The joint Parliament Portfolio Committees on Sport and Recreation and Police were briefed by Premier Soccer League (PSL) and the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) on the incidence of hooliganism by Kaizer Chiefs’ supporters after their team lost a football match at Moses Mabhida stadium on 21 April.
The PSL condemned the violence, and said that incidents like these were capable of tarnishing South Africa’s national sporting image. It asserted that they were often the handiwork of organized criminals, and not genuine supporters. The SAPS, on the other hand, conceded that there had perhaps been lapses in the categorisation of the match as “medium risk,” because intelligence reports had shown that Kaizer Chiefs’ supporters were dissatisfied with their coach, so disturbances could have been anticipated.
Members asked what the PSL guidelines were to monitor such an event. How many security officials per 100 spectators was the official PSL guideline? Why had only 18 turnstiles been opened, when 40 were available, as this could have cause frustration among the spectators? Did this mean that there was insufficient security manpower to police the match? They also bemoaned the lack of crowd control expertise among the deployed private security personnel. Of grave significance was the report that the operational plan had been signed off only on the day after the match. If this was true, it amounted to fraud.
All the delegations at the meeting said they fully supported the call by the Minister of Sport for an official inquiry. It was also suggested that the Committee should assist by considering amendments to the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act (SASREA) to give it more teeth, as currently it did not provide sufficient support to the authorities to curb the increasing trend towards hooliganism.
The Chairperson said the purpose of the meeting was to find a lasting solution to violence at sporting venues in the country. The latest of such occurrence was at the Moses Mabhida stadium, when Kaizer Chiefs’ supporters had gone on a rampage after their team had lost a soccer match. The Committee had condemned what had happened, together with the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Premier Soccer League (PSL), the Portfolio Committee on Police, and other stakeholders such as the SA Football Association (SAFA), the Department of Sport and Recreation (SRSA), the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and Stadium Management.
This Committee had decided that questions should not be asked in the media, but rather that stakeholders should be brought to Parliament in order to really understand what happened, to close the gaps identified and to chart a path forward. The Minister of Sports also had something to contribute in terms of the Safety at Sports and Recreation Events (SASREA) Act 2010, regarding whether it had to be strengthened and given more bite.
This meeting was not to accuse anyone of wrongdoing and apportion blame, but to put heads together to ensure that incidents like this did not recur. This big soccer clubs in the country had membership of people’s sons and daughters. Soccer was a family sport, and one should not be worried that going to stadiums would now mean persons risking losing their lives. In sport, one should accept winning with humility and losing gracefully, because either of these two was the expected outcome in any sporting contest.
The meeting today was to assist one another to find a common solution to this problem. The Committee would be strict on any stakeholder, be it SAFA, the PSL, the police or others, that failed to state weaknesses identified and went on to defend their constituency, because only Parliament could correct the gaps in legislation.
Minister of Sport: Overview
Ms Tokozile Xasa, Minister of Sport, said the Department, along with all other well-meaning SA citizens, was very concerned about the continuous trend of violence and unbecoming behaviour at football matches. SRSA believed that this trend should be put halted, as it not only posed a significant risk to lives, but was also against the law. It also had the potential to tarnish SA’s reputation, because the country had invested heavily since the apartheid era and had positioned the country as capable of hosting major sporting events. This had been attested to when SA hosted the FIFA World Cup and the country had been declared in 2012 as the best tourism destination in the world travel awards. This incident was therefore viewed in a serious light by SRSA.
Following what had happened, SRSA was in the process of seeking solutions and getting a deep understanding of the catalysts to this state of affairs. Should there be gaps, these would be identified, and if it was in legislation, clarifications would also be offered. Going back to the FNB stadium incidents in 2017, SRSA had come to an untenable situation when it instituted a commission of inquiry and had been challenged in court by the stadium management. Looking at SASREA, the Ministry had seen it had no teeth. This made the Department to consider other alternatives measures to remedy this anomaly. It had now requested the President to institute a judicial commission of inquiry because of the latest occurrence at Moses Mabhida stadium
SRSA was making efforts to ensure that the PSL and SAFA sat together to identify gaps and offer solutions to help the cause of football administration in the country. Issues such as the release of players for national duty, what the ministerial inquiry would want to be provided by SAFA and PSL, and security arrangements prior to football matches/events, would also be discussed at that meeting. SRSA was happy that critical role players were present here today, and hoped that interim measures could be agreed prior to the inquiry which could banish the image of our sporting events as being unsafe and not events full of fun for families to attend. SRSA was committed to the agenda of rebuilding the nation, using sport as a springboard.
Deputy Minister of Police: Overview
Mr Bogani Mkongi, Deputy Minister of Police, said the SAPS supported the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act, because it served as the foundation for security at sports gatherings. The police committed itself to the principle of security at sports gatherings, because such gatherings could also be used for terrorism. In the police’s strategy of anti-terrorism, it needed to stand firm at sporting events because these were occasions when activities against the nation could take place. The question of the growing hooliganism in sporting events was a national security threat that must be dealt with, otherwise it could grow and SA would have the same problem as Britain, where hooligans from other countries congregated during sporting events. The mushrooming of protests using WhatsApp, Sms and other media to mobilise people to fight against each other must be stopped. The Committee must discuss and find a solution to people losing their lives by merely going watch a football match.
The Department of Police supported the commission of inquiry suggested by the Minister of Sport on the FNB and Moses Mabhida incidents, and would cooperate fully and submit itself to ensure that it was a success. Another solution being offered was to begin the education process at school sports programmes, because hooligan tendencies began at school sports events. This was where children were being orientated not to tolerate loss. The SASREA Act could be modified to integrate safety into school sports programmes.
Five recommendations had been made to the police that would be presented during the course of this meeting. The Department laid no blame on anyone, but would offer inputs to ensure safety at sporting events in the country.
Premier Soccer League (PSL): Status of investigations
Dr Irvin Khoza, Chairperson of the PSL, said the PSL’s executive committee (EXCO) was shocked, extremely disappointed and concerned regarding the unacceptable events at Moses Mabhida Stadium. It also condemned in the strongest terms the tarnishing of the country’s national and sporting image by the criminals who had perpetrated those unspeakable acts on 21 April 2018. The PSL placed on record that it took very seriously the specific legislative responsibilities placed upon it to play its role regarding ensuring the safety of the millions of law-abiding ticket holding members of the public, players, officials and match support staff who annually attended league-sanctioned professional football matches across the country.
It welcomed and appreciated the steps the Portfolio Committee had initiated in respect of this incident, and in particular, the insightful enquiries it had raised its official request addressed to the PSL in connection with the incident. The PSL could confirm that the League would do everything possible within its power to assist the Committee and the government to address the increasing trend in recent times of violent and chaotic acts of criminality at local professional football matches. The League and its EXCO were absolutely committed to take all reasonable steps, on a collaborative basis, in consultation with all key stakeholders, to deal with and sterilise this very real challenge facing the country -- and its most popular sport.
The League’s commitment to this process was evidenced by the fact that, even prior to the shocking events at Moses Mabhida in April, the PSL had already recognised the increasing risks of criminality and public violence at professional football matches, and had held the first of a planned series of joint meetings with the Minister of Sport and the Minister of Safety and Security in Johannesburg during March. It had also attended a similar briefing session to the one requested for today, in Johannesburg on 26 April, with a delegation headed by the Minister of Sport. At that meeting, it had presented a documented interim report on the Moses Mabhida incident to the Minister. The League was still involved in fully investigating and collecting the facts regarding the incident.
The SASREA places a collective responsibility on a number of key safety and security stakeholders, including the SAPS through an Event Safety and Security Planning Committee (ESSPC), which was chaired by the SAPS, and whose purpose was to secure SAPS-categorized medium and high risk football matches, such as the one hosted at Moses Mabhida Stadium on 21 April. SAPS was also still involved in an auditing and validation process in respect of the contingency and operational planning, SASREA compliance documentation, and match day deliverables furnished to SAPS by certain of these stakeholders. This was in order for SAPS to finalise its investigations into the incident and be placed in an informed position to contribute fully and meaningfully to processes convened by the government to fully identify and bring an end to the unacceptable increase in serious violence and criminality at high-attendance football matches involving the more popular professional football clubs.
The PSL fully supports the call by the Minister of Sport for an official inquiry.
SAPS Presentation: Operational Planning and Execution
Maj Gen Lensingh Singh: SAPS NHQ, said that in line with the SASREA, the PSL had submitted an application on 7 April for the categorisation of the Nedbank Cup semi-final between Kaizer Chiefs and the Free State Stars to the SAPS. The event was scheduled for 21 April. On 9 April, the application was forwarded to SAPS Kwazulu-Natal provincial office for a risk recommendation. The response indicated that the event was assessed as being a medium risk event.
According to the content of the application from the PSL, there was no history of crowd-clashing incidents or violence by or between spectators of participating teams, or at the venue itself. No other factors were provided that the SAPS should have taken take into account. Lt Col Sigamoney, stationed at the Durban Central Police Station, had been appointed as the authorised SAPS member. The categorisation certificate was relayed to the PSL and the SAPS Kwazulu-Natal provincial office.
An Event Safety and Security Planning Committee was established. An initial meeting was held at the Moses Mabhida Stadium on 17 April, chaired by Capt Ranoo, who was stationed at the Durban Central Police Station. Among the issues discussed were:
- The expected attendance of ±30 000 individuals, in accordance with ticket sales.
- Access accreditation.
- The activation of the Venue Operational Centre (VOC).
- The application of safety and security operational concepts, including the deployment of personnel.
Kaizer Chiefs’ representatives reported that their supporters were dissatisfied with the coach. Stadium management had requested support from SAPS. In addition, a threat assessment report was submitted by the SAPS’s Crime Intelligence, and the following threats were identified:
- Pitch invasion (indicated as a possibility).
- Sales of illegal parking tickets.
- Traffic congestion.
- Increased crime in the vicinity of the stadium.
An Operational Plan was compiled and approved by the overall commander, Colonel Naidoo.
The stadium gates were opened at 17:00. The game commenced, as planned at 20:15. The total attendance was 26 185. Five spectators were removed from the stadium after a fight broke out. Six spectators were removed from the stadium for accessing suites without accreditation. The turnstiles were overcrowded due to a deviation, with 18 turnstiles opened instead of 40. Security personnel were redeployed to the pitch to assist by forming a human security barrier.
A few minutes before the end of the game, Kaizer Chiefs’ supporters started throwing objects towards the technical team area. Public Order Policing (POP) and Visible Policing (VISPOL) personnel were immediately redeployed to line-up behind the technical team to protect players and officials. Private security personnel were also redeployed to form a human security barrier around the pitch.
The following events transpired after the game ended: Several spectators breached an area of the pitch and confronted security on the pitch. Objects were thrown on to the pitch. Supporters charged towards the technical staff and players, and invaded the pitch.
POP, Vispol and security personnel encircled the players, match officials and technical staff, to ensure a safe passage into the changing rooms. An armoured vehicle was brought on to the pitch and blocked off the entrance to the change rooms to protect those inside. Several clashes erupted between spectators and deployed SAPS members and personnel. Sporadic fires were also lit within the stadium. Stun grenades and smoke were used to disperse the crowd.
A total of 21 injuries were reported, including one SAPS member, one Metro Police member, four private security personnel members and 15 spectators. Damage was caused to TV cameras and speakers. Stadium chairs were set alight. Windows in certain suites were broken. The exact extent of damage and the value involved was still being determined by the Stadium management, the PSL and Supersport.
Mr T Mhlongo (DA) complained that the presentation by the PSL had been very unclear to him. He was disappointed that the Moses Mabhida incident was not the first time Chiefs’ supporters had run amok in a football match involving their team -- similar incidents had happened in 2017. After the previous incidents, what had been the recommendations? What were the challenges that the PSL was facing? The PSL had stated that it was practically impossible to implement SASREA -- what were the problems with the Act? Had the PSL failed to adhere to Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and SAFA guidelines? If not, why had this tragedy happened? The stadium had a capacity of 55 000, and 26 000 had attended the match, with 697 security personnel and officials present -- how many officials were required to monitor an event? What were the PSL guidelines for monitoring an event? How many officials per 100 spectators was the official PSL guideline? There seemed to be a failure of visibility of security personnel at the match. SAFA had made a statement in the media that there were only 55 officials. What exactly was the number? There was a planning meeting prior to the match kickoff -- was an official assigned or deployed to cover this match? Did private security also attend all the meetings? The match had been classified as a medium risk -- what mechanisms had led to such a classification?
Mr D Bergman (DA) wanted to know whether it was the responsibility of the home team to provide security. If it was, then Kaizer Chiefs were supposed to be the designated home team in that match and knowing the threats against the coach, what more could they have done to prevent what took place? Why were there only three security guards around their assaulted colleague? Why was there no reaction from the security guards when the fences were breached? Why were the police unprepared, even after their own risk assessment showed there was the possibility of crowd violence? Why did it take the police such a long time to respond to the storming of the fences by spectators? Why was the PSL having a change of heart by supporting this commission of inquiry, and not the previous one?
Mr P Moteka (EFF) appreciated his welcome back to the Committee. He asked how many actual supporters were in the stadium among the 30 000 spectators? How did the spectators breach the fences to invade the pitch? What actually went wrong? With 30 000 spectators against 697 security personnel; was that enough to police the match securely? If the number was not enough, then why allow the match to proceed? With these 697 security persons reporting to 14 different security outfits, was it not a classic case of creating room for confusion? A situation such as this meant that accountability could be compromised, because one could not assign blame to a single security entity. Arresting four spectators did not deal with the symptoms, because no one was arrested from the management side. Planning, implementation and management were equally to blame, yet nobody had been found culpable.
Mr M Mabika (NFP) assured the presenters that the purpose of the meeting was not to conduct an inquiry but to share ideas, because hooliganism in sport was becoming a crisis. It had happened in 2017, and now this year. This Committee knew very well that neither the PSL nor SAPS was happy with these occurrences. The question was whether they were doing enough to ensure that it came to an end. If there were challenges, how could the government assist in bringing it to an end? Did the PSL, with all the beautiful stadiums in SA, have a standardised safety protocol to prevent spectators from freely invading the pitches? At the FNB stadium, it was not that easy for spectators to get on to the pitch, but that was not the case at other stadiums. He asked how the match risk categories were arrived at. Why was this match classified as medium risk, even after Kaizer Chiefs’ officials had notified SAPS that they were aware of their supporters being disgruntled because of the coach?
Mr L Ntshayisa (AIC) said the recent disturbances by soccer spectator called for the formation of supporters clubs at all clubs. If these were formed, the supporters could then be educated on what was expected of them. Crime intelligence was supposed to have been gathered even before the match to know what the supporters were thinking. It was worrying that that aspect of policing was not coming up to scratch. How could the PSL have only one security official at such a high profile match? Another worry was the level of training of the security personnel from the private security firms -- were they properly trained on how to handle crowd control?
Mr M Filtane (UDM) appreciated the fact that the stakeholders had found it fit to come to Parliament, where accountability took place. In carrying out its oversight duties, Parliament shied away from apportioning blame. This had not been an ordinary match, but had involved big teams and the stakes had been high on the day. What criteria did the police use to assign risk, because they had fallen short on the day in question? Chiefs supporters had indicated their unhappiness with their coach, which was a signal that something could happen. What then had intelligence reports indicated, and what had been done about it? What was the proportion of security personnel to the spectators at the stadium? Of all the security at the stadium that day, who was ultimately responsible for coordination? What was the mode of communication and its effectiveness? When it was known that over 36 000 spectators were expected, why open up only 18 gates instead of 40? The long queue of spectators at a few gates could have contributed to fans being agitated and irritable. Who was responsible for ascertaining that deployed security personnel were properly and adequately trained and up to the task at hand on the day? Had a clearance certificate been issued, clearing the event to take place? Before today, what steps had been taken to ensure the submission of compliance to SASREA? What amendments to SASREA were proposed, as this could assist the legislature to close any gaps? Did the infrastructure at the stadium comply with the needs of the day?
Ms D Kohler Barnard (DA) was relieved there had not been a repeat of the 2001 Ellis Park incident, which had killed 43 people. She asked the police what exactly the protocols were in the run up to a match of this caliber. How many planning meetings were held before match day? How many of those meetings were attended by the person in charge? Reports indicate that such a person stepped in at the very end of such meetings, after all the planning had been done. This would have put that person at a disadvantage in terms of command and control. Where was a copy of the operational plan which sources said had been signed off only on Sunday 22 April -- the day after the match? That was equivalent to fraud, if the operational plan was indeed signed off only after the match, and meant that there was a cover up under way. Had that plan ever been sent to, and seen by the National Police Commissioner, as it should have been? The fact that few gates were open meant that there was insufficient security manpower to police the match. There also seemed to be zero crowd control before or after the match. Besides all of this, crime intelligence had decided that this was a medium risk match, which was a massive failure on their part. This failure had been continuing for eight years, and an explanation was needed. The security company that had its staff at the field was an 18-month old company based in KwaMashu. What specific training did the private security personnel at the match day have in terms of crowd management, access control and overall security? It was fine to tell the Committee what PSIRA does, but did the members of this particular security company have the relevant certificates, and passed the required courses? The video coverage showed the private security personnel lobbing chairs at the pitch invaders -- what gave them the idea that throwing chairs was going to achieve anything, and how did they get the job?
Mr Z Mbhele (DA) wanted to know what had been done by crime intelligence, since a pitch invasion had been indicated, according to the police presentation, as a possible threat. Did the operational planning make specific tactical provision for that scenario? Reliable sources had confirmed the signing of the security and operational plan the day after the match -- could that documentation be forwarded to the two Committees for Members’ inspection? Could the Acting Provincial Police Commissioner confirm if there were two other major events that took place in Durban on the same day? This could have stretched the police personnel and resources, and could have contributed to the allocation of police officers to the event not being based on the actual need, given the size and categorisation of the event.
Ms M Molebatsi (ANC) wanted to know when the police would arrest more people connected to the violence. She asked the PSL why were there was no clear information on the gender of the security person attacked on the pitch, which had fuelled confusion. Did clubs not have an obligation to provide some form of security at the stadium? Were the private security companies at the stadium properly registered with PSIRA?
Ms M Mmola (ANC) wanted the police to answer if they thought enough of their members were deployed to secure the match. Why had the PSL deployed only one security entity for such a big event? What were Kaiser Chiefs expecting from their supporters on that match day, knowing that they were unhappy with their coach?
Ms L Mabija (ANC) suggested a link between hooliganism in sport and drug abuse in society. If most supporters were already high in the stadium, this would lead to anti-social behaviour when they got a bit irritated. The drug lords were cashing in heavily at the expense of SA society. Effective strategies should be found to change the mindset of the people, especially the football club supporters.
Mr S Mmusi (ANC) suggested there should be proper barricades erected between supporters’ stands and the pitch in stadiums across the country. What measures and training did the security personnel have in situations when their lives were in danger? These incidents had been happening for some time in SA, but one hardly heard a word of strong condemnation from club owners. The fact that South Africa was in denial that it was a violent nation would continue to work against it. This fact had to be confronted and measures put in place to educate young people through the schools’ sports programmes, to inculcate in them the significance of ownership, responsibility and good behaviour, and the values of losing gracefully. SA was a violent nation -- one just had to look at what was happening across the country now to realise something needed to be done.
Ms B Abrahams (ANC) wanted to know the difference between a state guard, a security guard and any other guard? What was the duration of training to qualify as a guard? Was there any specialised training and duration for a person to qualify as a security guard? How was their screening carried out, and for how long?
Mr S Ralegoma (ANC) wanted to know what informed the police to categorise a match as medium risk. Who took absolute responsibility for the security lapse that day? Was it PSL or the security? The Minister should act quickly to tighten any loopholes to ensure this did not recur.
Mr F Beukman (ANC), co-Chairperson, asked if banning supporters implicated in acts of hooliganism was something they would consider, if not, what was their suggestions going forward? In the presentation, SAPS had indicated that they were reliant on video coverage from Supersport to identify the perpetrators, while they had police officers at the scene -- surely they should have had their own video coverage as well?
The Chairperson bemoaned the fact that people going to watch a soccer match could return home as a corpse. She proposed that the Committees reflect deeply and put forward solutions. She asked why stadiums were handed over to private security firms to manage. Guidelines stating the ratio of spectators to security personnel had to be updated. How could the PSL have only one security entity at such an important match? These gaps had to be filled and the Committee should not only ask questions, but be a part of the solution as well.
Mr Khoza said that it was correct that current legislation had no deterrent effect, and it was easy for people to get away with crime. Criminals were going to the stadiums to intentionally commit organised criminal acts. The issue of supporters taking responsibility was very important.
Referring to responsibility, he said in terms of the SASREA Act, the National Police Commissioner appoints an authorised member responsible for the events planning committee, and all reports went to that person.
On why the PSL had confused the gender of the assaulted security guard, nothing had been announced until the PSL chairperson had called a press conference. It was the media that reported on that, not the PSL. The first issue addressed during the PSL press conference was to clarify that it was not a woman, but a man that had been assaulted. Kaizer Chiefs had condemned the incident even on their website, and all this had been done to send a strong message that this was unacceptable behaviour.
One impression to be corrected was that there was not one PSL security official, but rather that there was one member in the Venue Operational Centre (VOC) from the PSL. He was the national risk manager of the PSL, and the VOC was where all the stakeholders responsible for providing services belonged.
Regarding compliance, in terms of the SASREA Act, no game could take place if it did not comply with Section 8, which dealt with infrastructure. The PSL had taken a decision to draft a common manual to ensure that all stadia complied with the Act, and seminars and workshops were being organised to ensure that they understood these issues.
On supporter education, what one saw in the stadium was a manifestation of South African society. Football was a big hospital, because many of the people who came to the watch matches had psychiatric, alcoholic or medical problems, and that was why the PSL insisted that people had to coexist and come to enjoy the games and not to take football matches as a matter of life and death. The PSL believed that violence in stadiums was caused by criminal elements, and it always appealed to the genuine fans to help it identify those coming to cause trouble.
From 16 to 20 May, the PSL was up-skilling its safety officers on report preparation and supporter education.
On the day of the match, PSIRA had been there to ascertain if the private security members were properly accredited members of their organisation. PSIRA would have to testify if the private security personnel deployed were properly trained. On ratio of spectators to security personnel, that was an ongoing challenge, and SRSA would have to come up with a regulation to govern that.
A few challenges had been identified in terms of the SASREA, one of which was the requirement to provide notice of a match six months in advance so that the stadium could be assessed. The PSL input was that it should apply only to major events like during the World Cup in 2010, because of security, intelligence, disaster management and the like. In a match like the Nedbank Cup, it could not be determined in advance which team was going to play which team. The league was concluded in June/July and started again in August, so the six months that was required could not be complied with.
General Khehla Sitole, National Police Commissioner, said that the intention of the police was to create a crime-free environment for social economic stability. The modus operandi was moving to the recreation arena, because it one of the pillars for economic stability. To assist the Minister in achieving her objectives, the SAPS was suggesting that she should consider the establishment of a multi-disciplinary committee. In this committee, all stakeholders would come together to consider what was happening and respond accordingly. SAPS had requested an urgent meeting with SAFA, where important issues would be discussed.
On how many persons had been arrested, SAPS were arresting some of the ringleaders and were digging deeper and researching and analysing their mode of operation. This was aimed towards creating a safer environment in the sports and recreation arena.
Regarding the number of police operatives deployed to high profile matches, there seemed to be a gap in communication between SAPS and the Committee, and that would require a closed meeting where Members could be briefed on certain approaches that were followed. This briefing could not be done in a public forum because some of the issues to be divulged bordered on national security.
On measures to ensure this does not recur; the first proposal was a review of the SASREA Act, as already indicated by the Minister. Secondly, there should be a multi-disciplinary analysis of this legislation so that joint areas of improvement could be looked at. Training standards also had to be reviewed, because certain security responses were needed. Area management also required a bit of legislative review. There were sector security standards and crime prevention principles. Any area utilised for security must comply with these principles, but some areas did not. If they did not comply, SAPS took responsibility and undertook a physical security assessment, which also applied to stadiums. SAPS also proposed a review of resource requirements for the execution of this Act, because not all the parties were equally resourced. SAPS also proposed it conducted both intelligence and modus operandi briefings for the Minister and the DG.
Lt Gen Elias Mawela, National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), in answer to the question on what more could have been done, knowing the threats, responded that with simple planning SAPS could have done better. SAPS should have been responsive instead of reactive at that match. SAPS knew its limitations and the gaps that existed, and better planning could have led to a better outcome.
On who was in charge because of the 14 private security outfits being involved, he said that at the stadium there was a venue operational centre, and the line managers inside the VOC assigned duties while the VOC commander had overall responsibility for all activities that took place in the stadium.
Regarding those arrested, investigation was ongoing to ascertain their level of involvement and what part they and their accomplices had played.
On support required from Parliament, he said SAPS had established a dedicated team which would manage events in the provinces of KZN and Gauteng because of the magnitude of events that took place there. This dedicated team would assist in retaining institutional memory and implementing a succession plan.
Regarding how matches were categorized, Section 6 of SASREA clearly states the elements to be considered by the National Police Commissioner. Over and above that, members were required to be “street wise” -- to know the environment better such as when matches involved relegation matches and high profile matches, and not only when the top teams were playing, but top eight matches as well. SAPS agreed with the PSL that a penal provision should be inserted in the SASREA for any violations.
Gen Sitole referred to the matter of operational plan being signed off a day after match, and said he would be receiving a report by Friday May 11. An instruction had been given, demanding that an internal investigation be instituted.
Mr Stefan Badenhorst, Acting Deputy Director: Law Enforcement, PSIRA replied to the question about training standards for the private security industry. He said PSIRA prescribed the minimum framing the different categories of training providers must have before they could render security services. This was also dependent on the nature of security service rendered by the security officers, because there was a different curriculum prescribed for different kinds of work such as in access control, or security patrol work. They all required different levels of training for various categories. PSIRA monitored compliance for the different levels of security officers. On whether security officers were properly trained, he said that although PSIRA prescribed the statutory minimum training standards, there was a gap in the various security environments and some work was still needed there.
Mr Alec Moemi, Director General: SRSA, said the Department had already met with SAFA and the PSL, and had received a report from them. It had studied that report and with all the input from stakeholders today, it reaffirmed the need for a ministerial commission of inquiry to look into what had transpired at the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban. This could only proceed based on the attitude of the stadium management, and if they failed cooperate, there was no other option but to institute a full judicial commission of inquiry. SRSA committed that it would pursue the matter, and the Minister had appointed the Deputy Minister to facilitate and mediate between the PSL and SAFA.
On the issue of player vs country, the Minister intended to issue a Section 13 directive in terms of SASREA to allow for both SAFA and the PSL to conclude a process whereby they could sign on the domestic calendar and international fixtures, and SRSA was also a signatory to this. The Minister was also putting in place a dispute resolution mechanism so that the two bodies could find each other. Another Sec 13 directive was being issued by the Minister so that all stakeholders could get a briefing before all matches categorised as high risk kicked off. It was a pity that these issues occurred only in football, but not in rugby or cricket. SRSA was studying and analyzing why this was so, but for now the ministerial commission of inquiry would suffice.
The meeting was adjourned.