South African Maritime Safety Authority + Robben Island Museum 2016/17 Annual Report; BRRR; Committee Report on Limpopo Oversight

Tourism

13 October 2017
Chairperson: Ms S Xego (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Committee met to be briefed by the South African Maritime Safety Authority and the Robben Island Museum on their activities. It was also going to consider its of Draft Budgetary Review Recommendation Report.

The National Department of Tourism had been appropriated R2 billion where it had spent R1.9 billion which was 85.5% expenditure

The Department was issued an unqualified audit without findings.  The Department had 64 targets it was pursuing where it had achieved 55, with 9 unachieved. Projects unachieved related to delays caused by environmental impact assessments which had not been finalised on time.

Additionally, projects had not been attained regarding social responsibility implementation which referred to the Expanded Public Works Programme of the Committee.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) trends had shown that sharing economies like Uber and Airbnb had been quite disruptive as they had affected the tourism economy in the country and had policy and regulatory implications for the Department, since if left unchecked quality assurance at the destination where Airbnb was concerned could be compromised.

The International Travel and Tourism Trends report had also been included in the draft BRRR to ensure that SA Tourism and the National Department of Tourism would focus on issues of environmental sustainability, safety and security and universal accessibility.

Regarding technical issues on expenditure, National Department had incurred R89.9 million under expenditure; had also requested a rollover of the amount where National Treasury had declined to issue that rollover. That meant the Department would have to reprioritise certain projects and commitments.

Fruitless and wasteful expenditure had greatly improved as the previous financial year the National Department had seen almost R1 million of fruitless and wasteful expenditure; whereas in the year under review there had only been R60 000 fruitless expenditure because of cancellations on travelling and planning.

The National Department’s operational support for community tourism business had been highlighted when the Committee had observed during oversight that the Department had not been supporting businesses at Nahakwe Lodge and Khalanga Guest Lodge, both in Limpopo. There also seemed to be a decline in graded establishments and those that had not renewed their grading continuing operating with old grading plaques as they were not dated. SA Tourism and the National Department had to ensure that the grading matter would be addressed.

On capitalisation of Government owned resources; the Committee had been discussing the funding of the municipal owned holiday resorts all over SA. The Department had counted 700 such resorts across SA that were in disrepair and planned to submit a funding proposal to National Treasury for a ringfenced fund to revive the resorts and have them generate revenue.

There was also the capitalisation of the transformation fund where the Committee had recommended to the Department to develop a tourism development fund. The Department had instead developed a tourism transformation fund which to date had been allocated R120 million where the Content Advisor felt the funds were too little to deal with emerging tourism enterprises. The Committee was recommending that the Department submit a funding proposal to National Treasury to capitalise the fund to ensure that the fund was augmented. The Department was assisted by the National Empowerment Fund on matters of equity.

Recommendations to the Minister of Finance involved all the key funding proposals. First it was recommended that the Minister consider the Tourism Marketing Investment Framework developed by SA Tourism and appropriate additional funding for domestic and International marketing activities. Secondly, the Minister was recommended to consider additional allocation to the budget vote 33 for the capitalisation of Government owned tourism products.  Thirdly, that the Minister of Finance capitalise the transformation fund to ensure there was enough funding to assist with transformation of the tourism sector.

Recommendations to the Minister of Tourism were that she had to manage the National Department’s budget efficiently so that there would be no underspending, which generally led to requests for rollovers which were not guaranteed; that there had to be improvement in the planning for travelling arrangements to avoid fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 

The Minister had to ensure that all projects constructed by the Department would receive operational support after construction to avoid having white elephants, for example; the Khalanga Lodge where R43 million had been spent with the lodge since being non-operational because it was inoperable. 

The Minister also had to work with Members of the Executive Council in Provinces to ensure provincial master plans were developed.

Robben Island Museum was awaiting the conclusion of the investigation by South African Maritime Safety Authority into the Thandi ferry incident which had occurred on the 15 September 2017. The Museum had also sourced its own capacity on marine investigations to thoroughly see what could have been done and still could be done better going forward

The council of the Museum had been briefed and were satisfied that controls had been in place and were appreciative of how the management, the master and the skippers of the boat in question had handled the situation. Praise also had to go to the National Sea Rescue Institute and the control room of Transnet on how all collaborated to deal with the incident. The Committee could see the from the pictures in the presentation the Thandi ferry as it was taking in water however; had maintained its stability, which meant that the boat had no design flaws.   

The SA Maritime Safety Authority ran a vessels annual safety survey which included the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers which did not apply to the ships to the extent that they were categorised as small vessels operating locally.

Regarding the incident; the Thandi ferry had been no more than three years in operation having conducted routine trips to Robben Island and the main land. The SA Maritime Safety Authority knew that the Thandi had had an approved stability book because it had administered that; the skipper on the day had had a valid certificate of competence.  The weather conditions on that day had been adverse.

SA Marine Safety Authority’s preliminary investigation showed that the vessel had lost one engine and steering as soon as it had left the island. From then on it had started taking water and the National Sea Rescue Institute and others had responded to the emergency and rescue operations had commenced which had involved a lot of other ships that were in the vicinity. The Thandi had been towed back since it had kept its structural integrity and stability. SA Maritime Safety Authority projected that its investigation would be completed within two weeks from the day of the briefing to Parliament.

During an investigation the Safety Authority normally checked whether a vessel had satisfied requirements from a construction perspective; from there it would probe the operators as to whether they had been adequately trained from a certification perspective. Following that would be what had transpired on board during an incident, how had crowd control been managed?

Notable on the date there was no harbour master at Robben Island and their importance thereof was that the harbour master determined when to open and close the harbour by monitoring the weather. A harbour master at Robben Island had never been a requirement and SA Marine Safety Authority had observed that but would not speculate whether that had an influence on the day. Lastly the SA Marine Safety Authority would check to see whether the office site systems support to the operations had considered the weather conditions, who had received the reports and who had interpreted them.

The Committee commented that:

  • In May 2017 there had been allegations of price fixing and problems with the ferries which were historical; could Robben Island Museum elaborate on that.
  • The Museum had to ensure that Robben Island became more accessible to domestic tourists, what were the plans to reverse the percentages of visitors where 70% were international and only 30% were domestic visitors to the Island. What was the Museum doing to ensure a better pricing system for South Africans?
  • Could the SA Marine Safety Authority elaborate on what the usual procedure was when a vessel lost an engine without taking water? Would the report of the investigation be made public or would it be used internally?
  • Seeing that there was no harbour master at Robben Island, could the Island not have contacted the harbour master at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront or the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre to ensure that Robben Island did not simply rely on visuals but had scientific information concerning the weather conditions as weather at sea was known to change quite rapidly?
  • How many passengers was the Thandi allowed to carry? What had been the passenger to weight ratio on the day?
  • How was the Museum going to mitigate the impact of the Thandi ferry incident on its visitor numbers?
  • Did the Museum feel its budget allocation was enough to continue its operations? Did it have facilities it could have accommodated the passengers at; had the weather been so bad on the 15 September 2017 that they could not have been taken inland post the incident?
  • What was the length of the council term and how big was it; was the council satisfied with how the Museum senior management were leading the entity?
  • Could the Museum elaborate, give a breakdown of the 30% domestic visitors to the Island? What was the Museum’s current strategy to increase domestic visitors to the Island?
  • Were the three ferries owned by the Museum adequate for its business and were the names of the ferries part of its transformation agenda? Was the Museum transformed?

The Committee also wanted to know why the Manila amendments to the Standards of Training Certificates and Watchkeeping allowed non-application to the port operations for vessels operating in Table Bay as the vessels actually went as far as Robben Island and did not remain within Table Bay. Why was there no SA Marine Safety Authority administered enabling maritime legislation that required insurance of passengers?

Could the Museum provide the Committee with some feedback on its new integrated tour guiding service; additionally, elaborate on its planned restaurant and visitor’s centre to be established on the Island?

The Committee had recently visited small harbours in the Western Cape and had been struck by the many sunken vessels at said harbour. SA Marine Safety Authority’s mandate, amongst others, was to prevent pollution by ships in the ocean’s environment; how was the Authority coordinating its work with the Department of Environmental Affairs?

What had SAMSA learned from the preliminary investigation? What would it do better after the Thandi ferry incident?

Meeting report

Mr Jerry Boltina, Committee Secretary announced that the Committee was to receive presentations from the Robben Island Museum (RIM) and the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA). Moreover, it was to consider its Draft Budgetary Review Recommendation Report (BRRR).

The Chairperson (Ms B Ngcobo, ANC) had submitted an apology, she had been called home as her house had been affected by the severe storms in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN).
Ms S Xego was elected to chair the meeting.

The Acting Chairperson said the Committee would first consider its BRRR.

Consideration of Draft Budgetary Review Recommendation Report (BRRR)
Mr Sibusiso Khuzwayo, Content Advisor, presented the draft report to the Committee.
The National Department of Tourism (NDT) had been appropriated R2 billion where it had spent R1.9 billion which was 85.5% expenditure.
The Auditor-General South Africa’s (AGSA) report was also included, which had issued NDT an unqualified audit with no findings.

Programme performance
NDT had four programmes: administration, policy and knowledge services, International tourism and domestic tourism. NDT had 64 targets it was pursuing where it had achieved 55 targets with 9 unachieved. Projects unachieved related to delays caused by environmental impact assessments which had not been finalised on time. Additionally, there were projects that had not been attained regarding social responsibility implementation which referred to Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) of the Committee.

The Committee had looked at the State of Tourism Report which had been developed by NDT; there it seemed that the tourism industry had recovered from the sluggish performance which had been due to the 201/15 migration regulations. The sector had recorded 10 million visitors to South Africa (SA), together with an increase in tourist expenditure.

The global competitiveness report 2017/18, which ranked 137 countries in terms of their global competitiveness, and he had included that report in the draft BRRR as it had a direct impact on the country’s tourism sector if and when the competitiveness of the country declined. SA had moved by 14 spaces down because of three main issues: that South African Tourism and Brand SA would have to work hard to revive the SA brand as that could affect arrivals in the country.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) trends had shown that sharing economies like Uber and Airbnb had been quite disruptive as they had affected the tourism economy in the country and that had policy and regulatory implications for NDT since, if left unchecked, quality assurance at the destination where Airbnb was concerned could be compromised.

The international travel and Tourism trends report had also been included in the draft BRRR to ensure that SA Tourism (SAT) and the NDT would focus on issues of environmental sustainability, safety and security and universal accessibility.

Key findings
Regarding technical issues on expenditure, NDT had incurred R89.9 million under expenditure; had also requested a rollover of the amount where National Treasury (NT) had declined to issue that rollover. That meant that NDT would have to reprioritise certain projects and commitments.
Fruitless and wasteful expenditure had greatly improved as the previous financial year NDT had seen almost R1 million of fruitless and wasteful expenditure; whereas in the year under review there had only been R60 000 fruitless spent because of cancellations on travelling and planning.

NDT operational support for community tourism business had been highlighted when the Committee had observed during oversight that NDT had not been supporting businesses at Nahakwe Lodge and Khalanga Guest Lodge, both in Limpopo. There also seemed to be a decline in graded establishments and those that had not renewed their grading continuing to operating with old grading plaques as they were not dated. SAT and NDT had to ensure that the grading matter would be addressed.
Lack of provincial tourism masterplan: the Committee had seen during oversight the misalignment between Provinces, local Government and the NDT strategy and policy frameworks, therefore Provinces had to develop masterplans to ensure alignment. Lack of planning and coordination continued at municipal level as there were municipalities that still considered tourism an unfunded mandate; and had no tourism staff solely responsible for tourism which created a gap in the implementation of national and provincial programmes. Poor signage continued to be a challenge, especially to iconic national and international tourist attraction sites. The Committee had seen best practice in ?which?  Province where SANRAL had assisted with signage and the Committee was encouraging NDT to take the initiative to other Provinces.
Neglect of universal access; most tourism sites in the country remained non-universally accessible as the chairperson had experienced in some of the sites during oversight.     

Key Funding proposals
On capitalisation of Government owned resources; the Committee had been discussing the funding of the municipal owned holiday resorts all over SA. NDT had counted 700 such resorts across SA that were in disrepair where NDT planned to submit a funding proposal to NT for a ringfenced fund to revive the resorts and have hem generate revenue.
There was also the capitalisation of the transformation fund where the Committee had recommended to NDT to develop a tourism development fund. NDT had instead developed a tourism transformation fund which to date had been allocated R120 million, where Mr Khuzwayo felt that the funds were to little to deal with emerging tourism enterprises. The Committee was recommending NDT submit a funding proposal to NT to capitalise the fund to ensure that the fund got augmented. NDT were assisted by the National Empowerment Fund on matters of equity.

Recommendations
Recommendations to the Minister of Finance involved all the key funding proposals. First it was recommended that the Minister consider the Tourism Marketing Investment Framework developed by SAT and appropriate additional funding for domestic and International marketing activities. Secondly, the Minister was recommended to consider additional allocation to the budget vote 33 for the capitalisation of Government owned tourism products.  Thirdly, that the Minister of Finance capitalise the transformation fund to ensure that there was enough funding to assist with transformation of the tourism sector.

Recommendations to the Minister of Tourism were that she had to manage NDT’s budget efficiently so that there would be no underspending, which generally led to requests for rollovers which were not guaranteed; that there had to be improvement in the planning for travelling arrangements to avoid fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 
 The Minister had to ensure that all projects constructed by NDT would receive operational support after construction to avoid having white elephants for example; the Khalanga Lodge where R43 million had been spent with the lodge since being non-operational because it was inoperable.  
The Minister also had to work with Members of the Executive Council (MEC’s) in Provinces to ensure provincial master plans were developed.

Discussion
Mr T Rawula (EFF) noted that the reflection on tourism graded establishments which did not renew their permits but continued operating. That was corruption as non-renewal meant misrepresentation of the tourist attraction and the grading council. The Committee had raised a concern about the grading council being non-transparent and untransformed which had not been included in the draft BRRR. Secondly, it had been calling for maximisation of access, especially for rural and township tourism establishments, as the reality had been that for one reason they had not been graded and politically the argument had always been that it had to be the grading council’s obligation to ensure that it accelerated its accessibility by assisting township and rural establishments to be graded. What could then be concluded was that those that had renewed their grading permits were mainstream tourist establishments. In that regard their transformation score cards had to be rigorously verified and validated. Those were his recommendations.

There was also the matter of a lack of a tourism masterplan in Provinces and the lethargy that local municipalities had regarding tourism. NDT together with the tourism industry had a responsibility and obligation to inspire and revive tourism at local and provincial Government.

The underdevelopment of homestays and township tourism as drivers of small scale economies could not be separated from the oceans tourism especially in coastal towns as the recognition of ocean tourism would eventually lead to considerations of the oceans economy. Important therein would be what the role of tourism would be in accelerating access and participation of township and rural tourism establishments in the oceans economy. The recommendations had not captured that and he was proposing that be included as his recommendation.

Mr J Vos (DA) proposed an alternative conclusion where the recommendation read:’ the Committee submits to the National Treasury (NT) that the programme to get off the ground the NDT required additional funding to ensure that Government properties at local Government were ready for uptake as businesses’- the Committee was aware that there were more than 700 local Government holiday resorts that had been underutilised or in disrepair because of lack of investment or management from municipal authorities. The Committee had been emphatic that most municipalities did not have the capacity or sufficient funding to manage or maintain the resorts to the benefit of tourism; the simple solution would be to form public private partnerships (PPPs) as per the recommendation from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in its 2013/14 decision. The IDC had recommended that a pilot project had to be commissioned to establish the PPPs with municipalities to develop the holiday resorts into tourism products which would benefit the towns and regions wherein they were located, so that the financial burden would be removed from the municipalities. Mr Vos did not agree with applying to NT for additional funding for the management of the 700 properties; he rather recommended that NDT or NT assisted the municipalities with the formulation of the PPPs through council resolutions.
Regarding transformation; he proposed an extension to Mr Rawula’s sentiments about transformation. Where the NDT was setting up a fund to assist with transformation the Committee had to be specific about what it wanted to achieve. It had seen great potential in township accommodation through homestays and from the fund it could invest in transforming those so that they could access the tourism value chain. Similarly, with township tourism products being compiled and listed as an outcome for the transformation fund.   

In terms of Airbnb; he did not agree with the sentiment from the BRRR that Airbnb had been disruptive and negative. Airbnb was a platform like Trivago and others, and while it could be construed as disruptive he did not see as negative because it was a shared economy platform approach. Therefore, many bed and breakfasts (Bnb’s) could simply list their products on Airbnb as it was simply a platform and not a mechanism to circumvent municipal or other hospitality regulations and norms and standards and the Committee had to be clear on that point. 
He agreed with recommendation that the NDT had to consider developing a policy and regulatory framework for disruptive technologies such as Uber to ensure quality assurance but it had to include all other platforms like bookings.com and Lekkerslaap and many other tourism platforms.

Mr Vos agreed that there had to be a conversion from people simply travelling to visit family and friends as the most prevalent reason people travelled in South Africa (SA) was for funerals. NDT had to create a reason for people to travel and he agreed with the recommendation with the caveat it was about time that in policy development Government had to introduce dual pricing. It was known that the reasons South Africans did not travel was because of affordability. Dual pricing had to be explored to allow South Africans to pay a cheaper rate to visit many of the Government owned parks and resorts.

Ms M Masehela (ANC) said it had to be emphasised in the recommendations that NDT had to make grading compulsory all tourist establishments as they represented the country as a whole.  
Regarding poor planning, the fact that municipalities had no staff dedicated to tourism had been raised by the Committee but no recommendation thereto appeared in the draft BRRR. She asked that Mr Khuzwayo include that as a recommendation that the Committee wanted dedicated tourism staff in all municipalities.

There had been many instances in the draft BRRR where it would be easier for the Committee to understand had tables been inserted where NDT had been accounting for expenditure and budget allocations. She suggested that be done.

Though agreeing with Mr Vos about NDT and NT assisting local Government with formulating council resolutions for PPPs there still could remain challenges as local municipalities did not budget for tourism, which was why where tourism officials existed in local Government, they could do no programmes as there was no money; therefore, she was in support of the Committee requesting funding for tourism at local Government so that Government resorts could be better managed. 

Mr Khuzwayo said the staff would affect all the issues raised by Members under recommendations. There currently was assistance provided through the Tourism Incentive Programme (TIP) which was money transferred by the NDT to the South African Tourism (SAT) to facilitate what Mr Rawula had alluded to regarding grading however; there had been poor uptake. Therefore, possibly the recommendation could be the maximisation of TIP uptake by the tourism industry for grading assistance and that the council had to report quarterly on how many people it was assisting through TIP.
In the previous BRRR the Committee had raised the matter of grading at a policy level and the SAT had previously reported that it was reviewing the matter but could not make any pronouncements at that time as the matter was being considered by the Minister. To the effect that NDT had to consider a policy shift to the grading scheme of SA from voluntary to compulsory could be drafted to capture the sentiments of both Mr Vos and Ms Masehela.

The NDT had finalised a strategy on the ocean’s economy which it had not presented yet to the Committee because originally tourism had been excluded from the oceans operation Phakisa. The Committee could recommend that NDT had to ensure participation of local coastal communities in the ocean’s Phakisa.

Mr Khuzwayo suggested that the Committee keep both recommendations regarding the local Government holiday resorts. The budget recommendation could be kept to capitalise Mr Vos’s proposal of NT and NDT assisting local Government by facilitating PPP arrangements at municipal level through council resolutions; possibly the Minister could facilitate said PPP arrangements through (MinMEC).

Dual pricing had been raised before, seemingly there had been no uptake by the tourism industry. The Committee could recommend that SAT and NDT had to explore a dual pricing system to enable South Africans to afford touring the country.
        
There was already a proposed recommendation in the draft BRRR regarding the Minister engaging local Government at MinMEC regarding prioritisation of tourism through adequate budgeting and appointment of dedicated tourism personnel and lobbying for establishment of tourism coordinating structures at all levels of Government including the private sector.

The Acting Chairperson said the staff had to effect the changes and circulate the final draft as soon as possible. She asked whether the Committee was adopting the draft report with the substantive amendments as proposed.

The BRRR was adopted with substantive amendments.

Robben Island Museum (RIM) briefing to the Committee on Tourism 
Mr Sibusiso Buthelezi, Council Chairperson, RIM, said the council of RIM had been briefed and were satisfied that controls had been in place and were appreciative of how the management, the master and the skippers of the boat in question had handled the situation. Praise also had to go to the National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) and the control room of Transnet on how all collaborated to deal with the incident. Normally RIM accounted to the Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture. He then read with the Committee through the presentation.
The NDT had been actively involved in RIM’s activities.

Mr Mava Dladla, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), RIM, took the Committee through the section of the presentation involving a RIM ferry. He said that RIM owned 3 ferries one of which RIM had recently been directed to decommission by the maritime regulator.

Ferry Operations and Sea Conditions   
Mr Sandresan Thandroyan, Senior Ferry Operations Manager, RIM, continued with the Committee from where Mr Dladla had left off.  Nothing?

Mr Dladla said that RIM was awaiting the conclusion of the investigation by South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) into the Thandi ferry incident which had occurred on 15 September 2017. RIM had also sourced its own capacity on marine investigations to thoroughly see what could have been done and still could be done better going forward.  

The Acting Chairperson requested that the Committee first allow SAMSA to present so that deliberations could be done once-off for both presentations.   She understood SAMSA was an entity of the Department of Transport (DoT).


South African Marine Safety Authority (SAMSA) briefing
Licensing and Regulation of Robben Island Ferry Services
Mr Sobantu Tilayi, Chief Operations Officer (COO), SAMSA, said as the Committee could see the from the pictures in the presentation, the Thandi ferry as it was taking in water however; had maintained its stability which meant that the boat had no design flaws. He then took the Committee through the report.
SAMSA was governed by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) which had two areas of responsibility; protection of life at sea and protection of the marine environment. SAMSA had been invited to speak on those two components. SAMSA had a centre called Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to coordinate safety at sea and small vessels regulations which spoke to the RIM ferry services.     

SAMSA had recently had an incident in Durban SAMSA had almost closed the entire port of Durban and were on the ground because SAMSA had a casualty response function which was a duty to respond to all maritime emergencies.    

Robben Island Operations 
SAMSA ran a vessels annual safety survey where there also was also the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) which did not apply to the ships to the extent that they were categorised as small vessels operating locally.

Regarding the incident; the Thandi ferry had been no more than three years in operation having conducted routine trips to Robben Island and the mainland. SAMSA knew that the Thandi had had an approved stability book because SAMSA administered that; the skipper on the day had had a valid certificate of competence.  The weather conditions on that day had been adverse.

SAMSA’s preliminary investigation showed that the vessel had lost one engine and steering as soon as it had left the island. From then on it had started taking water and the NSRI and others had responded to the emergency and rescue operations had commenced, which had involved a lot of other ships that were in the vicinity. The Thandi had been towed back since it had kept its structural integrity and stability. SAMSA projected that its investigation would be completed within two weeks from the day of the briefing to Parliament.

During an investigation SAMSA normally checked whether a vessel had satisfied requirements from a construction perspective; from there it would probe the operators as to whether they had been adequately trained from a certification perspective. Following that would be what had transpired on board during an incident, how had crowd control been managed?
Notable on the date there was no harbour master at Robben Island and the importance thereof was that the harbour master determined when to open the and close the harbour by monitoring the weather. A harbour master at Robben Island had never been a requirement and SAMSA had observed that but would not speculate whether that had an influence on the day. Lastly SAMSA would check to see whether the office site systems support to the operations had considered the weather conditions, who had received the reports and who had interpreted them.
SAMSA were still to approach the operator in terms of the investigation and it was aware that generally the biggest pressure was that suffered by the shipmaster or the skipper if the weather deteriorated; with the operators instructing the skipper to sail when conditions were visibly adverse.    

Discussion
Mr Vos said over a period concerns had been raised about RIM; in May 2017 there had been allegations of price fixing and problems with the ferries which were historical had emerged. Though the numbers showed a functioning entity RIM had to ensure that it had a good product that was market ready.
RIM had to ensure that Robben Island became more accessible to domestic tourists, therefore he wanted to know what plans there were to reverse the percentages of visitors where 70% were international and only 30% were domestic visitors to the Island. He knew that came down to pricing and he also knew of the innovation of the Table Mountain Cable Car that had introduced a pricing system where in October and November children rode the cable car for free and adults rode for free on their birthdays; what was the RIM doing to ensure a better pricing system for South Africans?

Could SAMSA elaborate on what the usual procedure was when a vessel lost an engine without taking water? Would SAMSA’s report of the investigation be made public or would it be used internally as Mr Vos believed it was in the public interest for the report to be tabled publicly so that such events could be prevented in future?
Seeing that there was no harbour master at Robben Island could the Island not have contacted the harbour master at the Victoria and Alfred (V&A) Waterfront or the MRCC to ensure that Robben Island did not simply rely on visuals but had scientific information concerning the weather conditions as weather at sea was known to change quite rapidly?
How many passengers was the Thandi allowed to carry? What had been the passenger to weight ratio on the day?

He wanted to know why the Manila amendments to the STCW allowed non-application to the port operations for vessels operating in Table Bay as the vessels actually went as far as Robben Island and did not remain within the Table Bay.
Why was there no SAMSA administered enabling maritime legislation that required insurance of passengers?
Could RIM provide the Committee with some feedback on its new integrated tour guiding service; additionally, elaborate on its planned restaurant and visitor’s centre to be established on the Island?

Ms Adams asked what SAMSA’ position was on the fact that safety was not coupled with insurance at sea in terms of legislation as SAMSA were ultimately responsible for people and vessels at sea? Recently she had visited small harbours in the Western Cape(WC); and she had been struck by the many sunken vessels at said harbour. SAMSA’s mandate amongst others was to prevent pollution by ships in the ocean’s environment; how was SAMSA coordinating its work with the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA)?

What had SAMSA learned from the preliminary investigation? What would it do better after the Thandi ferry incident?

When exactly would the investigation report be available as a month had passed since the incident which had been the deadline SAMSA had set itself to publish the report?

How was the RIM going to mitigate the impact of the Thandi ferry incident on its visitor numbers?

RIM was the pride of South Africa and a world heritage site; it had not presented on the financial impact of the incident on its operations and revenue collection, which was something that Ms Adams would have appreciated.

Did RIM feel its budget allocation was enough to continue its operations? Did RIM have facilities it could have accommodated the passengers at; had the weather been so bad on 15 September 2017 that they could not have been taken inland post the incident?

What was the length of the council term and how big was it; was the council satisfied with how RIM senior management were leading the entity?
Beyond counselling the passengers of the Thandi on the 15 what more had RIM done to minimise any adverse impact on its brand?

Could the RIM elaborate by giving a breakdown of the 30% domestic visitors to the Island? What was RIMs current strategy to increase domestic visitors to the Island?
Were three ferries owned by RIM adequate for its business and were the names of the ferries part of its transformation agenda? Was RIM transformed?

What was the duration of the contracts with the privately-owned vessels? How was the tendering process brought to the attention of disadvantaged communities?
 
Did not SAMSA think the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 should have been amended already seeing that it regulated all merchant shipping activities in South African waters? Was that law on par with international waters regulations?

Mr Rawula wanted to know the period between the last incident and that which had occurred on 15 September 2017. Had RIM undertaken further counselling of family members of the passengers that had been involved in the incident; had it apologised to the families?

Had there been any penalty imposed or any civil claims against RIM by the passengers involved in the incident since the 15 September?

There was a perception from communities outside the WC that by virtue of RIM being located in Cape Town it was a tourist attraction of the WC alone; what was the current marketing strategy of RIM including career exhibitions at basic and higher learning institutions to areas beyond the WC?

He also wanted to know the Employment Equity and management demographics by race and colour, in terms of staff compositions.

What was the RIM’s role in ensuring community based cooperatives were able to find derive benefits in the ocean’s economy or Robben Island’s activities?

What commitments could the RIM give the Committee to ensure that the ratio of International to domestic visitors was balanced, unless RIM focused only on revenues?

Was it possible that the master could have misled the RIM about the weather conditions on the 15 September? What possible sanctions did SAMSA impose on ship officials when they were found to be at fault?

Could SAMSA speak to the degree of independence of their investigation and their terms of reference?  

The Acting-chairperson said possibly there was a need for a joint meeting between the portfolio Committees on Tourism, Transport, Arts and Culture and any other Committee that had an interest on RIM. She would advise the chairperson on her return to organise such a joint meeting.

Were the privately-owned ferries enough and how were they sourced? Was the Thandi still in operations?

Mr Buthelezi said even though the five ferries were privately owned and were not part of RIM’s asset register, RIM did not want the perception to be that it was distancing itself from the operators.  

Robben Island, while not having a dedicated harbour master, it had a formal relationship with Transnet control room (TCR) which was the harbour master for the V&A waterfront.
The weather determining indeed was a responsibility of the skipper and ferry master; moreover, RIM had constant feedback from the TCR in that regard. On average 15-20 trips were cancelled every month because of weather conditions.

As it had been said that RIM was not legally compelled to have insurance; but did have in fact insurance as part of good practice.

RIM had over the years been receiving adverse media coverage but because incidences like that of 15 September had also grown thin; the fact that the incident had occurred at all had highlighted RIM and its operations.

The perception that the incident had damaged RIM’s brand were far from the truth because based on anecdotal responses and others from industry players; because of the world class response to the incident by the TCR, NSRI and others to the Thandi’s distress signal; the feedback had been very positive. Madiba 1 went to the Thandi and all 65 passengers had been transferred to the Madiba 1, the actual experience besides the fact that it was potentially dangerous had a positive effect. All 65 passengers were provided with trauma counselling and only one passenger had been taken to hospital for treatment of hyperthermia.

The cargo boat Diaz and ferry Susan Kruger were more than 40 years old and had been used to transport prisoners in the previous regime. They had always been regularly inspected by SAMSA and for maintenance and too frequently to RIM’s frustration SAMSA took RIM’s boats off operations for inspection and maintenance. Sikhululekile was a relatively new boat, which also was off-service for maintenance by SAMSA and not once had RIM been non-compliant to SAMSA’s instruction.

RIM responded to the troubles with its own fleet by procuring privately owned boats. To date they had been contracted to five private operators. Two years previously RIM had realised that it would be important to leave ad hoc procurement of the private boats and to proactively define terms of reference; from where they issued open Request for Proposals (RFP) to procure the services so that a panel would be used whenever RIM needed services. The ferries were from a limited pool of operators and initially RIM had entered into a 12-month contract with all five which had ended early in 2017.  RIM had run another RFP which had culminated in the conclusion of a 36-month contract with all five operators. RIM intended to renew another 36-month RFP but it had not closed the window; that if a service provider emerged in between and met the criteria of the RFP. From the five operators only four had gone through the RFP as the fifth, Madiba 1, had come after the RFP.

Regarding price fixing; in the process of procurement of private boats RIM had picked up that the quotations were too similar and therefore RIM had been the complainant that had approached the Competition Commission about the price fixing. The Competition Commission had responded accordingly.

Thandi had a capacity of 70 and on 15 September 2017 there had been 65 passengers and 5 crew members. It would be physically impossible to overload the Thandi as passengers were issued a limited number of tickets corresponding to the number of seats.

RIM had been inscribed not only as a national museum but was also a world heritage site. There was extensive marketing of RIM and it belonged to the peoples of the world as inscribed through its vision and mission. RIM symbolised the triumph of the human spirit over adversities and it served as an inspiration to the peoples of the world, which was why 70% of visitors were international.  RIM did not see that 70:30 ratio negatively as it reflected the symbolism of the inspiration of RIM. RIM could submit a cross section of the demographics of the international visitors that came to RIM as it was not celebrities and the moneyed personalities of the world.
Certainly, RIM could do more to extend access and price was not a limiting factor as people were turned away because of lack of capacity. 

Reading the RIM second Integrated Conservation Management Plan (ICMP) which was required by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) every five years; had put numbers of visitors RIM projected to accommodate. Though the second ICMP allowed RIM to accommodate up 1 million visitors per year; that was suggested to be done gradually. To date RIM were working on its third ICMP.

The implementation of the component of visitor management plan speaking to the issue of tour guiding was that facilities had to be able to keep up with the number of visitors. Mr Buthelezi suggested that RIM be allowed at some point to present its strategic plan to the Committee. The ICMP had a visitor, environmental and operational management plan each respectively.      
RIM also had a memorialisation plan which derived from the heritage of Robben Island as the story of the Island was multi layered and as far as the political layer was concerned; RIM had close to 5000 people that had been to Robben Island as political prisoners. RIM planned to tell the story of each ex-political prisoner through that memorialisation programme. The project was funded by the National Lotteries Commission (NLC).

In terms of accessibility; RIM specialised tours for school, church and community groups, and concessionary pricing which RIM actively marketed across SA.
RIM continued to show humility in its media releases, public statements and its interaction with all the 65 affected passengers and all 65 marvelled at the manner RIM emergency and rescue system had responded to the incident.

Penalties to the Thandi would certainly be sanctioned but guided by the outcomes of the SAMSA investigation as the Thandi was not in operations for obvious reasons.

Mr Buthelezi was chairing the council of RIM for the third consecutive term where a term had a three years cycle.

Mr Dladla on a +/- 250 head count, 191 employees were black amongst which 84 were females. The integrated tour guiding model (ITGM) had been necessitated by succession planning which had to occur since historically tour guiding had been split into two. The Maximum-security prison tour guiding would have been done by ex- political prisoners so that the general tour guides would do the other layers of the Island. Because of age, RIM was phasing in tour guiding done by the general tour guide for the whole Island alone. 

The visitors centre was where historically family members of ex-political prisoners would come to see the prisoners; RIM would be introducing that as part of the tour and the NLC had assisted RIM with funding that as part of the memorialisation project.  The restaurant used to be a bar for the warders on the Island which RIM was planning to make an eatery for visitors when they came to the Island.

In terms of accommodation on the Island there was the governor’s house which had about 18 rooms, and there was the multipurpose centre which had about 90 beds, therefore the 70 people which were on the Thandi would have been accommodated if they had had to sleep over.

Regarding outreach RIM had partnered with a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) which arranged events across the nine Provinces where RIM sent its outreach staff to take RIM to the communities around the country where the target group was high schools. As part of the National Development Plan funding RIM had about 20 mothers from Khayelitsha and Langa city participating in a crafts project where the products from that would be on sale from December 2017. 

Mr Tilayi said the vessel took water because there was a wash over the bound which broke the windows instead of the loss of the one engine.  Along the trajectory of adverse conditions there was a cut-off point which was the reason there had to be someone responsible for decision making in that regard, which was also why as part of the investigation SAMSA appreciated that there was a relationship between RIM and the harbour master.

As a regulator SAMSA would not want to regulate anyone out of business and when it licensed a vessel, it was on the basis of a limited number of passengers to travel over a particular distance, depending on stability and the endurance of a vessel, amongst other things.

The STWC standards were set for international shipping, where it was said a seafarer with a SAMSA ticket would be able to operate a ship whether it was in Singapore, Panama or elsewhere in the world. Be that as it was the international regime appreciated that countries were unique and allowed localised regimes as the international requirements were quite onerous and meant for high seas operations. As much as SAMSA aligned its requirements to include as much of the international requirements it dispensed with other non-requirements. However; SAMSA would still insist on particular training such as navigation in heavy fog, extreme conditions and others. SAMSA was comfortable that its legislation would withstand scrutiny, even more so with non-Manila arrangements, SAMSA was still required by the IMO to report on such legislation.

SAMSA had not deemed it necessary for passenger vessels to have insurance up to the incident of 15 September but SAMSA was aware that RIM was insured together with the operator of the Thandi. SAMSA however; had been under pressure such that it had insisted on insurance in the fishing industry.

On sunken boats in small harbours, Mr Tilayi requested that SAMSA be allowed to respond in future to that question but SAMSA was indeed part of operation Phakisa-ocean’s economy; wherein included was a lab on small harbours development. In that regard the conclusion of that work would affect RIM in so far as what infrastructure, navigational aids and authority would be used to guide the harbour. Mr Tilayi was aware that the Department of Public Works (DPW) had appointed a service provider in that regard whereas SAMSA were advising RIM through its special projects unit.

The investigative reports of sea incidences normally took about six months to conclude though SAMSA had insisted to the investigators to speed up the investigation regarding the Thandi; the interim report was normally available three months after an incident. SAMSA had punted the one-month deadline for the report on that basis of speeding things up.
The investigative reports generally were publicly available as the Promotion Of Access To Information Act (PAIA) forced SAMSA to make the reports available but SAMSA would also take guidance on the matter. The reluctance and caution was on the basis that SAMSA wanted to learn what to do in future when similar incidences occurred. Moreover, if the report was publicised and parties involved in the incident instituted litigation processes against each that muddied the waters; but certainly, SAMSA made reports available when they were requested.

The DoT had gone on a big legislative review which included the Merchant Shipping Act and the Maritime Transport Policy had already been to Cabinet; therefore, certainly the merchant shipping Act possibly would be amended through that review.

Operators were required to keep their own statistics and SAMSA categorised an incident as an event that possibly could lead to loss of life. Within that definition there was a duty on the operator to have his own events log book; therefore, SAMSA would not be aware of minor events that would have occurred at RIM.

SAMSA perhaps would rather use the term ‘misjudged’ instead of ‘misled’ where Mr Rawula had asked about consequences for the shipmaster possibly misleading RIM however; SAMSA could not respond to the question of possible sanctions as it formed part of the investigation.

SAMSA was so independent that sometimes those it regulated became annoyed at the body.  The reason SAMSA had to be independent was that it was monitored by IMO. 

SAMSA would certainly want to account to a joint Committee session as it operated in various maritime initiatives and the ocean’s economy Phakisa had also given SAMSA maritime tourism as a participant which affected the Committee directly. Small harbours it seemed would receive their own laboratory to the extent that there was a small harbour in Robben Island where there was design, management issues and risk elements which SAMSA was concerned about in terms of its work.   

Captain Gustav Louw, SAMSA, said penalties to the master or the skipper would be determined by the investigation if it was found that either of them had not complied with STWC requirements or the owner if the skipper would have been forced to operate a non-seaworthy boat. 

On the size or weight of the vessel, particularly small vessels, SAMSA simply had to certify the vessel in terms of the regulations however; if the operator wanted to use larger ferries that was the RIM’s prerogative because SAMSA could not force RIM to use big vessels if RIM did not want to.

The Acting-chairperson thanked both SAMSA and RIM for availing themselves to the Committee.

The meeting was adjourned.
 

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