SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations impact on SA Foreign Policy; South African Jews for a Free Palestine (SAJFP) on current Palestine/Israel political situation

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International Relations

07 September 2016
Chairperson: Mr M Masango (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

Both the Department of Trade and Industry and of International Relations and Cooperation briefed the Committee on the South African Development Community and European Union Economic Partnership Agreement. The departments were in agreement that trade negotiations were informed by and were in line with national development objectives set out in the National Development Plan, the New Growth Path and the Industrial Policy Action Plan. Negotiations provided opportunities to increase exports of value added products and were aimed at supporting regional integration. These negotiations could not unduly limit development policy space. Prior to negotiations, there were national consultation at intra-governmental level and in the National Economic Development and Labour Council and the Southern African Customs Union was consulted to ensure protection of common external tariff.

In terms of tariff schedule, South Africa was committed to grant a duty-free access to 86% of the European Union imports over 12 years (that is, from 2000 to 2012), while the European Union liberalised 95% of South Africa’s imports over 10 years – which was fully implemented in 2010. Recognised was negotiations between the EU and various groupings of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries which started on 27 November 2002. The Economic Partnership Agreements were negotiated to replace the unilateral trade regime between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacificcountries under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and before the under the Lomé Convention. Although South Africa became part of both the Lomé Convention in 1997 and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement CPA, it was excluded from the unilateral regime provided by EU to the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The SADC countries negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements under three groupings: (i) the SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Group (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland); the East Africa Community (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi); and East and Southern African Group which comprised the rest of SADC countries. South Africa was active participant in the SADC-EU EPA configuration negotiations endorsed in 2007 and its core interest was to harmonise the trading regime between Southern African Customs Union and the EU with a view to secure further market access in agriculture and claw back some policy space lost under the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement the Economic Partnership Agreement had many implications. The Southern African Customs Union common external tariffs could be maintained and the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement shortfalls could be addressed.

The Brexit had also implications of the Economic Partnership Agreement. The Department of Trade and Industry stated that it was engaging with the United Kingdom on the implications of its exit from the EU on trade. The Economic Partnership Agreements would provisionally enter into force for the United Kingdom and stay in force until the United Kingdom had complemented its exit from the EU.

Members welcomed the presentation and sought clarity on a number of of issues including, why agreements were referred to as SADC-EU EPA instead of SACU-EU EPA, the effect of tripartite agreement of SADC, EAC and COMESA on the regional economic and industrial integration, on the position of Lesotho on the Economic Partnership Agreement, why Angola was not part of SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, whether South Africa could pull out of Economic Partnership Agreements, whether the issue of unemployment was considered, whether uniformed trade regime under the Economic Partnership Agreement took into account the sovereignty of a nation-state, on whose motor vehicles were exported to the EU.

The South African Jews for a Free Palestine/Israel contended that people who were expelled deserved better. There was a need to treat them as citizens on the basis of equal rights principle. The 1948 expulsion created refugees and internally displaced persons who were abandoned to their own fate. These people were too bearers of rights in terms of public international law and international human rights law. The UN Security Council had taken a resolution 194 of 1949 stating that both refugees and internally displaced persons should return to their homes and live peacefully with their neighbours, but this decision had not yet been implemented by the state of Israel. In villages from which Lubyan people were expelled, trees were planted which became a forest. Yet, the University of Tel Aviv was built in an area where Palestinians were expelled. Palestinians in (citizens of) Israel were a minority. The Palestinian delegation defined them as survivors of ethnic cleansing and forced removal and stressed that Israel was a racist state because it defined itself as a Jewish state. From its definitional perspective, the Israel authorities told its citizens of Palestinian background that they did not belong to the Jewish state, but Palestine. The major fight of Palestinian delegation was to force Israel to recognise its diverse population and democratic processes which, as a result, would accommodate the diversity. The Two states solutions could be supported only if human rights of all citizens would be respected without giving regard to any distinction of any kind.

Members sympathised with Palestinians and felt that Palestinians should accept the two states solution for the sake of sustainable peace. As a country that had experienced apartheid, South Africa had various ways of dealing with the state of Israel to deviate from its apartheid policies and thus recognise its diverse population. 

Meeting report

Briefing by the Department of Trade and Industry
Ms Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, Deputy Director-General: International Trade and Economic Development Division: Department of Trade and Industry, took the Committee through presentation. Attention was paid on approach to the negotiations, background on South Africa-European (SA-EU) Union trade relations, implications of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); improvement on the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with regard to market access and textual provisions; South Africa – European Union Geographical Indications, milestones, way forward and conclusion.

Ms Mlumbi-Peter noted that trade negotiations were informed by and were in line with national development objectives set out in the National Development Plan (NDP), the New Growth Path (NGP) and the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). They provided opportunities to increase exports of value added products and were aimed at supporting regional integration. These negotiations could not unduly limit development policy space. Prior to negotiations, there were national consultations at intra-governmental level and in the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was consulted to ensure protection of common external tariff.

With regard to background on SA – EU relations, trade relations had been governed by trade chapter of the TDCA, which was signed on 11 October 1999. In terms of tariff schedule, South Africa was committed to grant duty-free access to 86% of the EU imports over 12 years (that is, from 2000 to 2012), while the EU liberalised 95% of South Africa’s imports over 10 years – which was fully implemented in 2010. This approach provided for some protection of sensitive South Africa sectors like clothing and textile and no preferences were given or only a margin of preference was given. The TDCA reduced South Africa’s policy space in a number of areas, resulting in uneven market access in agriculture. The EU remained South Africa’s main trading partner; hence total trade had grown by 257% since the agreement was implemented in 2000.

Providing the EPA negotiations background, Ms Mlumbi-Peter noted that negotiations between the EU and various groupings of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries started on 27 November 2002. The EPAs were negotiated to replace the unilateral trade regime between the EU and ACP countries under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) and before the under the Lomé Convention. Although South Africa became part of both the Lomé Convention in 1997 and the CPA, it was excluded from the unilateral regime provided by EU to the ACP countries.

 

The SADC countries negotiated EPAs under three groupings: (i) the SADC EPA Group (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland); the East Africa Community (EAC) (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi); and East and Southern African Group (ESA) which comprised the rest of SADC countries. South Africa was an active participant in the SADC-EU EPA configuration negotiations endorsed in 2007 and its core interest was to harmonise the trading regime between SACU and the EU with a view to secure further market access in agriculture and claw back some policy space lost under the TDCA. The EPA had many implications. The SACU common external tariffs could be maintained and the TDCA shortfalls could be addressed.

The EPAs provided South Africa with an opportunity to improve market access better than TDCA on fisheries products as well as 32 agricultural products and with an opportunity to manage improvement of the TDCA textual provisions.

On SA-EU geographical indications, the SADC-EU EPA made provisions for a bilateral protocol between SA and the EU protection of GIs and on trade in wine and spirits. The Protocol addressed the issue of protection of South Africa’s wines names exported to the EU and vice versa as well as protection of agricultural products. It also provided for co-existence of names and therefore insured that South African users of specific names like “Feta” would be able to continue to use the name.

For implementation of EPA negotiations, institutions would be established for the proper implementation of the Agreement and public awareness seminars would be carried out for civil societies.

As a way forward, the EU could provisionally apply agreement while it was being ratified by all the EU countries subject to approval by the EU Parliament. Yet, the SADC EPA countries would have to ratify the Agreement before it entered into force. The aim was for the Agreement to enter into force before the entry of the EC Duty Free Quota Free Market Access regulation on 01 October 2016 to guarantee continued preferential market access into the EU for Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland.

Ms Mlumbi-Peter noted the implications of Brexit on EPA. The DTI was engaging with the UK on the implications on trade when UK leaves the EU and how to address it. The UK was the eighth largest trading partner of South Africa and would remain an important trading partner. The EPAs would provisionally enter into force for the UK and stay in force until the UK had complemented its exit from the EU. The EPA negotiations created an opportunity for SACU member states to comply with their obligations under SACU agreement 2002, on the one hand, and to consolidate SACU on its trade relations with EU on the other. The policy space would be enhanced and market access for South Africa would be improved.

Department of International Relations (DIRCO)
The DIRCO reported to the Committee that the EU started the negotiations for the various EPA agreements with the ACP on 27 November 2002. However, South Africa had never been a party to the CPA because – unlike other countries – its trading relationship was regulated by the TDCA, which South Africa had concluded separately with the EU. South Africa participated in the SADC-EU EPA configuration negotiations since 2007, while Angola was an observer to the negotiations. These agreements were concluded on 10 June 2016 in Botswana. The Agreement needed to be ratified by the SADC countries to be operational and it had to be ratified by 1 October 2016 in order to facilitate continued preferential market access into the EU. South Africa would be able to obtain greater market benefit (see attachment).

Discussion
Mr S Mokgalapa (DA) sought clarity on regional integration and thus asked on why agreements were referred to as SADC-EU EPA instead of SACU-EU EPA Given that there were seven countries of SADC, the reconfiguration could not be referred to as the SADC’s. He also sought clarity on the effect of the tripartite agreement of SADC, EAC and COMESA on the regional economic and industrial integration. He sought clarity on the position of Lesotho which was part of CACU but which had not ratified the agreement.

Mr D Bergman (DA) sought clarity on why Angola was not part of SADC-EU EPA and on what its concerns might be.

Ms H Maxon (EFF) expressed her concerns with agreements concluded with EU because they were permanently binding, making it difficult to withdraw from them. She sought clarity on whether agreements were concluded with that fact in mind. Was there a possibility to get out of an agreement? Was there a clause providing how a state party could pull out of an agreement? Was the SA-EU geographical indication working?

Mr M Maila (ANC) remarked that South Africa was not a manufacturer of motor cars and motor vehicles and sought clarity on whose motor cars and motor vehicles South Africa exported to the EU. When would South Africa be able to produce its own motor vehicles? He sought clarity on why there was a difference of two years in implementing the TDCA as it pertained to the tariff schedule: the EU enjoyed duty-free access for the period of 12 years whereas South Africa benefited from liberalisation of imported products from EU for the period of ten years. He sought clarity on preferential market access into the EU for Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland.

Ms T Kenye (ANC) sought clarity on impacts of trade agreements on the African continent, on the position of China if it was noted that the EU remained the main trading partner of South Africa and the UK remained the largest trading partner of South Africa; on the difference between the main trading partner and the largest trading partner; on the negative balance in exportation to the EU that needed to be addressed and on whether uniformed trade regime under the EPA took into account the sovereignty of a nation-state.

Ms D Raphuti (ANC) remarked that the use of abbreviation in the presentation did not sit well with her because she could not understand their full meaning. She sought clarity on whether the protection of South African sensitive sectors was all about the protection of employment or whether the creation of employment was, in the context of protection, also considered; on what were the top ten products that were exported to the EU, on whether labelling the motor vehicle TATA had anything to do with Tata Mandela or whether home-grown motor vehicles could be named TATA after Tata Mandela, on who determined the quality of products and on what reasons were provided that South African products were not meeting the quality standards and, finally on the impact of Brexit on the agreements.

Ms S Kalyan (DA) remarked that South Africa was committed to promoting small businesses and sought clarity on impacts of agreements on small business and on what increase was meant within the clothing textile sector, on what the EU as a main trading partner and the UK as a largest trading partner meant, on what would happen if the Protocol was ratified and came into force Brexit could leave EU, on how many countries were needed to ratify the Protocol to come into force, on why vague language was used in the presentation (referring to the main trading and largest trading) and on impact of duty-free access to sugar. Could not this duty free sugar compel Coca Cola to leave South Africa?

Mr L Mpumlwana (ANC) sought clarity on whether there was a balance between iron ore (raw materials) exported to the EU and the products that were manufactured from them. Was South Africa benefiting or losing? If it was losing, how this situation could be addressed.

Ms C Dudley (ACDP) sought clarity on whether agreements addressed all concerns that were raised prior to negotiations and what these agreements could mean to ordinary people.

Mr M Mncwango (IFP) sought clarity on the difference of two years in the tariff schedule and on whether this worked in favour of South Africa and on what uneven market access in agriculture meant. Were there imbalances which could not help the agricultural sector? Could not the focus on exporting raw materials have a negative impact on existing unemployment? Was this approach contributing to creating employment? Referring on a deadlock, he sought clarity on how the DTI dealt with labour disputes.

The Chairperson sought clarity on discrepancies in the tariff schedule, on the policy space, on uneven access in agriculture, on why imports were liberalised, on the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, on big negative trade balance with regard to SA exports, on why South African wines were not allowed in the EU even though they were manufactured by French descendants and on whether South Africa could pull out from an agreement.

Response
On the question of SADC EPA Group instead of SACU EPA group, Ms Mlumbi-Peter responded that the configuration for negotiations of the EPA was EU configurations. There were several discussions on the continent about these EU configurations because they were not aligned with regional development communities at the continent. It was not the SADC EPA, but the SADC EPA grouping. There was a great distinction even if such grouping was bringing confusion. In terms of how SADC countries were participating in the EU configuration, she indicated that the SADC countries were participating under three different groupings. She reiterated that Angola participated in the discussions but did not ratify the Agreement. Angola was not participating in any trade agreement. It was a SADC member but it had not ratified the SADC Protocol. It was still in the process of rebuilding its country. South Africa raised its concerns over the configurations and its impact on the regional economic integration agenda. At African Union level, South Africa was duty bound to defend both the region and continent. Most of resolutions on these issues were discussed and negotiated in the ministerial meetings. Different taxes were negotiated in terms of configurations. As continent, countries had agreed to advance economic integration agenda, which was built on three pillars: (i) The market integration pillar, which was based on negotiated trade agreement among African countries, (ii) infrastructure development and (iii) industrial development. The latter two pillars could enable the African intra-trade. The key constraint was not necessarily tariff even though it was one of the problem countries that were not trading to each other. Due to individual commitment, the tariff had been reduced. The major constraint to African intra-trade was the problem of productivity or possession of similar products or the problem of inter-connectivity between two countries. The Economic integration agenda dealt with all these typical issues in a more integrated and comprehensive manner.

On the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) of the COMESA-EAC-SADC, Ms Mlumbi-Peter stated that the tripartite was a strategic agreement that was being implemented in the continental TFTA which was launched with the aim to enhance productive capacity and the development of regional value-chains as well as promote inter-connectivity and reduce costs of doing business in eastern and southern Africa. It would provide preferential data access to state parties more than they were enjoying such access.

On the question of Lesotho,it was difficult to answer that question, but all SACU countries had committed to ratifying the Agreement by October and Lesotho had not communicated otherwise.

The question of exclusivity was related to the implications raised in the presentation with regard to EPA. All trade agreements had indeed costs and benefits and they were always permanent. Any trade agreement was all about elimination of tariffs or reduction thereof. What determined that it was beneficial or not was when benefits outweighed the costs. By the nature of the agreement, there would always be winners and losers. Trade agreements were always negotiated under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) especially when it came to tariff. Tariff was negotiated on the basis of the MFN. In analysing whether the EPA was beneficial, one had to look on whether the agreement had created additional markets beyond what South Africa had in the TDCA or better policy space. In agreement, a country was offering good opportunities to another country. The EPA created preferential access market to SACU by the EU. In terms of time frame, trade agreements, by nature, were permanent, but could be reviewed. Their permanent nature was to ensure predictable arrangements and this would appeal to investors. They were however subjected to review.

The Chairperson said due to time constraints, Ms Mlumbi-Peter should answer the remaining questions in writing. The DTI and DIRCO delegations were excused.

South African Jews for a Free Palestine (SAJFP) on current political situation on the Palestine/Israel question as well as the bodies and the role they play within Palestine/Israel
Dr Heidi Grunebaum, Chairperson: SAJFP thanked the Committee for giving her (along with the SAJFP members present, Merle Favis and Emma Daitz) an opportunity to appear before it with their Palestinian guests from Israel, namely, Naif Hujjo, Umar Al-Ghubari, Moussa Sagheir and Myssana Morany.

Dr Grunebaum said the SAJFP was one of various groups representing a growing number of South African Jews who had taken the view that Jewish ethical traditions of Tikkun Olam (or repair of the world, justice for fellow human beings) ought to guide South Africans Jews to understand and respond to experiences that had been excluded from their collective self-understanding as South African Jews. This included acknowledging that there was more than one narrative of Jewish history than the official one Israel had promoted. As ethnicity, religion, and national identity was used to justify oppression, she believed that the SAJFP was obliged to speak against the unconditional defence of a state that acts in their name.

Dr Grunebaum submitted that, in 2015, a diverse group of South African Jews travelled with more than 200 signed pledges to Israel to participate in a ceremony at the destroyed Palestinian village called Lubya, one of more than 530 such villages. The village inhabitants were expelled in 1948 and the villages were destroyed to prevent them from returning. It was in that context that Lubya’s remains were scattered beneath a Jewish National Fund (JNF) forest, called South Africa Forest. It was planted in the name of the South Africans Jews and in the name of all South Africans. Many of the South African Jews in the Jewish group who travelled to the ceremony had contributed their pocket money as children to the JNF blue boxes in the belief that they were greening the desert in a land that they were told had been unpopulated, empty and uncultivated. On learning that this narrative had hidden the existence of the village and people who had lived there until 1948, many of them felt deceived that such actions had been undertaken and continued in their name. Over the past years, they had committed to meet and to engage with the very people whose presence had been erased from the landscape and from the history they were taught.

Dr Grunebaum further noted that the 2015 ceremony was hosted by the Association for the Defence and Rights of the Internally Displaced (ADRID) and by the Zochrot, an Israeli NGO. Participants included Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. The SAJFP handed over more than 200 pledges signed by Jewish South Africans acknowledging that unwittingly, trees were planted in South Africa Forest and thus contributed further to the pain of Palestinians expelled from their villages and whose existence and experiences have been denied.

The SAJFP was committed to build relationships with people and civil society organisations to develop new ways of addressing these experiences and imagining a shared future. Following on from that initiative in 2015, it invited colleagues from ADRID, from Zochrot, and Adalah to visit it in South Africa and to participate in a range of meetings and public events. As Palestinian citizens of Israel, they brought insight to a mostly untold story of the Palestinian situation and, in this way, help us to contribute positively.

Members of Palestinian delegation hosted by SAJFP introduced themselves as follows:
 

  • Mr Umar al-Ghubari was the Co-ordinator of the Space for Return initiative of Zochrot, the Israeli NGO which raised awareness about the on-going Nakba in the broader Jewish Israeli public to create the conditions for the return of Palestinian refugees and a shared life in Israel. Al-Ghubari was a group Counsellor, political educator and documenter of the Palestinian Nakba. He was from the Palestinian village, Mshierfeh near Nazareth.
  • Mr Naif Hujjo was born in Lubya from which he and his family were expelled in July 1948. He was a community leader, writer and educator living in Deir Hanna near his destroyed village. Hujjo was the chairperson of ADRID, the Association for the Defense and Rights of the Internally Displaced Palestinians in Israel.
  • Mr Moussa Sagheir was a former teacher, an organiser and member of ADRID. His family was expelled from the village of Husha. Sagheir lives in Shefa 'Amr, two kilometres away from Husha.
  • Ms Myssana Morany was an Advocate in the Land and Planning Rights Unit of Adalah, a legal advocacy NGO for the rights of Palestinians in Israel. Following her legal apprenticeship in the legislation and legal advice unit in the Attorney General's Office in Jerusalem. Myssana received her LL.B and LL.M in Law from the Faculty of Law at Haifa University.

Discussion
The Chairperson explained the Committee heard all groups who requested to brief it on matters of concern. It heard views from right wing and left wing. It should not surprise the SAJFP to hear that it heard other organisations who might present to it a different story. For example, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) had also requested the Committee to brief it on a similar matter. If the ambassador of Israel or Palestine would wish to brief the Committee, they would be given a space. If they were given the space, the SAJFP should not feel betrayed.

Mr Mokgalapa remarked that the Committee was duty bound to listen to everyone who made an official request to talk to the Committee. He sought clarity on whether the SAJFP believed in two states solution and on what programmes were being run by the SAJFP.

Mr Bergman sought clarity on what kind of social injustice was perpetrated by Israel. Was there different a system of education? Could what wastaking place in Israel be compared with what happened in South Africa during the apartheid regime? What were Palestinians fighting for? Was it to live in Israel or in Palestine? What did they want? Was anything being done for Palestinians who were being killed in Syria?

Mr Mncwango remarked that the issue of Lubya seemed to be a bigger part of the question of Palestine/Israel and however, the Lubya problem could not be resolved if the issue of Israel/Palestine was not addressed. Was the Lubyan problem communicated to the state of Israel? If yes, what was the position of Israel on the matter? Did Arabs in Israel have political rights? If yes, what were those particular rights?

Ms Maxon remarked that members were feeling the pain of Palestinians and sought clarity on what Palestinians were doing in order to fight their own struggle. South African had to fight for their freedom. Was the SAJFP happy with the role of the UN in resolving the conflict? Were the Palestinians who visited Parliament travelling for lobbying African countries against the state of Israel?

Ms Dudley recognised the effort of the SAJFP to raise issues the Palestinians were facing. She sought clarity on whether the Israel Constitution was protecting democratic processes and on whether it guaranteed minority rights. Did Palestinians think that a peace process would help them to move forward? Were they willing to compromise?

Mr Maila sought clarity on whether Palestinians regarded their removal in their original places as crimes against humanity, on whether the SAJFP did not think that it was a time to approach the International Criminal Court? Was the Lubya people’s language recognised? Was it being taught in schools? What was the justification of the state of Israel on the removal of the people in their places?

Ms Raphuti remarked that the previous month was Women’s month and she was happy to see that the Lubya struggle was led by women. The Committee recognised their peaceful struggle because the Committee was there to promote justice and fairness.

Mr N Paulsen (EFF) said he had met the group of Palestinians on two occasions. It was widely known that the state of Israel was an apartheid state and South Africa knew that it was dealing with an apartheid state. South Africa knew how it would deal with Israel in their relations. What ?(stance?) could the SAJFP propose South Africa take in dealing with Israel? He felt that the problem lay in ignoring what Palestinians wanted. Did Palestinians agree with the two states solution? Or did the world want to create two states like the Bantustan (black state) and the rest of South Africa (white state)? Was not a two state solution a discriminatory policy? A two states approach was a reactionary and an injustice solution.

Mr Mncwango commented that Mr Paulsen’s comment was so personal and aimed at fuelling conflict and should be withdrawn.

The Chairperson remarked that Mr Paulsen’s statement would not be withdrawn. He proceeded to state that the President had appointed two special envoys to mediate the problem of Israel/Palestine. Did the SAJFP know about them? Did it engage with them? Many organisations fighting for the liberation of Palestinians had requested South Africa to expel the Israel Ambassador; however, South Africa had opted to engaging with Israel diplomatically. Did Lubyans wish to claim the piece of land or the piece of forest? If the University of Tel Aviv was built on the land on which Lubyan people were forced to leave in 1948, would they want the university to be destroyed to claim their land? Were people ready to receive compensation if there were structures erected on the land? Did the organisation recognise Israel as a state? In order to reach a compromise and sustainable peace, the starting point was to recognise each other as states.

Mr Mpumlwana sought clarity on whether there was distinction between the so called Israelis and so called Palestinians? Was there preferential treatment on the basis of race? Was the SAJFP a civil society or a political party?

Mr Umar al-Ghubari responded that they were representing their different civil societies that were created to raise issues related to human rights abuse in Israel/Palestine and to promote human rights principles. Their main purpose was to ensure that refugees returned to their original home in dignity. Originally, people became refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) in 1948 when they were expelled from their homes and ever since denied to return. These people who were expelled had rights in terms of public international law and international human rights law. In addition, the UN Security Council had taken a resolution 194 of 1949 stating that they should return to their homes and live peacefully with their neighbours, but this decision had not yet been implemented by the state of Israel until today. Villages from which Lubyan people were expelled, trees – known as the South African forest were planted. Again, the University of Tel Aviv was built on the area where another Palestinian community was expelled in 1948.

The forest planted in the Lubya village was funded by the South African Jews. The fact was that most Palestinians were forced to leave their lands and some of them live inside Israel as homeless. The Palestinians in Israel became a minority whereby minority rights should apply to them. The protection of citizens of Israel from Palestinian background was also advocated on the basis of rights of minority. More important was that these people should be recognised by Israel authorities as their citizens to whom equal rights of citizenship apply. These were survivors of ethnic cleansing and forced removal who were treated as stateless persons. In the view of the Palestinian delegation, Jewish and Palestinians could peacefully live together without regard to race and nationality. This was impossible because Israel was a racist state. It defined itself as a Jewish state. From its definitional perspective, the Israel authorities told its citizens of Palestinian background that they did not belong to the Jewish state, but Palestine. In principle, a state belonged to all citizens – from different backgrounds. The Palestinian delegation was fighting for a democratic state which recognised all citizens’ rights on an equal basis. The history of Israel should also talk about what happened to Palestinians in 1948. Israel should recognise the Palestinian language, culture and tradition. The delegation supported a two state solution if these countries would respect and observe human rights principles and refrain from oppressing one another. By contrast, the Israel had adopted 50 discriminatory laws which were being implemented by Israel against citizens of Palestinian origin.

The Chairperson thanked the Palestinian delegation and stated that the Committee would consider its message.

The meeting was adjourned. 

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