tested. The nuclear liability was part of the bill that put forward various mechanisms to deal with nuclear liability and was at an advanced stage with preparations; it was taken forward for consultation with Parliament and Cabinet.

On the importance of accelerating investigation work on high-level radioactive waste, he said that this was a correct and important approach. NRWDI was responsible for undertaking this. This did not mean there was no solution at this moment. They would look into deep geological disposal in the long term. As they prepared for the work, all state entities would be capacities to ensure they could execute their mandate.

The Director-General of DMRE, Adv. Thabo Mokoena, added to the response. DMRE had consulted with Cabinet, which gave comments. The matter was with the state law advisor, after which inputs would come back to Cabinet and then broader public consultation. On other stakeholders, he added that Eskom was keen to participate. The modalities would be worked out during the process. The provision of the 2500MW in the IRP was a massive infrastructure project. They were starting as early as now. The performance agreement of the Minister (2024 deadline) meant simply that the construction of the successful bidder would need to commence post 2024. Post 2030, they would make the necessary provisions indicating that 2500MW would come into the creed by a stipulated date. All these modalities would be worked out. NERSA had been engaged along with a public consultation process that was starting. An infrastructure project of this magnitude needed to be with society at large. The principle issue of the IRP process meant that the pace and scale would be dealt with in an orderly and systematic process of procuring the 2500MW of nuclear power. 

The Chairperson said that he had seen processes of Parliament, which at times, departments made to seem as if the delay was with Parliament. He trusted that when the funding bill returned, there would be sufficient time to decide how they handle the bill according to the processes of Parliament. In light of the presentation, the Chairperson suggested they agree that it was still work in progress and not finalised. The Committee would monitor developments as they took place and find a way to put it into consideration of its programme. If Members allowed, the Committee should factor a way for it to be necessary for Members of Parliament to consider opening up to NERSA’s view on the process; also to understand the attitude on the process of Eskom too, in order to ensure they had all the necessary information as they continued the process. When they pleaded the case, his main worry was that the budget would tell them whether what was being taken was possible in relation to what was in the coffers. In the final analysis of making an informed decision, it was important to develop an understanding of the projection that might be necessary for them to participate. The only problem was if they did not have enough resources. There was no question on the role of nuclear (for peaceful purposes) and the role of South Africa in nuclear. Yet experience has shown that some projects are presented and down the road things change. At least they had further information and knowledge on the science of the NNB plan. He asked Members if they had an agreement on this, to consider adding other entities in order to understand their take in the consultative process.

Mr Wolmarans was in agreement with the suggestion.

The Chairperson took it that Members agreed as ‘silence meant consent’.

Consideration and adoption of meeting minutes

The Committee proceeded to the minutes of 02 December 2020 and the minutes of 10 February 2021.

Both minutes were adopted with reminders about resolutions. A reminder was given on the resolution, as DMRE had promised deliverables (information from the Department by 14 January 2021) but the Committee Secretary indicated that nothing had been received from the Department since December 2020. The Secretary said that she would check what was the information requested.

Specificity in minutes was key. The information was about an update on a site with regards to the closing of one of the mining shaft (illegal mining), as requested by Ms Phillips. The information was not received.

DMRE committed to correcting this. They said they would send this to the Committee.
The Chairperson thanked the Members, support staff and all the Department delegates for attending the meeting.

The meeting was adjourned.