SAPS 2019/20 Budget: Programme 2, 3, including DPCI, 4 and 5, with the Minister

Meeting report

Opening remarks

The Chairperson invited the SA Police Service (SAPS) delegation to begin by responding to questions left unaddressed in the previous Committee meeting.

The National Commissioner of SAPS, General Khehla Sitole, responded to a question regarding the status of homeless people in Tshwane. Charges related to an attempted murder of a homeless person. The police were supposed to investigate sufficiently in order to place the case on the roll. The court was unable to place the case on the roll in the finalisation of the investigation and as a result, when the mandatory period of eight hours passed, the suspect had to be released. The suspect was then identified by another witness for a second attempted murder of another homeless person and was rearrested. The first case was also placed on the roll by the court. The suspect was taken through court and bail was successfully defended and the suspect was in custody. Analysis was underway to link the suspect to the murders. If positive links were determined, the suspect would be treated as a serial killer, but this had not been finalised.

On the question regarding the current status of non-statutory police force members, firstly, the project for non-statutory forces was still a part of the transformation plan of SAPS.  There had been an implementation plan. By the time the matter had been taken to court, the organisation was prepared for implementation because it had already been responding to deadlines. Then court interdicted SAPS from proceeding with the implementation. SAPS had not yet reached an outcome stage with the court but the implementation plan from SAPS was ready. Beyond the court, the organisation would have direction as to the continuation of the implementation.

A question had been asked about what measures were being taken to improve the morality of personnel. The value statement of the turnaround vision was a starting point. One of the points from the value statement was that the organisation was performance-driven and therefore good performance would be acknowledged, rewarded and celebrated. The organisation would develop a rewards strategy for this. One of its key dimensions was the annual Excellence Awards. All members participated and were rewarded. The ceremony was convened by starting in each province and built up to national level. Any small achievement of members needed to be acknowledged. A third dimension of the rewards strategy was monetary and non-monetary awards. Any SAPS member could apply to the committee that oversaw this at any stage. Bronze, gold and platinum certificates were awarded for non-monetary awards. Monetary awards ranged up to R30 000.

Secondly, a promotion process was under review. A new model was being examined that could be used to acknowledge and motivate members.

Lastly, part of the motivation was to provide members with the tools of trade and training necessary for their particular fields. As National Commissioner, Gen. Sitole was moving around the country on a vision road show to make sure that members shared the vision and understood it.

There were two methods of policing – basic and operational policing. Basic policing was a 24-hour sustainable policy. Operational policing was a high-density deployment approach based on targeted geographical areas. SAPS needed to be able to do basic policing throughout the country, especially since operational policing was extremely expensive. Basic policing was a cost-effective policing method that needed to be moved towards. Currently around 80 percent of policing was based on operational policing and SAPS was trying to phase this out.

Gen. Sitole moved to clarification regarding SAPS’ firearm losses and re-clarification of targets. SAPS agreed with the Committee in that it wanted the target to reach zero. Recovery of lost firearms sat at around 7000 firearms. Of these, 300 were found to be police firearms. 300 of the 800 police firearms lost in the financial year had been recovered at a rate of 40 percent. This meant that increasing this to a higher percentage was doable. SAPS was reviewing the targeted approach as it understood the implications regarding public confidence.

On the further clarification of the use of intelligence to reduce drug-related crimes, the response to crime in terms of the Annual Performance Plan (APP) was on a per programme basis. A more detailed response to intelligence-related matters would be presented in the forthcoming Programme Four. SAPS had a process whereby it generated transnational intelligence exercises for drugs crossing into the country. One example of such interventions was the heroin corridor from Zambia via Mozambique into South Africa. Within South Africa there was intelligence cluster coordination across National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC) members with SAPS. These dealt with strategic and tactical intelligence in support of the Drug Master Plan. There was also a SAPS departmental Master Plan. At local level there were local drug action plans. To enhance these responses, Gen. Sitole had issued a directive regarding the restoration of intelligence at police stations through the reinstitution of the CIO function. This dealt with tactical intelligence at police station level to make them self-sufficient.

General Sitole then dealt with the confirmation of the domestic information of the domestic violence register. What was in place was a weekly inspection of the domestic violence registers by officers at the police station level. The use of the domestic violence register was in place, but shortcomings remained. One challenge was the use of consequential management shown by the ‘reprimand approach’ used in domestic violence matters. There was a continuous exercise to force stations to use the domestic violence register.

On the breakdown of the SAPS-related corruption and criminal departmental investigations, the breakdown would be dealt with in depth in Programme Three to follow. The information that SAPS did not have would be submitted to the Committee by means of a report.

Gen. Sitole also pleaded to the Committee in terms of understanding and working with SAPS. Firstly, the type of plan SAPS was presenting – the APP – was a plan “rolling on the Strategic Plan”. The Strategic Plan addressed long term, strategic priorities. The APP was the execution of the strategic priorities. Below this, there was the Operational Plan which was where the operational business took place. Underneath this were the action plans in terms of the various environments. When Committee Members asked for operational detail, it would not be in these plans as they lay in other plans. Gen. Sitole suggested that at another stage SAPS be given the opportunity to present the Annual Operational Plan as part of the Operational Detail. Once this was done, SAPS would ask the Committee for a closed session as the information would be tactical in nature.

The Chairperson thanked the SAPS delegation and noted that many of responses applied to Programme Two and Programme Three; Visible Policing and Detective Services, which would be detailed in the day’s Committee proceedings.Members were asked to keep this in mind so as not to repeat the same questions.

Programme 2: Visible Policing (Border Security and Specialised Interventions)

Gen. Sithole said Programme Two took up nearly 50 percent of policing and was a very wide programme. Matters where SAPS would need the support of the Committee would be put up front.

Programme Two was based on the Basic Policing Model. There were three dimensions to this Model. One was Strategic Policing. Under Strategic Policing was where SAPS said the police could not fight crime alone, requiring the integrated approach and multidisciplinary collaboration, needing cooperation of other government departments. It was the Programme where SAPS did root cause analysis. Out of root cause analysis, if a particular discipline did not remove the root causes, then the crime would continue to take place. For example, criminals were using root cause opportunities in order to invent new modus operandi. Until the root cause was removed, the modus operandi would continue to sustain itself. While police could chase the related crimes, the modus operandi would continue. This was why SAPS needed the cooperation of other departments in order to operationalise the strategic policy.

There was also a Community Policing Strategy which mobilised the community. There was the Youth Crime Prevention Strategy which mobilises young people to help them from being perpetrators and victims of crimes. There was the traditional policing concept which mobilised traditional leaders in crime prevention. There was also a spiritual environment mobilisation dimension through spiritual crime prevention.

Stabilisation and normalisation required mass community mobilisation in order to achieve. Another dimension of innovative policing was where modus operandi analysis took place. This would provide reports on new methods applied by criminals in the future. There was also a modus operandi counter strategy to combat the matter of SAPS chasing the crime rather than the method. This had led to the establishment of a functioning Modus Operandi Centre.

Academics and researchers had also been mobilised under the Concept Vision Centre.

There was also a Back to Basics Programme.

Gen. Sitole thanked the Committee for its support in advance and handed over to the Component Head: Strategic Management, Major General Leon Rabie, SAPS Component Head: Strategic Management, to proceed with the presentation.

Hierarchy of Plans: Implementation of the Strategic Direction

The strategic and annual planning of SAPS provided direction to what SAPS planned and included in its planning processes. First reference was to the regulatory requirement as a department, where SAPS had to consider the inputs from government in terms of what the priorities were and what was included in government's Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), as well as the National Development Plan.

There were also inputs by the Portfolio Committee on Police. This needed to be considered an annual analysis basis. Also, in each MTSF, SAPS was required to develop and implement a strategic plan. This was informed by the strategic direction of government. What was critical was that the 2019 year was to a certain extent, abnormal, relevant to the previous years because there had been a delay in the submission of SAPS’ APPs. And currently there was no final MTSF for government from the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME). SAPS were currently consulting the relevant departments and had been provided the month of July to keep inputting those priorities that had been identified for SAPS. The priorities in the MTSF for broader government were currently being informed by the National Development Plan, and the commitments that were made therein. Once SAPS had considered those relevant factors, the inputs would be made.

The Chairperson interjected to say that the Committee did not have the relevant section of the presentation.

Maj, Gen. Rabie said that SAPS would provide it to the Committee.

The hierarchy of plans in the SAPS organisation were as Gen. Sitole had indicated. Firstly, there was a strategic plan stretching over the MTSF. This overarching plan was supported by strategies and high-level plans within the organisation of which General Sitole had highlighted. Specific details could be found within this detail by the priority plans. SAPS’ APP meant that it had to, in terms of parliamentary requirements, table APPs highlighting the key focal areas. Moreover, this included information on spending areas as well as areas that would be specifically reported on. 

At the business unit level were detailed annual operational plans that detailed what needed to be done, the timeframes associated thereof and the responsibilities of actors in order to do so. This flowed into the individual agreements of managers and members within SAPS. Therefore, as the priorities started at the top, they were unpacked in more detail as they descended into the planning hierarchy and ended up into individual agreements where individuals could be held accountable.

Programme 2: Visible Policing  

As Gen. Sitole had indicated, there was a specific focus on visible policing and associated programmes. This would be followed by Programme Three and the detective service environment.

Programme Two focussed on discouraging crimes by providing proactive and responsive policing to reduce levels of priority crime.

Expenditure Estimates

The expenditure estimates for Programme Two were dealt with by the SAPS Divisional Commissioner: Financial Management and Administration, Lieutenant General PP Dimpane.

Programme Two was divided into four sub-programmes in terms of funding. These included: Crime Prevention, Border Security, Specialised Interventions, and Facilities. The 2019/20 expenditure estimates had increased by sixth and a half percent.

Crime Prevention consisted of Rail Police, K9 Units, Mounted Police, Youth, Children and Gender Based Violence, Flying Squad, Detained Persons.

Border Security included Ports of Entry.

Specialised Interventions consisted of the Special Task Force, National Intervention Units, Tactical Response Teams, and Public Order Policing.

Facilities consisted of provision of municipal services, leases, and accommodation charges.

Crime Prevention

Specific performance areas that had been identified within Programme Two: Visible Policing were dealt with by Maj. Gen. Rabie.

The first sub-programme was crime prevention, focussing on the indicators included in the performance tables of SAPS. SAPS would report on a quarterly and annual basis to the Portfolio Committee as well as other oversight bodies.

The first indicator related to revitalising strategic partnerships. As Gen. Sitole indicated, this related to the role of communities and entities within the business sphere. SAPS needed to optimise involvement in the prevention of crime and the target had been set that SAPS would identify and sign memoranda of agreement with strategic partners.

Over the medium term, SAPS would establish and sustain these partnerships with a broad range of stakeholders informed by the key elements of SAPS’ strategic direction. SAPS was testing the performance indicator in the current financial year with the intention that once it confirmed that it contained all the relevant and required performance information available, it would be included from the next financial year as part of SAPS’ performance targets.

As far as crimes were concerned, SAPS was reporting on different categories of crime. SAPS primarily reported on community reported crimes that fell in the ‘serious’ category of crimes. Sub-categories included contact crime, contact-related crime, property-related crime, and other serious crime. The category that had specifically been highlighted by the President and Minister of Police, Mr Bheki Cele, was within the contact or violent crime category. Here, SAPS had identified specific commitments that needed to be achieved over the medium term.

Included here as part of violent or contact crime categories, were crimes against women and children. Specific focus was on reporting crimes that were of a violent nature. Specific targets had previously been set in terms of reducing crimes against women and children, with regular progress reports being made to the Committee. During SAPS’ last engagements with the previous Portfolio Committee, SAPS had identified a possible problem in that there may be contradictory indicators in this category.

On one side was the commitment to address the reporting of crimes through awareness campaigns, engagement with communities and informing them and asking that they report violent crimes. This could have an impact on the actual reporting of related crimes which would create a sense of increased incidences of crimes within such categories. This contradicted SAPS’ other commitments to reduce crimes against women and children. In this regard, the decision had been made to continue reporting on the trends in the APP, still focussing on reducing incidents of such crime, but being sure to make clear the report was not contradictory in nature but rather as a statistical indicator. Previous targets in this category had been to reduce crimes against women by 11.9 percent, while crimes against children by 5.57 percent.

A third indicator and focus area was on drug-related crimes. SAPS had set targets in the past to increase the identification of crime and drug-related crime. One of the aspects that had impacted SAPS’s efforts to address drug-related crimes was the recent court outcome regarding the use of cannabis. As a result, given the proportion of drug use related to cannabis, there had been a significant drop in reported figures as SAPS could no longer arrest individuals for this form of drug use. SAPS therefore had the intention to establish a new baseline concerning drug-related crimes (particularly possession of and dealing in drugs) moving forward. 

In terms of statistical indicators of the actual quantities of drugs seized, such as cannabis and cocaine, the cannabis figures related to quantities seized that were still termed to be illegal and cannabis related crimes. SAPS would continue reporting on the seizures and recovery of cocaine, crystal meth, heroin, and mandrax. What had proved to be problematic in the past was that by setting targets associated with certain years could be distorted by variations caused by large-scale seizures in certain years. As drug availability varied according to external regional and global factors outside of SAPS’s control, it was not possible to guarantee consistent seizure numbers in forthcoming financial years based on previous recorded figures.

Rather, the statistical indicators would be used to report the actual numbers associated with different drug categories, rather than primarily informing seizure targets. It would be guided by targets in terms of SAPS operations and the quantities they would seize.

Implementation of Sector Policing

Implementation of sector policing had been prioritised in both the current and previous MTSF periods. As far as the implementation of sector policing was concerned, SAPS had reached a level of maturity where it had already implemented sector policing at all police stations that had been identified. The intention was to continue reporting to oversight bodies on the percentage of stations where sector policing had been implemented.

SAPS was targeting 875 police stations to implement sector policing. SAPS wanted to maintain 95 percent of those identified stations over the medium term.

Strategic Indicators

Strategic indicators were high level indicators included in the high-level plan of SAPS. The first related to reports of serious crimes. Targets would be reviewed and published in an addendum based on new directions provided by the Presidency.

In terms of the broader category of serious crime, SAPS had committed to a two percent reduction per annum. General Sitole’s directive was that this two percent commitment that was reflected would only be applicable until the end of July in the current financial year. SAPS would then submit the addendum based on the new inputs and targets provided by Minister Cele and the President once SAPS had recalculated.

The State of the Nation Address (Sona) had targeted a 50 percent reduction in violent crime over a ten-year period. Violent crime was a sub-category of serious crime, meaning the changed targets relating to violent crime would influence the targets associated with serious crime as part of the overall category.

The next commitment was the percentage of police stations where there would be functional Community Policing Forums (CPFs) according to the guidelines that had been implemented by SAPS. In the past, the target was 99 percent of police stations needed to have functional CPF’s. In the previous financial year, this had been calculated from the number of police stations being 1 143. Currently SAPS had close to 1 151 police stations. This meant that there were police stations where SAPS was unable to implement CPFs due to, for example, sparsely populated areas where stations were found. Such factors made it difficult for SAPS to implement properly-functioning CPFs. This did not mean such stations were exempt from the Rural Safety Strategies and other interventions identified by SAPS.

Specific Annual Targets Related to Programme 2

The first category to be reported on was contact crime. This had been referred to in the Sona as violent crime, but these were the same category. The targets that SAPS sought to achieve was to reduce contact crime by two percent over the medium term. As previously indicated, SAPS would have to reconsider that target and align it with the direction set by Sona which would then be published in the addendum.

The direction that was provided by Gen. Sitole in terms of applicability of targets was the same in this case, where the targets remained valid for the month of July 2019 but would then be recalculated. As far as contact crime was concerned for the purpose of the Committee, SAPS would have a more detailed presentation on contact crimes including murder, assault, sexual offences, and attempted murder.

When looking at second category contact-related crime, it included two types of crime: arson, and malicious damage to property. This also had the target of reduction by two percent over the over the medium term.

The third category was property-related crimes. Property related crimes included house break-ins, motor vehicle thefts, etc. This also had the target of reduction by two percent over the medium term.

Other serious crimes included fraud and general theft. This also had the target of reduction by two percent over the over the medium term.

In terms of the new performance indicator, up until this point, SAPS had been reporting to the Portfolio Committee and other oversight bodies on the main category of crimes and then the sub categories. SAPS had now introduced new indicators that referred to the 30 high crime rate police stations to provide a sense of the impacts and progress being made on crime levels in such high crime areas. The target set was a two percent reduction at these police stations. Addressing the levels of crime at these stations would have a significant impact on general crime levels.

There would also be focus on sub-categories at these high crime rate stations. Reduction of contact crimes would be influenced by the new strategic direction and the two percent reduction target would change. The high crime rate stations would be reviewed continuously. Despite increased priority given to stations in Gauteng, there had been increases to the number of stations to be included.

The next performance indicator contributing to reduction of serious crime was the recovery of lost and illegal firearms. In the previous financial year, there had been a significant number of illegal firearms and the target that SAPS had for the 2019/20 financial year amounted to 5 404. The recovery of illegal firearms stated included police firearms, not only privately-owned firearms.

In terms of the number of SAPS-owned firearms, in the 2017/18 financial year, 358 firearms had been recovered. The target was set to increase by 10 percent in the current financial year.

The next focus area was the recovery of stolen and lost vehicles. In the 2017/18 financial year, SAPS had recovered a total of 27 747 vehicles. The estimated performance for the 2018/19 financial year was to increase to 36548.

Escape from police custody was a revised performance indicator. The target that had been set was a reduction in the number of incidents by 2 percent per annum.

The finalisation of firearm licenses where SAPS had responsibility to administer the firearm application process and review targets, came with a target of ensuring 90 percent of new application were finalised within 90 working day. In the 2017/18 financial year, SAPS had achieved 78 percent.

Another indicator was to enhance quality service delivery and responsiveness. This was measured using Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie designations. Alpha complaints included incidents in progress, where the suspect was on the scene and SAPS needed to respond immediately. The national average target response time for Alpha crimes was: 17 minutes and 37 seconds. Bravo complaints were where a crime had been committed by the suspect but the suspect was no longer on the scene. The national average target for Bravo complaints was: 21 minutes and 28 seconds. Charlie complaints included incidents where there had been an attempted crime and the suspect no longer remained. The target was set at 19 minutes and 13 seconds.

Another indicator referred to victim friendly services. Maj. Gen.  Rabie used this to illustrate how indicators linked to the strategic direction. The Sona had specifically highlighted the need to improve provision of services to victims in vulnerable groups. This specific direction informed victim friendly service indicators. The target was that 100 percent of police stations needed to be compliant with two of the three sets of criteria relating to the establishment of victim friendly facilities. Where there was insufficient accommodation, some stations had off-site victim friendly facilities in another building in the town in some cases.

The next indicator referred to implementation of the SAPS Rural Safety Strategy. These were part of the strategies referred to by Gen. Sitole. Approximately 883 police stations in the 2018/19 financial year were classified as either rural or urban-rural mixed and these were what the Rural Safety Strategy focussed on. This excluded urban areas and metros specifically. SAPS had targeted 865 stations for full implementation of the Rural Safety Strategy set criteria for the 2018/19 financial year. This included launching regular operation to address crimes, compilation of a rural safety plan, and regular engagement with local farming communities. 

Community outreach programmes that had been conducted during the 2017/18 financial year had included 88 community campaigns, 24 national campaigns, and 65 presidential campaigns. This had exceeded the set targets. Many of these strategies targeted vulnerable groups and SAPS was encouraging these communities to report crimes against them.

In terms of school safety programmes, SAPS partnered with the Department of Education. SAPS targeted 1 300 schools per annum. This was cumulative. The target set when the safety programme was initiated was 50 000 schools within the safety programme. This entailed collaboration with identified schools, establishment of mechanisms for engagement with learners, school boards and school management on matters related to school crimes. It also included launching and implementation of appropriate projects identified at the schools. SAPS was required to conduct meetings on a quarterly basis as a minimum in order to report on progress in these matters.

Border security and specialised interventions

Border security and specialised interventions included Operational Response Services (ORS).

The first matter related to effective border security management and identified crime-related “hits”. If a potential hit was identified on the enhanced movement control system, SAPS needed to respond to these. Intention was that all identified hits would be responded to.

Profiled vehicles, containers and cargo consignments identified for smuggling illicit drugs, firearms, stolen and robbed vehicles, smuggled persons, and counterfeit goods and contraband had a target of 100 percent of profiled vehicles and containers being searched.

Crowd management targets included all incidents identified that required SAPS to respond to with the dedicated capability for this purpose needed to be responded to.

High risk incidents involved the specialised capabilities of SAPS requiring the special task force. The target was to continue responding to all incidents identified over the medium term.

In terms of protection of valuable and dangerous government cargo, ORS had the responsibility to provide the necessary protection for cargo classified accordingly. The medium-term target was set to continue without any incidents.

The Movement Control System (MCS) and Enhanced Movement Control System (EMCS) contained two categories: the screening of wanted persons crossing ports of entry and screening stolen vehicles which related to profiling vehicles, containers and cargo.

Police incidents of a security nature which required specialised intervention included the National Intervention Unit (NIU) and Special Task Force (STF) were specialised competencies that responded to high risk incidents such as hostage situations or cash in transit scenarios. The medium-term targets were a 100 percent response to all incidents referred to STF and the NIU.

In terms of crowd management, these were categorised into peaceful or unrest crowd management incident situations. All incidents that required intervention for crowd management were responded to and this was a target to maintain.

This concluded Programme Two presentation with indicators and specific areas identified for the purpose of reporting to oversight bodies, as well as targets associated thereof. Maj. Gen. Rabie stressed that there would be restatements of performance as a result of the new direction provided by Minister Cele and the Presidency.

Discussion

The Chairperson noted that there were a number of overlapping questions. A number of questions on Programme Two had already been asked the previous day. She asked whether the Committee would allow Gen. Sitole to continue with the presentation of Programme Three before taking questions.

Mr A Whitfield (DA) asked for one round of questions specific to Programme Two’s presentation and that Members would not raise questions related to previous presentations. Immediate questions had been raised which would make it useful to continue with questioning.

Mr O Terblanche (DA) supported Mr Whitfield and wanted to finalise the section on Programme Two.  

Ms N Peacock (ANC) asked about ICTS technology systems within SAPS. How far was SAPS in preparing for the Fourth Industrial Revolution? The President emphasised decent job creation, yet the system was outsourced. Could the SAPS department look at insourcing by establishing an IT department and monitor it as a department? This would ensure confidentiality of the department’s system that would not be compromised.  In terms of community report crimes, it was indicated that in rural areas there were problems establishing CPFs - could SAPS establish sub-regional/zonally-structured CPFs using the SAPS establishment guidelines to accommodate zonal areas?

Ms Z Majozi (IFP) turned to Programme Two, slide one, asking who the stakeholders referred to were. Of these stakeholders, were any government departments involved? In terms of reduction of serious crimes, what types of induction workshops were there to instil patriotism? Communities would not collaborate with police without a patriotic sense of the police working for the love of their country. It started within the police stations to conduct police patriotism.  For the border security budget, many incidences of transnational drug trade led Ms Majozi to question whether this allocation was enough, particularly regarding drug and human trafficking. What were the detection methods used by SAPS at ports of entry and borders? Ms Majozi was encouraged by the Victim Friendly Services and the establishment of side offices. How did the police handle rape cases?

Mr HA Shembeni (EFF) asked about effective border policy management. What was being used for drug detection and searching of containers and cargos at the borders? Were there scanners, full-time canines, or CCTV cameras? In the case of wanted suspects, was there footage available to analyse them as well as fingerprints, for example?

Ms J Mofokeng (ANC) asked a question relating to the previous Committee meeting about fingerprints and whether SAPS was looking to improve biometric technology relating to the Fourth Industrial Revolution.  In terms of slide 94 and numbers of reported crimes against women and children, would victim friendly services be feasible in every police station keeping the SAPS budget in mind? SAPS had many untrained officers, improper screening and many who were abusers themselves. SAPS used to have a highly effect women’s forum. How would SAPS capacitate these victim friendly services? Female police officers would be better able to care and listen in such instances. Had satellite police stations been included in the total number of police stations listed in the presentation?

Was Sunnyside police station not considered a high crime station? Regarding stolen and illegal firearms and firearms handed over from communities, what were the numbers of firearms destroyed?

In terms of school safety, this could relate to misuse of firearms. It was the responsibility of polices officers in schools.  What was the role of Metro police in school safety? Could they be asked to participate?

Mr K Maphatsoe (ANC) asked about the transport of detainees and escapees in court or police stations. This implied insiders or simple negligence within SAPS. How did this relate to the responsibility of Correctional Services?

Ms MA Molekwa (ANC) asked about the matter of police stations and criteria which the department used to determine provision of police services to communities. There were challenges with rural areas with large populations but only one or two police stations to serve them. These were in high crime stations in the North West and Limpopo province. Ms Molekwa suggested looking into the deployment of mobile polices services at areas without stations.  In terms of community outreach programmes, to what extent had it reached those it targeted? It was important to have an impact on the affected victims, particularly women and children. Information needed to be accessible to those who needed it. Vulnerable communities needed information and to be educated on how to report such crimes through outreach programmes.

Mr Terblanche said that SAPS had challenges with rollout of plans to ground level despite the impressive presentation. Mr Terblanche had spoken to officers on the ground that were not aware of such plans as the Operational Plan of SAPS. At police station level, what responsibility, if any, did Station Commanders have over the spending of their budgets in terms of manoeuvrability and funding approvals at national level?

Contact crimes response time was a challenge. This was a major ground level claim against the police that SAPS was not responding and needed urgent attention. In terms of the experience at police stations, Mr Terblanche felt the experience was unfriendly, unclean etc and this needed to change. In terms of sector policing indicators reflecting a 100 percent implementation, Mr Terblanche felt this was incorrect. There had been over a decade of rollouts, yet many stations did not have sector policing operating anymore due to insufficient human and vehicular resources in particular. This needed to be improved. In terms of estimates of performance, was the best that SAPS could do a 1-2 percent increase acceptable to the public?  In terms of management of crimes at the listed high crime rate stations, while it was a commendable effort for SAPS to combat high crime areas, the Constitution guaranteed equal rights to policing services regardless of whether one was situated near a high crime rate area or not.

Did SAPS have an approved rural safety plan in place? At the moment it seemed to be stuck at provincial office level. When would there be an approved rural safety plan and when would the implementation have an impact on reducing crime levels at farms and other rural areas such as villages? In terms of state-owned firearms, how difficult was it to remove serial numbers on police firearms? In terms of victim friendly centres at stations, these were a problem. Mr Terblanche asked for a commitment/indication of when the matter would be finalised.

Mr Terblanche asked about the findings of the Farlam Commission and how far SAPS was with implementation of the findings and compliance of this.

Mr Whitfield welcomed Gen. Sitole’s admission that SAPS could not fight crime alone and that crime prevention and combatting was a complex issue.  Mr Whitfield would be providing appeals in meeting going forward relating to the request from Gen. Sitole for more cooperation amongst departments, and that the Committee adopted an integrated approach by scheduling regular joint committees of the Security Cluster in particular, and where necessary, with the departments of Social Development, Health, and any other departments such as Transport, for example, that would serve the purpose of creating more integration amongst the departments at this level.

Mr Whitfield made reference to two indicators related to stolen firearms. What was concerning was that the number of identifiable stolen/lost SAPS firearms that were recovered did not include the numbers of lost/stolen SAPS firearms that were not reported.

When would the Committee receive the addendum? The Committee understood that the addendum spoke to commitments made in the Sona. Mr Whitfield stressed the importance of impact assessment and thus the Committee and SAPS would regularly receive interrogation of the structure of the indicators used to measure performance in order to ensure accountability. This would relate to inputs, outcomes and impacts. Many indicators did not deal with impact. This was also made difficult due to considerations of confidentiality.

Rural safety indicators did not measure impacts, only outcomes. There was no baseline that indicated what the number of serious or violent crimes committees in rural precincts were. This did not allow the Committee to interrogate whether the strategy had been effective in order to pursue accountability through detail unpacked.  Regarding the top 30 stations and reallocation of resources, if these efforts were to be successful, there would need to be redistribution of resources to the stations. What immediate steps were being taken to resource the top 30 police stations in order to reduce crime and therefore have an impact related to that allocation of resources? Resourcing these would reduce crime in order to have an impact. Regarding SAPS reaction times, the reaction time was getting longer over the medium term, not shorter.  Why was it the case that targets were being set lower than in previous years? This could be a resourcing matter, but SAPS could not set targets that would lead to a regression in terms of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).

Mr Whitfield was pleased to see new and progressive indicators in the APP. Going forward the structure of targets needed to be geared towards not just focussing on outcomes, but on the impacts in terms of achieving the President’s objective of halving violent crime within ten years.

The Chairperson said that Mr Whitfield’s questions were the exact questions that needed to be answered regarding achievement of performance indicators. Could SAPS explain if there had been any material findings on the performance indicators in terms of the Auditor- General’s report?

The Chairperson voiced concern that there seemed to be a reactive rather than proactive role in policing. Was this correct? How could SAPS move from reactive to proactive policing? Slide 111 of the presentation indicated 206 cargos - was this correct? Should it not be much higher considering that Ministers and Deputy Ministers fell under this category?

The Chairperson noted a concern that Commissioner Sitole would be involved in a min-mec the following day and proposed extending the current Committee meeting in order to finish Programmes three, four and five. Then the following day could deal with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), the Civilian Secretariat for Police Services (CSPS), and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID).

Gen. Sitole said that instructions had already been issued to the programme manager of programmes four and five to arrive in order to continue in this fashion.

The Chairperson thanked General Sitole and continued with responses.

Gen. Sitole said the question on the top 30 police stations including Sunnyside and resourcing criteria. Firstly, Sunnyside was not necessary a high crime rate station. Crime rate stations were a combination of high crime rate stations and hot spot areas. The criteria were derived from these profiles which determined stations with inflated profiles. These were dedicated police stations and following dedicated resourcing.  Stations in Rustenburg (North West), Riebeek (Mpumalanga), and Upington (Northern Cape) were also joining the trend as the fastest growing crime rate stations. Gen. Sitole pleaded with Members to require profile information when visiting stations. It was required that stations had a profile according to Basic Policing Instructions. Profiles of police stations were rapidly changing due to rapid changes to spatial development. SAPS was attempting to collaborate with municipalities and create links between municipal and station profiles. Information was not getting captured. Resourcing and intervention departments at SAPS were required to manage distribution. These followed dedicated resourcing and amongst them and had hotspots within them. These were where the crime profile was not big but when crimes did occur, they were classified as serious crimes. One example was Delft in the Western Cape.

SAPS did have an IT division. However, the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) Act had been raised by SAPS as a handicap to improving technology within SAPS and as a national security matter. Some of the terms of contracts SITA entered into compromised state security by allowing access to IT systems. It had been put to Minister Cele to try get out of the SITA Act. Gen. Sitole called for support from the Committee. The longer it continued, the more severe the damage became.

In terms of stakeholders, it began with departments. It was a requirement of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. There were key stakeholders that SAPS could not do without, such as the Department of Education, School Safety and Social Development.

In terms of moral fibre contamination, there was a challenge, particularly in that criminals were investing in the moral fibre contamination of society. This was done through initiatives such as sponsoring tertiary education of citizens in order to, for example, produce Advocates who defended criminals taken to court. Other examples included criminals buying groceries for citizens in order to undermine and take confidence away from the government by demanding protection from the police in return for the groceries. These areas could become no-go areas for police. This was why community policing became so important. Police induction on patriotism related to the SAPS Turnaround Vision. This was to create a crime free conducive environment for economic and social stability in order to support a better life for all. This related to SAPS being a team on a journey to a safer Africa and a safer world. Then there was the slogan of SAPS which was rendering selfless and patriotic service. Within this slogan there was a formal patriotic educational programme that had been initiated and the patriotic education programme was applied through the participative management corps. There was a junior management corps which spoke with the grassroots level. Then there was a middle and senior corps. The patriotic education was emphasised more on the junior side. This was being enhanced and intensified. There were also links with the community, especially in the singing of the national anthem. SAPS also always called for community discipline.

On the question related to community hand over of firearms, Gen. Sitole said there had been a recent mass firearm destruction in 2019. When firearms were handed over by communities, they were taken to SAPS stores in Silverton. Minister Cele had ordered SAPS to work on amnesty for another firearms handover and destruction process.

Involvement of metros in school safety relate to the SAPS Integrated Strategy which included school safety initiatives. Over and above school safety, SAPS had a school safety policy promulgated by government but there was no campus safety policy. SAPS had called for this to change with a campus safety summit to ensure it was dealt with together. Metros were supposed to submit plans to the Provincial Commissioner for ratification. More emphasis would be put onto school safety. Outreach programmes vis-a-vis targeted communities were key focal areas in the Community Policing Strategy. It had been decided that SAPS would bring the Performance Management System into it in order to look at the impacts of the outreaches.

Gen. Sitole had listened to the discussions of the Committee Members regarding the indicators used in the presentation and proposed that Members, when looking into the strategies, could also think of what indicators they would expect in order for these strategies to be effectively measured as SAPS was interested in the practical interpretation of the input indicators, the output, the outcome and the impact. Gen. Sitole agreed with Members that the majority of indicators did not stretch to outcome and impact.

Gen. Sitole also raised the matter of contradictory indicators for the Committee’s direction. One was crimes dependent on police action. There was an indicator for increasing the confiscation of drugs in the street. However, another indicator in the Operational Plan referred to cutting the supply of drugs. Large scale drug busts would cut street level supply and therefore could inhibit the ability to fulfil other indicator targets.

The SAPS vision compelled SAPS to align the Operational Policing Approach to Economic Growth, Radical Economic Transformation, as well as social protection and stability. SAPS needed the support of the Committee in these aspects. For example, economic business developments undertaken in crime hot spot areas without consultation with SAPS. This alignment matter spoke to the achievement of impact indicators.

On the question of police not knowing high level plans, Gen. Sitole had decided to lead by example and had been undertaking a vision road show across the country. This explained in detail what the vision was about, what was expected at police stations and what were the plans associated with it. Therefore, it was not a process that would be achieved in the short term.

Regarding the state of cleanliness in police stations, Gen. Sitole agreed it was a matter that needed to be addressed. It was a serious matter as it carried with it the image of government.

With sector policing and lack of resources, sector policing was not a resource intensive concept. It operationalised community policing. Therefore, it involved using current resources allocated to police stations to be used to assist SAPS to implement sector policing. However, it was a serious consideration that police stations be adequately resourced in order to do so. Sector policing was not seen as separate to resourcing.

In terms of the two percent reduction and setting of low targets, this reflected the reality to the Committee. Previous targets had been concluded and exceeded the resources required to achieve such targets. As a result, not following resource-based target setting led to overspending and involved Section 81 of Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and prescripts of the Auditor General (AG).

On the question of whether SAPS had an approved rural safety strategy, Gen. Sitole said there was a rural safety strategy and the Deputy National Commissioner: Policing, Lieutenant General SF Masemola, could elaborate.

Regarding findings of the Farlam Commission, Gen. Sitole asked the Committee for SAPS to be given the opportunity to submit a progress report.

On the question of changing from reactive to proactive policing, it was said that for SAPS to be proactive, it was required that it adopt a crime prevention approach. The secretariat had convened a summit to develop a national crime prevention framework. This would then be cascaded down to provincial and local crime prevention frameworks. Gen. Sitole had also spoken about the modus operandi analysis centre which made a demonstration on the 72-hour turnaround where most crimes were foiled in the planning stage before crimes took place due to modus operandi analysis - this was part of the proactive approach.

The Deputy National Commissioner: Asset and Legal Management, Lt. Gen, FN Vuma, answered the question relating to the dot-pin markings on firearms. Of the total number of SAPS firearms which were 246 186, there were 242 999 that were dot-pin marked. The remainder that were unmarked were so because of the firearm permit system maintenance contact which was not in place. This returned to the same matters regarding the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the reliance on the SITA Act. When SITA did not perform it affected SAPS.

Lt. Gen. Dimpane, Divisional Commissioner: Financial Management and Administration, answered the question on whether the border policing management budget was sufficient. Spending over the years had been within the allocation. However, due to more focussed attention on cross-border crimes meant that the 2020/21 budget would increase above inflation.

In terms of the family and children violent protection units, there was an allocation in Programme Two (proactive prevention units) and in Programme Three that would be seen in the following presentation. In this case, Programme Two related to proactive interventions that would be carried out.

The Component Head: Financial Management Accounting, Division: Financial Management and Administration, Maj. Gen. J Nelson, answered the question relating to police stations and the role of Station Commanders entrusted with budget allocations and manoeuvrability. SAPS had introduced the financial reporting structure which made provision for financial reporting on different levels. There was a responsibility structure wherein Gen. Sitole entrusted Station Commanders with a particular budget. This cascaded down to this level and could be managed within a defined financial framework.

A member of the SAPS delegation responded to the question surrounding the criteria for establishment of stations. Project commissioners would submit the user asset management plans that contained the priorities in terms of the construction of police stations. In other cases, this could be based on Committee demand. In the Access to Policing Services Strategy, Gen. Sitole had also touched on stations based on community demand. Three mobile contact points had been deployed to manage the situation in the North West. Establishment of satellite police stations were prioritised in order to ensure implementation of the Access to Policing Strategy.

On implementation of victim friendly facilities, there were two categories of police stations. Devolved police stations where custodian functions were devolved to the accountable officer of SAPS. Non-devolved police stations were totally managed by the Department of Public Works (DPW). With regard to the devolved police stations, all had victim friendly facilities within the station. To implement similar situations in non-devolved police stations, authorisation was first needed from DPW.

Gen. Sitole said that Olievenhoutbosch was not a satellite station, it was fully-fledged. It was also receiving attention as it was raised at provincial level by Gauteng, the same with Moretele police station.  

Lt. Gen. Masemola said the establishment of CPFs in certain areas of the country was underway. SAPS took note of the recommendations made by Members. The problem with those police stations was that most of the police stations referred to were farming areas with seasonal workers going in and out at certain times, but it had been noted.

On the question of how detection at borders and searching of containers took place, part of the question was more operational in nature and could be elaborated on in a closed session Committee meeting. There were scanners at some ports of entry, as well as movement control systems where biometric measure implemented by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) was being rolled out at all ports of entry. This would make the job of SAPS much easier. SAPS’s movement control system currently only used the passport system - the biometric fingerprint system would improve this.

The Rural Safety Strategy had been consulted with all the provinces but was in the process of being finalised in the financial year.

In terms of the 80 000 firearm applications, 80 920 was a number that had been finalised out of the total figure of 103 205. When it said “finalised” it did not mean that all applicants were granted firearm licenses, rather that the applications had been dealt with, either being approved or disapproved. Putting a target would be problematic due to the constitutional right to self-protection.

In terms of how SAPS dealt with the matter of escapes, SAPS undertook added enforcement measures during peak periods. If there was an escape, there was a specific team sent to the station in question to investigate circumstances surrounding the escape. Consequence management was implemented if any wrongdoings occurred. However, in most cases escapes were a result of infrastructure deficiencies, maintenance of which was the responsibility of the DPW. This was especially the case at the courts.

Gen. Sitole responded to the question relating to correctional services noting he engaged the National Commissioner of Correctional Services, Mr Arthur Fraser, and was working on an integrated plan which included prevention of escapes. There were challenges that both departments would have to deal with. For example, SAPS would arrest dangerous criminals and Correctional Services would be unable to absorb them, forcing them to be kept at stations. This spoke to the need for balancing of resources voiced by the Integrated Plan.

In terms of the goal of halving serious and violent crime within a decade, this was another aspect that required high level cooperation. Should SAPS arrest high numbers of criminals that could not be subsequently absorbed, it would be detrimental. The same applied with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Department of Justice. SAPS agreed to an integrated plan with the new Director of the NPA, Adv Shamila Batohi, which would be escalated to the cluster level.

Maj. Gen. Rabie responded to the questions raised in relation to target setting processes. In some instances, there were indicators that, when looking at previous years’ performances and the estimated performance and the current targets held by SAPS, did not reconcile. This was attributed to a number of factors which would need to be explained in detail in future presentations. One instance was the recovery of firearms. When looking at the set target, it appeared lower than the performance recorded in the previous or baseline financial year. In this case, in terms of the audit findings made, it was found there had been an overstatement of performance in that financial year as SAPS had taken a concerted effort during that specific year.

One of the other factors contributing to this was that the SAPS APP was submitted in three phases. Phase one was to be submitted by the end of August 2019. However, SAPS was still expected to submit targets working on three months of information. This complicated matters as accurate information was more difficult to determine. This became easier after nine months when submitting again in November/December. The protocol that SAPS followed was that if there was not accurate information, SAPS would revert to the target. SAPS was implementing measures for new estimates of performance indices.

On the question of when the addendums would be available, Maj. Gen.  Rabie asked that as SAPS had been given 30 days from the DPME to respond to their proposed targets as far at the NDP was concerned. SAPS would need to take this into consideration and then get approval. SAPS would be able to table the addendum targets by mid-August 2019 if this was acceptable.

In terms of why SAPS had set targets lower than previous performance, in some instances there had been an overstatement of performance in previous years, as well as the fact that the previous Committee had advised SAPS to revisit targets (specifically targets at the time within the detective service environment) and were realigned from being set too high.  Had there been material findings on indicators? The performance information had had numerous material findings over the years. SAPS implemented efforts to try and reduce this and there was a discernible difference. Improvements still needed to be made. There were problems in terms of material findings that would be clear when briefed by the Auditor-General. 

Gen. Sitole said that an initiative proposed by Committee members for a Joint Committee related to a proposal made to the Portfolio Committee on Police for inter-Committee intervention. It would assist SAPS in terms of mandate matters relating to overlapping priorities. For example, there were matters where SAPS was reporting to the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence. There was difficulty due to matters relating to national security discussed as per the requirements of the Strategic Intelligence Act. SAPS would then appear before the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and be questioned about the Intelligence Service budget which was not part of the PFMA. In addition to these two Committees, SAPS would also report to the Portfolio Committee on Police and thus be faced with differing demands and influences, leading to Gen. Sitole’s strong support for inter committee interaction to address overlapping priorities and performance indicators.

The Divisional Commissioner: Forensic Services, Lt.  Gen. LA Mangale, said there were biometric systems in SAPS primarily based on fingerprints. Particularly at borders and ports of entries, the biometric system allowed for interoperability between departments using the movement control detection system.

Mr Terblanche asked a question regarding the policing of trains, especially in the Western Cape. What did SAPS have in mind to address the matter?

Ms Majozi had comments and recommendations for the joint committee proceedings and agreed with Gen. Sitole that there was information SAPS was unable to disclose. This was why the question had been asked about stakeholders so that the Committee would know which indicators were functioning smoothly. In terms of Education and the Department of Social Development, these could be included with the Department of Economic Development as strategic stakeholders. This was particularly in relation to criminals sponsoring citizens’ tertiary education. The justice system needed Advocates and therefore there could be government initiatives that helped absorb students vulnerable to sponsorship at the hands of criminals. The Committee should engage other departments as a Joint Committee and deal with matters not related to operational processes but rather comparing and assessing KPIs in terms of making sure the indicators ensured accountability.  In terms biometrics, how did detection of non-South Africans at borders and points of entry work?

The Chairperson said that Ms Majozi’s question was a very operational question and would not necessarily be answered completely.

Ms Mofokeng asked that the first report of the provincial resource breakdown be made available to Committee Members.  She asked for a report on the police stations falling under the responsibility of DPW. Some were dilapidated, vandalised and incomplete. There was the challenge of DPW impacting on SAPS. Ms Mofokeng challenged Gen. Sitole on “what you call a police station” as Olievenhoutbosch was not, in Ms Mofokeng’s opinion, a fully-fledged station.

Mr TI Mafanya (EFF) asked about the matter of the integrated approach and root causes. In the particular departmental approach, could SAPS specifically identify which departments needed to be approached and the specific needs in terms of the analysis in how they were to be approached?

A lot of what had been said on paper in the presentation seemed convincing but this was different to the on the ground reality implementation. Implementation at junior level, monitoring and proper outcomes from findings in terms of the presentations was not as convincing as the planning.

Mr Maphatsoe supported comments made by Gen. Sitole in budgeting regarding SAPS ICT. A decision had previously been taken that the Security Cluster should move away from SITA. SITA delayed operations and members lacked security understanding of equipment needed for operations. The Committee needed to support a swift move away from SITA. Security needed to be prioritised. There needed to be protected procurement.

Gen. Sitole said on the policing of trains, he had personally attended a top-level meeting with the Passenger Rail Agency of SA (Prasa) team to discuss an integrated plan. Trains were subject to sabotage – this had an immediate economic impact. To achieve an integrated plan, Prasa needed to review its strategy. SAPS was also focussing more on policing of trains and railway Police.

SAPS needed assistance from all government clusters as it serviced all aspects of society. Higher priority / everyday impact departments included: Education, DSD, and Economic Affairs. The most adverse effect on policing was local government/municipal policy. Municipalities impacted extremely negatively on policing. This began with diversion. It required diverting officers from policing to management of public order. This involved additional capital costs. Once there was municipal stability and economic growth, these public order policing capital costs could be reduced. If service delivery continued to be inadequate, police would continue to be diverted to public order.

The Cabinet Lekgotla had introduced rural economies. This involved the Departments of Agriculture, Mineral and Energy. Illicit economies proved one of the largest threats to the grand economic strategy through illicit mining for example.

There were other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that SAPS was already working with, such as Business Against Crime (BAC) and SABRIC (SA Banking Risk Information Centre). They were not necessarily all required at the same time, but they were needed as per intervention and this was where the Committee’s assistance for mobilisation and understanding was important. The message that SAPS wanted to carry over was that security was the foundation for anything; building schools, development exercises or economic growth and this was the purpose of the alignment.

Gen. Sitole elaborated on SITA and the equally important policy imperative of Public Works. It was serious: physical security assessments at Parliament had been done in a report three years ago which had already suggested moving from a card-based system to biometrics. The National Key Points were urgent when likely to be attacked. There were vulnerable Eskom facilities in this regard. It was SAPS’s view that the budget should remain with the Security Cluster.

In terms of the building of stations, Minister Cele was negotiating with the Department of Defence who did their own buildings. The matter was SAPS renting from DPW. Crime Intelligence (CI) also had rented buildings that had been broken into. This required a policy change in a high-risk area.

Monitoring of outcomes would be worked on by SAPS. Minister Cele had instructed that a Monitoring and Evaluation be established within SAPS and an inspectorate division.

Lt. Gen. Masemola responded to the question of border security in cars. Normally people would exit cars and go inside to stamp passports. Biometric was beginning to roll out. The DHA started at ports of entry in Lesotho. Perpetrators of crimes would be picked up in the database. Non-residents would not be picked up in the database.

Programme 3: Detective Services

Maj. Gen. Rabie said that Detective Services were responsible for the successful prosecution of offenders by investigating, gathering and analysing evidence.

The expenditure estimates associated with Programme Three were presented by Lt. Gen. Dimpane. Programme Three had four sub programmes and took up 21 percent of the budget. The total Increase in the Programme allocation was 7.1 percent. The purpose of the Programme was to enable investigative work of SAPS.

Maj. Gen. Rabie dealt with the sub programmes within Programme Three.

Crime investigation

The presentation would not deal with DPCI conviction rates vis different categories of crimes as the DPCI would conduct its own presentation.

SAPS did not have control over conviction rates - this was the responsibility of the NPA and the courts.

For the total category of serious crimes, the conviction rate was 88.64 percent, targeted to move to 89 percent over the medium term. The conviction rate for contact crimes was at 81 percent and targeted to increase to 81.25 percent over the medium term. Conviction rate for crimes against women was 84 percent and targeted to move to 84.6 percent over the medium term. Crimes against children convictions were at 81.62 percent and the target was 82.25 percent over the medium term. Contact related crimes were at 87 percent and the target was 87.66 percent over the medium term. The conviction rate for property-related crimes was at 89.18 percent and the target was 89.31 percent over the medium term. The conviction rate for other serious crimes was 95.72 percent and the target was 95.92 percent over the medium term.  

Conviction rate was a comparison of guilty and not guilty to determine cases going through the court system, and what portion was found guilty or not and what was in line with NPA stipulations.

The violent conduct conviction rate was at 63.63 percent and the target was 64.05 percent. The percentage reduction in outstanding person to case forensic investigative leads was a new performance indicator and the target was 30 percent conviction rate over the medium term. The percentage reduction in contact crime case dockets older than three years was a new performance indicator and the target was 14.95 percent over the medium term.

The detection rate of serious crimes that had been solved, gone to court, withdrawn or found to be false or unfounded, was then expressed as a percentage of the total reported crimes. SAPS had less control over withdrawn cases.

Trial ready case dockets for serious crimes referred to the percentage of dockets that were currently in court system which were trial ready.

Criminal Record Centre

This section of the APP spoke to SAPS’s forensic capability. The first indicator related to the percentage of original pervious conviction reports generated and the targets associated thereof.

Discussion

Ms Mofokeng asked about SAPS not prioritising forensic training. SAPS had the skills available but was not focussing on developing more and attracting young people with the budget.

Looking at the number of withdrawn cases SAPS had dealt with, opening cases used resources and thus withdrawal of cases had an impact. How best could SAPS avoid repeated withdrawals? There needed to be an integration approach regarding protection orders. SAPS needed to collaborate with the justice system. Protection orders should be finalised on the system immediately. Abusers remained abusers and thus victims needed to be helped in terms of linking protection orders to one another and not withdrawing cases. People needed to be educated about protection orders and the Domestic Violence Act.

Mr Terblanche said the public was interested in the number of cases opened and successfully detected and convictions that took place. This section dealt with serious crime. The figures were not giving proper pictures of the effectiveness of detectives. 37 percent was not encouraging.  What would the total figure/situation of all cases reported and dealt with by detectives be? What was the caseload per detective? In terms of the police not having a role to play once dockets went to court, successful conviction was dependent on the quality of evidence and detective work. This meant SAPS did have a certain responsibility.

The criminal records centre had figures that were very encouraging. To what extent could it be said that the criminal records centre had captured all the information of crimes that took place related to criminal records to ensure a proper record centre? In terms of forensic laboratories, there was a huge challenge. The figures were positive. But was this the case? Mr Terblanche had heard about delayed cases that were awaiting incomplete reports. Training of people for the purpose of forensics was related to a skills drain. What was the current position and what was being done to secure retention of skilled people?

Gen. Sitole responded to budget related questions. It was raised with the Committee that the environment had a historical backlog of under budgeting. At a crime detection conference in 2018, Gen. Sitole issued a directive regarding review of the resource plan as result of the history of under budgeting.

In terms of withdrawal of cases, it was difficult for SAPS to blame women for withdrawing cases and it was discouraged. Officers chasing domestic violence victims away would be fired. The SAPS network 2018 conference approached Gen. Sitole to develop a gender strategy. After concluding the strategy, resourcing would be determined. Education and awareness was necessary for enhancement and sustainment of programmes related to this. Additionally, SAPS needed support programmes for victims to prevent abusers exploiting situations.

SAPS needed support from the Committee for review of bylaws. SAPS was working on a review with the Department of Justice. Around 40 percent of heist criminals were out on bail. Another more deadly matter raised with the Cluster was the bypassing of the appeals system by long-sentenced criminals. The bylaws needed to be coordinated.

The National Head: Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), Lieutenant General (Dr/Adv) Godfrey Lebeya, said that employment entry for forensics was at the level of a Warrant Officer. This was in attempt to retain scarce skills. There was also a scarce skills allowance available as an incentive. Most of the functions performed had other competing opportunities in the world and it was a challenge to keep up with these.

In terms of criminal records, legislation governed who should be in the criminal records database. Therefore, it was improper for SAPS to say who had perpetrated a crime – rather, it was within the framework of the legislation to say who had been convicted or accused of an offense. There were challenges and this was why one of the performance measurements was the reduction of backlogs. There were complex cases that needed lengthy finalisation.

Gen. Sitole added an acknowledgement of the environment. SAPS was serving almost all the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries with its forensic evidence conducted in South Africa. SAPS also conducted international forensic conferences. The Committee was urged to fight for improved funding to be able to continue this trend.

A member of the SAPS delegation from the Crime Detection Unit said that SAPS was discouraging the withdrawal of cases related to domestic violence. SAPS always pursued cases of perjury against conflicting statements.

In terms of low conviction rates, the docket would be at court by the time detection was conducted. Convictions were for financial years so the lengthy nature of detective work meant that cases would carry over.

In terms of the caseload for detectives, it varied by station. On average there were around 60 dockets on hand per Detective.

Gen. Sitole said there were suggestions relating to outstanding reports. These were blood sample reports and related to the Department of Health, not SAPS.

The retention strategy was under Human Resources and was specifically linked to forensics.  

Gen. Sitole clarified that Olievenhoutbosch police station was a fully-fledged station but was rented from the municipality. It was a station from the old era ‘nation states”. These required design changes but there were difficulties due to the rental component. A special work-study was commissioned to determine where a new station should be.

Programme 5: Protection and Security Services

Maj. Gen. Rabie said that Programme Five minimised security violations through protection of foreign and local prominent people and securing strategic interests.

Lt. Gen. Dimpane said that Programme Five consisted of four sub-programmes: VIP Protection Services, Static Security, the Government Security Regulator and Operational Support.

Maj. Gen. Rabie said that indicators associated with Programme Five were focussed on provision of static and in transit protection to VIPs. On a strategic indicator level was the percentage protection provided to VIPs in-transit and government installations. The target was zero security breaches. 50 percent of strategic installations needed to be audited annually.

All 217 National Key Points required evaluation.

There were two components in the Programme: protection and security service, which was the main division, as well as the presidential division where the head reported to Gen. Sitole.  

11 national key points were assigned to the presidential division and all 11 were evaluated.

Gen. Sitole said that it was a policy imperative that the National Strategic Policy on Protection and Security was advanced. The national standards on protection excluded municipalities and currently municipalities used their discretion for procurement of protection services (resulting in procurement of unvetted security companies).  

In terms of vehicle specifications, dignitaries chose the make of their vehicles. There were specification requirements for vehicles used to protect dignitaries stipulated by Protection and Security. These needed to be able to evacuate dignitaries as well as a fighting device if need be. Many vehicles did not meet this Treasury threshold; while most South African made cars met the threshold (such as the Toyota Fortuner or Jeep Cherokee) but were slower. Another challenge was computer tracking in German products which meant they could be shut down remotely via computer.

In terms of threat assessments, the explanation for the ad hoc protection was that all were eligible for ad hoc protection subject to threat assessment.

Types of buildings dealt with were strategic installations and National Key Points. A problem here was government departments entering into rent-to-buy contracts for these buildings. These came associated with security and protection service regulations stipulated by the owner of the building.

Discussion

Ms Mofokeng said that Gen. Sitole had scared her as the transport was clearly not safe. Fortuners and Jeeps for the police were not good as taxi drivers would steal engines and bypass locking systems. Criminals were using Mercedes Benz and BMW car and the police needed to match these.

On the matter of municipalities, it was a serious problem. Municipalities could not be treated separate but should be seen as equal public representatives. The oversight bodies over metros needed to crack down on protection services.

Ms Mofokeng also asked about security protection using motorbike escorts. Were the metros trained in the same way and were they safe?

Ms Molekwa commented on the matter of municipalities using their discretion. The Maximum Information Security Services document regulated security and ICT companies. The department needed to provide a mechanism for screening of security services at municipal level. These posed threats from private companies’ competence.

Mr Terblanche said Gen. Sitole explained the responsibilities were to the Committee. Mr Terblanche understood it was a necessarily-regulated environment.  Matters regularly raised regarding protection services from the layperson’s terms related to budget and high cost of protection associated with public officials. Dignitaries required protection, but it was necessary for balance in line with regulation and distribution of resources. Members of state needed to be protected but with balance in terms of the associated costs. In terms of visitation of important installations, were investigative personnel spread across country?

Mr Shembeni said that at national level matters, security was a non-negotiable matter. Anything and everything started with security. This was a priority matter for the Committee to deal with.

The Chairperson welcomed Minister Cele and said Gen. Sitole provided sound inputs and responses. Programme Four responses would be dealt with and then the DPCI.

Gen. Sitole said a precondition for freedom was security. The prerequisite to solving challenges was removing the policy handicap. There was need for a strategic policy connecting down to municipal level which would solve problems. Regarding the question of the use of motorbikes on protection service convoy routes, there were standard operating procedures followed. The budget for protection and security were all national security-related. This was in compliance with the Strategic Intelligence Act. This was not a public discussion. SAPS constantly examined the specificities of various protection tools but within the context of cost effectiveness.

South African-manufactured vehicle specifications were being examined. This spoke to sovereign control over technologies used, not necessarily Jeeps or Fortuners. SAPS wanted all such vehicles to be South African based equipment. SAPS looked to the Committee for support in pursuit of this motion. 

Lt. Gen. Masemola said that visitation, inspections and auditing of National Key Points were conducted from Head Office level. The reason for the 50 percent level was due to installations being evaluated every second year. In fact, 100 percent of work that was done was concluded. National Key Points were evaluated every year, while installations were evaluated every second year.

Gen. Sitole appealed to the Committee about spatial development control. Some National Key Points were pipelines. Spatial development control needed to be managed in such a way that they were not on top of pipelines spreading across provinces.

Programme: Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI)

Lt. Gen. Lebeya introduced the delegation from the Hawks which consisted of Maj. Gen. S Mosipi, the Acting Component Head Serious Corruption Investigations, DPCI, Brigadier J Surajbali, the Acting Section Head: Executive Support, Office of the National Head, DPCI, and Colonel LW Mampane, Head: Finance, DPCI.

Overview

The presentation focussed on a short introduction, the mandate, establishment and composition, background, overview of the workforce profile, overview of case workload, accommodation and challenges, setting the strategic direction, alignment of the 2019/20 APP with government priorities, performance indicators and targets of the APP, and the medium term expenditure framework of the DPCI.

The information was contained already in a larger report. There were pages that spoke directly to the DPCI that would be elaborated on.

Introduction

The purpose was to appraise Members of the Committee on the mandate, establishment and composition of the DPCI, the findings made by Lt. Gen. Lebeya since his appointment, the APP of the DPCI, as well as financial information.

Background

The DPCI came into existence through approval of the Police Amendment Act 57 of 2008. That was assented to by the President on 27 January 2009. On the 19 February, the President signed the coming into operation of the law that birthed the DPCI in 2009. Section 13 of the NPA Act was also amended to phase out the Directorate for Special Operations (DSO). Following 2009, the establishment of the DPCI and the contents of the said amendment were challenged in court and a Constitutional Court judgement ruled the Act was amended in order to provide adequate operational independence in 2012.

The mandate of the DPCI was informed by section 17(d) of the Police Act. Subsection one provided that the functions of the DPCI were to prevent, combat and investigate national priority offences identified by the National Head. The Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 also informed the mandate. If during the course of the investigation, evidence of any other crime was detected, the National Head of the DPCI could consider that to be in the interest of justice or public interest and could extend the investigation so as to include any offence expected to be connected with the subject of the investigation. In short, the mandate of the DPCI was defined in the Police Act focussed on national priority offences related to serious organised crime, crime requiring national prevention and investigation, or crimes requiring specialised investigation and intervention skills. These were referred to in Section 16(1) of the Police Act. The DPCI dealt with serious corruption, serious commercial crime and serious organised crime.

The establishment and the composition of the DPCI were directed by Section 17(c) of the Police Act as amended. It also provided that the national head of the DPCI shall manage the DPCI and control all members in terms of the Constitution as well as in terms of Chapter 6(a) of the South African Police Service Act, or any other applicable legislation. Leadership positions had to pass through Parliament and Cabinet before the Minister could appoint them. There was an allowance for other persons to be appointed by the National Head as well as legal officers and administrators for secondment from other departments. This would constitute the personnel within the DPCI.

Currently the DPCI was reflected under Programme Three: Detective Services. Section 17(k) of the Police Act, as amended, placed the obligation and provided that a separate programme for the DPCI be put in place. This was still to be affected.

The current structure of the DPCI was operationally divided into three operating environments: serious corruption investigations, serious organised crime investigations, and serious commercial crime investigations. There were other supporting environments to ensure these operational environments were able to carry out the mandate. These included the Priority Crimes Specialised Investigation Unit. There was the capacity to deal with financial investigation, assets for future investigation, and the cyber-related crime and digital forensic investigation. The Priority Crime Management Centre was one of the components that looked at priority offenses and drew a picture of what the associated threats were and assisted with other analyses to ensure investigators were empowered with relevant information. This was where telecommunications became involved relating to organised or repeated criminal activities. Support was also provided under HR, Executive Support, and Integrity Management had the obligation to ensure that DPCI personnel were constantly assessed to ensure they were beyond reproach. There was also strategic management, corporate communication, policy and standards. Those were the support sections within the DPCI.

Work was being undertaken on a new proposed structure that took the NDP into consideration. It was however approved at the incorrect level - it was supposed to be approved at the level of the National Head. It had already passed consultation with the Minister of Police and was in consultation with the office of the Minister of Public Service and Administration as required by the Act. The new structure took into account the creation of certain competencies informed by the Sona and certain provisions in the NDP 2030 (especially Chapters 7, 12-15). The new structure also considered government priorities and implementation constraints. These national and ministerial priorities included: violent crime, firearms and explosives, narcotics enforcement, fraud and corruption (JCPS, private and public sectors, municipal clean audits, foreign bribery matters), economically-protected resources (precious metals and minerals, wildlife trafficking), and cybercrime investigation. The DPCI also emphasised the need to capacitate forensic accounting investigation.

Subsequent to the closure of the DSO, certain DSO investigators and members, as well as members of the SAPS Organised Commercial Crime Division, as well as the high tech from Serious and Violent Crime, were put together to be part of the DPCI. The DPCI had taken on these competencies.

Upon Lt. Gen. Lebeya’s appointment in 2018 to conduct a fundamental assessment, orderly, pragmatic and sustainable changes were instituted based on the principles of Assessment, Implementation and Monitoring (AIM). There remained the need to re-engineer the DPCI. Through engagement with management and the various stakeholders and personnel in the relevant environments, it was decided changes were necessary. Among the challenges identified were: the incoherent organisational structure, high employee turnover rate, removal of some personnel from the DPCI into the greater Service and failure to implement Section 17(g) of the South African Police Service Act regarding the condition of service of the members. Outstanding implementation included Section 17(k) of the South African Police Service Act which dealt with the separate programme for the DPCI and identification of stagnation of investigation of cases where little guidance was provided by commanders. Accommodation matters were already mentioned by the greater Service presentations. There was also the poor performance management in terms of setting of targets and dealing with integrity and disciplinary matters and poor allocation of human and physical resources. Other challenges related to integrity matters, the manner appointments were done while inadequate implementation of the Act had adversely impacted on the attrition of the skilled workforce from the DPCI.

Workforce Profile

The workforce profile had declined since establishment. A work study had been conducted that suggested that in order to respond to the challenge, a fixed establishment be set at 3 532 members.

Retention of skilled personnel had seen work begin on a guidance programme for members and commanders within the DPCI.

The case workload of members saw 18 086 cases shared by members. In terms of case counts there were 83 736 counts. 1 817 cases had been put to the Director of Public Prosecution and were ready from the investigation point of view.

Challenges Regarding Accommodation

The majority of DPCI buildings were leased and did not belong to the state. 11n buildings were state-owned. State-owned buildings were key to minimising expenses. DPCI buildings had experienced numerous burglaries and security standards could be improved at state-owned buildings.

Some buildings’ compliance with safety requirements had been condemned.

Several state-owned vehicles were damaged in 2018 in the Free State due to insecure premises and had been lost as they were not insured.

Other matters were of land lords locking buildings as the DPW had not paid the rent it was responsible for.

The most common faults were of cracks and malfunctioning of fire detection equipment and roofs in buildings. These had been dealt with previously in Parliament and committed to solving.

It was believed that the DPCI head office could be improved in order to accommodate all personnel at one state-owned location.

The suggestions to address accommodation matters were that the DPW needed to assist in the matter. For example, on the status of accommodation in the Free State (where there was basement flooding), KwaZulu-Natal (the building was shared with other businesses), Limpopo (where there were damaged court papers as a result of flooding due to roof leakages), and the Eastern Cape. Lt. Gen. Lebeya called for the support of the Committee in these matters.

Setting the Strategic Direction

Re-engineering of DPCI through implementation of short, medium- and long-term solutions was key to strategic direction. Amongst these inputs was to ensure DPCI fought corruption within. A clear strategy needed to be put in place designed to respond to challenges. 

Skills of DPCI personnel needed to be enhanced. Guidelines related to this had been developed and a team had been appointed to work on this.

The current operational mandate was being interrogated to ensure that only matters of a serious nature were taken on, thereby sharing with colleagues in the greater detective service.

The budgetary process would be sensitised to ensure areas that had lagged behind in the past decade were recovered. This was guided by the NDP and the medium-term strategic framework, as well as constitutional imperatives and the legislation needed to be given effect.

Structurally, Lt. Gen. Lebeya indicated there were areas where the DPCI put proposals in place to be able to respond to corruption, commercial and organised crime.

The structure needed to create room for growth for those within the DPCI to retain talent. There was need to work to bring back those who had been lost to other environments within the greater Service.

A team effort would be prioritised over individual investigation.

It was appreciated that SAPS had seconded 38 members to assist the DPCI in challenging cases that required speedy attention.

There was the multidisciplinary approach to be embarked upon as provided for in the Act.

On integrity matters, DPCI members were taken through a process to ensure they were beyond reproach. These supported statements made by the President on the need to build a capable and ethical state. Implementation of a signing of oath of office for every member of the DPCI was undertaken. There was revitalisation of the Operational Committee which was not optimally utilised. The Anticorruption Task Team continued to function, and it was ensured activities were enhanced.

Regarding the APP, the JCPS Cluster matters were taken into consideration, as well as trial-ready case dockets based on clean audits dealing with the public sector and municipality corruption in order to enhance accountability. Trial-ready case dockets were also in the Annual Operational Plan.

From the proactive point of view, there was focus on deterrence, prevention and education.

Targets set were to reduce levels of fraud and corruption in both the public and private sectors in order to attract investment in SA. The percentage of trial-ready case dockets would be improved. The conviction rates for fraud and corruption within the JCPS cluster and the public and private sectors were new indicators.

Alignment of the DPCI APP with government priorities had been undertaken with reference to Chapter 12. This related to reducing the level of serious organised crime through the successful closure of serious organised crime projects. In this regard, there was need for specialised skills such as forensic chartered accountants. The DPCI was still using external service providers to do so.

The performance indicators and targets of specialised investigation of serious commercial crime-related charges were outlined.

Budget matters had already been outlined by the greater Service presentation, but budget assistance would improve the specialised investigation capacity, the Illegal Firearm Control Bureau, the Narcotics Bureau, as well as the Cyber Crime Division would be capacitated to respond to the challenges raised in the presentation.

Discussion

Minister Cele clarified the statement made by Lt. Gen. Lebeya that the National Head of the DPCI was employed by the Minister was incorrect - it was still under the Cabinet structure. The Minister facilitated but the employer of the Head of the DPCI was the Cabinet of the Republic of South Africa.

Mr Shembeni said the matter of the state of DPCI buildings was a major oversight. Rain damage to dockets was a serious challenge.  

Mr Maphatsoe agreed with the seriousness of the building challenges relating to reliability and security breaches. The DPCI was dealing with serious crimes and as a country it could not be allowed to continue. The question was how the DPCI could acquire buildings? The DPW matters needed to be worked around. The Committee needed to try and influence that security was a priority. Dealing with crime and serious crime-related matters needed the police to be able to do its work and perform without hindrance from another department, as was currently the case with the DPW. The DPW would be called before the Committee. The DPCI needed to be given a way to acquire its own buildings if government was serious about combating serious crimes. There needed to be conducive conditions and facilities to deal with the serious crimes dealt with by the DPCI. The whole country and world investment could be influenced by the performance of departments such as the DPCI. The global corridors of investment meant that actors were affected by the inability to deal with serious crimes.

Ms Mofokeng wanted to check on the matter of the closure of the DSO. Lt. Gen. Lebeya had said that most personnel had been absorbed. Ms Mofokeng’s challenge was that it appeared to have been said that there had been incorrect placement. What would be the problems associated with such incorrect placement in relation to skills retention?

Building risks and the DPW had been adequately identified by the other Committee members. The matter of accessibility of buildings, particularly to people with disabilities, had not received as much attention. This was made with specific reference to the Eastern Cape building with stairs.

On the matter of one member one docket, how successful was this? What was the turnaround time?

Mr Terblanche voiced disappointment with factors that had prevented the DPCI from operating and delivering on its mandate. This was a 10-year-old body that still seemed like a start-up business. It lacked buildings and capacity etc. This could not be allowed to continue. The public perception was of a lack of competence in relation the Scorpions. The Committee needed to support Lt. Gen. Lebeya in taking responsibility for meeting the DPCI’s needs.

In terms of case-ready dockets, there had been no large breakthroughs that had caught the attention of the public. The DPCI was an important weapon to scare off learned criminals and it needed to be capacitated. Mr Terblanche asked that an action plan be compiled for how these were thought to be addressed and provision of a progress update.

Lt. Gen. Lebeya responded to questions on absorption of members of DSO and incorrect placing and stagnation of cases. Lt. Gen. Lebeya was part of the process of amalgamation of facets of the DSO and SAPS into the DPCI. Investigators willing to become part of the greater Directorate were placed at various places where their skills lay. Personnel skilled in matters relating to the organised and commercial crime environment were placed there. Those taken for placement in Crime Intelligence were dependent on the skills they had. Some were offered places in the forensic environment if they qualified for it. It was not a forced process, with their choices taken into consideration. They had also been placed where the service needed them best. Most remained in these positions. Performance could not be differentiated between SAPS members. Correct placement referred to was that some of the personnel were taken into posts advertised in the greater Service for personal growth reasons. The DPCI had already engaged internally with Gen. Sitole and received support. Some personnel had subsequently been brought back. Once the structure was finalised, members who had been brought back from these new positions in the greater Service, would be returned.

Stagnation of cases related to high workload of members. The numbers of counts differed per case. Each count needed to be proved. One member one docket did not work because of the nature of there being numerous charges within one docket. This was why teams investigated a case docket in order to finalise in a shorter period of time.

Capacity and perception of the lack of organisation within the DPCI required addressing and had been identified as a challenge. The turnaround strategy had been laid out as the DPCI understood the operating environment.

The Chairperson was appalled at the state of the buildings and implored the Minister that it be raised with the DPW before the Committee engaged.

Minister Cele said that the building challenge was across the security cluster. It spanned Crime Intelligence, the DPCI, and SAPS. There had been serious break-ins in Crime Intelligence buildings. Police stations were in peoples’ houses and SAPS still paid leases.

Lt. Gen. Lebeya had spoken about organisational integrity. SAPS was overseen by IPID which was overseen by the Judge specifically dealing with the integrity matters of the organisation to keep it clean. It was important that this mechanism was raised, and the capacity of the Judge was in place.

In terms of de-linking from Programme Three, DPCI should, by law, have been its own programme. Engagement with Treasury was occurring in order to allow the DPCI to operate without hindrance. The law had been passed but some matters remained.

In response to Mr Terblanche, things had to be fixed before the new plan could be introduced. The DPCI was 50 percent capacitated. Even before the new plans, the present capacity matters needed to be dealt with. This would be costly. Bearing in mind the history of Directorate, the start-up character afforded to it needed to end. Quality over quantity was critical for the DPCI to combat “clever” criminals.

On the DPW and the police, the new Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure had written that the houses of the Ministers could be taken. The DPW was responsible for many operating delays that confronted other departments. While the police might not have had the capacity to fill this role completely, there were more creative solutions. The Department of Defence had construction capacity and this could be one mechanism of overcoming the supply chain issues.

Minister Cele supported the diversion of funds from the DPW to relevant bodies in the Security Cluster in order to address the backlog regarding station construction.

Programme 4: Crime Intelligence

Gen. Sitole introduced the Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence: Lt. Gen. Peter Jacobs. Maj. Gen. Rabie would continue with the presentation.

Maj. Gen. Rabie handed over to Lt. Gen. Dimpane for the section of the presentation focussing on the expenditure estimates associated with Programme Four.

Lt. Gen. Dimpane said the expenditure estimates of Programme Four had two sub-programmes: Crime Intelligence Operations and Intelligence Information Management. Its purpose was to manage crime intelligence, analyse crime information and provide technical support for investigation and crime prevention operations. The Secret Service Account was not part of Programme Four. There had been an increase of 6 percent allocation.

Technical Indicators

Maj. Gen. Rabie proceeded to the performance information for Programme Four. The first set of indicators related to the statistical indicators primarily focussed on the types of products associated with the Crime Intelligence environment. The first category was risk assessment reports generated for the purpose of proactive policing operations in the financial year. The second indicator concerned the number of early warning reports generated for proactive policing operations. The third indicator related to the number of profiles that would be generated for reactive policing operations. An additional indicator was intelligence analysis reports, which were generated on a quarterly basis. Another was the number of persons of interest reports generated. All of these would be influenced by specific operational measures or requirements. 

Performance Indicators

The performance indicators included the percentage of network operations successfully terminated. Another was the percentage of security risk and vetting assessments conducted in terms of the indicated content. The percentage of intelligence reports that were operationalised were targeted at ensuring that the reports produced generated by Crime Intelligence were productively used or operationalised within the relevant environments. This included both proactive and reactive approaches. Cross-border operations and arrests of identified transnational crime suspects was facilitated in terms of the Internet Protocol. South Africa, as part of Interpol, was targeting a 100 percent response to all requests.

Here, the annual commitments concerned the percentage of security clearances finalised in relation to the total plan. ICT security assessments were estimated to exceed targets in terms of demand. Annual commitments were also made in terms of the mandatory physical security assessments conducted. Moreover, there was a security awareness programme that had been included. The percentage of proactive intelligence reports that had been operationalised fitted into three organisational sub-divisions: cluster, provincial and national level. There were intelligence reports generated at these different levels. The same applied to reactive intelligence reports. Proactive intelligence reports focussed on the investigation processes of specifically reported crimes. In terms of cross-border operations and facilitated arrests, as an Interpol member, there was a commitment to responding to 100 percent of requests.

Gen. Sitole highlighted Crime Intelligence’s history, and that a corporate renewal strategy was ordered and could be provided to the Committee if requested. Following the instruction of the formulation of the Corporate Renewal Strategy, it had been decided to treat intelligence products as an input into the organisational operational process which required a requisite output from the various operatives. This would be linked to the performance management system in order to ensure accountability. The other aspect dealt with by the Corporate Renewal Strategy was the user requirement for Intelligence which had a technological side. Lt. Gen. Jacobs could expand on this with regards to improvement of technology.  

In terms of extension of intelligence capacity to police station level, intelligence capacity started from police stations. One challenge that required the support of the Committee was the declassification of information requests received. Over 80 percent of requests for declassification were denied by the principles of the Strategic Intelligence Act or National Security and Protection of State Information. Declassifications were needed for Joint Standing Committees and the Inspector-General. Presently a good understanding was being built up with bodies involved in such requests such as the commissions and Office of the Public Protector.  

Discussion

Mr Maphatsoe was happy that Committee support had been requested and would be received. He was not sure that other countries had such requests for declassification of information - as far as was he was aware, this was not done in other countries. South Africa needed to protect intelligence and information gathered. It was time for the Committee to protect the police and Detectives of the country in protecting intelligence information. 

Mr Terblanche said that from a public perspective there was a perception of Crime Intelligence or intelligence being “spies”. This was not the case. In terms of the inputs and indicators, what was the contribution of crime prevention initiatives to the reduction of crime? In terms of the high crime statistics in South Africa, to what extent could Crime Intelligence contribute to management of this?

The Chairperson asked about the changing crime threats in the country. How was Crime Intelligence changing its operations in order to deal with these changes? How could Crime Intelligence oversee management of corruption? How did Crime Intelligence plan to assist in realising the Sona call for a 50 percent reduction in crime?  What progress had been made in shaping the investigations and turnaround strategy?  In terms of the Committee refusing to declassify documents, it would need to be revisited and the constitutionality would need to be examined.  

Minister Cele said there was a time and space for declassification. The joint Standing Committee on Intelligence meetings were not attended by journalists or televised. The time and space of Committee Members’ questions that were asked needed to be noted and were possibly more relevant there.

Intelligence was heavily regulated. There were three entities dealing with intelligence: Military Intelligence, State Security, and Crime Intelligence. Private companies could not be allowed to enter the intelligence realm. There needed to be coordination amongst entities of these three structures through the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). Crime Intelligence was mostly dealing with matters internal to the country. The others dealt with external as well internal matters. However, sharing of information was useful despite this for the benefit of country.

On the question of whether Crime Intelligence helped to reduce crime, there was the example of the cash-in- transit heist arrests made prior to implementation of their planned heist. This would not have been possible without proper intelligence. Moreover, it played a deterrence function.

Progress needed to be made. Crime Intelligence moved far from where it had been. It had been “messed up” as a result of the Mdluli era, with politics taking precedence over crimes.

In terms of IT and technology and Crime Intelligence, this needed to be pushed. Technology was unfortunately a national matter where SA was lagging. National structural changes were required. There was a “spectrum” that was never achieved in pursuit of addressing matters. Crime Intelligence was not where it was supposed to be with related matters. Criminals had access to technology on the open market to use against Crime Intelligence and were often better placed. Better resourcing was needed in order to be a step ahead of criminals. Without technology there was no Crime Intelligence.

Gen. Sitole said that Minister Cele had provided direction. In terms of the technology user requirement, a dark web modus operandi analysis was required. The criminal underworld was operating on the deep web. Drug transactions and illicit financial flows were possible here and South Africa was at risk. Other countries did deep web modus operandi analyses on a daily basis. This added to the need for technology.

Gen. Sitole wanted to confirm that Crime Intelligence had moved quite a distance since the change into the current Crime Intelligence structure that was long overdue. Gen. Sitole called for capacity support and investment for Crime Intelligence.

The Chairperson enquired what the dark web was.

Gen. Sitole explained the interchangeability of the deep web and dark web and that they were a larger, less protected sphere of the internet where the criminal underworld operated.

The Chairperson asked whether, then, there was a capacity to fight cybercrime.

Gen. Sitole was glad to have the Committee interested in preventing cybercrime. There were large scale damages that could be risked without an investment approach. This could be done by influencing Treasury. This was not necessarily asking for more budget - it was investment in policing which would prove to be a trickle-down investment in safe economic growth and stability.

Minister Cele said that he would be speaking to the Minister of Communications about SITA and service providers. Bringing capacity internally would be extremely difficult. However, SITA speaking on behalf of SAPS harmed capacity. There would have to be “blood on the floor” for a move towards independence from SITA and establishing internal capacity rather than relying on SITA and its associated service providers.

The Chairperson said the Committee was dealing with Crime Intelligence, not violent crimes and blood on the floor with SITA. There needed to be a reduction in violent crimes, not blood on the floor with SITA.

Lt. Gen. Jacobs addressed the changing crime threats. The three agencies with NICOC developed the National Intelligence Estimate which outlined threats on a five-year basis. Every year, a National Intelligence Priorities (NIPs) document was developed which outlined threats in crime intelligence. Within Crime Intelligence, threats were unpacked and colour-coded according to “severe”, “major”, etc. Within these time spaces, Crime Intelligence ensured regular updates and estimates.

In terms of impact questions, these threat assessments and management tools were used to guide focal areas of Crime Intelligence and direct policing. In order to guide policing correctly, proactive and reactive Operationalised Intelligence measures were in place. These were to monitor and ensure operationalisation and feedback. This provided crime prevention units with specific intelligence to implement. This ensured Crime Intelligence remained relevant using indicators measuring this operationalisation and impacts.

Management of corruption in Crime Intelligence was managed using a Technological Framework that was developed in partnership with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) rather than using external consulting. This ensured integration rather than purchasing of stand-alone products. Delays were caused by Treasury not being aligned with CSIR. Procurement was now possible to deal with the backlog. Through this system and framework, procurement was clearly defined through the technology partnership. Corruption had previously been found in the technology purchases.

The impact on crime was characterised by a highly active role in all key crimes. The flagship intervention had been the cash-in-transit heist arrests. Another was a group in Mpumalanga that possessed jamming equipment. This was a work in progress. Gangsterism was a large threat requiring attention and was not confined to the Western Cape. Crime Intelligence was working with the prison authorities to combat matters of the release of gang members.

The Chairperson thanked the presenters and the meeting was concluded.

Closing Remarks

The Chairperson said the Committee was left to deal with the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service (CSPS) and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) in the meeting the following day. The Committee noted a Min-Mec clashed with that meeting and the Commissioners were excused to attend that meeting.

On the morning of Tuesday 9 July 2019, there would be the finalisation of the Budget Report to be published the day after that. This would be followed by the debate on Vote 23 and Vote 20.

The Chairperson wished Minister Cele luck for the budget speech.

The meeting was adjourned.