Eskom Inquiry: Khulani Qoma

Meeting report

Mr Qoma’s Opinion: Eskom Board committed material fiduciary duty infringements: A roadmap to recovery (awaited)
The Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprise heard a submission from Khulani Qoma, General Manager in the Office of the Eskom Board Chairperson, responsible for reputation management as well as board spokesperson. When he joined Eskom in December 2016, Mr Qoma explained that the objective of his role was to restore confidence in both the Board and Eskom by South Africans. Eskom needed to find its feet so that the organisation could be sustainable yet again.

The evidence leader noted that substantial evidence had been placed before the Committee which suggested corporate governance lapses and he engaged Mr Qoma on the two documents he had furnished the Committee.

Explaining the lack of confidence in Eskom, Mr Qoma explained that there had been a tacit admission that reputationally the organisation was taking a huge knock as Mr Matshela Koko had been roundly flagged in the media as someone who was totally without any ethics and he lied in front of the camera in his Carte Blanche interview of 11 June 2016. This was played to the Committee.

Mr Qoma spoke about the controversial tender in April 2016, involving Mr Edwin Mabelane, then Head of Procurement and Matshela Koko who was Eskom Group Chief Executive. A short-term coal supply agreement between various suppliers and Eskom to supply coal to Arnot Power Station where Tegeta requested that Eskom give a R600 million prepayment to enable it to meet the procurement requirements.

Mr Qoma spoke of the blacklisting by Mr Brian Molefe of journalist, Chris Yelland, whom Mr Qoma considered an ethical journalist. He had been blacklisted at the time Mr Qoma joined Eskom but the reasons for the blacklisting did not make sense. After approaching then Chairperson, Dr Ngubane, Mr Yelland was taken off the blacklist, much to the chagrin of Mr Molefe when he returned to Eskom.

Asked about the effect on Eskom’s reputation of the return of Mr Molefe as Group CEO, Mr Qoma said that the effect was totally devastating because it flew against the expectations of society. Other people who were eating at Eskom's reputation were Matshela Koko and Anoj Singh.

Mr Qoma told how Dr Ngubane had been close to suspending Mashela Koko but he was stopped in his tracks by Minister Brown. Dr Ngubane had received an anonymous letter with a list of alleged infractions against Koko and had called a quick board meeting to seek a suspension. The Board had agreed but just before Dr Ngubane was to call Mr Koko, Mr Khoza snuck out of the room to make a call to a Gupta brother. Very shortly thereafter, Minister Brown phoned Dr Ngubane, instructing him to stop the suspension process.

Mr Qoma was asked to read an opinion paper Eskom Board committed material fiduciary duty infringements: A roadmap to recovery which he had written and presented to the current Acting Board Chairperson, Mr Zethembe Khoza.

Mr Qoma, and was a request sent by the current Board to Minister Brown requesting approval for Anoj Singh to access Board Minutes and other confidential documents while he was on suspension. Both Mr Qoma and Committee Members believed this to be highly irregular and unethical.

Mr Qoma reserved his greatest criticism for Minister Brown. She had a skill for finding an individual below the surface to serve on the Eskom Board instead of finding a reputable leader who was known by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. That was a sign of irresponsibility and he thought that South Africans were too polite because in South Africa, the office is more important than the substance. He asserted that, “Minister Brown actually lies and she lies all the time. And she thinks that we can’t see it. Minister Brown had actually gone to the end of the world telling everyone that she was not wet. Yet she was right in the midst of water."

Mr Qoma admitted to receiving one threatening call about his appearance at the Eskom inquiry.

Adv Vanara asked if there was a lack of capacity in Eskom or whether it was a deliberate attempt to ensure that certain families got enrichment out of the opportunities that existed at Eskom.

Mr Qoma was brief in his response, explaining that the problem was that the new Board, and obviously the Minister, had been captured.

Committee members asked if the conduct of the Minister and the Board, in the promotion of mediocrity in the recruitment of board members or executive, was criminal. Mr Qoma agreed, noting that the lost opportunity costs had not been quantified. The Minister had a portfolio that potentially made her a super minister because she was in charge of the economic pillars of the country, but she had no clue about what she was doing. That was criminal. Members applauded Mr Qoma's honesty. It was very refreshing, and he was not afraid to talk about lies. He was complimented on the quality of the opinion piece written for the Board.
Members asked why Eskom had wanted Carl Niehaus to be brought in to assist Mr Qoma with messaging; why he considered the R30 million payout to Mr Brian Molefe a Ponzi scheme; whether Eskom had thought the payout would stay secret.

It was noted by the Committee that those that Mr Qoma had implicated would have the opportunity to respond to the very serious allegations he had made. He had connected the dots starting with his employment, and based on reading the Public Protector Report, the Dentons Report, the Academics’ Reports, and the Church’s Report.

Members recalled a Portfolio Committee meeting where the Minister said she had little to do with the appointment of the CEO as the Memorandum of Incorporation did not give her that power. Mr Qoma said the Minister had quite proudly demonstrated her ignorance of her own role. She had a very funny strategy: she either was misled, or she did not know, or she said the matter was operational. However, when it suited her, she would dabble in operational matters. Eskom had a crucial role to play in the country and it needed a fit leader to lead it and then the rest would follow suit.

Meeting Report
Mr S Swart (ACDP) indicated that there were further developments, especially from Mr Matona, and that the Committee would have to hear the evidence at some stage.

The Chairperson thanked Mr Smart and indicated that the Committee would have an in-camera meeting after today’s hearings and would discuss the matter then.

The Chairperson read the pledge to Mr Khulani Alpheus Qoma and he affirmed that he would tell the truth.

Adv Ntuthuzelo Vanara led the evidence collection.

Witness: Mr Khulani Alpheus Qoma

Adv Vanara: Mr Qoma, for the record, can you state your full names for the record?

Mr Qoma: Khulani Alpheus Qoma

Adv Vanara: You are aware that the Committee is looking at the corporate governance at Eskom and that you have been asked to appear before it to give testimony about your knowledge and experience within Eskom. Can you explain to the Committee what is your academic background and what is your relationship with Eskom?

Mr Qoma: I hold a couple of degrees – BA Communications Science, Post-Graduate Higher Diploma in Journalism and Media Studies, and MBL which is a Master of Business Leadership. My relationship with Eskom is that of General Manager in the office of the Eskom Board Chairperson. The substantive value of that is that I am responsible for reputation management as an advisor as well as the spokesperson at the same time.

Adv Vanara: There has been substantial evidence before the Committee, which suggests some corporate governance lapses. You have furnished the Committee with two documents, which we will, in short, engage in. But if you could just share with the Committee when you joined Eskom and what was your mandate. What is it that you were meant to do at Eskom?

Mr Qoma: I joined Eskom on the 1 December 2016. My mandate is to assist Eskom to get out of the rut of a very bad image. At the time, the Public Protector had just published its report and it was very clear that the organisation was going down a spiral reputationally so my mandate was to advise the Board at material times, and strategically ensure that we were able to deal with the challenges at that time and actually get to a level that would have been acceptable both to Eskom and to the people of South Africa.

Adv Vanara: If I understand you correctly, the objective was for you to restore confidence in both the board and Eskom

Mr Qoma: Yes. It was an admission, the way I interpreted it, that the Board had realised that South Africans had lost confidence in Eskom's ability to perform. Eskom needed to find its feet so that the organisation could be sustainable again.

Adv Vanara: My understanding is that at Eskom there is a Corporate Affairs team. Was your appointment not in any way a duplication or what were the reasons for your appointment over and above Eskom’s Corporate Affairs?

Mr Qoma: I sought to understand that at the time when I was approached in November 2016, because I understood that Eskom had a very big team from a corporate affairs point of view. I was told that they could not meet the expectations of turning around the reputation of the company. Therefore, they needed someone who had the requisite experience.

Adv Vanara: Before you joined Eskom, can you just take the Committee through whether this position had been advertised or you had been headhunted and, if so, by whom? And, secondly, explain to the Committee if there was a document that you had to prepare for the Board, prior to your appointment.

Mr Qoma: I was headhunted by Eskom board member, Ms Venete Klein, and later joined by Zethembe Khoza, Eskom board chairperson. Initial conversations were quite broad and later on they went to the specifics of what they actually wanted and had in mind for this position to accomplish. I prepared the presentation requested and presented the strategy at a board meeting. The main problem at that time or the problem statement, if you want to put it that way, was the State of Capture Report by the Public Protector. The result is that I am sitting here today and I work for Eskom.

Adv Vanara: So, you started duties on 1 December 2016. Is that correct?

Mr Qoma: Yes.

Adv Vanara: You, in your statement in paragraph 3.5, refer to the Minister’s appointment of Mr Koko as Acting Group Chief Executive. Can you take the Committee through your testimony on that?

Mr Qoma: It would have been just a few weeks before I started, and I remember the shock that I had and nearly went back on my decision to join Eskom because I did not understand what it all meant. There was a tacit admission that reputationally the organisation was taking a huge knock. Suddenly the decision was that someone who was quite compromised as we all know, Mr Koko, was actually appointed by the Minister. This was a shock for me and I remember distinctly receiving quite a few calls asking if I was still joining those guys in spite of what the Minister had just done. Essentially, these are my problems. Koko had been quite roundly flagged in the media as someone who was totally without ethics. That was the media. And then there was an interview later on with Carte Blanche where he totally lied in front of the camera. So, the question was asked and he decided to tell a different story from what the objective facts were. Then at the end of the show, they produced the document and he was lost because it was a document that bore his signature. That was a national story. I don’t think anyone with reading ability missed that. If you were in South Africa and you looked up, you would have seen that one way or another. In spite of all that, the Minister actually appointed Koko. What got me totally messed up about the entire thing, was the fact that I had a different understanding of what a shareholder is. It would be someone who was very agile, someone who breathes and lives the values enshrined on certain prescripts. When the Minister did this I did not understand what it could be stemming from. For me, it was totally out of place. So, we have Koko today.

Adv Vanara played an extract of the CEO Matshela Koko Carte Blanche interview of 11 June 2016.

Adv Vanara: When you referred to a humiliating appearance on Carte Blanche where you say Mr Koko was caught publicly lying, is that the Carte Blanche interview you are referring to?

Mr Qoma: Certainly.

Adv Vanara: This interview took place around June 2016. Do you have any reason to doubt that?

Mr Qoma: Well, for some reason I recorded it differently. To my mind, it was before I joined Eskom.

Adv Vanara: I am going to show you a document here which is a submission made to a Board Tender Committee meeting on 11 April 2016. I would like you to assist the Committee to understand the signatories of this document.

Mr Qoma: (Read the signatures) Yes, these are senior executives of Eskom. I am focusing on the signatories: our Executive at Primary Energy, Mr Edwin Mabelane, who was then Head of Procurement and Matshela Koko was Group Executive of Generation at the time.

Adv Vanara: Can you go to the first page of the document and read the date on the document?

Mr Qoma: Submission to the Board Tender Committee on 11 April 2016.

Adv Vanara: Can you read the entire submission?

Mr Qoma: (Reads the submission) Addendum to the short-term coal supply agreement between various suppliers and Eskom (Pty) Ltd for the supply of coal to Arnot Power Station. Resolution required: Resolve that approval be, and is hereby, granted that addenda to the short-term supply agreements between various suppliers and Eskom be concluded to extend the supply of coal from various sources of Arnot Power Station for up to a further five months and all such periods as may be requested by suppliers but no later than 30 November 2016. The Chief Financial Officer is hereby authorised to approve the basis for repayment to secure the fixed coal price for the period of extension. The Group Executive: Generation is hereby authorised to take all the necessary steps to give effect to the above, including the signing of any concerns or any other documentation necessary or related thereto.

Summary of facts: Salient Facts: the requirements for the supply of contract coal originates from the 2016 supply chain as presented at the Primary Energy Technical Control Centre of 8 April 2016. It was identified that supply to Arnot will be inadequate to meet the burn requirements of the Power Station of the winter months and that there was an urgent need for additional coal. This identified requirement is as a result of the need to build up stock over a short period, while the RFP for Arnot is being finalised. The shortfall of supply amounts to approximately 2.1 million tons. At present, this RFP is in negotiation phase and it is anticipated that will take up to a maximum period of five months to conclude the supply contracts. The current short-term portfolio consists of two suppliers, namely Umsimbithi Mining (Pty) Ltd and Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd. Umsimbithi is contracted to supply Arnot with 540 000 tons and was currently underperforming due to protracted industrial action. The current contract supply will then be depleted in and around June should the industrial action be stemmed for mining operations restored. The supplier indicated a willingness to extend from July 2016 to September 2016 on similar terms and conditions. Tegeta short-term contracts are for 600 000 tons of coal from Optimum’s export stockpile. Supply for these contracts is due to be completed by 15 April 2016. The coal from Optimum’s export stock is a higher-grade coal that is suitable for Arnot and Kriel Power Stations. It is difficult to source from elsewhere. These contracts are entered into in terms of the medium-term mandate granted by the Board Tender Committee on 11 September 2008. The BTC have approved a mandate to negotiate and conclude CSAs on a medium-term basis for the supply and delivery of coal to various Eskom power stations for the period October 2008 to March 2018 and this includes the beneficiation of coal by suppliers and the contractors. The benefits of extending these short-term contracts include the coal is being mined and delivered without delay. Tegeta has the potential to supply approximately 250 tons per month and Umsimbithi approximately 180 tons per month. It will therefore be in the best interests of Eskom to negotiate and conclude extensions to these short-term contracts to alleviate the coal shortage at Arnot, due to the closure of Arnot Colliery. Additionally, to alleviate the shortfall of coal requirement at Kriel due to the underperformance of Kriel underground mine. By procuring this coal for Arnot and Kriel Power Stations, it will assist towards building stock days as, according to the April 2016 supply plan as presented at the Primary Energy TCC of 8 April 2016, there is currently an estimated 2.14MT tons shortfall at Arnot Power Station for the financial year 2017 and 280 000 tons shortfall at Kriel Power Station for the financial year 2017. Both suppliers have indicated their willingness to extend the current contracts. However, Tegeta has requested that Eskom consider some form of prepayment to enable it to meet the procurement requirements from the export component of the mine in lieu of the fact that it was subsidising the direct fit to Hendrina Power Station for power and this will enable it to meet the coal supply demands for the two power stations in the short term.

Key assumptions: The submission and decision required set out herein is based on the following key assumptions: quality as agreed in the existing STC would be delivered; terms and conditions of the existing STC shall remain. Eskom is securing its call supply for two power stations in the short-term, pending the conclusion of the procurement process. The principle of prepayment for security of supplies has been established by various approvals.

Financial implications: To date, the cost of coal in respect of these short-term contracts is as follows: contracts for Tegeta Exploration and Resources tons current 500 000. Second addendum: 1.2 billion. Rands current 235 715. Second addendum 586 787 Unit cost 20.41 Second addendum 20.41.

Adv Vanara: This is a submission made by, amongst others, Mr Matshela Koko, to the Board Tender Committee on 11 April 2016. The interview that we have just shown you took place in June 2016, hardly three months later. You have seen for yourself Mr Koko pleading ignorance. What do you make of that?

Mr Qoma: It confirms what we already know, that the relationship between him and the truth does not appear to be close.

Adv Vanara: Let’s move on then. You are a reputational manager having worked at different organisations, both in the public and private sector for both individuals and juristic persons. What did you make of that appointment from a reputational perspective for Eskom?

Mr Qoma: if you look at how reputations are achieved by companies and people, you actually arrive at one conclusion – they arise from correct and rational decisions by the bearers of those reputations. If it is an organisation it has to be led by correct people so that then decisions are made which give rise to a good reputation. It is not about words, it is about lead action so when the Minister and the Board, obviously I am emphasising the Minister as she has a bigger reputation, made a recommendation of a person with such a terrible past and the Minister endorses that, then you wonder what your role is as a reputation manager because I don’t appoint people. Anyone who does reputation management does not appoint anyone. So, you rely on people to create a platform for reputation to thrive. That was the decision that destroyed the reputation. Period.

Adv Vanara: In Paragraph 3.9 of your statement, you refer to a blacklisting of a certain journalist. Can you share that with the Committee?

Mr Qoma: When I joined Eskom, amongst a number of things that confirmed to me that the reputation management was something that possibly is not very familiar with some of them and, in fact, is quite closer to some of the people employed to do the job, I found that Chris Yelland – a lot of people know Chris Yelland as someone who actually is a very ethical journalist. He wants only the truth and you may hate him for that if you do not like the truth. He had been blacklisted at the time when I joined and I soon discovered that, so I tried to find out why. I was given various reasons that did not make sense. In fact, whatever reason that could possibly have been made available could not have made sense given that this is a democracy and we may disagree, but we don’t blacklist each other. So, I debated it and took it to the Monday meeting. We used to have regular Monday meetings where all the executives attended, including the CEO. So Matshela Koko was CEO then. I took it there and I said that I had realised that Chris Yelland was no longer part of the people that access our account, Twitter account, as well as the documents of the organisation, to which all journalists are entitled. This journalist was excluded. We argued about it. At some point, he said to me that since they had blacklisted that guy, “My stress levels are actually down because he gives me a lot of stress”. I didn’t win because the meeting became very heated and I decided to walk away and seek a different approach to it. Later on, I went to Dr Ngubane and presented the same case that I had presented in the meeting and he said to me that if I think so strongly about this thing, then tell them that I am actually removing him from the blacklist. That is how the blacklist was lifted. I shall fast track it. When Molefe joined after the entire fiasco, this matter was brought back by Corporate Affairs yet again – that Yelland had been brought back and was accessing the stuff that he used not to access while he was blacklisted and that was distorting our outlook in terms of our social media. I was very quick to say that it was now an instruction of the Chairman to un-blacklist him, so he remains part of our network.

Adv Vanara: But who had blacklisted the journalist in question? Who had taken the decision to blacklist him? Do you know?

Mr Qoma: I understand, because I did enquire, that it was Molefe’s decision which was then carried forward by Koko. So, typically he would have instructed Corporate Affairs to blacklist him and then later on he moved on and then Koko came in and was very excited about the decision.

Adv Vanara: Again, what was the effect, from a reputational management perspective, of the return of Mr Molefe as Group CEO at Eskom?

Mr Qoma: The effect was actually totally devastating for us because it flew against the expectations of society to have him back in the company. So, Eskom like all other entities operates within the mandate of the citizens of the nation. So, when he came back, it was unthinkable for everyone. It was very clear. The media went on a serious protest, commentators as well as political parties came into the fray. As you know, cases were opened against his return. So, all of that played against the image of the organisation and, therefore, the confidence that we could have possibly built, if we did not allow ourselves to go that particular route.

Adv Vanara: You are the advisor, the reputational manager. Did you share your views with the Board or the Chairperson of the Board?

Mr Qoma: Yes, I did but I must admit that I did not do it to the level that I normally do these things when it comes to strategic decisions that I think are irrational. I normally write things down because I know that a moment will come when I shall be asked what did I do. On this particular one, when it was presented to me as something that could possibly happen, I thought that it was not possible. I thought of everything that could possibly happen but Molefe would not come back. This is how I ended up not writing it down. I said to myself that the Minister was going to stop it. There was no way that she was going to allow it to happen. So eventually I decided not to write it down. I just spoke about it. I raised all the concerns reputationally that I know, but did not write it down, which is what I regret.

Adv Vanara: You know, part and parcel of Eskom, there is this Dentons Report. What is your role on how this report is handled within Eskom? I understand that there are various versions of the report.

Mr Qoma: When I joined, obviously there was the State of Capture Report and then later on there was the Dentons Report that had added damage to the reputation. Essentially, the main issue was the non-availability of the Dentons Report. So, the media was aware that an investigation which culminated in four executives being suspended, had been done and concluded, but the report, though it had been promised at the time of the commencement of the investigation, was not. So, it was held within the ranks. At that particular point, I think it will have been early this year, the media started, particularly Sikonathi Mantshantsha of the Business Day was the catalyst. He wanted the report, he asked about the contents of the report, and Eskom did not want to hear about revealing that report. I had various conversations with the Board and I had one major conversation with them where what I eventually presented was a risk profile of the non-disclosure of the Dentons Report. In that meeting, there was agreement generally that the report be released to the media. Mr Anoj Singh was not convinced. I was at pains to understand why he did not see the reason I was presenting that perspective because I wanted to understand if I was missing a particular point that he could not take the point when everyone else was saying, we hear you, let’s release it. A couple of days later, I think it was on the 2nd, and on the 7th there was to be a press conference for the release of this particular report publicly, unfettered, as it was received from Dentons. Then there was a shift and a legal opinion was suddenly solicited, which opinion precluded the release the report. We had already committed that to the media so, in an invite, we had said that we were going to release the report. Suddenly, we get an opinion and the lawyers said that it should be redacted and should be released through PAIA. From a PR reputation point of view, that is an absolute no. When you make a commitment to the media, even if it is the wrong commitment, you need to take it on the chin, live with it. Because it is exactly how you lose image as leaders when you make a commitment and then you turn against it. So, that was how it was actually handled. The reputational impact was maximum there, but negatively.

Adv Vanara: The Opinion that you prepared for the Acting Chairperson of the Board, Mr Khoza, which subsequently served before the Board. Can you just take the Committee through what prompted the Opinion and how the Opinion was prepared, and how it made its way to a meeting of the Board?

Mr Qoma: I provided dates on the document itself. I will just tell the story. For dates, you can always refer to the document. When Mr Khoza was appointed, he asked what could his priorities be so that he could then become the formal Chairperson of the Board. This was just an ambition; nothing wrong with it. But he asked how he could then do it through the work that he was supposed to do. I took advantage of that. I engaged him because it was something that had been in my mind for a while. With Dr Ngubane. I was speaking the same language. When he asked this question, I saw a possibility to engage him with on what I saw as the trajectory reputationally. I told him that he needs to make some critical but very unpopular decisions. In any case, that is how you gain a reputation and confidence. It is not about the good but you have to make decisions that are in keeping with the sustainability of the organisation, whatever cause you are pushing. We debated it a little bit and I told him exactly what I meant.

I said that the people who are depleting the reputation of the company and eating at the reputation of the organisation every day, it is Matshela Koko and it is Anoj Singh. That is just the beginning but you need to deal with those very important people because the value against negative is actually no relationship. They were eating this entire asset of the state faster than we can ever imagine. I gave him the reasons. They had been mentioned on the Dubai trips, Oberoi Hotel and massages and everything else, and they were not responding to those questions. If the Chief Executive and CFO are negatively mentioned and it is not true, you ascend the highest mountain and actually protest. They did not explain when I asked the questions because the media was asking the questions and I needed to get answers from them. They were not answering and it was clear that they knew that they were not innocent.

Now, where does that leave the image of Eskom? In the doldrums. It is harming us all based on their actions. So, I said to him that we need to get rid of them. He said, “No, no, we need a decision on it”. I said, “No, no. There are two things here. Reputationally, you don’t necessarily have to wait for court. Courts take quite long and the reputation actually diminishes every day. You do not need a decision to determine that. At the very least, as the head of the institution, you need to protect Eskom which remains vulnerable until that decision is made”. I think the meeting was on Friday. He said come to my house on Saturday. I drove to KZN. We met there. There the conversation was not as long. I had already secured a draft from the previous conversation. Then I started writing because he was almost with me. Mr Khoza was 90% into the proposal so in case he agreed, I presented that draft and then we spoke a little bit and it didn’t even take that long. Then he said, “No, no, proceed with it. Go and update and send it back to me”. I remember that it was a Saturday. I’m trying to get the dates as close as possible, if not precisely. But then he shocks me. He said this is likely to succeed. I ask him why. He says to me that Minister Brown is captured. Is that okay? Then he hastens to explain what he means by that. He said that Minister Brown reports to the Guptas and then he tells me about the new Board Members. It was the 14th, if I am not mistaken. I think the document will have it. I try to stick to the story. He says on 23 June, which would have been the AGM, four Board members are going to be announced and those Board members have been appointed by the Guptas. He uses a Zulu phrase, “abantu besikole”, meaning they are very young.

He tells me that actually Dr Ngubane had been close to suspending Mashela Koko but he was stopped right in his tracks by Minister Brown. He says on that particular day, Dr Ngubane had received an anonymous letter with a list of alleged infractions against Koko. Then he conjured up a quick Board meeting to seek a suspension and the Board members had agreed with it, having looked at those infractions. Koko was called because it was late and Koko had already gone home. It was late in the day and so Koko had departed the office by then. He was called back to wait in his office. Letters were prepared to suspend him. Mr Ngobeni had this and he had shared the collateral with other Board members. Just before Dr Ngubane was to call Koko, he snuck out of the room, that is Mr Khoza himself, to make a call to a G brother - I understood that to mean a Gupta brother. He said, I snuck out and I made a call to the G brother and told them that Koko was about to be suspended. They, in turn, made a call to the Minister to instruct her to stop the suspension. Dr Ngubane confirmed this in our conversation that, indeed, he was shocked when he suddenly received a call when he was about to call Koko in so that he was suspended.

My mind is not as innocent, typical of a human being. When he said, in Zulu abantu besikole, meaning the Board Members, that are to be announced on the 23rd, I looked forward to the 23rd so that I can see abantu besikole if they were looking like schoolkids. Indeed, they looked like school kids and I may be offending in this regard but I have to be honest because that is what I sought to do. The three members like abantu besikole, looked like I was walking in the mind of the Chairman, with the exception of Sathaseelan Gounden who was elderly, but also, quite interestingly, a relic from the Post Office. He was part of the Board Members that had to make way for an Administrator at the Post Office. So, Minister Brown had brought another reject to be part of the Board. That was Sathi Gounden.

Adv Vanara: I am a little bit interested in this meeting where Dr Ngubane was supposedly going to suspend Mr Koko. Was it the time when you were already part and parcel of Eskom or was it prior to you joining Eskom?

Mr Qoma: I was already part of Eskom.

Adv Vanara: When would this meeting have taken place? This special meeting called by Dr Ngubane to suspend Mr Koko.

Mr Qoma: It would have been this year – during the early part of this year

Adv Vanara: Ms Suzanne Daniels - would she have been the Company Secretary at the time of the convening of this meeting?

Mr Qoma: Yes, and I understand that she was the one who prepared the documents to suspend Koko. She will have a personal account of the meeting. I heard all this, but she would have read a personal account because she was Company Secretary and she would have prepared all the documentation to suspend Koko.

Adv Vanara: When you say you later confirmed this with Dr Ngubane, at what stage was this?

Mr Qoma: This was, I think, a month after he left Eskom.

Adv Vanara: You had this discussion with Mr Khoza about your Opinion where he is giving you the go-ahead, but my understanding is that this was still a draft to be finalised. Did the draft get to be finalised, and if so, what happened to the document?

Mr Qoma: So, it was a Sunday, after meeting him on a Saturday in his house. On Sunday, it would be the early part of Sunday when I sent him a formal document with the changes that had – well, he just said update it. He did not give me any particular changes to update. Then I sent it back to him. I confirmed in writing, via a text message, that it had been sent to him. And then I proceeded with my life.

This document it appeared was sent to the rest of the Board by him or by Suzanne Daniels, between the two of them. After that I received a call from the Sunday Times about when I attended that meeting, they confronted me with my Opinion, which I duly confirmed because it, indeed, was my Opinion. They sought some comment from me but I wouldn’t comment obviously because that would not have been in keeping with the organisation. The story then appeared, I think, on 26 June. On 27th, on Monday, it was a very the first meeting of this new Board, the reconstituted Board as Minister Brown says. In that meeting, I understand Mr Khoza and Anoj led the charge in their condemnation of this Opinion. It was felt that I had overstepped the mark in how I wrote it. It was prescriptive and a few other descriptors that they used to really stamp on it and then an instruction was made to Suzanne Daniels to get rid of me.

Adv Vanara: This Opinion, I apologise as it is a lengthy document, but could you please read it to the Committee.

Mr Qoma read Eskom Board committed material fiduciary duty infringements: A roadmap to recovery

Adv Vanara: It is not necessary to read the conclusion as the Committee has the document. I want us to move to 8.2. You seem to be discussing an approach by the Board to the Minister for Mr Singh to be furnished with Board Minutes after his suspension. Can you discuss that with the Committee and how that matter was handled?

Mr Qoma: Eight point?

Adv Vanara: 8.2: Minister Brown saw nothing wrong with an outlandish request of the Eskom employees – a deliberate, well-orchestrated and shame-free document.

Mr Qoma: My puzzle here comes with the fact that this current Board actually sent a request to Minister Brown to request for Mr Singh’s access to Board Minutes and other confidential documents. This is reported in the media as a matter of fact, and I think it was also confirmed – it was not refuted, let’s put it that way. So, The Sunday Times has the actual letter that was written by the Board to the Minister, asking for Anoj Singh to have access to confidential documents, and this was in spite of the fact that he was already suspended. Now, that is a normal puzzle. It doesn’t puzzle me only, it will puzzle anyone who knows anything about governance. When you are suspended, you should not therefore have access to things. But this Board had the temerity to approach the Minister, and the Minister, in turn, did not find anything wrong with this because she still heard this Board. If we are to look at governance in the serious light that we should, people actually should get dismissed for stuff, for even having an idea like that cross their mind that a person who is suspended and who is facing allegations that have emanated from the Gupta leaks, Bowman’s Report and other sources. You had DBSA having Eskom over a barrel because they wanted this guy to be out of the company because he was actually pulling the organisation down and yet this Board fought very hard to still keep him while he was away on suspension.

Adv Vanara: You make reference to Minister not taking action after being made to mislead Parliament. That is 8.3. Can you tell the Committee what you mean by that?

Mr Qoma: There was a question that was asked, by, first, the DA on the McKinsey / Trillian matter. It would have been some time towards the end of last year. And because the question was asked to the Minister but the subject matter was Eskom, we provided the response to the Minister in turn, which she then delivered to Parliament. That response was prepared by Anoj Singh. He said we did not pay a cent to Trillian. Meanwhile, we had actually paid them quite a lot of millions. So then, the Minister, in turn lied because she used that information. She was embarrassed by media reports that expressly stated that she had lied. Fast forward. Well, she did not do anything. Before I proceed, she is a Minister in this government and someone causes her to lie. Yet she does not even find anything wrong with it, except to protest for a moment and move on. Minister Brown moves on and pretended as if she had never been lied to. She put her head down and hoped that this particular matter would never come back, and there is no one who lied to her.

She put her head down until when Oliver Wyman had us over a barrel because we had lied again. This same gentleman had released a statement in which Minister presented the findings of Oliver Wyman. Oliver Wyman said, “Correct this within this timeline”. They put us on terms. We corrected and then Minister Brown, guess what, she suddenly emerges from under the table and she protests that she did not know what was happening. Now, I think one has to be actually totally lost not to realise that this is totally unacceptable of a Minister who was caused to lie in a parliamentary question, I think it was November. She did not see that there was something wrong with this transaction and dealt with it, and actually, investigate the matter. At that time, it was early warning enough. Singh did not face any music on this. She knows that the information came from Singh. When the Oliver Wyman thing comes up and the media is chasing her down, she suddenly says, “I did not know what was happening”. If you go back to the statement, you will actually be shocked. She just said, “I don’t know. I did not know”, when she knew. So, those are my opinions about this Minister.

Adv Vanara: So, just to wrap up. Your opinion dated 14 June, it would appear from your statement that you shared it with the spokesperson of the Minister. Is that correct?

Mr Qoma: Yes.

Adv Vanara: Have you heard anything from the Minister regarding this damning opinion of this Board?

Mr Qoma: I must admit that even when I shared it with him, I was being polite. I know that he is a happy clapper. He would never say anything that could make the Minister unhappy. He would never advise the Minister about anything that would not please the Minister. He just claps. He is happy. So, I expected him not to do anything about it because it is a critical review. And indeed, it does not appear that he did do anything. I have never received anything from him.

Adv Vanara: I am not asking you about the Spokesperson and the Spokesperson is not a shareholder representative of Eskom. The Minister is. So, I want to find out if, according to your knowledge, the Minister was furnished with this damning opinion that you presented to the Board.

Mr Qoma: No, nothing has come of it.

Adv Vanara: You are aware that Messrs Tshediso Matona, Dan Marokane and Ms Tsholofelo Molefe were suspended for, what we know today, nothing. Zero. And the Board, of which Mr Khoza was part, did not want anything to do, at least, with Tshediso Matona and Dan Marokane. What do you make of that contradiction in the Board’s behaviour in the manner in which those three executives were treated and the kid gloves approach that is afforded the likes of Messrs Matshela Koko, Anoj Singh, et al?

Mr Qoma: Having looked at certain documents, my suspicion when the Board did not want to release the Dentons Report, I have come to a conclusion that this was an intrigue. A decision was made to get rid of certain people so that one person who was more effective to the agenda was to be retained. If you think about it, those individuals that were suspended were actually in direct competition to Matshela Koko in terms of him ascending to that position which was going to possibly make him effective. I think if you believe something different to that, this is possibly going to be an obiter. When the mandate or terms of reference was prepared for Dentons, it excluded individuals (who would be found to be culpable in the breaches in governance). So, the scope of work deliberately excludes individuals. Dentons look at processes and systems and deliberately excluded individuals who would be found to be culpable.

Now, the little bit that we know today, persons that will certainly have been found guilty is Koko amongst his executives. I have got a page here that I was given by Dr Ngubane of the scope that was given to Dentons. It says, I think that we can read it somewhere, let me just check it quickly. (He checked his documents) I have got it: 8.1. This letter was sent to Ms Mariam Cassim, the chairperson of the Audit and Risk Committee at the time. It comes from a representative of Dentons, Shahid Sulaiman. He says in the letter, I quote: “I note that the terms of reference in respect of the investigation do not require that misconduct by any specific individual be investigated. Accordingly, as we have seen from our first draft preliminary report, we made no recommendations in relation to any specific individual”.

Now, if leadership is possible, then this is not part of leadership. We paid R20 million for the investigation and we are not getting any outcome because we are saying to the investigator, Dentons, that any individual found culpable is not going to be touched as the investigation would treat them very lightly so that there is no one found to be culpable.

Adv Vanara: That is the Dentons Report. There is the Bowman Report. There is just a plethora of reports prepared for Eskom. One assumes that they did not come cheaply but Eskom must have paid a lot of money. But have you seen any consequence?

Mr Qoma: No, no consequence whatsoever, otherwise we would not be here.

Adv Vanara: The last question from me relates to having both what you have said here and some of which is contained in both your opinion and this statement, having been brought to manage the reputation of Eskom, have the Eskom Board and the Minister, the shareholder, done anything to protect the reputation of Eskom and to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities towards this country, in the interest not of themselves, but in the interest of South Africa?

Mr Qoma: Minister Brown and the Board. I think that this is not about anything else but objective thinking. Anyone would come to the same conclusion. Eskom has a role to play in the country that is beyond words and it needs a fit leader to lead it at government level and then the rest will actually follow suit. The Minister appointed Koko when Koko denied on Carte Blanche, but there were also media reports that he was corrupt. But when the Minister appointed Koko, she did not need to do any in-depth due diligence as it was very clear, all in her face. She has just recently appointed Sean Maritz, who had appointed a friend from church, not following processes. She just appointed that guy as Acting CEO at Eskom, appointed by Minister Lynne Brown. She brought Molefe and Anoj, the same people who were also responsible for the destruction of Eskom. Minister Brown has not responded to the allegations from the media about the interest that is borne by her lover at Eskom. She has not been able to respond to that. I don’t think anything will discourage her from saying that it is not true and actually do so, if it wasn’t true. Minister Brown, she has actually gone to the end of the world telling us that she is not wet. Yet she is right in the midst of water. Her DG is captured and she is allegedly captured but if there are allegations, make an effort to respond to them, otherwise we should treat them as true.

The DG is captured, her PA is captured. Obviously, her lover has an interest at Eskom. So, then you have a Transnet and Eskom and Denel. People who are captured. Done. It is water to her so she is in the midst of water. Yet, she says, “I am not wet,” and we are supposed to believe that. So, the problem here is the Minister. She has not been able to respond to the media. She will either say she has been lied to, or did not know, or something to that effect, but instead the Minister… We should actually remove the position and deal with the issues here. If we deal with the respect for office that does not take us anywhere. This Minister needs to sit here and account because these matters would not have been possible if she was a capable Minister. She was a totally incapable Minister. There is no doubt about that. This is an argument that could be won by any person who has a mouth – only the mouth to be able to emit words out of it. The Minister can never be able to explain successfully why she is the Minister of Water and she is not wet.

Adv Vanara: And the Board? You have just dealt with the Minister. What about the Board?

Mr Qoma: The Board has done … There was a point when DBSA wanted to pull the plug on us because they wanted Singh out of the company. In their own analysis, they said you either remove this man or we move our money. But this current Board did everything to keep that away. It was a not question of suspending him, but creating an opportunity for putting him away from the company. It actually sent him on special leave, not a full suspension. That is why he was able to meet people, our officials, at Rockland in Jo’burg. He had been one unassailable individual and yet his vulnerabilities are known. But, the answer to that question is one. He understands the business; he is assertive; the Board is lacklustre. Those individuals that had been brought on board as Board members, some of them if you Google them, you will not find them. Yet they run an institution of the State that sits right at the heart of the economy but with individuals who could never make it anywhere. I can bet you, if you ever check their names, you will come to one conclusion: where Minister Brown… She had some special skill to find an individual below the surface which is what Minister Brown managed to do. She is going to announce another Board now. I expect individuals who are not just under the surface, but further under the surface, to be ferreted out to be named for the Board for this very important institution. That is a sign of irresponsibility and I think that we are too polite because in this country, office is more important than substance sometimes. Minister Brown has actually not been asked questions that actually reveal her lies. She lies and she lies all the time. And she thinks that we can’t see it.

Adv Vanara: Thank you, sir. No further questions.

Questions from the Committee
The Chairperson explained that Members would have to abide by the 10-minute rule. They would not get any extra time as there was voting on Bills and they were expected back in the House.

Dr Z Luyenge (ANC): In appreciating the presentation by Mr Qoma, I want to first understand, since you became part of this process, have you received any threatening calls or security-related threats on your life.

Mr Qoma: Yes, just one threatening call only.

Dr Luyenge: I think that we have a responsibility to look into that as this collective. I wanted us to know that. My questions: the first one relates to the manner in which cosmetic massage information was given to Parliament, as alleged by yourself, that the Minister lied to Parliament. Were you part of the sourcing of the response by the Minister because the Minister always gets responses from the relevant sections of the Department? Were you part of the sourcing?

Mr Qoma No, I wasn’t. It was handled operationally by Corporate Affairs.

Dr Luyenge: The Tegeta issue and the Guptas. Are you aware of any other State-owned Enterprises (SoEs) that have connections with the Guptas?

Mr Qoma: I am not aware. No.

Dr Luyenge: Can you put it very clearly, the role of the Minister in soliciting permission from the Board for Mr Singh to have access to the Board Minutes and confidential information? I think you said that.

Mr Qoma: Yes, I did say that. It came through a media report that the Board, this current Board, had asked for the Minister to… had asked for permission for access to Board Minutes and other confidential documents on behalf of Mr Singh.

Dr Luyenge: As it relates to the capacity of the Board, do you think that the blunders that they have made, is due to a lack of capacity or was it a deliberate attempt to ensure that certain families got enrichment out of the processes and opportunities that exist in Eskom?

Mr Qoma: The current Acting Chairperson said that this new Board, obviously including the Minister as I stated, they are captured. And you take it further. He said that on the 14th, before the board members were to be announced on 23 June 2016 and, if you want to look at it through his prism, or you want to prove this theory, you have a scenario when one of our biggest investors, DBSA, says get rid of this man or we am going to pull the plug. But this Board marries, gets married to, an individual, not an institution and this individual happens to be totally captured, it stands to reason that the Board is without capacity because obviously there are no skills there. The Minister still owes South Africans an explanation in terms of how did she scratch all of these good corporate leaders that we know and read about in the media all the time? She has totally avoided the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, where you don’t even have to the vet people, you just have outstanding business leaders, but she goes and gets people below the surface. She has to explain that. So, they’re without skills, they’re without proper leadership acumen, and, obviously, they don’t know anything about governance.

Dr Luyenge: Of all the misdemeanours that you identified, was there any instance where you felt bold enough to approach the Minister. I am part of this establishment. I know there is a constitutional rule by the Department over Eskom. Did you ever approach the Minister in any instance, including the Chairperson of the Board, about all of them, or any of them?

Mr Qoma: I considered approaching the Minister and as it happened after my Opinion, I consulted about it because I know that they will do anything to deal with me. And the opinion that I received was that if I take it to the Minister, because there may be governance issues in terms of who I report to and also about talking to the Minister, they might just find a loophole to deal with me.

Dr Luyenge: If it might be proved with more evidence the way that you have presented, sufficient enough for this matter to be taken to another level, would you be prepared to say, “I am Mr Qoma. I am here. I stand by my word”?

Mr Qoma: I take Parliament very seriously and what I have presented here is to the best of my knowledge. If I need to firm it up through some kind of a legal process, I can do that.

Dr Luyenge: Lastly, do you think, by any means, in all that has happened to you and you have read about the perception towards the SoEs and Eskom, in particular, whereas you have this kind of information. Now what would be your bottom line? Wouldn’t you think that somewhere, somehow, there was criminality in what had happened?

Mr Qoma: I am not sure that I understand the question. If you don’t mind, please.

Dr Luyenge: Let me simplify it. Let me rephrase the question. In all that has happened, the conduct of the Minister, of the Board, the consideration that is made and then the promotion of mediocrity in recruitment of the Board or executive or anybody, if that is done, don’t you think that is criminal?

Mr Qoma: Without a doubt. Everyone is talking about all the losses that we have suffered under bad leadership, but we have not really quantified lost opportunity costs of the entire thing. The Minister has a portfolio that potentially makes her a super minister because she is in charge of the economic pillars of this country but she has no clue about what she is doing. That is criminal.

Ms N Mazzone (DA): I applaud your complete honesty. It is very refreshing. I’d like to ask you a few simple questions to start off with. In your time as spokesperson for Eskom, were you ever requested or asked to meet with Salim Essa or any of the Guptas, or G-brothers as they were referred to, or any members of the Zuma family.

Mr Qoma: Not at all.

Ms Mazzone: You speak a lot about lies and you are one of the few people brave enough to say that word and you say that issues were lied about. The Minister lied to us and Anoj Singh lied to us, etc. Were you ever instructed to concoct a lie to make something that had happened at Eskom look better than it actually did?

Mr Qoma: No, I’ve not had any official actually opening up to me and asking to tell a different story, no.

Ms Mazzone: Did you have personal contact with Minister Brown, or did you work through the structures of Eskom and then to Minister Brown’s office?

Mr Qoma: I only worked up to the Chairperson. I didn’t go beyond to the Minister.

Ms Mazzone: I am very interested in more information on 8.11. You say: “This also manifested when Dr Ngubane pushed for the employment of Carl Niehaus to assist me with Board messages on the 19 May with increasing pressure in the ensuing days. I pushed back by raising the risks associated with the decision given the Niehaus infamy. I saw it as a reputational risk and wasteful expenditure”. Now, I agree with you entirely. If I was in your position, I would also view Carl Niehaus as a great risk. Why do you think that they wanted Carl Niehaus to be brought in to assist you with messaging?

Mr Qoma: How he introduced Carl to me, he possibly thought that I did not know that he is a veteran of the MK Military Veterans Association (MVA). Well, possibly at that time I did not know that. But I knew that he was associated politically but specifically in terms of the MK MVA, at that time I did not know. So, I wouldn’t know exactly why, but the point from my position was that it did not make any business sense. That’s why I then looked at his proposal as a business value against the core function in which he would be operating.

Ms Mazzone: In your Board discussions, you mentioned the fact that you were concerned about the Dentons Report and how the Dentons Report was handled. Now, we have heard before that the original Dentons Report was going to be released and many people, including myself, PAIA’d the Report and that a sudden decision was taken to release the redacted Report. 99% of the Report was redacted. Thankfully, many of us have the original Report. Could you explain why you think the decision to release the redacted Report was so suddenly made?

Mr Qoma: it was a combination of things, but mostly there was a lot of pressure in the media and, of course, various commentators. We were sitting with a situation where we appeared guilty if we did not release it. So, internally we felt that too, but the outcome of that resulted from the pressure externally.

Ms Mazzone: And then, obviously, I have a personal interest in knowing why this decision was taken. You alerted that there was a conflict of interest with Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, and plenty of investigation work and legal work was done by Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, amongst others, including the suing of me by Mr Matshela Koko, as well as by Mr Molefe and Eskom themselves. Many other cases were brought too. When you raised the conflict of interest issue, was there a response given to you. Did Minister Brown respond to this possible conflict of interest?

Mr Qoma: No, I didn’t raise this with Minister Brown. I raised it within our own operations; within my line of reporting. So, I didn’t go all the way to… But, obviously, now we know because it is Cliffe Dekker that executed the investigation which appears to be exonerating Mr Koko. So, essentially, the initial opinion hurt, which resulted in Cliffe Dekker being the company to do this thing.

Ms Mazzone: My last question. You speak at length and very honestly about your opinion about the R30 million you call a “thank you from the Guptas” for Mr Molefe and you call it “a well-orchestrated Ponzi scheme”. When this issue broke, can you explain to us what the atmosphere at Eskom was like? Were people at Eskom shocked? Did people expect this to break? Did people think it would stay a secret or was it known that it would eventually be made public?

Mr Qoma: Well, the sense that I got was that some people were genuinely shocked, but it depended where those people were. I spoke to the Chairman, Dr Ngubane, about it. He said to me that he did not know about it. So, we had our own conversation and I said, “Tell me this thing. Tell me exactly as you know it”. He said, “I did not know the quantum, but I knew that there was an arrangement”. So, he signed off on the approval for this thing to happen. He came across to me as though he was genuinely shocked by the amount but obviously he was not too displeased about the fact that this was going to Molefe. I did not get the sense that he was objectively concerned about the subjectivity that related to the recipient of the amount.

Mr T Rawula (EFF): Thank you for coming to the inquiry. I want to start off by referring to your own submission. I think it is paragraph 8.11 which refer to the thank-you from the Guptas. You characterised the R30 million payout as a Ponzi scheme as a result of unrivalled performance by Mr Molefe in the interest of the Guptas. You further say that the Minister was complicit, in your own assessment. Also, you made a point that after Mr Molefe was released, Dr Ngubane wanted to visit Mr Molefe. He didn’t stay long, if I captured it correctly, because he had to meet the President. Now, I want to know which President we are talking about here. And further, you raised a point about Carl Niehaus’ pitch. You did not approve. I got the point that you did not approve of him with the result that it did not happen. I want you to talk to me about your own influence to forbid the appointment of a veteran, such as Carl Niehaus, when the chairperson Dr Ngubane had warmed to the idea. But I want to couple that point of characterising the payout as a Ponzi scheme, with the previous submission from Suzanne Daniels. There was an intention by the Board to make an adjustment to the pension fund rules, which would be adjusted to suit Mr Molefe. It was presented as though it was acceptable practice, although it had never happened before, but it was a decision of the Board to amend the rules. You characterised that as a Ponzi scheme, despite the huge legitimate process to amend the rules.

Mr Qoma: Let me start with the last question about why I characterised it as a Ponzi scheme. From what we now know, the decision that was made to grant him retirement was a consequence of a non-quorate board meeting. So that decision therefore was a non-decision. That is the first point of departure. And I think there are a couple of things to look at when it comes to Molefe in this particular matter. How it was that he was convinced to come back to the company was to have foresight of the consequence of bringing him back. On the day when he was dismissed, Dr Ngubane said, “Let’s go and give him support at his house”. We drive there. Now you don’t fire a person and follow him to his house to give him support. So that is a Ponzi scheme. If you want to argue differently, you have a mountain to climb. He said that after the meeting, he was going to see the President – and we have one President in the country.

I did not forbid the appointment of Carl Niehaus. I merely raised the risk. Do not over estimate my importance. I raise the risk of appointing him and that you don’t ask for a person to come and correct your reputation when they have their own reputation to correct.

Mr Rawula: The other matter that I want to check… Also, the previous witness or the last witness that was here, she confirmed having met the Guptas personally in a meeting together with the Deputy Minister, Mr Ben Martins and Duduzane. I want to check from you whether you have ever been part of a meeting where fellows from the Guptas were part of the meeting, and which other politicians were there and can you remember the dates and the venue where the meeting was. I’m raising this specifically because you have said yourself, in your discussion with Dr Ngubane, you agreed that the Minister is captured by the Guptas and, in finishing your statement, you have indicated those who have been captured, including the Director-General of Public Enterprises and you said Minister Brown is captured herself. So, I want to check if you have ever been part of a meeting with the Guptas and which politicians were there.

Mr Qoma: Let me start with a slight correction. I did not say, personally, that Minister Brown was captured. Let me rephrase that. I did not say that it was a point that originated with me. It became a theory to me as presented by Acting Chairperson Khoza. Then I became very keen and I could conjure up all these reasons that actually show that she is totally captured. If she is not captured, she has to tell us. She has to convince us because she appears to be totally captured. So, I warmed to the theory that she is captured. She is in the water, she is submerged under it, and, of course, she says she is not wet. I have not met the Guptas. I have never been introduced to them. I have never met them, even at close quarters, to be able to tell them apart

Mr Rawula: Coming to the suspension of Mr Tshediso (Matona) and Ms Tsholofelo (Molefe). They led evidence to the Committee that there was supposed to be a meeting which should have sat on 8 March, and at that meeting there was an agenda item which was phrased as an inquiry resolution which was going to lead to the reasons why they should have been suspended. But the Board, having looked at it, differed. It differed. They did not agree with the decision and as a result, the meeting did not proceed. A subsequent Board meeting was called where the Minister was going to be present and in that meeting Mr Tshediso and Ms Tsholofelo were recused from the meeting and ultimately a decision was taken to suspend them without any proven wrongdoing, which ultimately ended up with a handshake. You have referred to the Minister as a person who is irrational and having poor leadership. Would you attribute that a decision was taken as a result of her influence, on the basis of the inquiry resolution being disputed by the majority of the Board.

Mr Qoma: I think you would be complicating it if you go that far. The Minister appointed Sean Maritz [as Interim Group CEO] hardly a month ago. In the document that challenges the processes of a particular Eskom executive, which became a court process… A document goes to the Minister and it mentioned Sean and all the litany of his infractions, including appointing his buddy from church. There is a method that goes straight to the Minister. I am not even talking about media reports but a court document in which the Minister is copied, a number of months before she appointed him. We have Sean Maritz there, a totally compromised individual. We have a Koko Matshela, who is totally compromised, who was appointed by this Minister, in spite of her prior knowledge about these guys’ infractions. If you want me to, I can go on. I can do that.

Mr S Swart (ACDP): Thank you, Mr Qoma, and being so open and honest with us. Obviously, those that you have implicated will have the opportunity to come and respond to the very serious allegations that you have made. But you are connecting the dots that a lot of us have from the various reports, starting with your employment, which is based on looking at the Public Protector Report; the Dentons Report; we see the Academics’ Report; we see the Church’s Report. Have you read all these reports and has that helped you connect the dots?

Mr Qoma: Yes, I have.

Mr Swart: So, when you came to deal with the Public Protector’s Report and I am sure that it must have been a great concern of yours that the findings of the Public Protector indicated that the then Board benefited Tegeta. That is a serious breach of the PFMA and to date no criminal action has been taken following the Public Protector’s findings, that have not been taken on review by Eskom.

Mr Qoma: Is it a question?

Mr Swart: What is of great concern to me, and you also indicated in response to a colleague’s question about the lack of follow up for any criminality. In the Public Protector’s Report, there are a lot of findings on the facts and one would have thought that, if Eskom disputed those, it would have taken those facts on review. We know that the President is taking a small part of that Report relating to his powers on review but the factual findings have not been taken on review. One of its findings relates to the Tegeta contract, which the Public Protector says is a serious breach of the PFMA. That was sent to the Hawks and the NPA. But, today, a year later, there is still no criminal action. Is that a matter of concern to you?

Mr Qoma: Yes, as a reputation manager. Like I said earlier, a good reputation is a consequence of rational decisions. So, if the organisation is unsustainable because it is buckling under terrible decisions, you can’t have a good reputation. That is a huge concern for me.

Mr Swart: Thank you. Then you made mention in your report of connecting the dots, paragraph 8.1. Where you say: “Dentons was used to eliminate competition for Koko: It is clear that the suspension of the four executives, i.e. Matona, Marokane, Molefe and Koko was not predicated on noble intentions but to pave the way for Koko to be GCEO so as to effectively execute the capturing of Eskom”. We now know from last week’s evidence that on 9 March 2015, Ms Daniels alleges she was taken with Mr Koko to meet Salim Essa at Melrose Arch - this is prior to that meeting – where she was asked how to suspend people and she was told of that suspension which was going to happen by Mr Salim Essa, who, we know, is a lieutenant of the Guptas. So, when you take that context, it corroborates exactly what you have said here. That that was the intention, and here you say it: “This is based on the fact that the Dentons investigation deliberately omitted the individuals behind corporate governance lapses wherein Koko was most featured. The three executives were summarily removed and Koko miraculously returned to the office to be GCEO. Mr Salim Essa said: “Those three executives will be suspended. Mr Koko, you will be suspended but don’t worry, you will come back”. This plays into the narrative and corroborates the narrative of capture by the Guptas. Would you agree with that?

Mr Qoma: I think that saying something contrary to what you have just said would be totally out of this world and outlandish.

Mr Swart: Then, of course, you are bringing the dots together in 8.7, when you say, “I now have a better understanding why my Opinion (which was a very sharp Opinion, I must say, as a lawyer myself) highlighting the lapses of fiduciary duties in terms of the Companies Act, the Roadmap to Recovery was handled the way it was by the newly constituted Board. I touched Gupta collaborators in their sordid studio. This comes together if I consider what Mr Khoza told me in his home on 17 June where Mr Khoza said the Minister is captured”. You never said that; you are quoting what another person said. He can come and say that he never told you that. The Minister can come and say that she denies it, but that was told in your presence. And again, corroborates other evidence that we have heard before us.

I want to put this statement from the Academic’s Report to you: “By shedding light on the modus operandi of a network of implicated individuals and recognised brokers, South Africans are joining the dots. The information is coming to light of a coordinated political project and that must come from ministerial level or even presidential level. A political project of state capture has been underway whereby government structures have been systematically repurposed to serve corrupt interests”. You give the exact example here. Would you agree that this is an exact corroboration of what is said in this Academics’ Report?

Mr Qoma: I think it was a scheme that didn’t have a lot of brains behind it because we can even untangle it like we are doing right now. Yes, I agree.

Mr Swart: But you see, I appreciate the fact that it might not have had a lot of brains, but it achieved billions of rand that we understand to be plundering and looting in the country. Is that not correct? It’s being investigated.

Mr Qoma: I think we woke up too late. The scheme itself did not have a lot of intellectual investment. We just woke up late ourselves. We trusted people too much.

Mr Swart: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr E Marais (DA): The most interesting part of the document in front of me is 5.6. I want to highlight this part: “He (that is Khoza) said a G-brother instructed Minister Brown to cancel the suspension which Dr Ngubane dutifully cancelled. That is how he explained the extent of Minister Brown’s capture to me. Dr Ngubane confirmed to me the elements of Khoza’s narrative or, more particularly, that he received a call from Minister Brown to not go ahead with the suspension”. You will recall Minister Brown’s denial of these events in the Sunday Times recently. It sums up the whole connection of dots that we just heard now when you explained your full testimony on this issue. And you are standing by this?

Mr Qoma: Yes.

Mr Marais: Thank you. Then I want to go to 8.2. This is for me the strangest thing I ever heard when a person is suspended but then even the current Board approaches the Minister with a request to grant access to the board minutes on behalf of Mr Singh. I have never heard of this before in my life in corporate governance. This is so unusual because the whole Board has been influenced to do that on behalf of Mr Singh. So, everybody was part of that decision to do that?

Mr Qoma: I think take it a step further. If I remember correctly what the story said, it was not refuted so the story stands and the facts of the story remain incontrovertible. So, this is true. The letter was written by Khoza but it was pp’d or signed on the behalf of him by Sathi Gounden. Now, what is most important about this is that it puts the entire Board in this thing. Sathi headed up the Audit and Risk Sub-Committee. You would expect a person like that to be the heart of governance. He signed it. You don’t have Khoza’s signature on that particular document. He wrote the letter and instructed it as an outcome of the Board but Sathi Gounden attached his signature on behalf of Khoza who was travelling overseas at the time when the letter needed to be sanctioned. The Minister did not see anything wrong with this. We have a Minister who is totally lost because, on the basis of just this letter, you can dismiss the entire Board. But the Minister did not say or do anything. She put her head down until whatever hits whatever and then she suddenly wakes up and says, “Someone misled me”.

Mr Marais: Lastly, I want your view on the executive level that is normally an F level in Eskom. They are ultimately responsible for running the whole company, to put it that way, but simultaneously, there is a Board that receives remuneration for what they do. So effectively the Board as well as the Executive level is ultimately responsible for the running of Eskom on behalf of the whole of South Africa as the main stakeholder in this company.

Mr Qoma: Well, I think the logical way of looking at the leadership pipeline, or let us say working leadership pipeline - you can’t have the best board and best executives when you are an atrocious shareholder, in this instance Minister Brown. It all flows together. They actually fly together. A good Minister will ensure that she appoints men and women of unimpeachable status. Now how do you expect, if you use that logic, to have an executive board and an executive team that performs in the best interest of South Africa, when you have a Minister who has not answered about her lover who is dabbling in the business of a company that she should be looking after.

Mr Marais: This is going to be my last question. Did you at any stage engage with Mr Molefe as the CEO of the company and how did you experience his running of the business?

Mr Qoma: No, he had the shortest stint possible at the time when I was there. When I joined, he was there, but then he left and when he came back it was too short to have conversations.

Mr Marais: Thank you

Mr M Gungubele (ANC): A number of my questions have found expression in the interactions of my colleagues. So, I will make a general statement that actually defines capturing in your heading that says Eskom’s implosion deliberate, well-orchestrated, shame-free; entire leadership culpability. It finds expression in a number of things that you are saying. You seem to be articulating a series of non-actions and missed actions which arguably create conditions for Gupta objectives. I will just ask questions on a few. The list of non-actions that you have spoken about – what was supposed to be done to Koko and was not done; what was supposed to be done to Singh and was not done. There is one particular area, I don’t know if you followed this, there was a Portfolio Committee meeting where the Minister said that she had little role with regard to the appointment of the CEO as the Memorandum of Incorporation did not give her that power. If you had followed it, you would know how we interacted with her on that, but I want to hear a short comment on that.

Mr Qoma: I was actually present in that meeting. The Minister quite proudly demonstrated her ignorance of her own role and that she was unaware of her own role because she did not understand the MOI, and you corrected her.

Mr Gungubele: You are aware that when she said that she was misrepresenting the Memorandum of Incorporation.

Mr Qoma: Yes, you will see in my statement that she has a very funny strategy. She either was misled or she did not know, or it is operational. “It is operational,” was very important to her. When she is cornered and it is about Eskom, she will say that it was an operational matter. But when it suits her and when she thinks it will make her look good, she will dabble in operations and forget that she normally says it is operational. She doesn’t have a strategy which is why she was misrepresenting.

Mr Gungubele: I have not come across such a well-structured, useful presentation so I will be jumping to a few examples of non-actions and missed actions. You are saying that it is alleged that Mr Khoza instructed the decision for the suspension of Mr Mabelane and Mr Kalima. How would you strengthen that allegation?

Mr Qoma: For the Head of Personnel to come and tell the truth, because that is a very strong allegation that Mr Khoza instructed the decision for the suspension of those two individuals. So for the Head of HR to come and explain that.

Mr Gungubele: That is very important that this should be verified because it speaks to a number of areas about the suitability of Mr Khoza to be the Board Chair. You are also speaking about Mr Khoza bragging about his role in negotiating the exit of the three executives on 30 March. Other than your word against his, is there any other basis of strengthening that?

Mr Qoma: It’s a tricky one. I had to present it to the Committee with all those pitfalls as he’s more likely to evade it because he says he doesn’t know anything when he is asked questions. He will possibly, like you say, just say “I don’t know”. I travelled with him in the same car. We got lost looking for Koeberg. I would not have conjured that up. So, I don’t know how you’re going to verify it. He says he doesn’t know a lot of things. I don’t think he will say that he knows this one.

Mr Gungubele: The issue of Impulse International: the contradictions of its COO claiming not to have any knowledge of Koko; Koko claiming not to have knowledge of a relationship with the COO; the stepdaughter denying any knowledge, and so on. This connection, to what extent was the Minister and the Board aware?

Mr Qoma: Well, this is part of the report, my Opinion, which appears to be controversial. This was reported in the Financial Mail.

Mr Gungubele: My question is do you think the Minister is well aware of these developments and these contradictions? If so, on what would you base that?

Mr Qoma: The Minister would know about this because she knows everything in the media. She has a dedicated team who just gives her what the media says. So the Minister knows about it. It was reported prominently by the Financial Mail.

Mr Gungubele: You seem to be critical of the Minister. It was in 2014, if I am correct, when she chairs the Board and directed the removal of board member, Chwayita Mabude, and Zola Tsotsi, board chairperson. It falls under your section about controversial or low-quality individuals. You seem to be cannibalising the two. You want to say something about that?

Mr Qoma: I tried to package my evidence properly. I am relying on the evidence by Ms Molefe who actually made a case about that. The point that I was driving was that it is very clear that this Minister has gone off the rails totally from that point to date to get us totally challenged individuals. Then I get down to your point that some of the current Board members cannot even be found on Google.

Mr Gungubele: I am deliberately trying to interpret the dereliction of duties. If you look at your summary, it is about negation of fiduciary responsibilities either by the Board or the Minister, all creating conditions for Gupta beneficiaries. My last question is in two-fold: What knowledge do you have of the 11 April 2016 decision by the Board with regard to the pre-payment? Do you have other evidence? Now that these behaviours have created conditions for Gupta to benefit, other than the Tegeta transactions, do you have other evidence that these conditions, one or two, benefitted the Guptas?

Mr Qoma: I think the meeting that you are referring to in terms of corroborating it, we need to actually check the records because it happened two days before a pre-scheduled meeting. So why would you have a meeting at 9 o’clock two days earlier than the scheduled meeting - so you need to get that record. I am not aware of other benefits other than for Tegeta and so on.

Mr Gungubele: In 8.6 you say the alleged decision of suspension of the individuals who were instrumental in McKinsey/Trillian on record, seem to be indisputably connected to Guptas.

Mr Qoma: Yes, I think it has been a long day. I do actually make a point about that. There was a decision which seems to have been taken operationally by the Head of HR and related officials. Then the Chairperson intervenes and allegedly rescinds that decision. It lends itself to the Chairperson’s own theory, but when he said that he made a call to a G brother, he inadvertently implicated himself. He was talking about the new Board being captured and the Minister being captured, but, inadvertently, he implicated himself.

The Chairperson thanked Mr Qoma for coming before the Portfolio Committee inquiry into Eskom, which they really appreciated.

Meeting adjourned.