Current political situation in Lesotho and Burundi and SA’s role towards obtaining a peaceful resolution to the conflicts: Department briefing; Committee Strategic Plan

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International Relations

02 March 2016
Chairperson: Mr M Masango (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation briefed the Committee on the political situation in Lesotho. The first coalition government in Lesotho was formed under former President Mr Thomas Thabane following elections in 2012. Political and security instability followed after a failed military coup attempt in August 2014. Tensions between the Lesotho Defence Force and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) compounded the situation. The SADC intervention was prompted by the developments and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was appointed as SADC Facilitator to Lesotho by the SADC Double Troika Summit of 13 September 2014. A SADC Observer Mission was deployed to Lesotho for early elections held in February 2015.There was no outright winner and once again a coalition government was formed. Instability returned to Lesotho. A number of Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) members were accused of mutiny and were arrested. Many LDF members for fear of being imprisoned fled to SA. The mutiny trial was still ongoing and was indefinitely postponed. Lesotho opposition leaders also fled to SA on18 May 2015 including former Prime Minister Mr Thomas Thabane. Former Lesotho Defence Force Commander, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao was killed on the 25 June 2015 by army officers who attempted to arrest him for his alleged involvement in an alleged mutiny plot. In response to the happenings an Extra-Ordinary SADC Double Troika Summit took place on the 3 July 2015 and it had received an endorsed the SADC Facilitator’s Report. The Summit established a SADC Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances which led to the death of Brigadier Mahao. The investigation was at the request of the current Prime Minister of Lesotho Mr Pakalitha Mosisili. The SADC Commission of Inquiry completed its work in early November 2015. Colonel Tefo Hashatsi who was implicated in the killing of Brigadier Mahao filed a case in the Lesotho courts challenging the legality of the Commission’s Inquiry. The case was first heard on the 2 December 2015 but was then postponed. Part of the key findings of the Commission of Inquiry was that there was no conclusive finding that there was a mutiny. The LDF had failed to provide evidence in that they had attempted to arrest Brigadier Mahao for his involvement in the mutiny and hence his involvement was doubtful. On balance, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that Brigadier Mahao did not resist arrest and that the use of force was not commensurate with the resistance shown. Evidence had also not been preserved and it was unlikely that he had walked himself into hospital. Some of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry were that the Lesotho government pursue criminal investigations into the death of Brigadier Mahao and that the LMPS be empowered to do so. General Tlali Kamoli should also be relieved of his duties and that LDF members implicated in murders, attempted murders or treason be suspended and investigated. In addition that deficiencies and overlaps in the constitution of Lesotho with respect to mandates of security institutions to be looked at urgently with a comprehensive strategy to reform them. Current developments were that the court case against the Commission of Inquiry was dismissed on 8 February 2016. On the 8 February 2016, Lesotho Prime Minister Mosisili tabled the Commission of Inquiry’s Report to the Lesotho parliament but had removed the names of the perpetrators of Brigadier Mahao’s killing. Opposition members consequently staged a walkout. Lesotho was expected to implement the recommendations of the Summit and of the Facilitator’s Report.

Members felt that the Lesotho situation had many troubling elements and it seemed even with all the efforts that had been put in that nothing had changed. They asked if the people of Lesotho were receptive to the SADC Intervention and to what extent had Lesotho implemented the recommendations of Deputy President Ramaphosa. Members were concerned that if nothing was done differently, in four years time another intervention would be needed. DIRCO was asked if a warrant of arrest been issued for the capture of Brigadier Mahao, and if so who had authorised the arrest, was the South African government protecting and monitoring opposition members that had taken refuge in SA and whether the persons involved in the shooting and killing of Brigadier Mahao had been subjected to the Commission of Inquiry.  Members pointed out that the constitution of Lesotho perhaps needed amendment and that constitutional and security reforms should be implemented as had been recommended.

The Department also briefed the Committee on the political situation in Burundi. Prior to the 2015 election; Burundi was a stable country with fairly open media and democratic freedoms. President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his candidature for re-election in May 2015. Opposition parties rejected his eligibility as unconstitutional and against the Arusha Accords, as he had already served two full five-year terms. The constitutional court of Burundi declared his candidature as legitimate. Elections were held in July 2015 and President Nkurunziza won by 69% of the poll. There had been a 70% voter turnout but opposition parties had boycotted the elections. The East African Community (EAC) and the United Nations (UN) election observers had declared elections peaceful but not free and fair. The African Union (AU) had not sent observers to the elections. Street protests and civil unrest against the “third term” of the President degenerated into violence and was met by strong response by security forces. Other incidences of violence included an attempted coup d’ etat and even assassinations of high profile leaders of both government and the opposition. Reportedly 450 civilians and security forces had been killed to date. 230 000 Burundians had reportedly fled to neighbouring countries. Claims of emerging genocide and civil war had thus far been found to be unsubstantiated. The Burundian government openly accused Rwanda of recruiting, training, and arming rebels from refugee camps in Rwanda. Rwanda denied the charges. The Burundian economy was in a severe decline and this was worsened by the withdrawal of donor funding. Regional interventions included the EAC convening several summits to address the crisis in which SA had participated as a guest. Since July 2015 there had been no demonstrable progress in the dialogue process. The AU had called for dialogue to start urgently. The AU had initially sent around 100 military and human rights observers to Burundi but its effectiveness was hampered by a non finalised Memorandum of Understanding and limited numbers to cover the country.  The AU Peace and Security Council had met several times against the backdrop of the escalation of violence. The AUPSC on 17 December 2015 decided to deploy a protection and prevention force of up to 5000 to Burundi and requested the UN Security Council (UNSC) to endorse it. The UNSC had not endorsed as there was no evidence of impending genocide and civil war. At an AU Summit held on 31 January 2016 it was decided not to deploy the force but rather to send a high-level delegation to Burundi to get inclusive dialogue underway. Some of the outcomes of the high-level visit were that the Burundian government had lifted warrants of arrest against some Burundians and allowed the AU to deploy 100 human rights observers and 100 military monitors. The international community was also requested to restore aid to Burundi. Inclusive dialogue would start as soon as possible with the convening of a meeting by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda before the end of March 2016. SA had sent an interdepartmental team lead by the DIRCO to Burundi from 8-9 December 2015. They had met with stakeholders and found that amongst other things that violence by unidentified attackers was sporadic and that the reports of impending civil war and genocide were exaggerated. As one of the guarantors of the Arusha Peace Accords, SA remained ready to play its part to assist in the peace process in Burundi. SA was also expected to participate in the AU military observer deployment. On a bilateral level SA would pursuant to the request from the government of Burundi resuscitate its Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development on Burundi which included the training of Burundian diplomats, institutional capacity building and the establishment of a business council.

Members of Burundian opposition parties sat in on the briefing. The Committee commended DIRCO and SA for its efforts in Burundi. Members did however express regret that the AU should have served as observers during the elections in Burundi. Members respected the decision of the Burundian constitutional court in declaring the candidature of President Nkurunziza as legitimate. Members were concerned that donor funding to Burundi had been withdrawn. Such actions detrimentally affected ordinary people. DIRCO was asked what it thought about claims that Rwanda was involved in the destabilisation of Burundi. What could the reasons for Rwanda interfering be. Was it perhaps ethnic or political? The Committee agreed that greater dialogue was needed amongst stakeholders in Burundi.  DIRCO was asked whether UN mediators that had resigned had been replaced in Burundi. If the situation in Burundi was not considered a civil war and no genocide had taken place why were opposition leaders outside of Burundi not returning to the country. Did they fear for their lives? Members felt that people should be allowed to return and be engaged in dialogue. Some members asked if the Committee would allow the Burundian opposition members to address the Committee. The Chairperson made a ruling that guests of the Committee were not allowed to speak in meetings but could be invited by the Committee to make presentations to members. Would exiled persons be allowed to return to Burundi without conditions? Members asked whether the 450 lives that had been lost and the 230 000 people that had been displaced could not be considered as civil war or genocide. The DIRCO was also asked what had changed the minds of the heads of state about deploying 5000 troops to Burundi. In as much as the elections in Burundi were considered peaceful, members asked whether the elections had been free and fair. SA was often seen as the big brother of Africa but it took time effort and money. Members felt that it was high time that other able African countries take up the role. Members further felt that there was hypocrisy at play in Africa as much was said about the candidature of President Nkurunziza in Burundi but not much was being said about President Paul Kagame of Rwanda’s third term as President. Members had safety concerns about South African police and military members being deployed to Burundi as observers.

The Committee adopted its Draft Committee Strategic Plan (2015-2020) unamended.  

Meeting report

Opening Remarks

The Chairperson tendered the apologies of Deputy Ministers Ms Nomaindia Mfeketu and Mr Llewellyn Landers to the Committee.

The Committee would receive a briefing on the political crisis in Lesotho and the interventions made in this regard. Members would also be briefed on the political crisis in Burundi. The Committee’s work required it to keep abreast of international developments. For example what was happening in the African Union and the United Nations? The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) should also keep the Committee informed on what was happening in Syria and the Ukraine. The Committee should also be kept abreast of developments that were taking place between the US and Cuba.

Briefing by the DIRCO on Lesotho

Mr Edward Makaya, Deputy Director General: Africa, DIRCO, explained that the first coalition government in Lesotho was formed under former President, Mr Thomas Thabane, following elections in 2012. Political and security instability followed after a failed military coup attempt in August 2014. Tensions between the Lesotho Defence Force and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) compounded the situation. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention was prompted by the developments and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was appointed as the SADC Facilitator to Lesotho by the SADC Double Troika Summit of 13 September 2014. A SADC Observer Mission was deployed to Lesotho for early elections held in February 2015. There was no outright winner and once again a coalition government was formed. Instability returned to Lesotho. A number of Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) members were accused of mutiny and were arrested. Many LDF members for fear of being imprisoned fled to SA. The mutiny trial was still ongoing and was indefinitely postponed. Lesotho opposition leaders also fled to SA on18 May 2015 including former Prime Minister Mr Thomas Thabane. Former Lesotho Defence Force Commander, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao was killed on 25 June 2015 by army officers who attempted to arrest him for his alleged involvement in an alleged mutiny plot. In response to the happenings an Extra-Ordinary SADC Double Troika Summit took place on 3 July 2015 and it had received and endorsed the SADC Facilitator’s Report. The Summit established a SADC Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances which led to the death of Brigadier Mahao. The investigation was at the request of the current Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr Pakalitha Mosisili. The SADC Commission of Inquiry completed its work in early November 2015. Colonel Tefo Hashatsi, who was implicated in the killing of Brigadier Mahao, filed a case in the Lesotho courts challenging the legality of the Commission’s Inquiry. The case was first heard on 2 December 2015 but was then postponed. Part of the key findings of the Commission of Inquiry was that there was no conclusive finding that there was a mutiny. The LDF had failed to provide evidence that they had attempted to arrest Brigadier Mahao for his involvement in the mutiny and hence his involvement was doubtful. On balance, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that Brigadier Mahao did not resist arrest and that the use of force was not commensurate with the resistance shown. Evidence had also not been preserved and it was unlikely that he had walked himself into hospital. Some of the recommendations of the Commission were that the Lesotho government pursue criminal investigations into the death of Brigadier Mahao and that the LMPS be empowered to do so. General Tlali Kamoli should also be relieved of his duties and that LDF members implicated in murders, attempted murders or treason be suspended and investigated.  That deficiencies and overlaps in the constitution of Lesotho with respect to mandates of security institutions needed to be looked at urgently with a comprehensive strategy to reform them. Current developments were that the court case against the Commission of Inquiry was dismissed on 8 February 2016. On the same day, Lesotho Prime Minister Mosisili tabled the Commission of Inquiry’s Report to the Lesotho parliament but had removed the names of the perpetrators of Brigadier Mahao’s killing. Opposition members consequently staged a walkout. Lesotho was expected to implement the recommendations of the Commission and of the Facilitator’s Report.

Discussion

Mr B Radebe (ANC) noted that the situation in Lesotho had many troubling elements and it seemed as if nothing had changed. He asked what support there was for the SADC Intervention in Lesotho. Were the people of Lesotho receptive to the SADC intervention? He asked whether both Generals Mahao and Kamoli had returned to Lesotho with the SADC’s permission. On the recommendations made by Deputy President Ramaphosa, he asked to what extent Lesotho had implemented them. He also asked what the mandate of the Oversight Committee was and were its recommendations binding.

Mr Makaya stated that there was overwhelming support for the SADC Intervention in Lesotho. People were disappointed that the Oversight Committee as approved by the Extra-Ordinary SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015 had not yet been deployed. The vacuum created by the non-deployment of the Oversight Committee was being filled by Deputy President Ramaphosa. The problem was that he could not be in Lesotho forever. On the return of General Kamoli and Brigadier Mahao to Lesotho, there was no need for permission from the SADC. Lesotho was a sovereign state. SA had asked them not to return. If Prime Minister Thomas Thabane was in power then Brigadier Mahao would return. If Prime Minister Mosisili was in power then General Kamoli would return. SA had not anticipated that when General Kamoli returned it would lead to the death of Brigadier Mahao. The appointment of Brigadier Mahao in August 2014 and the removal of General Kamoli by Prime Minister Thabane were considered legal just as the appointment of General Kamoli by Prime Minister Mosisili was considered legal by the Commission of Inquiry, was considered a flaw. The problems in Lesotho were due to its constitution and the interference of its security forces. Deputy President Ramaphosa had said that Lesotho needed constitutional reform. On security, the army had a mistaken belief that it had powers of arrest which was in conflict with what Lesotho’s police should do. Security sector reform was also needed. Respective roles had to be allocated. SADC expected Lesotho to embark on these reforms. The Oversight Committee had four elements ie political, security (police and defence force), legal (constitutional and security reforms) and administrative. Its composition had been determined and SA had one or two members.    

Mr S Mokgalapa (DA) was concerned that if nothing was done differently, in four years time another intervention would be needed. There seemed to be many loopholes. He asked whether a warrant for arrest had been issued in relation to Brigadier Mahao. If so, who had authorised the arrest? How was it possible for a colonel to do the arrest without the Chief of Defence and the Prime Minister of Lesotho not knowing about it? Who protected members of the Lesotho opposition and officers whilst they were in SA? Was the South African government protecting them? Were their movements monitored? He referred to the walkout staged by opposition members of Lesotho’s parliament when Prime Minister Mosisili tabled the Commission of Inquiry’s Report in their parliament. Prime Minister Mosisili had removed the names of the alleged perpetrators from the Commission of Inquiry’s Report. Were the perpetrators subjected to the Commission of Inquiry. He asked whether criminal charges had been laid. What was the current status? Who sanctioned the return to Lesotho of Brigadiers Mahao and Kamoli? Was it the SADC or the Lesotho government? He noted that there was more than what “meets the eye” in what was happening in Lesotho.

Mr Makaya said that the soldiers who went to arrest Brigadier Mahao had been duly authorised by the relevant authorities in Lesotho. The Lesotho opposition members and soldiers in SA were being monitored. Prime Minister Mosisili had explained that he had removed the list of the soldiers’ names in the Commission of Inquiry’s Report until such time that they would be investigated then their names would be released.

Mr L Mpumlwana (ANC) said that he sympathised with the DIRCO on the Lesotho issue. The conflict in was very old and dated back to the 1960s. It started in 1965 and was very complicated. There were rumours of tenders between Prime Minister Mosisili and General Kamoli.

Mr Makaya said that Prime Minister Mosisili had appointed General Kamoli before 2014. He did not wish to speculate on the matter of tenders. 

The chairperson asked whether the Commission of Inquiry made recommendations about the soldiers who had apparently mutinied and been arrested. He asked if the Commission could make recommendations and whether such recommendations were binding. Who was involved in the attempted coup d’ etat in 2014? He suspected that General Kamoli was behind the coup and engineered things on his return. The continuous challenges that arose in Lesotho were because its constitution allowed for a coalition government and there was also involvement of its security forces. Perhaps Lesotho’s constitution needed an amendment. The constitution should also put the security forces in their place. The Committee appreciated the work done by Deputy President Ramaphosa in Lesotho. Lesotho was of strategic importance to SA not only from a security perspective but also because 40% of SA’s water came from Lesotho.

Mr Makaya said that on the arrested soldiers there was a court order by a Lesotho Court that had called for the release of the soldiers. Their court marshal had been postponed indefinitely. DIRCO believed that the findings of the Commission of Inquiry were binding. SADC expected Prime Minister Mosisili to implement the findings and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. On who was responsible for the coup he stated that there were tensions between General Kamoli and the former Prime Minister Thabane.  When the coup happened Prime Minister Thabane was already in SA. The Committee could make its own deductions. SADC had urged the Lesotho government to implement the constitutional and security sector reforms that were required. It was clear that the army regarded themselves as a key stakeholder.

Ms T Kenye (ANC) asked what recommendations DIRCO had to separate the role of the army and police in Lesotho. The Oversight Committee had recommended a road map. Had the Oversight Committee engaged with stakeholders?

The Chairperson asked in the DIRCO’s view could Prime Minister Mosisili have been at fault to have omitted the names of the perpetrators from the Commission of Inquiry’s Report. He pointed out that when opposition parties walked out it caused a stalemate.

Mr Makaya responded that as far as the SADC was concerned the Lesotho government was expected to implement recommendations made by Deputy President Ramaphosa and the Commission of Inquiry. 

The Chairperson said that the SADC had to continue to monitor Lesotho.

Mr Radebe appreciated the work done by Deputy President Ramaphosa. It was troubling that the government of Lesotho ignored its courts of law. SADC needed to be more hard handed. The same things could not be said over and over again. Rules of courts had to be adhered to. He personally felt that Lesotho had no government. Things could not go on as they were.

Mr Mpumlwana said that greater investigation was needed. Symptoms were only being treated. It was a complex situation and the army had been in charge for a long time. He felt that nothing would change. To expect the army to obey courts was difficult.

Briefing by the DIRCO on Burundi

Mr Makaya explained that prior to the 2015 election; Burundi was a stable country with a fairly open media and democratic freedoms. President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his candidature for re-election in May 2015. Opposition parties rejected his eligibility as unconstitutional and against the Arusha Accords, as he had already served two full five-year terms. The constitutional court of Burundi declared his candidature as legitimate. Elections were held in July 2015 and President Nkurunziza won by 69% of the poll. There had been a 70% voter turnout but opposition parties had boycotted the elections. The East African Community (EAC) and the United Nations (UN) election observers had declared elections peaceful but not free and fair. The AU had not sent observers to the elections. Street protests and civil unrest against the “third term” of the President degenerated into violence and was met by strong response by security forces. Other incidences of violence included an attempted coup d’ etat and even assassinations of high profile leaders of both government and the opposition. Reportedly 450 civilians and security forces had been killed to date. 230 000 Burundians had reportedly fled to neighbouring countries. Claims of emerging genocide and civil war had thus far been found to be unsubstantiated. The Burundian government openly accused Rwanda of recruiting, training and arming rebels from refugee camps in Rwanda. Rwanda denied the charges. The Burundian economy was in a severe decline and this was worsened by the withdrawal of donor funding. Regional interventions included the EAC convening several summits to address the crisis in which SA had participated as a guest. Since July 2015 there had been no demonstrable progress in the dialogue process. The AU had called for dialogue to start urgently. The AU had initially sent around 100 military and human rights observers to Burundi but its effectiveness was hampered by a non finalised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and limited numbers to cover the country. 

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) had met several times against the backdrop of the escalation of violence. The AUPSC, on 17 December 2015, decided to deploy a protection and prevention force of up to 5000 to Burundi and requested the UN Security Council (UNSC) to endorse it. The UNSC had not endorsed this as there was no evidence of impending genocide and civil war. At an AU Summit held on 31 January 2016 it was decided not to deploy the force but rather to send a high-level delegation to Burundi to get inclusive dialogue underway. Some of the outcomes of the high-level visit were that the Burundian government had to lift warrants of arrest against some Burundians and allow the AU to deploy 100 human rights observers and 100 military monitors. The international community was also requested to restore aid to Burundi. Inclusive dialogue would start as soon as possible with the convening of a meeting by President Museveni before the end of March 2016. SA had sent a interdepartmental team lead by the DIRCO to Burundi from 8-9 December 2015. They had met with stakeholders and found that amongst other things that violence by unidentified attackers was sporadic and that the reports of impending civil war and genocide were exaggerated. As one of the guarantors of the Arusha Peace Accords, SA remained ready to play its part to assist in the peace process in Burundi. SA was also expected to participate in the AU military observer deployment. On a bilateral level, SA would, pursuant to the request from the government of Burundi, resuscitate its Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) on Burundi which included the training of Burundian diplomats, institutional capacity building and the establishment of a business council.

Discussion

Mr Radebe regretted that the AU had not served as observers during the elections in Burundi. I was a mistake. The Burundians should have been helped. He appreciated that the AU was trying to make up for the mistake. He noted that the constitutional court of Burundi had declared the candidature of President Nkurunziza as legitimate. Who had the right to say that the constitutional court of Burundi was wrong? It was unfortunate that Burundi was back to square one. Africans were still suffering from colonialism. Africans needed to liberate themselves from the shackles of colonialism. The voter turnout for the elections in Burundi had been quite high at 70%. President Nkurunziza had legitimately won by 69%. People had to respect institutions like the constitutional court. He asked who had withdrawn donor funding from Burundi. It was ordinary people who suffered when donor funding was withdrawn. He appreciated that SA was assisting the Burundian people. He asked about the efforts of neighbouring countries in trying to destabilise Burundi. There were claims that Rwanda was involved. The AU needed to look into the allegations against Rwanda.

Mr Makaya conceded that it was regrettable that the AU had not sent election observers to Burundi. Burundi was a priority in terms of solving conflict issues in the continent. On the matter of respect for the constitutional court, SA and the EAC had agreed that when the constitutional court made a ruling over the candidature of President Nkurunziza then the matter would be considered closed. SA had been tempted like many other states to obtain a legal opinion over the matter but Burundi was a sovereign state which had to be respected. The Arusha Agreement and the constitution of Burundi needed to be discussed. Germany used to be a major donor in Burundi. SA had engaged with the Germans to reconsider the reinstatement of the donor funding. It was the ordinary people that would suffer. SA had also met with the UK and US Envoys on the Great Lakes. Inclusive dialogue was required in Burundi. It was a process that would take a while.

Ms D Raphuti (ANC) also commended SA for the work that it was doing in Burundi. The conflict in Burundi seemed to be sporadic. The anarchists needed to be dealt with. Dialogue with stakeholders needed to take place. The constitutional court had declared that President Nkurunziza was serving his second term and not his third. Rebels had to be rooted out like weeds.

Mr Makaya noted that sporadic attacks were part of discussions. On the allegations against Rwanda interfering in Burundi, he said that there were even one or two countries that had interfered in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There was a UN Framework which said that member states should not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The alleged interference by Rwanda was nevertheless a concern. The next step would be engagement with the government of Rwanda. International Law prohibited such interference. If it was true then Rwanda must desist from doing it.

Ms Kenye was concerned about militias being disarmed. This could lead to genocide. The UN mediators alleged that there was bias and hence resigned. She asked whether the mediators were replaced. The constitutional court had cleared President Nkurunziza. When President Nkurunziza had visited SA he had requested SA to interact on multilateral fora. She did not see any multilateral fora on interventions that had been made. Were the 5000 troops that would have been deployed from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)?  

Mr Makaya, on UN mediators, said that they gave space to the AU and the EAC to run with the matter. When President Nkurunziza had visited SA in 2014 he had requested SA to train officials and even security staff. On bilateral engagement with SA, President Zuma would send a special envoy.

Mr Mpumlwana asked how rich Burundi was. Was there interest from outside Burundi to loot the riches of Burundi?  He asked why opposition party members outside of Burundi had not returned to Burundi. Did they feel unsafe? He also asked what the involvement of Rwanda was in Burundi. He added that DIRCO made him proud. 

Mr Mokgalapa noted the presence of members of the opposition parties from Burundi in the meeting and said that the Committee should ask why they had left Burundi. The role of the international community was important as already 450 people had died and 230 000 had been displaced. Could the situation in Burundi not be considered civil war or genocide? In Rwanda the mistake had been made to turn a blind eye and things had been allowed to escalate. He asked what had made the heads of state to have changed their minds about the deployment of 5000 troops in Burundi. A high-level visit to Burundi had taken place but no timeframes had been set. There was a Diaspora of Burundians all over the world. People should be allowed to return and engage in dialogue. He pointed out that there was a rumour that the judge who had made the ruling on the terms of office of President Nkurunziza had run away. Who was going to take responsibility for the killing of people? He asked what the role of the 300 military and human rights observers was. On the issue of allegations against Rwanda, he noted that Rwanda had its own problems. The whole region was sensitive. It was not as easy to flush out rebels as some would think.

Mr Makaya noted that there was an AU Commission Concept Paper on the deployment of the 5000 troops. The deployment would only be done with the consent of the host country. Burundi had not given its consent. Tanzania was a member of the EAC and had said there was no need for the deployment. He noted that the AU had only deployed a force without the consent of the host country once. Other options would have to be considered.

Mr Mokgalapa said that he understood it to be a political issue and accepted the explanation.

Mr D Bergman (DA), on the perceived lack of civil war in Burundi, asked how that conclusion had been reached. It was very rare in a country where everything was flourishing to get a 70% turnout of voters. Observers had said that the elections had been peaceful. The question should be whether the elections were free and fair. The 70% turnout should be re-looked at. There were 200 000 opposition party members outside of Burundi. Why did they not feel safe in Burundi? He asked what about the 450 lives that had been lost? When was the situation going to be considered a civil war? Greater vigilance and checks and balances were needed. Historically SA was always seen as the big brother of Africa and President Zuma and Deputy President Ramaphosa ran around to put out fires all over the continent. SA also deployed its troops. It was a huge expense and SA could no longer do both. It should be one or the other. There were a few other countries that were also able to take on the role of big brother. 

Mr Makaya pointed out that the AU and the EAC was on the ground in Burundi but had not made a determination that the situation was a civil war and that genocide had taken place. He did not wish to speak about the election results or whether elections had been forced or not.

Mr Maila stated it was generally accepted that all governments and institutions had to accept and respect the independence of the judiciary. He found it surprising that the judiciary in Burundi had been questioned and that donor funding had been withheld. Referring to earlier comments that there were rumours that the judge who had made the ruling had run away, he asked why the judge would run away if he had ruled in favour of the President. He noted that Rwanda was to have elections in 2017 and President Paul Kagame was to run for a third seven-year term. Resistance in Rwanda was feeble compared to Burundi. He felt that there was hypocrisy at play.

Mr Makaya confirmed that indeed it was President Kagame’s third term as president. He had changed the constitution of Rwanda and there had been a muted reaction from the international community. There was a lack of consistency. Complaints were made about President Nkurunziza running for election again but nothing was said about President Kagame.

Ms C Dudley (ACDP), on donor funding, asked what the issues were. Did donor funding go where it was supposed to? She was concerned about SA sending its police and military personnel to Burundi as observers. It was dangerous and things could escalate. She did not wish the South African observers to be sitting ducks in a conflict ridden country. She agreed that it would be useful to hear what the Committee’s Burundian guests had to say. 

Mr Makaya explained that there was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the role of military observers. The MOU had not yet been concluded but it did define the rules. Burundi would protect the South Africans deployed there. Roles would be spelt out.

The Chairperson made a ruling that the presiding officers of Parliament had always informed guests that they could only be observers and could not participate. Visitors could participate if the Committee invited them to make a presentation. President Zuma was only a facilitator in Burundi and the full time mediator was President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. In SA, political parties had freedom of expression.  DIRCO was asked what the AU and the EAC said about the alleged external interference by Rwanda. What was the reason for Rwanda interfering. Could it be for ethnic or political reasons? He asked whether the Arusha Agreement had facilitated towards the election of President Nkurunziza. What did the constitution say about the sitting President? In the eyes of the opposition, the election of President Nkurunziza was illegitimate. President Nkurunziza had agreed to lift the warrants of arrest that had been issued against some opposition leaders. What about those whose warrants of arrest had not been lifted? Even in SA there were political parties in Parliament who were either anti black or anti white. A dialogue was needed between political parties. Whether the situation in Burundi bordered on civil war or genocide was something that would be looked into. He asked whether exiles would be allowed to return to Burundi without conditions. He noted that there was no agreed definition of peaceful, legitimate, free and fair elections. The Committee needed to agree that when the AU and the UN went on observer missions they should be required to make determinations. He conceded that it was difficult to make the determinations. On the role that SA was playing, like the training of Burundian officials he stated that SA should be assisting with the political discussions. SA should assist countries in Africa. SA was one of the few countries that had forgiven magnanimously. In some countries forgiveness was not forthcoming. Whites and blacks in SA lived side by side. Even Afrikaners had lived side by side with English whites after all the atrocities that the English had metered out on Afrikaners during the Anglo-Boer war.

Mr Makaya responded that the AU and the EAC was concerned about the instability in Burundi. SA had midwifed the Democratic Republic of Burundi and hence wanted sustainable stability. He added on the resumption of dialogue that President Museveni of Uganda would convene the first session before the end of the week. On Burundian exiles, five heads of state lead by President Zuma had met with President Nkurunziza, leaders of political parties, religious leaders and civil society as well as a former president of Burundi. He read out excerpts of a communiqué which spoke about the commitment of government and stakeholders on having dialogue and that the next step was to meet political parties that were outside of Burundi. If there was external involvement in the Burundian conflict then it would be stopped. It was totally against international law principles. An AU high level delegation would engage with Rwanda. Rwanda had however publicly denied it. DIRCO did not wish to speculate on the reasons for Rwanda’s interference. What was contained in the Arusha Agreement and what was said in the constitution of Burundi that needed to be considered? He noted that there would be the return of exiles without preconditions. It was about inclusive political dialogue. On the AU observing elections he said that they adhered to the SADC Principles. DIRCO increasingly observed that where elections had taken place in Africa, the losing parties never accepted the results.

Mr Radebe disagreed with no preconditions being attached to the return of opposition members to Burundi. There should not be a utopian belief that all will be good. He believed in all inclusive dialogue. He was concerned that without preconditions there might be those who still believed in an armed struggle. SA accepted the constitutional court ruling in Burundi.

The Chairperson thanked Mr Makaya for a very detailed and informative briefing.

Draft Committee Strategic Plan (2015-2020)

The Chairperson said that members had said all that could be said on the Draft Committee Strategic Plan. It had to be in line with the Strategic Plan of the 5TH Parliament of SA.

Mr Mokgalapa agreed that the Draft Committee Strategic Plan was straight forward. All that Committee section needed to do was to add in figures.

Ms Dineo Mosala, Committee Content Adviser, briefly took members through some of the figures that had been included in the Draft Committee Strategic Plan. The Committee had set a target of having 25 meetings for the year. There would be one outreach programme. DIRCO had said that the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) Bill would be coming before the Committee in 2017. The Committee planned to at least have one study tour in 2016. On oversight visits to missions, to African Renaissance Fund (ARF) projects and to international organisations for the current year was only one. In 2017/18 and in 2018/19 there would be two each. On risk management the Committee had to look at issues like for example its draft oversight model, delays in draft legislation and documents to be tabled, budget constraints, the uncertainty of the socio-economic environment and the lack of co-ordination between committees of Parliament.

The Chairperson placed the Draft Committee Strategic Plan before the Committee for adoption.

The Committee adopted the Draft Committee Strategic Plan unamended. 

The meeting was adjourned.

 

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