SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence & Security Co-Operation; Protocol on Establishment of Peace & Security Council of African Uni

Meeting report

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE; ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE: JOINT MEETING
1 April 2003
SADC PROTOCOL ON POLITICS, DEFENCE & SECURITY CO-OPERATION; PROTOCOL ON ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF AFRICAN UNION: BRIEFING BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

Chairperson: Mr BJ Tolo (ANC, NCOP)

Documents handed out:
Explanatory Memorandum: SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
Deputy Minister's briefing on AU Protocol
Explanatory Memorandum: Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

SUMMARY
The briefings focused on the importance of peace and stability in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and on the African continent as a whole as a prerequisite to sustainable development, the ongoing consolidation of South Africa's democracy and the expansion of its commercial interests. Members of the committees concerned were urged to make informed, incisive input to ensuing debates in Parliament on the ratification of each Protocol and not to use the issues concerned for political point scoring.

MINUTES
The Chair welcomed Mr A Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and members of his delegation to the meeting, together with members of the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs, members of the Select Committee on Economic Affairs and delegates from the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature.

SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation: Briefing
Deputy Minister Pahad spoke on the background to the SADC Protocol and its implications for South Africa. The Protocol's principal objective was to operationalise a mutual defence pact within the SADC region. This would ensure a peaceful and stable environment for sustainable development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. He drew attention to Article 11 as the focal point of the Organ Protocol, spelling out the obligations, jurisdiction, methods and procedures of the organ. He also outlined the sub-structures, lines of communication and reporting detailed in the Protocol.

He noted that the Protocol should be viewed against the background of South Africa's ongoing commitment to and role in creating conditions for good governance in the region and beyond. He expressed the hope that the debate in the House on the Protocol would be informed more by a deeper understanding of the issues than by the desire to score political points.

Discussion
The following issues were raised in the first round of questions and discussion:
- Angola's absence from the list of signatories to the Protocol
- how many SADC states had processed the Protocol through their respective parliaments
- how states paying lip-service to the Protocol would be dealt with
- whether the annual rotation of Protocol chair would be workable.

In response, the Deputy Minister said that Angola had now signed the Protocol. Noting that South Africa probably had the most developed parliamentary system in the region, he conceded that the process of ratification in each of the member states had been delayed. He urged members to work though this process as speedily and efficiently as possible in order to set an example to other SADC member states and pave the way for implementation of the Protocol. While there was no penalty for non-compliance, South Africa's commitment to tackling the issues more decisively should encourage commitment from other member states. The culture of equal status for member states regardless of size and capacity underpinned the annual rotation of Protocol chair.

During the second round of questions and discussion, the following issues were raised:
- whether South Africa was obliged to enter into defence pacts with protagonist states regardless of circumstance
- how South Africa's involvement in peace-brokering interventions would be financed
- South Africa's role in addressing the looming crisis in Swaziland.

The Deputy Minister replied that any decision to intervene would be made in the context of the common defence pacts underpinning both SADC and the AU and that regime change was not deemed a valid motivation for non-peaceful action. He conceded that the financing of interventions presented an ongoing challenge since many African states remained dependent on aid and did not have the capacity to contribute towards regional peace-keeping and related initiatives. As a result, funding tended to be arranged through the UN or, bilaterally, with the assistance of the United States or the European Union. Nevertheless, a SADC structure for financing interventions would be established.

Drawing attention to South Africa's status as the region's economic power-house and its concomitant capacity for contributing significantly towards regional initiatives, the Deputy Minister emphasised the importance of a stable, peaceful region and continent to the processes of consolidating South Africa's democracy and expanding its commercial interests. Resources spent on peace brokering and peace keeping should be viewed in this context. Acknowledging Swaziland's crisis in respect of the role of the monarch, he noted South Africa's ongoing commitment to quiet diplomacy. This was in support of efforts on the part of President Chissano of Mozambique and South Africa's Deputy President Zuma to resolve the issues concerned.

Deputy Minister Pahad referred members and visitors to Article 8 of the Protocol for details of decision-making procedures.

In response to concerns raised about the perceived emasculation of the UN on the Iraq issue and the implications of this for the Protocol, the Deputy Minister emphasised South Africa's commitment to reasserting and strengthening UN hegemony and supremacy as the only multilateral organisation capable of guaranteeing a new world order based on the international rule of law. He nevertheless acknowledged the need for the transformation of some UN structures in order to make them more representative.

Members of the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs agreed to recommend that Parliament should ratify the Protocol.

Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU: Briefing
Deputy Minister Pahad spoke on the background, objectives and implications of the AU Protocol which sees the establishment of a decision-making organ for the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts on the continent. He drew particular attention to the need for early-warning, preventative diplomacy to underpin the implementation of the Protocol and its broad mandate. He then provided insight into the rationale behind appointing a Panel of the Wise and establishing an African Standby Force, briefly explaining the role of each in addressing intra- and inter-state conflict in Africa. Pivotal to the successful implementation of the Protocol would be a commitment among all member states to intelligence-sharing which, noting the sensitivity of the issues concerned, would require a climate of confidence in the institutions concerned. This would need to be built over time.

Noting that these sensitivities had made the member state ratification process a lengthy one, the Deputy Minister urged members to facilitate debate in their own Parliament through informed, incisive input. This would fast-track South Africa's ratification of the Protocol in anticipation of the next AU summit in July/August 2003.

Discussion
The following issues were raised:
- the potential for early-warning diplomacy to be controlled by vested interests and therefore easily undermined
- more detail on the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in peace-brokering on the continent
- the potential for overlap between the SADC and AU structures
- whether a African Standby Force could be perceived to undermine the role members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace-keeping in their region
- whether additional capacity at diplomatic missions planned to strengthen the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) would be utilised to inform early warning diplomacy
- what measures other than non-participation in the AU were envisaged for dealing with the instigators of coups
- whether instigators of regime-change in response to perceived election rigging would also be excluded from participation in the AU.

In response, Deputy Minister Pahad again emphasised the confidence-building exercise that would need to underpin intelligence-sharing in the context of early warning diplomacy. This would encourage the participation of the continent's most powerful states without which the Protocol would not function effectively.

He provided insight into the quiet but incisive role South Africa's NGOs continued to play in facilitating reconciliation and building institutional capacity. Most African states had no effective NGO networks of their own and, in many instances, the trade union movement had been destroyed during the Cold War era. The implications of this for building and consolidating democracy and strengthening civil society were profound.

He noted that while there might well be minor areas of overlap between the SADC and AU structures concerned, the establishment of regional and sub-regional institutions was in keeping with an overall commitment in both SADC and the AU to the devolution of authority on regional security issues.

He acknowledged the potential for competition between ECOWAS and the Council but expressed confidence that this could be managed.

Provision had been made in AU structures for overseeing electoral processes and South Africa's diplomatic missions would continue to support this and other processes.

While non-participation in the AU would be the first penalty imposed for undemocratic regime-change, other measures such as economic sanctions would also be used. The sub-regional groupings would be responsible for enforcing these. South Africa's parliamentary structures would continue to serve as an example of democracy in action and hosting the AU parliament would play a vital role in this process.

A second round of questions raised the following concerns:
- what working closely with the UN Security Council meant in practical terms
- why a Panel of the Wise was necessary
- the need for appropriate intervention from ex-colonial powers when this was deemed necessary
- how effective, in practical terms, early warning diplomacy would be in preventing conflict
- why twenty-five out of fifty-three African states had not signed the Protocol
- the pitfalls of a rotating chair.

An assistant to the Deputy Minister advised that all fifty-three states had unanimously adopted the Protocol but that the administrative process of securing the signatures of heads of state was taking time.

The Deputy Minister emphasised the important role envisaged for the Panel of the Wise in facilitating conflict-resolution and peace-keeping processes by way of their calibre, stature and influence. This had particular implications for allaying fears and neutralising inappropriate levels of criticism among ex-colonial powers of African interventions aimed at solving problems on the continent.

He again emphasised the need for reasserting and strengthening the role of the UN as the only effective multilateral institution of its kind. The efficacy of regional intelligence-gathering for early warning diplomacy had been tested in the case of recent developments in a number of African states . It was hoped that the new structures established by the Protocol would be more pre-emptively persuasive in the face of recalcitrance.

Although the mechanism of a rotating chair was problematic, the principles underpinning this had already been explained.

The Chair thanked the Deputy Minister and his delegation for their informative briefing on each Protocol.

The committee agreed to recommend that Parliament should ratify the Protocol and the meeting was adjourned.