Operation Vimbezela: Department of Defence and South African National Defence Force briefing

Meeting report

Chairperson’s opening remarks
The Chairperson welcomed everyone and then expressed concern that the presentations to be dealt with today were only received that morning. The Committee had also been notified that the Department forgot to bring the presentation on security challenges posed by the proliferation of unregistered airports and airstrips. This is something that would have to be directed to the Minister as it was unprofessional.

There had been apologies from the Minister, Ms Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula and Mr S Motimela (ANC).

Briefing by the Department of Defence on Operation Vimbezela
Brigadier General Kwezi Nomphetsheni, Director: SANDF Joint Operation Division; indicated that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) formalised the defence cooperation with Central African Republic Armed forces by means of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), concluded and signed in 2007. Among the issues underpinned by the agreement was that SANDF would provide training assistance to the Central African Republic's Defence Force (FACA) and the MoU was renewed on 31 December 2012. The parties agreed that South Africa would continue to provide training to FACA, have a right to self defence and save human lives in CAR and would assist in implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The MoU was signed in 2007 and this was meant to be reviewed every five years. The CAB MEMO NO: 18 of 2007 authorised the deployment of 85 SANDF members for reason of training and the close protection of the CAR President. The Presidential Minute no: 436 dated 15 July 2008 authorised only provision of Military Training and Capacity building to the Armed Forces of CAR. The implementation arrangement was in place on annual basis since 2010 in terms of training and does not cover the protection of the President. The close protection to the CAR President was not provided for by the SANDF. The deployment in CAR was mandated to do the following:

• To continue with training capacity programmes to the Armed Forces of CAR
• To exercise self-defence to protect protect and save human lives
• To further send reinforcement to achieve the said mandate
• To assist the Government of CAR with DDR planning and implementation

Brigadier General Nomphetsheni highlighted that there were a number of objectives that were set to be achieved by SANDF and these focused on streamlining the training capacity building programme in CAR to cover a period of five years and beyond. There are also plans for operational deployment plan and sustenance for the next five years, sustenance will also have to factor in the processes for the establishment of the forward strategic sustainment hub, including timeframes. There are also plans to appreciate, plan and produce a Strategic Master Plan for DDR programme and SSR programne and continuous Capacity Building Programmes for the short, medium and long term engagement. This included clear entry/exit strategy with milestones as benchmarks for the mission deliverable. The SANDF must deploy a protection force consisting of a strengthened subunit and other FSE and continue with training capacity programmes to the Armed Forces of CAR whilst exercising protection task namely self-defence, protection of property and human lives from March 2013 until 31 March2018.

Brigadier General Nomphetsheni stated that the operation was going to be executed in three stages with stage 1 consisting of mobilisation of forces from 18-22 March 2013. Stage 2 was the deployment to CAR by the end of March 2013 and stage 3 was on sustainment and rotation (6 months) basis. The SANDF was to continue with training capacity programmes to the Armed Forces of CAR as from 2013 to 2018 rotating on a six months basis. The contingent must be able to defend and to protect property and save human lives. Furthermore, the SANDF must be able to react by means of sending reinforcements to achieve the said mandate and to assist the Government of CAR with DDR and SSR. There were a number of guidelines for planning that focused on achieving the end state and these included the strengthening of subunit to include its inherent support weapons, consider streamlining command and control. SANDF appreciate and plan to sustain the deployed force for a period of five years with calculated rotations to be aligned with the current existing rotations. SANDF also planned for contingency measures for immediate withdrawal in CAR at short notice due to possible changes in the interim transitional administration.

Discussion
Mr G Michalakis (DA) wanted to know about the cost operation that would have been incurred by the Department in CAR up until March 2018 as this information was missing from the presentation. There was also no information around the training capacity programmes to the Armed Forces in terms of the number of individuals that had been trained and the challenges that were experienced. The presentation seemed to have focused on the positive aspects and failed to highlight the challenges as this was important for Members when conducting oversight.

Mr S Esau (DA) asked about the effectiveness of the defence force in CAR and the support that was provided by CAR government to SANDF. It would be important to also know about the contingency measures that were put in place. Was there any intelligence that was provided to prevent any possible threat? It was evident that CAR became worse off when South Africa left there and this was an important factor that needed to be taken into consideration. Was there any investigation to what transpired in CAR? The follow up questions would be on issues around procurement process.

The Chairperson wanted to know if SANDF was offering any support to the families of those who were injured or deceased in the CAR operation.

Lieutenant General Vusumzi Masondo, Chief of Staff, SANDF, responded that there was an Education Trust that was meant to assist the families of those who suffered in the CAR operation. There had not been any investigation about what happened in CAR. There was some “bad blood” between SANDF and France and it was quite clear that SANDF was not welcomed in CAR. The reality is that CAR is a former colony of France and the latter were in support of the incumbent President then. France also had vested interests in the natural resources of the country. SANDF was also not aware if Parliament had instituted any investigation as to the matter of the CAR operation. The intelligence in CAR was not to a high standard and this was precisely the reason SANDF was caught off-guard. The Seleka rebels were not happy with the transition that was going on which involved the President of CAR. SANDF was not adequately prepared and trained to deal with any threat.

The Chairperson clarified that Parliament had not instituted any investigation into the matter (CAR operation). It would be important for the Committee to hear about the lessons that had been learned on the operation in CAR so that this tragedy could not be repeated in the future.

Lieutenant General Masondo responded that SANDF learned that there should be an evacuation plan for soldiers so as to be able to retreat during the attack and this was not the case in CAR. It was also a matter of concern that SANDF soldiers were deployed in open fields with no necessary protection and this should be avoided in future. It would be recommended for soldiers to be in a mountainous place where they could be protected. SANDF lost some of the equipment in CAR and some of the equipment ended up in the hands of the rebels and this was really an unfortunate situation. The Department would still need to look at the cost of the operation up until 2018 and the training that was offered including those who failed the training. 

Brigadier General Nomphetsheni added that there was no South African embassy in CAR and this meant that there was a potential for intelligence information to be compromised or be passed over to the opponent. SANDF soldiers also did not have armored vehicles for protection and this was another additional factor that meant that the soldiers were vulnerable.

Mr Esau asked why South Africa continued to train soldiers from CAR despite the fact that there was no adequate support that was provided by Government of CAR to SANDF soldiers.

The Chairperson appreciated the question but requested that it should be directed to the Minister as it was a political decision that could not be answered now.

The meeting was adjourned.