Crime Intelligence Turnaround Strategy; SAPS Restructuring

Meeting report

The Chairperson welcomed everyone and indicated the Committee would receive a briefing on Crime Intelligence’s (CI) corporate renewal strategy as well as restructuring and senior appointments within SAPS.

Briefing by SAPS: Overview of the Crime Intelligence Corporate Renewal Strategy

Lt Gen Peter Jacobs, Divisional Commissioner: Crime Intelligence, SAPS, took the Committee through a presentation on the Crime Intelligence (CI) corporate renewal strategy. The turnaround strategy was derived from SAPS’ turnaround vision as per fourth Back-to-Basics dimension which seeks to ensure a safer South Africa through proactive and reactive policing. This would require three key sub-strategies, these being CI Corporate Renewal Strategy (premised on seven key objectives), Counter Intelligence Strategy (premised on an offensive defensive posture with seven pillars), as well as Vetting Strategy (In support of corruption prevention/identification and improvement of Integrity). The strategic thrust being to repair, restore the trust and regain the respect of SAPS operational clients, through the rendering of a professional, effective and efficient crime intelligence service.

The turnaround strategy sought to address challenges within the Secret Services Account as well as Human Resource Management. Disciplinary cases, suspensions and rotations were the core focus. Also, intelligence analysis and coordination, Crime Intelligence operations, and support to SAPS were identified for repair and redirection during the four month-long analysis period.

In the external environment, the CI sought to redirect the Threat Management System, its relationship with other Intelligence Agencies, and repair public perception. On organisational environment, there were challenges as follows: irregular transfers from CI Head Office; seven years of acting positions; factionalism, unilateral transfers, weak centre with limited direction and command, as well as lack of policy, standards and procedures. On operational environment, it was found that there was need for enhancements in application of technology (need equal/better than those of criminals), eradicating corruption, and addressing insufficient informer coverage/deployment.

To optimise intelligence collection, CI sought to: establish information networks in key-sites; ensure intelligence collection is threat-based and impact-driven through partnerships to enhance intelligence; and to revitalise relationships with DPCI/Detectives through establishment of rapid intervention capabilities. To enhance intelligence analysis & coordination (MT), key deliverables were: enhancing coordination; revitalising strategic partnerships; enabling analysis to enhance modus operandi identification; revival of Threat Management System (TMS); and enhancement of technical capability to improve analysis. The need to fully optimise working procedures and guidelines to enhance operational effectiveness of surveillance, technical support, undercover operation coordination and agent administration capacities was also identified.

To optimise counter-intelligence, the objective was to position, capacitate and resource the counter-intelligence environment within the SAPS through: proper and effective protection of all information assets and information processing, storing and communication systems of the SAPS; optimising working relationships with other intelligence structures and stakeholders; refocusing counter-intelligence investigations within the SAPS; refocusing security intelligence collection to uphold the authority of the State; and development and implementation of a Vetting Strategy for the SAPS.

To capacitate and resource CI (especially grass-roots level), the objective was to develop a comprehensive resource plan as follows:

• Determine recruitment, selection and retention requirements in conjunction with Human Resource Management (HRM)
• Address critical and longer term resource (human and capital) needs in conjunction with HRM,

Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Financial divisions of the SAPS (integration and coordination and possible ring-fencing of money)

• Fill critical vacancies to enhance turnaround (especially collectors and analysts at grass-roots level)
• Prioritise the procurement of critical capital resources to replace outdated/obsolete infrastructure (especially cybercrime and surveillance environments)

To develop skills of CI members and establish a culture of performance management, the objective was to redesign mechanisms to measure performance, quality, impact and value for money as follows:

• Design, implement and enforce consequence management procedures
• Establish internal training committees to determine, basic, intermediate and advanced skills development requirements for each intelligence environment
• Address critical and longer term skills development needs/requirements in conjunction with HRD (integration and coordination)
• Continuous audit of skills and retraining of intelligence personnel (including mentoring and coaching programmes)

Lastly, implementation of specific interventions in support of the National Stabilisation Project (ST) was of paramount importance. The objective was to deal with the following operational priorities: cash-in-transit heists; gangsterism; political killings; taxi violence; and kidnappings, urgently.

General Khehla Sitole, National Commissioner, SAPS, said the force sought to build a culture of continual modus operandi analysis in efforts to counter criminal activities. The clear directive was that all CI capacity should be restored through the reinstatement of CIO capacity at police station level, among other imperatives. The introduction of the safer city concept was crucial and underway as part of stabilisation and normalisation efforts, and coordinative efforts with other regional and continental forces was part of the strategy mix. Ensuring the success of the turnaround strategy was crucial.

Discussion

The Chairperson welcomed the assessment and commented on corruption within the criminal justice chain. How was this mess being cleaned up? On recent crime statistical analysis, the majority of threats originated from outside the country’s borders. Was the current policing model and analysis taking new forms of threats into account? Was SAPS able to monitor criminal activities on an equal footing as compared to other jurisdictions? Was there adequate technical and technological capacity to deal with sophisticated criminal activities? Was SAPS’ informant network able to infiltrate all sectors? A robust technological footprint and capacity was crucial.

Ms P Mmola (ANC) made reference to media reports about an escape of two suspects through the roof of a police van in Limpopo. She asked for an update on this. How was crime intelligence capacity going to be spruced up at local police station level? How was it being ensured that there is stability at crime intelligence? How far had SAPS gone in vetting of senior command as part of its restoration and stabilisation efforts?

Mr P Mhlongo (EFF) commented on force’s turnaround strategy. He asked whether the high-level panel established by the President on crime intelligence had been able to identify key areas through substantial analyses which needed to be worked on. Was vetting being done correctly as there were reports of a top general within crime intelligence who was busted dealing in illicit drugs? Was the top command aware of a plot to destroy the EFF and its president, with the said general at the forefront? The intelligence service should not be used to further narrow political agendas. This should not be allowed as there was evidence of activities whose objective was to undermine and destabilise oppositional forces.

Ms M Molebatsi (ANC) asked what percentage of SAPS personnel had been vetted. She asked for views on proliferation of expired food products being sold in the streets by foreign nationals? This, if not addressed, could spark xenophobic attacks.

Mr L Ramatlakane (ANC) felt the set timeframes for full implementation of renewal strategy might hamstrung performance. Why was SAPS unable to deal with the taxi violence throughout the country decisively? There was need for a permanent footprint to address this challenge. That there had been 47 shooting incidents, without meaningful arrests or convictions in the Western Cape was indicative of a serious problem. It is a shocking state of affairs. He asked for confirmation whether parallel units within crime intelligence had been closed down, in light of the claims of factionalism. He asked, also in relation to the factionalism, whether everybody accepted the "new order".

Mr J Maake (ANC) commented on the turnaround strategy and noted the set timeframes. Did SAPS have enough resources to execute the identified strategies within the set timeframes? Failure to meet targets has always been a problem. Was the strategy resource-dependent or it was the other way round? The Committee’s duty would be to ensure that the set targets are met.

Mr Z Mbhele (DA) said crime intelligence has been in crisis for the past six years and that was where the public perception issue came in. The public would know when crime intelligence was failing. It appeared SAPS does not have a grip on the dynamics of organised crime in the country. There were severe leadership deficiencies, which had been addressed. Has the management looked at the shortcomings within the crime intelligence team? Operational bottlenecks and gaps were a significant stumbling block. What was the plan to execute purification, skills audits, and vetting of personnel? Was it a key focus? What were the timeframes as this had to happen as soon as possible. He asked whether the factionalism in the unit was purely due to internal organisational dynamics, or whether it was being co-opted into an external political faction.

Gen. Khehla Sitole, SAPS National Commissioner, replied that there were numerous challenges and community outcries, hence stabilisation and normalisation efforts were put into place. The damage was severe and stabilisation and normalisation could not be realised overnight. However, the existing limited resources were being put into use to implement quick wins. The current CI budget fell short in as far as full execution of renewal strategy was concerned. A review of technological and logistical requirements for CI as well as acquisitions were underway. On organised crime, the response was average, thus the dire need for intensification. SAPS was looking into a dedicated taskforce to deal with taxi violence, and working together with other departments such as Transport to ensure the stabilisation of the industry as a whole. He expressed SAPS’ commitment to addressing the identified challenges expeditiously. Efforts in that direction include the operationalisation of weekly intelligence briefings for senior provincial and national leadership, and updating SAPS’ modus operandi counter-strategy frequently to keep up with innovations by criminals especially on the cyberspace. Crime scenes were no longer on the ground but in the cyberspace. On the in transit escapees, the suspects were able to make their way out of the police van as its canopy had rusted to an extent that it could no longer hold.  The suspects were subsequently rearrested within 12 hours, and an investigation was underway.  To deal with the proliferation of illicit products, a combative strategy had been devised and would also encompass crimes relating to the merchandising of expired and counterfeit products. He confirmed that Crime Intelligence was infiltrated, and were working on the purification of the unit. The police are apolitical. The new order was being accepted. When Lt Gen Jacobs was appointed in March, he was ordered to command the unit, and if he failed, he would have to get out. This order was extended to everyone in the unit: "Accept it or ship out." The rogue units were closed down, and the damage that was done to the unit was severe. When the damage was severe, you cannot repair it in one day. All CI units must exist within the organisation’s approved work study. Rogue units were closed down and the CI has been tasked to continually ensure that any remnants of such are disbanded. The unit got caught in an under-budgeting backlog. This will be addressed by the business case the police force was taking to Cabinet and the Treasury. There will be a special focus on increasing CI's technological capabilities. The technology capability of CI was far from matching the technology advancements of criminals.

Lt General Jacobs said the support from senior leadership has been key in the past few months since he assumed leadership of CI unit. The synergies were positive. The future of crime needed to be understood and the organisation was preparing itself for the ever-changing dynamics. Part of the ongoing analysis sought to unpack the dynamics of sophisticated crime- foremost being on how the technological footprint was developing, and whether SAPS was embedding enough security systems to address this. It was being ensured that vetting and screening processes were undertaken on an ongoing basis within the system through working with personnel by way of declaration processes. CI is part of a continuous policing process and stability was crucial and being improved. There is no structure to destabilise any political parties. He unequivocally stated that there were no such covert or overt operations. He had heard all of the stories and the alleged individual was not part of SAPS. He welcomed further information from Mr Mhlongo offline. The unit would make sure the provided information was acted upon. There was an operation currently underway to nab the proliferation of counterfeit goods, which targeted their source. The informant network should be improved and the technological framework had been drawn out. He added the CI has the full support of the Minister and senior management in implementation of the turnaround strategy.

Lt Gen LJ Tsumane, Deputy National Commissioner: Crime Detection, SAPS, addressed questions on corruption within SAPS. There were countermeasures to deal with corruption within CI, which involved project-driven investigation within CI and DPCI. The anti-corruption unit within SAPS also seeks to assist in these efforts. A predictive in approach, precise in nature, and proactive model was being used to deal with emerging threats.

Restructuring of the SAPS presentation

General Sitole said the restructuring exercise was meant to impact positively on policing; the expectation was that it would improve policing. The new model will be subject to evaluation and review periodically. The purpose of the rationalisation was to migrate resources from the strategic framework down to the local policing framework- the core of the restructuring exercise.

Maj Gen J Makgato, Head: Organisational Development, SAPS, took the Committee through a presentation on the restructuring of SAPS. Demands for effective policing at local level necessitated the SAPS to restructure as allocation of resources to the front line required downsizing at higher organisational levels. An effective organisational structure should support the execution of core functions such that resources ought to be redirected to police stations, informed by the policing/operational demand. The project approach, spanning from January 2017 to present, went through a diagnostic phase, assessment of requirements, organisational design, as well as internal and stakeholder consultative processes.

Rationalisation of Head Office

The proposed National Organisational Structure (2018 – 2024) would see the rationalisation of Head Office from current 540 posts to a proposed 443, with Deputy National Commissioners being reduced from five to three. On clusters and police stations, the Board of Commissioners (BOC), in 2014, approved the new cluster concept with 118 clusters. The new cluster concept was implemented in 2015/2016 in line with the approved criteria and work study report. Subsequent to the implementation a functionality assessment was done during 2017, and the following deficiencies were identified: limited enabling structures; inadequate management practices; allowed for limited powers to deploy specialised units; inadequate support capacity and accommodations. Subsequently, responsibilities and delegations were redefined, and the proposed regionalisation was put on hold.

Proposed Clusters per Province

A total of 52 SAPS districts are currently aligned with district municipal boundaries. With the restructuring, 50 districts were proposed to be on the level of major general and 2 on the level of brigadier (1 in Northern Cape and 1 in Western Cape). Unacceptable levels of crime at police stations necessitated a revised approach to policing at local level (police stations and districts). Therefore, 30 Crime Weight Police Stations were identified according to an analysis of serious crime reported. Strategic relocation of forensic services down to local police station level, to enhance access of the function was part of the proposal. The restructuring would also see the introduction of a direct command structure at local level, to ensure that management agenda on crime is well-coordinated and streamlined. 118 clusters had been rationalised to 52, divided according to provinces. The existing personnel complement would be utilised to the utmost such that there will be no need for the creation of additional posts.

Discussion

The Chairperson asked how the envisaged structure complemented the National Development Plan. What was the value-add in all these changes? What impact would cluster commanders have in stations? 

Ms Mmola asked about the mooted rationalisation at head office. Were the officers being demoted or they would be accommodated elsewhere within a similar rank? What was the procedure?

Mr Mhlongo expressed concerns about the wars of generals at head office level. Where did this restructuring tie in with SAPS’ long term strategy? Had there been general consensus with stakeholders, particularly the unions? Were there guarantees that this would ensure stability and more streamlined performance? This had to be made clear. Rationalisation should be informed by substance rather than egos of the top command. Problems should not be cascaded down from the top command to suffocate communities at local level.

Ms Molebatsi said restructuring was a good move as it would deal with the top heavy structure characteristic at national level. The effectiveness of the new structures had to be ensured.

Mr Ramatlakane said the deployment of experienced generals at local level was supported as a matter of principle. The intention was good as there was dire need for senior police officers to lead the fight against crime. Effective policing, down to local level where crime was taking place had to be well-resourced and supported by management. Where was the model being envisaged stemming from? He was not sure whether the current policing structure is indeed aligned with the applied policing model. He hoped the restructuring would not have a negative impact on the stability of the organisation.

Mr Maake said his interest was whether the proposed restructuring would see officers being effectively deployed where there is urgent need.

Mr Mbhele said the delimitation of policing boundaries had to be well-defined. Policing should be localised as far as possible. Given that the restructuring would reduce the 112 cluster commanders down to 52 district commissioners, what was going to happen with the surplus from the former? Was there a clear and specific plan for the cluster commanders who would not have a place at district level? Provincial components were seemingly not captured in the restructuring exercise. How were provincial components being catered for in the restructuring and resource allocation?

General Sitole said ensuring skilled and experienced policing throughout the command chain down to local station level was of paramount importance. The restructuring exercise sought to achieve this together with professionalization of the service. In principle there was no contestation and resistance to the exercise. Crime prevention depends on numbers and visibility and this restructuring sought to achieve this. The cluster concept was not fully resourced thus it would be premature to fully and objectively evaluate its effectiveness. The impact of the cluster model was being curtailed by resource constraints currently. Over and above the rationalisation exercise, there are posts which would still be vacant, and filling these posts was phase one of the restructuring exercise. Rationalisation did not imply demotion. SAPS was engaging unions on the restructuring process in good faith, and the model was informed by a full-blown work-study investigation- exposed to benchmarking with other jurisdictions. A policing infrastructure alignment process would be part of the pilot project which would be conducted in due course. Surplus from the cluster model being phased out would be deployed to local police stations; the command protocol will not change. At the present moment, station commanders were overloaded and unable to fully focus on policing. This was one of the top priorities. District commissioners were purely operational and directly linked to crime fighting interventions. Going forward, the full capacitation of provincial command structures was paramount. He appreciated the work of the Committee and gave assurances that Members’ inputs would not be taken lightly.

The Chairperson appreciated the engagement as crime was one of the top two issues the public was concerned about. It must be addressed and taken as a huge priority CI had a huge task and the Committee supports efforts and looking forward to the fruits of the proposed structure. There must be confidence from top leadership level.

The meeting was adjourned.