Annual Report late tabling; UNFCCC COP 23 conference; SADC Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development

Meeting report

Chairperson’s Opening Remarks

The Chairperson informed the Committee that the briefings by National Treasury (NT) and the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) to provide an update of the on-going discussions regarding the late tabling of the Department of Environmental Affairs’ annual report and financial statements for the 2016/17 financial year had, as per their request, been postponed to 28 February 2018.

The Chairperson commented that South Africa was in the midst of very exciting times politically. Last week, South Africa had transitioned seamlessly to a new Presidency. This signalled the beginning of a new dawn and a lot of hope for the country and South Africans. Moreover, hopefully the current civil mood and atmosphere would characterise this Parliament going forward.

He expressed concern that the presentation received from the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) for the briefing that was postponed had been completely inadequate, and would need to be improved upon.

Outcomes of UNFCCC COP 23 conference

Mr Tlou Ramaru, Acting Director-General: Climate Change Adaption, DEA, said the purpose of his presentation was to provide a brief on the outcomes of the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP23 held in Bonn, Germany, in November, and to outline the significance of developments in the negotiations for South Africa and Africa.

Background

By way of context, Mr Ramaru said that climate change posed a significant threat to South Africa’s developmental goals, and also to the development gains made to date. No continent would be struck as severely by the impacts of climate change as Africa. Africa was also very vulnerable due to limited adaptive capacity, exacerbated by widespread poverty and the existing low levels of development. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that:

• By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa were projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change;

• By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%. Food security in many African countries could be severely compromised.

• Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea level rise would affect low-lying coastal areas.

Mr Ramaru warned that global warming of two degrees would not be evenly distributed. In parts of Africa and South Africa, one would experience between four and six degrees of warming on average. Climate change was already leading to unexpected climate variability in South Africa – for example, the drought in the Western Cape. South Africa had a high-carbon economy, being heavily coal-dependent, and it would have to change development paths. Fortunately, the cost of low-carbon power was now much cheaper than coal, and there were large economic opportunities in low-carbon development.

While COP 21 in Paris had resulted in the seminal Paris Agreement, COP 22, 23 and 24 would work on decisions to be taken at COP 24 on measures to implement the Paris Agreement. Africa had participated in COP23 with its usual solidarity, and South Africa had led the African negotiators on many key issues. COP23 had been expected to prioritise not only decisions on loss and damage from the impacts of climate change, but also finance, technology and capacity building support for action by developing countries.

The two main priorities of COP23 were to advance the work on the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement (adoption by COP24), and to establish arrangements for an inclusive, participatory and transparent (Talanoa) dialogue in Fiji, aimed at enhancing post-2020 ambitions.

COP23 Priorities and Outcomes for South Africa

Mr Ramaru said South Africa had had three main priorities for the meeting:

• To advance the work on the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement that were set for adoption at COP24 in Poland in 2018 together with arrangements for a Facilitative Dialogue aimed to enhance post-2020 ambition.

• To place a specific focus on the Durban commitments for pre-2020 action and support, particularly from developed countries.

• To obtain decisions on financial support for developing countries, in particular on the future of the Adaptation Fund and the communication by developed countries of the scale of financial support that they would be providing to developed countries.

He outlined the key outcomes of COP23. The major outcome of the Conference had been decision 1/CP.23 titled “Fiji Momentum for Implementation”, which addressed the following areas. Firstly, the parties confirmed their determination to accelerate the work on the Paris Agreement mandates. Secondly, they welcomed the design of the 2018 Facilitative (Talanoa) Dialogue to be conducted from April to December 2018. Thirdly, they decided to convene stocktakes of pre-2020 implementation and ambition at COP24 (2018) and COP25 (2019), and urged the parties to the Kyoto Protocol that had not yet ratified the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, to do so without further delay.

A significant success for the Africa group was the decision that the Adaptation Fund should serve the Paris Agreement, subject to decisions on governance and institutional arrangements, safeguards and operating modalities of the Fund to be taken in 2018. Several developed countries made financial pledges to the Adaptation Fund. Other outcomes on finance included decisions on long-term finance; a process to decide on the up-front communication of financial support provided by developed countries, and guidance on the Green Climate Fund, which clarified that all developing countries should have access to all the financial instruments.

Other significant decisions included the establishment of a gender action plan; an assessment of the current technical examination processes on mitigation and adaptation; and guidance to the executive committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts. There was also progress on the Paris work programme.

Political Dynamics

Mr Ramaru unpacked several political dynamics that COP23 had brought to light. The announcement by the USA to withdraw from the Paris Agreement continued to cast doubt on the USA position and its intentions in the negotiations. The USA delegation to the Bonn Climate Change Conference had indicated that they did not have clear instructions and were therefore engaging on the basis of what they understood to be positions that did not change across administrations. This put in doubt the extent to which parties could trust the USA as a reliable negotiating partner. There had not been any efforts to renegotiate the Paris package, which stood to be resisted by developing countries. Furthermore, during the high-level session, France and Germany had signalled their determination to raise their ambitions and to contribute towards filling the gaps left by the US. The rest of the world was resolute on this.

However, in the negotiations, this was not matched by a willingness by developed countries to engage meaningfully on finance, capacity-building and technology. The priority for South Africa going forward was therefore to impress upon developed countries the need to honour their commitments and show leadership. Securing progress on Article 9(5) on indicative support was key, and how this matter was dealt with would be an indication of the degree of commitment of developed parties to the process. There were many challenges to the principle of differentiation, particularly regarding the eligibility of so-called “middle-income countries” to receive financial support from the financial mechanism of the Convention. Developed countries were increasingly directing their development aid to the least developed and vulnerable countries, but these states had very low emissions while the so-called ‘emerging economies’ still had the greatest mitigation potential. As a result, investing in the low carbon future of emerging economies remained the best investment from a climate change perspective.

Mr Ramaru highlighted that the Paris Agreement would require enhanced reporting obligations, as part of its enhanced transparency system, for developing countries. As a result, specific provisions had been made in the Agreement for support to be provided by developed countries to developing countries, both for capacity-building in reporting, and also for the ongoing actual implementation of the reporting processes themselves. It was vital that these provisions were implemented fully, and appropriate resources were provided to developing countries. It was crucial that developing countries ensured that any gap in ambition related to the pre-2020 period was not transferred to developing countries. Developed countries’ emissions in excess of their fair allocation had to remain their responsibility after 2020.

Implications for South Africa

The Paris Agreement, when fully implemented, would inter alia require South Africa, firstly, to submit a “Nationally-Determined Contribution” (NDC) every five years, which detailed South Africa’s climate response; and, secondly, to report on progress in achieving its NDC. The nature and extent of these obligations would be clear only once negotiations on the Paris Rule Book had been finalised, but would involve building on current national systems established in terms of South Africa’s climate policy. The specific outcomes of COP 23 did not require additional implementation requirements for South Africa. Furthermore, the outcomes of COP 23 had no further organisational and personnel implications for the country.

Discussion

The Chairperson asked whether there was a date for when the Paris Rule Book would be finalised.

Mr Ramaru responded that there would be negotiations in that regard. There would be three sessions this year – in April, May, and possibly September. The expectation was that at COP 24 the Paris Rule Book had to be finalised.

Ms J Steenkamp (DA) asked what the Gender Action Plan entailed. How would the Gender Action Plan be planned and implemented, specifically in South Africa? How would the political dynamics of the US withdrawal influence South Africa and affect progress? What would the implications be if countries ultimately could not fund the Paris Agreement and, if that was the case, did South Africa have an alternative course of action planned?

Dr Z Luyenge (ANC) inquired to what extent indigenous approaches were being considered and used as a mitigating factor to climate change. He was concerned because there appeared to be many agreements but nothing by way of implementation, and the assessment of outcomes to understand whether underdeveloped countries could enforce, when it was the more developed countries that were the major contributors in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Mr T Hadebe (DA) queried whether the perception of developed countries that South Africa -- a ‘developing’ country -- was a developed country, had changed? How were operational resources to be allocated until the Paris Rule Book was finalised?

Mr S Makhubele (ANC) commented that since there were only about two years left before 2020, there may be a need for the DEA to report back in the interim on its progress so that it would be clear whether or not the deadline would be met on time. Since developed countries had changed their focus by fixing their attention on the least developed countries in terms of developmental aid, what were the implications, given that the developed countries contributed to the bulk of GHG emissions? Was this not an abdication of responsibility on the part of the developed countries? Had these countries been challenged in this regard? Was South Africa sure that it had the capacity to cope, and did it have assurances, should it need assistance, that there would be funding for the measures implemented in its transition to a green economy? South Africa, in plotting its own way forward, must be able to anticipate what could come from the discussions in the lead up to the finalisation of the Paris Rule Book, by ‘moving with’ the negotiations.

Mr R Purdon (DA) asked whether South Africa was part of the ‘Powering Past Coal Alliance,’ launched by Canada and the UK. Was South Africa giving an input into the Talanoa Dialogue? If so, what were its contributions? What had been the size of South Africa’s delegation to the conference in Germany, Bonn?

The Chairperson asked what the relationship was between the work that South Africa was doing in negotiations and the action in the country to try and meet South Africa’s obligations? What was South Africa doing to ensure that there was a transition to a low-carbon economy? In the context of a high level of resistance to the minimum GHG emission compliance standards, was there an appetite in South Africa to make the transition to a low-carbon economy? Moreover, what were the concrete actions taken by South Africa, in terms of mitigation and adaptation strategies, which would help South Africa to facilitate this transition? Were there clear timelines in the legislation, and where was the DEA in relation to the processing of legislation?

DEA’s response

Mr Ramaru, regarding the processing of legislation, said that the DEA had already played its part. The DEA believed that the legislation would be approved by Cabinet to be published for public comment by April.

Another colleague would address the query about investment in mitigation. Nevertheless, the DEA had projected the long-term adaptation scenarios, which clarified what scenarios were likely and had to be taken into account. Together with the provinces, a risk and vulnerability assessment had been conducted so that the DEA could understand where the hotspots were. With the Provinces, the DEA had developed an adaptation response plan across the nine provinces. This was facilitating the implementation of the adaptation plans. The DEA was also working with municipalities with a view to empowering municipalities to undertake their risk and vulnerability assessments and to be able to integrate climate change into their planning processes. There were a number of adaptation projects that were on the ground in KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Northern Cape.

Although the DEA had not seen it, the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) had been approved. Once it was received, it would be analysed and the DEA would position itself accordingly.

Regarding the use of indigenous knowledge, the DEA was working with communities, especially through the Adaptation Fund project in the KwaZulu-Natal catchment area, where the early warning systems, together with the South Africa Weather Services (SAWS), were being developed so as to ensure that the DEA was interfacing with people on the ground. At COP23, there had been exchanges around indigenous knowledge and it could not be common across countries, as there were different knowledge systems involved.

To meet the DEA’s reporting obligations, it was currently developing the monitoring and evaluation system. The Department was currently releasing GHG inventory biannual reports, which was part of the DEA’s monitoring and reporting. The DEA was confident that, come 2020, the system would be in place and functional.

Concerning the gender action plan, this was at a global level. The focus was around ensuring the participation of women through policy development and, in the design of programmes, that the gender aspect was taken into account throughout the entire UN system -- in terms of participation, serving on the committees, and supporting the UN system programmes.

Mr Maesela Kekana, Chief Director: International Climate Change Relations and Negotiations, DEA, said the gender action plan was still under negotiation and the draft contained the guidelines to countries for mainstreaming gender into their plans, but also in the execution of their climate actions. This encompassed women representation at all levels in the UN system itself.

The US withdrawal was a big problem. If President Trump decides that the US would be a free rider going forward, and did not respect the NDCs of the previous administration, it would create a significant gap in the system. Experience testified to the fact that US withdrawal from international agreements almost collapses the protocol. However, the US was still engaged. While the US had proposed favourable terms, it was yet to come to the table in this regard. The US was not ‘a fan’ of multilateralism. But negotiations were on-going.

In the main, the developed countries want to re-channel their mandates towards the funding of developing countries. This was no surprise, as there was not much to fund. What had been done was to agree on a climate change fund for all developing countries. However, what was creeping in now --for example, in the Green Fund -- the more money that was given, the more the developed countries required increased funding from the developing countries’ side. However, the expectation was that the Green Fund, the biggest, would continually be funded by developed countries. South Africa was taking a very difficult position around the issue of financing. As per the Paris agreement, however, developed countries had to make commitments to support the developing countries. Over the next five years, the developing countries would hold the developed countries to account with respect to these commitments.

What South Africa was expecting from the Talanoa dialogue was to answer three questions: Where are we? Where do we want to be? How do we get there? The expectation was that the dialogues would lead to the revision of the NDCs, especially those of developed countries. A special report had been commissioned on what actions needed to be taken over the next five years to achieve the targets. This report had been given to the scientific board of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC would release the report in the first week of October. It was meant to be the main input into the Talanoa Dialogue.

The letter and the spirit behind the facilitative dialogue were around two things. There were two sets of NDCs: those that begin in 2020 and in 2030, and those that begin in 2025 and 2035. What was desired was to have a common timeframe. Under the facilitative dialogue, what was expected was that in 2020, those that had a ten year NDC would provide a mid-year number, and those that had provided a mid-year number for 2025, would revise their NDCs to provide a long-term number, in order to close any gaps. The European Community was reluctant to revise their NDCs, which was a ten-year period, precisely because the US was not coming on board. What would happen was that South Africa would try to use the space at the Talanoa Dialogue to maintain political momentum.

Mr Kekana said that during the Talanoa Dialogue, in terms of the pre-2020 goals, parties would be urged -- particularly those who had not yet done so:

• To ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol without delay, if they were party to the Kyoto Protocol;

• To fulfil the provision of US $100 billion per year by 2020, as pledged in 2009; and

• To close the current ambition gap.

This approach had started to generate more political momentum. Cities were hosting their own conferences. Regions were also hosting their own Talanoa dialogues. There were plans to host one for Africa on the 22 March 2018. Although it was not mandatory, South Africa was planning to conduct a national stakeholder engagement in the spirit of the Talanoa Dialogue, which would look at the three spheres of government -- local, provincial and national -- around questions of integration, and how to recognise contributions to the national climate change goals etc.

There were three things which all the rich countries were aiming for: These were the conclusion of the transparency framework, and guidance on mitigation and concurrence. While these terms were accepted, South Africa was adamant that a decision had first to be made on how they were going to communicate the extent of financial support to South Africa. Concerning the pre-2020 and post-2020 periods, it needed to understand how to craft an international cooperative framework that would enhance prospects of achieving the NDCs. When South Africa submitted its next NDC, it was expected to show progression, including in terms of its goals. If South Africa did not get a good decision in this regard, it would be in some form of trouble. However, if South Africa came up with a good international cooperation framework for the pre-2020 period, this framework could be used to increase international cooperation, which would give South Africa space to increase its action. For example, there was a lot of potential for international cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique. The question was, who was going to fund it. Since South Africa had to protect itself, it had always insisted that its NDC applied to both mitigation and adaptation. South Africa could not wait on the international community when it came to natural disasters.

Mr Kekana concluded that when it came to anticipation of the Paris Rule Book and where South Africa was, in Paris it was agreed that capacities needed to be developed in developing countries, particularly institutional capacities. This had led to the conceptualisation of a capacity-building initiative for transparency. South Africa had commenced this process and it was at an advanced stage. It was a recipient of US $1 million for the implementation of the programme. It was also developing its own monitoring and evaluation system so that it could gauge its transition process to a low-carbon economy

South Africa was not part of the ‘Powering Past Coal Alliance,’ launched by Canada and the UK. South Africa had piloted a very interesting Independent Power Producer (IPP) programme. This was the future.

The Chairperson interjected, asking why -- if coal was not the future -- there was still a decision to build coal-fired power stations. This was an area which required some discussion. Were these power stations taking South Africa forward in terms of its transition, or were they holding it back? There appeared to be a contradiction between South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon economy and the construction of these power stations, since they would be adding more GHG emissions. They would undermine South Africa’s efforts to transition to a low-carbon economy. He also asked about the size of the South African delegation at the conference

Mr Kekana responded that the basis of South Africa’s transition policy for the future was based on economics. The energy that was derived from renewables was much cheaper, compared to the energy derived from coal globally. Coal was done, and it had not been able to create the jobs the US had purported that it could bring.

Taking into consideration that there were over 106 agenda items which mostly ran in parallel, there were 40 core negotiators. South Africa had tried to increase its representation by despatching members of the Africa group. There were fewer negotiators than those who operated in the climate action space, where the partnerships were made. Not only did the Ministers of Environment attend the proceedings, but other ministries as well, such as Water, Energy etc. The physical structure at COP had changed tremendously. Only one–third of the space was used for negotiation. In terms of the size of the delegation, South Africa did not feature in the top five African countries. What South Africa had managed to achieve was very significant. It was very proud that it continued to give guidance to the African group, and continued to champion the struggle of the developing countries so that a fair deal emerged from the negotiations. South Africa had the potential to do more.

The Chairperson asked for an accurate figure of the delegation size to be forwarded to the Committee.

Mr Mac Makwarela, Director: Climate Change Mitigation Policy, Regulation and Planning, DEA, referred to how South Africa was endeavouring to meet its obligations, and said that there had been a lot of talks about the mitigation system that South Africa was currently developing. This had been approved by Cabinet in 2015. The first step was to understand what the tasks were that South Africa was capable of doing in terms of mitigation reduction. Actions that were needed and the sources of emissions had also been identified. With this data, it was possible to determine how far South Africa could go in terms of emission reduction and how much the interventions that were proposed would contribute during the respective periods. South Africa had projected up to 2050. This was in line with South Africa’s obligations.

In terms of South Africa’s interventions, the majority of South Africa’s emissions were coming from coal-generated energy. It was important that these emissions were arrested. It was important to ensure that South Africa’s energy mix was emission-conservative. The policy considered the issues around, among others, the appropriate energy mix. A lot had changed since the Paris Agreement and since the mitigation system was approved by Cabinet in 2015. For example, attention was being given to the employment of women and the costs of renewables. South Africa should be doing more in this space. As a result, the DEA had, among others, influenced the energy mix by ensuring that clean energy had a space in the energy mix.

To ensure that South Africa meets the timeframes, the DEA was designing an approach and methodology to allocate targets and budgets. Targets would be allocated to various sectors, which would depend on the emission-prevalence of the various sectors. South Africa’s targets, at the moment, were based on the international objectives. South Africa fell short in terms of meeting international obligations. The methodology allowed countries to set more ambitious goals. All the measures South Africa was carrying out were to ensure that there was emission reduction certainty over the long-term. Also, industry should be aware of the long-term emission reduction trajectory of South Africa and the kind of instruments that were in place to facilitate the transition.

Mr Kekana said that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change relied on the distinction between developed and developing countries, and did not allow for the inclusion of a third category, namely, middle-income countries. Since South Africa was technically a middle-income country, it continued to give guidance to the financial mechanism around issues relating to developing and middle-income countries.

The Chairperson thanked the delegation, particularly the negotiators, for their efforts at COP23. Firstly, COP24 must adopt a Paris Rule Book which puts into practice the Paris Agreement in the period before 2020. There would be certain complications arising in the post-2020 period that would then need to be attended to. Although the work gets done in the Portfolio Committee, there was an impression that the Committee was not taken seriously. Only two Committee Members had attended COP23. It had nevertheless been a very impressive COP.

Last week, the Committee had had a joint meeting with the Standing Committee on Finance concerning the Carbon Tax Bill. The best way would have been to handle it in the form of a workshop, just to get to understand the Bill itself. The CarbonTax Bill was quite a complex piece of legislation. There was a sense that colleagues did not really understand what it was about, because of its complexity. The Standing Committee had had to finalise the Money Bill. The Chairperson would speak to Mr Yunus Carrim (ANC), Chairperson of the Standing Committee, to determine the possibility of hosting a Carbon Tax workshop. It was a vital piece of legislation that directly addressed South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon economy.

The Minister of Energy, Mr David Mahlobo, would probably be approached on the additional approval of coal power stations, such as the Thabametsi power station. Whether these power stations took South Africa forward or holds it back was an issue that would have to be addressed.

The Department of Energy must release the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) so that there could be clarity. Although the IRP did not apply only to nuclear energy, this was the problem that seemed to have bedevilled the IRP. The emphasis had become focused on nuclear and the controversies that surrounded it, as opposed to what the IRP was supposed to be about, which was the transition to an appropriate energy-mix. The Committee would request the Minister of Energy, Mr. David Mahlobo, to send a team to brief the Committee on the IRP.

SADC Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development

Mr Stuart Mangold, Senior Policy Advisor: African Bilateral Relations, DEA, said the purpose of the presentation was to request Parliament, in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution, to approve the ratification of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development.

Background

Mr Mangold, by way of context, commented that SADC was a priority for South Africa in terms of its international relations and cooperation agenda, which proclaimed ‘A better Africa and a better World’. The SADC Treaty stated that the objective for SADC was to achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment. The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) for environmental and sustainable development had identified the development of a legal framework for regional cooperation in areas of the environment and natural resources, including trans-boundary ecosystems, as a priority.

The SADC Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development had been signed by President Zuma on 18 August 2014 at the 34th SADC Summit, held at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. The overall objective of the Protocol was to promote sustainable utilization and trans-boundary management of the environment, which was of interest to SADC member states. The Protocol covered a wide range of environmental issues, including climate change, waste and pollution, chemicals management, biodiversity and natural heritage, sustainable land management, marine and inland water resources, as well as cross-cutting issues such as gender, science and technology and trade and investment.

The Protocol’s specific objectives were to:

• enhance the protection of the environment in order to contribute to human health, wellbeing and poverty alleviation;

• promote equitable and sustainable utilization of natural resources and the environment for the benefit of the present and future generations;

• promote the shared management of the trans-boundary environment and natural resources; and

• promote effective management and reponse to impacts of climate change and variability.

Mr Mangold commented that the Protocol was in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP), which prioritised the deepening of integration of the SADC region, as well as ensuring environmental sustainability and an equitable transition to a low-carbon economy. Furthermore, the Protocol was consistent with Section 24 of the Constitution, which enshrines the right of everyone to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations.

SADC Protocol on Environmental Management

Mr Mangold expanded on the content of the Protocol, which was divided into sections.

The preamble of the Protocol dealt with the SADC Treaty provisions; the role of environmental management in socio-economic well-being; food security and poverty alleviation; reference to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) provisions, Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and Rio+20; environment linked to global security, climate change, desertification, biodiversity, water resources, and the earth’s capacity to assimilate pollution and waste; gender equality, inter-regional trade, investment and development and economic integration; reference to ratification of international conventions and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) by member states;

Part 1: Definitions, Scope, Principles and Objectives

Part 1 presents the definitions, scope, principles and objectives of the Protocol (See Slides 9 and 10).

Part 2: Management of the Environment and Trans-boundary Considerations

Part 2 involves the protection of the environment through conservation, management and control of air, land and water pollution, waste and chemicals management, climate change, marine and coastal biodiversity and heritage trans-boundary environmental impacts. It deals with the management of shared natural resources and trans-boundary considerations through monitoring and reporting on environmental trends, co-ordination, management plans, and legislation.

Part 3: Implementation

Part 3 deals with matters of implementation. The general undertakings of member states entailed responsibility for the management of trans-boundary natural resources and shared ecosystems, waste and pollution, monitoring and reporting, information management and exchange, and cooperation with neighbouring states on environmental management. Member states’ responsibilities for law enforcement encompassed the provisioning of environmental management law enforcement resources – personnel and equipment – and harmonisation of monitoring and surveillance systems. Regarding the harmonisation of policies and legislation, the proposed measures that were to be taken included agreement on environmentally detrimental activities, and co-operation on environmental crime, extradition and penalties. Insofar as international relations were concerned, member states needed to be encouraged to sign, ratify and domesticate MEAs. There was also a need for the development of common positions for relevant MEAs.

Part 4: Cross-Sectoral Issues

Part 4 of the Protocol addressed cross-sectoral issues. In terms of human resources development, it dealt with environmental education and awareness, and capacity building for environmental management and skills transfer. It stressed the promotion of sustainable trade and investment, in the environmental management sector, public-private partnerships (PPPs), cleaner production, standards and certification, and access to markets. In relation to science and technology, the Protocol advances the promotion of joint research programmes, scientific advice and knowledge sharing, such as meteorology, drought early warning systems and remote sensing. From the perspective of information management, exchange and reporting, the Protocol unpacks methodologies for the management and exchange of relevant information, communication strategies, the development of standards and state of environment reporting. It promotes gender mainstreaming of environmental management, climate change and sustainable development policies, programmes, projects and budgets, and implementation of gender responsive policies, strategies, projects and programmes, including capacity building, education, and training.

Part 5: Institutional Arrangements

Part 5, which addresses institutional arrangements, provides for the establishment of the committee of ministers responsible for the environment; the committee of senior officials responsible for the environment; the technical committee on environmental management; and other specialist committees and working groups.

Part 6: Final Provisions

Part 6 deals with the final provisions (see slide 17)

South Africa’s Ratification Process

Mr Mangold said that the Protocol must be approved for ratification by Parliament, following national stakeholder consultations. The following steps had been taken and concluded:

• The DEA had obtained legal opinions from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD).

• An extensive process of consultation had been concluded, including presentations to the provincial departments responsible for the environment at the DEA Working Group 11 on 16 April 2015; and to the Environment MinTech and MinMech on 7 August 2015.

• No objections or concerns about South Africa’s ratification of this Protocol had been received from these provincial departments.

• The Protocol was submitted to Heads of the following National Departments for further inputs and comments: Arts and Culture, Trade and Industry; National Treasury; Economic Development; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Science and Technology; South African Police Services, South Africa Revenue Services; Transport; Defence and Military Veterans; Water and Sanitation; International Relations and Cooperation; and State Security Agency.

• No objections or concerns about South Africa’s ratification of this Protocol have been received from these Departments.

• The Protocol had been presented to the Global and Continental Affairs Committee (GCAC) on 24 August 2017, as well as to the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Directors-General Cluster on 12 September 2017, and the ICTS Cabinet Committee on 19 September 2017.

All of the above had recommended that South Africa should proceed with the ratification of the SADC Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development.

Benefits of Ratification

Mr Mangold elaborated on the benefits of ratification of the Protocol. It would contribute towards sustainable development and regional integration of SADC, which were priorities for South Africa in terms of the country’s international relations and cooperation agenda, ‘A better Africa and a better World’. It would also facilitate the harmonisation of policies, strategies and legal frameworks to enhance regional integration within the SADC region through the management of shared and trans-boundary natural resources, including monitoring and reporting on environmental trends, co-ordination of environmental management plans, and the harmonisation of legislation, policies and standards amongst member states.

Ratification and its subsequent coming into force had various other benefits. It provided a legal basis for coordinated environmental management, agreement on environmentally detrimental activities, co-operation on environmental crime, extradition and penalties, as well as developing and implementing co-ordinated environmental disaster management responses within SADC. It provided for joint implementation of environment impact assessments (EIAs) in order to harmonise EIA processes for cross-border infrastructure development, thereby enabling and paving the way for a coordinated approach to environmental management in the SADC region. The adoption of the Protocol by SADC member states would be in South Africa’s interest in promoting sound and improved trans-boundary environmental management and cooperation within the SADC region, which was consistent with the revised Regional Indicative Development Plan. South Africa’s ratification of the Protocol would send a clear signal that the country was committed to strengthening regional efforts to conserve trans-boundary natural resources and promote sustainable development. As the largest economy in the SADC region, it was envisaged that South Africa would be expected to take a leadership role in the implementation of the Protocol.

Implementation Plan

The national implementation of the Protocol would be coordinated by the DEA, with inputs from other relevant departments. The SADC regional implementation plan would be developed through the SADC environmental technical committees comprising senior officials of environment ministries from all SADC member states, coordinated and supported by the SADC Secretariat.

Mr Mangold argued that the implications of the Protocol included recognition that the environments were linked to global security in respect of issues such as climate change, desertification, biodiversity loss, diminishing water resources and the degradation of the earth’s capacity to assimilate pollution and waste, although it did not mention any specific security-related measures to be undertaken by SADC member states in this regard. Furthermore, the Protocol called for the facilitation of the harmonisation of environmental policies, legislation, law enforcement and natural resources governance, and provided for collaboration in environmental law enforcement between state parties.

In terms of Article 35, the Protocol should come into force 30 days after the instruments of ratification had been deposited by nine member states. Although 10 member states had signed, only one member had ratified the Protocol to date.

Finally, as Chair of SADC from August 2017 to August 2018, South Africa intended to ratify this Protocol to demonstrate commitment to strengthening regional efforts to conserve trans-boundary natural resources and promote sustainable development within SADC.

Recommendation

Mr Mangold said it was recommended that Parliament approve the ratification of the SADC Protocol on Environmental Management for Sustainable Development in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution.

Protocol approved

The presentation was followed by the approval by the Committee of the SADC Protocol. Approval of the report was proposed by Mr Luyenge and seconded by Ms S Mchunu (ANC).

The meeting was adjourned.