The Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the security upgrades at the President’s Nkandla residence were briefed by the Minister of Police and the Minister of Public Works on the issues which had led to the inflation of costs, shoddy workmanship, flouting of regulations, allegations of corruption, and demands that the President should repay a portion of the costs.
The Minister of Police said that the 2009 security evaluation report of the South African Police Service (SAPS) had been subject to interpretation by professionals and experts when it came to the implementation phase. The evaluation had spoken of fire fighting equipment that had to be on site, but had not specified what kind of equipment. The specifications had been left to the experts, who had determined that a “firepool” would be appropriate. However, the water pump and fire-fighting equipment could not be procured while the investigation was under way, hence the need for the completion of outstanding work.
The SAPS and South African National Defence Force (SANDF) housing complex, helipad and clinic at Nkandla had cost a total of R135.2 million. A letter from Senior Superintendent Linde of the SAPS building planning committee had stated “by instruction of the State President, President Zuma, the existing house at Nkandla, currently accommodating SAPS members, must be converted as part of the President’s household.” However, the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) had interviewed Mr Linde, and he had stated that these were his own words and not those of the President.
Processes were under way to investigate the cost inflation, scope-creep and recoveries, which fell under the purview of the SIU and the Department of Public Works (DPW). With regard to the police and defence force barracks, steps were being taken to ensure that there was a proper and official hand-over. A security re-evaluation would be conducted soon by a team of experts from law enforcement agencies which would strictly adhere to principles of project management, oversight and various prescripts.
Members said they had appreciated the oversight visit to the private residence of the President, as this had assisted the Committee to compare what been presented in the media with the reality, and to understand that the security of the President had been compromised. They wanted to know whether any disciplinary measures had been instituted against Superintendent Linde, as this was the only way to enforce accountability. They pointed out that the problem with the upgraded SAPS assessment had arisen when the private contractors had come on board and had started to usurp the work of the DPW and the SAPS. The building of the tunnels, with the exit and three lifts, had cost the exorbitant amount of R21 million, and this had happened after the private contractors had come in and substantially changed the cost estimates.
Some Members expressed concern that the Minister insisted that the “firepool”, the construction of 20 accommodation units, the visitors’ lounge, VIP parking, air conditioning and the relocation of poor households were part of the security features, despite the fact that the SIU report had made it very clear that these were not part of the security measures. They felt that the Ministers of Police and Public Works had rehashed the report of the Public Protector, and it was therefore impossible to get an opinion from the people who were controlled by the President and were defended by the ruling party. The two people who should have been present in the meeting were the Public Protector and the Head of the SIU. Concern was raised about the need for an additional R31 million to be used for the security upgrades, despite the fact that shoddy work had already been done, and it would be helpful to recover money from the contractors that had been hired.
The Minister of Public Works said that the initial report had separated the estimated money still to be spent on the security upgrades at the private residence of the President. All the reports had confirmed that the security upgrades had not been properly budgeted for, and due processes had not been followed in the appointment of the contractors. The supply chain management prescripts had not been adequately followed, and the DPW had had no policies to guide the management of this prestige project.
The DPW was very clear about the need to develop a policy on the management prescripts and to identify any professionals who may have acted unethically on this project. The project had been a victim of poor systems and a lack of controls within the DPW. The Department had already begun with internal disciplinary processes, and this was one of the ways of ensuring that those who were involved could be held accountable. A total of 12 officials had been involved in the project and had been charged with the irregular appointment of contractors. One junior official had pleaded guilty and had been given a three-month salary suspension and suspended from participating in any supply chain processes until he had undergone training. The Department had now taken bold action by reforming the entire supply chain management system by putting in qualified officials and controls to reduce and detect fraud and corrupt practices, including the implementation of a prestige policy to guide the implementation of security measures for political office bearers.
Members were concerned that the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) had not been followed by the DPW, as the PFMA made it very clear that any accounting officer found guilty of wrongdoing must be fined or imprisoned. It was confusing that there was only one cost centre as there should had been at least three cost centres so that the SAPS and the SANDF could carry the cost. What was the logic behind the combination of all the cost centres into one centre? They wanted to know how it was possible that the architect, Mr Makhanya, who was not even working for government, could instruct a government department to deviate funds that had exceeded all the regulations.
The DPW was asked to provide the Committee with the document that highlighted the processes to be followed to ensure that the problem of mismanagement of funds would be prevented in future, so that it could be interrogated by Members. They expressed dismay to discover that the architect was being sued for R155 million while he had never pocketed a cent, as that money had all gone to the contractors. Essentially, the main argument should focus on the fact that the President had been involved in this project going wrong, and whether this had been done directly or tacitly was the question that needed to be answered.
Members of the ANC defended the assessment reports of the Ministers and rejected calls from Members of the opposition parties to have the Public Protector appear before the Committee. They felt the reports of the two Ministers were fair and the Nkandla verification visit had been convincing, so there was for her to appear before the Committee. Members of the opposition parties, on the other hand, felt it was necessary to invite her because the authenticity of her report was being challenged, and she should be given the same opportunity afforded to the two Ministers, to have her report interrogated and to defend herself.
Members wanted to know why the Nkandla expenditure had been hidden when the Department of Public Works had presented its budget to the Parliament. They asked if it was a normal practice to award work to a service provider who was not on the database of the Department. They remarked that the ruling party members did not want certain individuals to be called before the Committee, and asked why the upgrades were considered security-related now, whereas they had initially been found not to be security related. An ANC Member commented that Mr Maimane (DA) did not have a licence to keep drugs in his church, whereas Mr Makhanya had one to practise as an architect – a remark she later had to withdraw. It was also stated that it was wrong to insinuate that the two Ministers had been dishonest in their reports because they were political appointees.
Briefing by Minister of Police
Mr Nkosinathi Nhleko, Minister of Police, said that the security evaluation report of the South African Police Service (SAPS) had been subject to interpretation by professionals and experts when it came to the implementation phase. For example, the security evaluation that had been done by SAPS in 2009 had spoken of fire fighting equipment that must be on site, but had not specified what kind of equipment. Such a function, including specifications, had been left to the experts and professionals. The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) report acknowledged that on 28 May 2009, the SAPS had visited Nkandla to conduct their first assessment after Mr Zuma had become President. The SAPS had then prepared a further assessment report which had not mentioned the costs involved. This was unsurprising, as the upgrades were to be implemented by the Department of Public Works (DPW), which would also bear the costs of the upgrades, save for those specific to the accommodation requirements of the SAPS personnel. This assessment report had been handed over to the DPW’s acting Director-General (DG) on 9 June 2009.
The SAPS and South African National Defence Force (SANDF) housing complex, helipad and clinic at Nkandla had cost a total of R135.2 million. Reference had been made to correspondence from Senior Superintendent L Linde of the SAPS building planning committee. According to paragraph 2 of the letter, it stated that “by instruction of the State President, President Zuma, the existing house at Nkandla, currently accommodate SAPS members, must be converted as part of the President’s household.” It should be noted that this matter had been dealt with by the SIU in its investigation report on page 202, paragraph 41, which had interviewed Mr Linde and who had stated that these were his own words, and not those of the President. This meant that he was not being truthful when he wrote “by the instruction of the State President” and this was, by his own account, an invention.
The SIU had observed that “there appears to be a disturbing tendency to invoke the name of the President to move the project along and to influence decisions.” The report had also further opined that “the direct involvement of these persons … was used by officials as a means to support or push through what they themselves wanted”. Further, Senior Superintendent Linde’s letter contained an attachment with a revised SAPS request which canvassed for the following:14 bachelor flats, a control room, park homes, two offices and a lock-up garage (armoured vehicle), lock-up garages x 12, guard houses and landscaping. The occupation by the state of the land adjacent to that occupied by the President, and where security and other measures were constructed and installed, fell under the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act (No. 3 of 1994), with a requirement for a proper lease agreement. In this regard, the lease agreement in question covered the clinic, barracks and helipad.
It was common cause that the barracks had been constructed at the instance of SAPS (14) and SANDF (6). In this regard, it should be noted that such a development had been governed by the SAPS’s housing policy, where allocation was based on merit and not proximity, and at the helm of which was the cluster commander who appointed an accommodation committee. Only then could the accommodation be allocated to SAPS members officially.
The need for the swimming pool/firepool appeared under the letter ‘F’ of the swimming pool design in the DPW Prestige Project dated 2009, and the SAPS security evaluation dated 2009 had also determined a requirement for fire-fighting capability to be on site. It had also appeared in the Ibhongo Consulting CC engineer’s report as a requirement for fire-fighting, and the location of the firepool was determined by practitioners. However, the water pump and appropriate equipment for firefighting equipment could not be procured while the investigation was under way, hence the need for completion of the outstanding work.
There were processes under way in relation to cost inflation, scope-creep and recoveries, which fell under the purview of the SIU and the NDPW, so the Minister of Public Works would accordingly update the Ad Hoc Committee on progress. With regard to the Police and Defence Force barracks, there was a process under way to ensure that there was a proper and official hand-over.
The Minister reiterated what had been stated by various investigative reports, that outstanding work had to be completed. The security re-evaluation would be conducted soon by a team of experts from law enforcement agencies. Such a process had to adhere strictly to principles of project management, oversight and various prescripts.
Ms M Kubayi (ANC) appreciated that the Committee had been given an opportunity to make an oversight visit to the Nkandla homestead as this had assisted in comparing what had been indicated to the media agianst the reality. She wanted to know whether there were any consequences that had been taken against Superintendent Linde, as this was the only way to enforce accountability. The SIU report had shown that there were a number of officials who had done things wrongly in the security upgrades, and there should be consequences.
Mr S Swart (ACDP) said that the visit to the private residence of the President had indeed been very insightful, as it had given everyone an opportunity to make conclusions on the escalated costs for the security upgrades. The opposition parties had rejected the Police Minister’s report, which seemed to exonerate the President from any misconduct. He wanted more information on the letter, which had been confirmed by the police spokesperson from the Police Ministry, Mr Musa Zondi, that there had been an instruction from the President for the upgrade of accommodation requirements of the SAPS personnel. The problem with the upgraded SAPS assessment had arisen when the private contractors had come on board and had started to usurp the work of Public Works and the SAPS. There had also been a case where a private contractor had written a letter on a Public Works document, and the SIU was instituting action in this regard.
It was understandable that there was still on-going litigation in respect of some of the matters, and therefore it would not be wise to go into much detail. However, there appeared to be a discrepancy between the SIU report and that of the Minister of Police. The SIU report on page 207 had made it very clear that the “firepool”, the construction of 20 units, the visitors’ lounge, VIP parking, air conditioning and the relocation of poor households, were not part of the security measures. However, the Minister still maintained that these were part of the security measures. There seemed to be a consensus that the costs in the security upgrades at the private residence of the President had been escalated and should be recovered from the contractors, architects and the President. It was concerning that the tunnels, with the exit and three lifts, had cost the exorbitant amount of R21 million. This was after the private contractors had come in and substantially changed the cost estimates.
It was concerning that the security measures were not in place, and it had been indicated that there was still more work to be done in this regard. He wanted more information on the fact that the DPW had said that phase 3 of the security measures was still to be implemented, and this would cost an additional R31 million. Would this be in accordance with the assessment of the Minister of Police? The Public Protector had made it very clear that there was an amount which the President needed to pay, and this was nowhere near the R246 million that most people were talking about, but a portion of the money that was not part of the security upgrades. In addition, the Public Protector had highlighted that the President had requested the building of a larger kraal and was willing to reimburse the state on the costs to be incurred, which indicated that the President had admitted his responsibility to pay for the extension of the kraal. The assertion that the President must not pay some money for the security upgrades at his residence flew directly in the face of the Public Protector’s report.
Mr M Maimane (DA) aid that the Minister was making a fascinating point by proposing that the security experts were supposed to be the ones who determined aspects such as the form, shape and character of the “firepool”. He wanted to know whether the use of a swimming people as a form of extinguishing fires was a common practice in rural areas. The use of the term “firepool” was indeed an insult to the intelligence the South Africans, as this was clearly a swimming pool -- it was nicely tiled and paved, with an entertainment area, and the overall aesthetics of the “firepool” showed it was initially intended to be a swimming pool. It was clear from the beginning that the President was going to be liable for the cost of other upgrades that could not be considered as part of security measures, like the swimming pool and the extension of the kraal, hence the Cabinet had decided to move away from the National Key Points Act. It could not be argued from the demonstration that had been done during the oversight visit to the private residence of the President that the initial intention of the swimming pool had been to extinguish a fire in case of emergency.
It was particularly interesting that there was a common theme linking any project that pertained to the name of the President. A parallel to this was had been the Waterkloof landing, where the main argument had been that the opposition parties were just “using the President’s name.” This logic was obviously dangerous, as it forced people to suspend their thinking when it came to any project that involved the President. The Public Protector had highlighted that the the architect, Mr Minihle Makhanya, had effectively become the project manager and it was clear that this person was under someone’s instruction. It would be bizarre and offensive to say that the President did not know about the security upgrades at his private residence, as the instructions to the architect were in fact the instructions of the President.
It was wrong to assume that since shoddy work had been done with all the security upgrades, there was no luxury involved, as the heavily secured and bullet-proofed clinic was part of this luxury. Even if the project of the clinic was insufficient and poor, this did not suggest that fundamentally this was a benefit that the President had derived, and he was therefore not liable to pay back the portion of the money. It would be illogical and an insult to taxpayers to say more inflated costs must go forward against the backdrop of a lack of forensic evidence as to why houses so small could cost R6 million each. It was crystal clear that the President had unduly benefited from the security upgrades at his private residence and the Public Protector had been correct in finding that this particular project had changed from being a security upgrade to being a presidential upgrade. President Zuma must finance a portion of the luxury that had been derived from the security upgrades.
Mr N Singh (IFP) also welcomed the report of the Minister, as it provided useful information. However, it was impossible to agree with the final conclusion of the report that the President was not liable to finance a portion of the luxury that had been derived from the security upgrades. It had emerged from the discussions last week, when it had been realised that when a security report had been written, whatever interventions contained in that report were to protect a particular individual. The Minister of Police had said today that there was a security report, and its “experts” and “professionals” were to implement those services, and SAPS did not have the power to change what was suggested by the security personnel. Who were these professional experts, as this had not been indicated in the Minister’s presentation?
There had been no mention of the R135.2 million for consultant and professional fees in the meeting in Pietermaritzburg, as the focus had been on the additional R70 million for the visitors’ centre. R50 million had been for the actual work, and R20 million for professional fees. The question to be asked was whether it was possible for 40% of the total cost of the project to go to professional and consultant fees. Was there any evidence of the delegated power to Superintended Linde over the project at the private residence of the President? What action had been taken against Superintendent Linde to repay the money, as this was the person who had directed that the R135.3 million should be spent on consultants and professional fees? It was disappointing to observe that the Minister had not dealt with any matter that had been raised in the SIU report, as had been pointed out by Mr Swart. There had been a top secret report which had stated that “in order to curb potential fire hazards due to lack of infrastructure and water supply that was erratic, a water reservoir was constructed for fire-fighting purposes”. It was quite clear from this that there had been no mention of a swimming pool, but of a water reservoir. He wanted to know if it was the policy of the Department of Police not to build a police station on Ingonyama Trust land, although R135.2 million of infrastructure had been built on this land. What was the relationship between the Ingonyama Trust and the SAPS?
It was discomforting to observe that the SAPS and SANDF were not taking responsibility for these units. It had been reported that the units were occupied by SAPS. Why was the Minister of Public Works not transferring these units to SAPS? What were the circumstances surrounding the appointment of Mr Makhanya? Why was there so much neglect at the moment at the private residence of the President, especially in the surrounding infrastructure? How could things get stolen right in front of the wall where the President lived?
Mr Nhleko responded that no action had been taken against Superintendent Linde at the moment. The Department was still to conduct an investigation on the matter, in collaboration with the report of the SIU. There was general agreement that processes were under way in terms of cost recovery and other disciplinary steps to be taken to deal with the matter. It was wrong to assume that the President had taken the decision to refer the matter of the security upgrades to the Minister of Police, as the Minister of Police could act only in terms of resolutions of the House. Therefore, the Minister was only reacting to a resolution that had been adopted by Parliament, and this had nothing to do with what the President had said and everything to do with the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Minister’s report and the referrals by the previous Ad Hoc Committee.
Mr Nhleko said that Mr Zondi had confirmed only the existence of Superintendent Linde’s letter, and not the contents of the letter. There was no way that Mr Zondi, who had not even been there in the first place, could have confirmed the contents of the letter. It was important to bear in mind that the SIU dealt with a whole range of matters, and the scope of the Minster of Police had been defined by what had been referred to as non-security features. These included the “firepool”, the extension of the kraal, the amphitheatre and the visitors’ lounge. Therefore, the role of the Minster of Police did not cover the broad scope of the security upgrades at the private residency of the President. It was important to not forget that the presentation had focused on the instruments that had been used to arrive at a certain conclusion -- for example, the purpose of constructing a “firepool”. What was central to the issue was the work of the security expert, who had been able to unpack everything that was required to ensure the safety of the President.
He wanted to put it on record that he did not have an answer to the question on the R31 million estimated for the completion of phase 3, but he found it peculiar that the estimated R31 million was often included in the R246 million. The question in this instance should be, how could it be possible to have an estimation of the cost, as this was something that did not exist? The indication that the President had met with the Public Protector and admitted his responsibility to pay for the extension of the kraal was an allegation that had been made, and had been perpetuated. The President had compiled a report reacting to the report of the Public Protector, and the discussions in Parliament. The President had denied that there were ever any discussions between him and the Public Protector. The report had also refuted the commitment that was claimed to have been made by the President to reimburse the state on the costs of the extensions to the kraal.
Mr Nhleko said that the Members of the Committee had been provided with a document which clearly explained the existence of the “firepool.” This matter had not arisen in 2014 or 2015, but out of the evaluation report in the first instance. There had been an interesting sort of trail of engagement around this matter involving security experts, the DPW, engineers and the architect. The report had also pointed out that it in order to ensure an improvement to the security of the President in the event of fire, it would be useful to have an extra 138 kl of water from the “firepool”. The whole notion of a “firepool,” and what it was to be used for, was not an afterthought as was often assumed by the general public. In essence, the “firepool” was part of the security measures and it had been conceptualised for this particular purpose.
It was important also to make it clear that Senior Superintendent Linde worked for the SAPS, and not in the Presidency, and therefore it was unlikely or improbable for the President to instruct a person at this lower level to do him a personal favour. The official had admitted that he was not being truthful when he had written “by the instruction of the State President. This was, by his own account, an invention, and this had been confirmed by the SIU report. There was this tendency by civil servants to do “name-dropping” in order to be absolved from responsibility and this was one of those cases. He assured Members that he would not have succumbed to an instruction by the President to come to the Committee to defend a particular agenda.
Mr Nhleko reiterated that the issue of cost inflation, which had been considered as cross-subsidisation, was a matter for further debate and discussion by the Members of the Committee, and he hoped that this matter would be clarified by the Minister of Public Works. The report that had been released by the Minister of Police had dealt with the items that had constituted private security, and those that had not. The question of a need for security upgrades, especially a “firepool,” had been established by security experts through their evaluations. The manifestation of that need had required the input of professionals and experts, and there was no contradiction in that. The need for fire-fighting capability to be made on site had been identified, and then there had been further engagements with the engineers, architects and the DPW.
It was incorrect to insinuate that the R135.2 million had been only for professional fees, as it had clearly been indicated in the report that the R135.2 million was inclusive of the professional fees. It was impossible at the moment to given an opinion on the question of the delegated power of Superintended Linde, but this was a matter that could become clearer, as there were many follow-ups on the matter. What was absolutely clear was that Senior Superintendent Linde had invented the whole story of the instruction from the President, as he himself had admitted to this. An explanation had already been offered on the construction of the water reservoir and how this was for the purpose of extinguishing fires. There would be an official handover of the houses for the SANDF and SAPS officials, as many questions had been asked on the matter.
Mr Nhleko said that the Ingonyama Trust Act required that the Department of Police had to enter into a lease agreement, and therefore it was possible to build a police station on land that belonged to the Trust as long as this followed the stipulated procedure. He asked Mr Swart to repeat his question related to Mr Makhanya.
Mr Swart first indicated that since the matter of Mr Makhanya was currently under litigation, he would therefore be cautious not to go into details on the matter, as this might prejudice the case. He asked about the steps that needed to be taken to institute the further security features at the private residence of the President.
Mr C Mulder (FF+) said that Members were interested in the police station in order to find out how the issue of 21 houses had come about, as the argument that had been put forward was that maybe there would be a police station. It had also been stated that the negotiations to build a police station had fallen through, but the presentation today had indicated that the houses were part of the Ingonyama Trust deal. The Minister had just said that the reason for drafting the report was to respond to the Ad Hoc Committee, but there had been a directive from the President in the report dated 14 August 2014 that he had the responsibility to determine whether the President was liable to pay for the security upgrades that had been implemented at his private residence. The Public Protector had only said that the Department of Police, and not the Minster of Police, should be involved in the matter. In essence, this suggested that Mr Nhleko had been instructed to determine whether the President was liable to pay for the security upgrades.
Mr Mulder made it very clear that the Committee had not instructed the Minister to deal only with the matters which were not considered as security upgrades, which included the swimming pool, cattle kraal, chicken run and visitors’ lounge. He wanted to know whether the security evaluation that had been drawn up in the first place had not been done by experts. The experts had presumably said there should only be a fire-fighting capacity. The idea of a “firepool” was essentially an afterthought, and he asked if there was a term “firepool” in any dictionary. He jokingly suggested that perhaps the name of all swimming pools in South Africa should be changed to “firepool,” as any house could use them for fire-fighting. How was it possible for the “firepool” to be shaped like a boat? Was this a coincidence? It was important to know why the Minister had referred to the property in the residence of the President as “state properties”. What was the legal approach that had been used to determine that the properties of the Presidency were “state properties”?
He asked if there was any particular reason for changing the hierarchy of Mr Linde from “Senior” Superintendent to “Junior” Superintendent, and assumed this had been done to suit a particular agenda. What steps had been taken against Superintendent Linde? It would perhaps be helpful for the Committee to get Superintendent Linde to explain the reason for using the name of the President in the first place, and the decision to change the initial statement. He asked if the whole property of the President did not fall under the Ingonyama Trust, as this question had been asked on numerous occasions. How was it possible to register a legal bond from the bank on property that belonged to the IngonyamaTrust? The fact that the 21 houses had been built in close proximity to one another could suggest that the houses were meant for the President. Why was the R206 million (excluding the R31 million still to be spent on the phase 3 project) of taxpayers money spent on the private residence of the President without adherence to the principles of project management and oversight? Who was responsible for this mismanagement?
Adv G Breytenbach (DA) said that Senior Superintendent Linde was not a junior official, as the Minister had indicated. A Senior Superintendent was a senior official in the South African Police Force. She wanted to put it on record that Senior Superintendent Linde was signing the letters on behalf of the National Commissioner, and Superintendent Linde could be regarded as the person who was doing the typing and writing. In addition, it was quite clear that Superintendent Linde was far from a junior official, as there were cases where he signed letters in his personal capacity.
She asked the Minister of the DPW to comment on how was it possible for Mr Makhanya to do as he pleased with the DPW. It would be important for the Committee to get the reports of the experts upon which the Minister of Police had relied in his report. This was to determine whether these people were really experts in their fields, as one needed to be an expert in order to give expert opinion, and the work that had been done these people did not suggest that they were anywhere near experts.
Adv Breytenbach also asked if it was possible to get a report on the cultural experts that had been appointed, especially their views on the extension of the kraal. It was clear that the Minister of Police, together with the Minister of the DPW, had rehashed the report of the Public Protector. It was impossible to get an opinion from the people who were controlled by the President and defended by the ruling party. The two people who should have been present at the meeting were the Public Protector and the Head of the SIU, as they were reasonably independent and had security of tenure. The Minister of Public Works had been upfront in stating that he had relied on the views of the Public Protector and the SIU in order to draw conclusions on the security upgrades at the private residence of the President.
Ms T Mahambehlala (ANC) said it was very unfortunate for the Committee to repeatedly discuss matters that had been previously discussed and concluded at the previous meeting. She wanted the Minister to discuss the matter of Superintendent Linde, as this was still unclear to most Members. It was a pity that Mr Maimane had not been present at the meeting in Pietermaritzburg, as it had been agreed that the swimming pool was not a “firepool” but a swimming pool that could be used as a reliable source of water in case any fire might erupt. The pool was also evidently dirty, as there had been no chlorine, and this suggested that this pool was not meant for swimming.
Ms D Dlakude (ANC) said the report of the Minister had assisted the Committee to link the report with what had been observed during the oversight visit to the private residence of the President. The Committee was not conducting an investigation, but only responding to the report of the Minister of Police as had been recommended by the previous Ad Hoc Committee, especially combining the SIU report, the Joint Standing Committee report and the report of the Public Protector.
Mr Nhleko said he had already clarified the issue of Superintendent Linde. This was a junior official, and not a senior official, as most Members seemed to imply. The location of the swimming pool had been determined by the experts or professionals, and was at the south west of the property at a relatively elevated point where the houses of the homestead were located. This indicated that that some logic must surely have been considered, as this swimming pool was not located at a lower base level, like most houses. The matter of whether the President had asked for the extension of the kraal was a matter for debate, but the question that should be asked was why the extension of the kraal had not taken place where the family was. The site where the family kraal was located was clearly not used, and this one of the reasons that there had been a need to consult a cultural expert in order to determine the location of the kraal. The cultural expert had explained everything, from the purpose of a kraal to how a kraal for a man in a polygamous relationship was positioned. It had been highlighted in the security evaluation report that one of the critical needs that had been identified was to have separate entrance points for livestock, the main entrance and pedestrian traffic, and the issue of technology infrastructure had also been considered.
It was clear from Members that were at private residence of the President that there was no facility called an amphitheatre, so it was crucial to determine why the place had been referred to as an amphitheatre in the first place. The matter essentially boiled down to the use of terms, as the structure that was constantly referred to as an amphitheatre was actually a soil retention wall, and this again had been built for security reasons. Most of the issues that had been raised by Members were issues of debate among Members of the Committee, and it would be up to the Committee to make a decision on whether the Public Protector or Superintendent Linde should appear before the Committee -- the opinion of the Minister was immaterial in this particular instance.
Mr N Kwankwa (UDM) said the broader issue that needed to be addressed was the report that talked about the amount the President was liable to pay for non-security features. The general feeling was that even though some of them were originally intended to be security features, the expenditure did not justify what had gone wrong. It was plausible to argue that it was difficult to conclude, based on the position of the swimming pool, whether it was meant for security or recreational purposes. However, it was very difficult to see the house of the President when one was standing in the swimming pool, and therefore it would be difficult to extinguish a fire in case of an emergency and protect the President. Members were generally concerned about the fact that the CCTV cameras were not working. It had been agreed that the security of the President had been compromised and it was felt that the contractors that had been hired needed to be called to finish the work. The logic from the DPW should be to recover more money from the contractors that had not finished the work of upgrading the security features.
Mr L Ntshayisa (AIC) also expressed concern about the need for an additional R31 million to be used for the security upgrades despite the fact that shoddy work had already been done, and said it would be helpful to recover the money from the contractors that had been hired. It was intriguing and baffling that most of the security features had not been completed, although R206 million had already been spent on the security upgrades. He wanted to know the price of each of the 21 houses, as there were suggestions that each house had cost about R6 million. There was a clear indication that money had been squandered on this project and that there had been an inflation of prices. It would be important for the Committee to know if the SIU report and that of the Public Protector had spoken of the need for a swimming pool.
Mr J Steenhuisen (DA) wanted to know if the asset register was reflecting other security features, like the clinic, houses, roads and visitors’ centre and on which diagram this had been based. How was it possible to determine where the private residential property of the President started and where it ended, and the outer boundaries? Was it possible to have a copy of the asset register? It was disappointing that the media and Members of the opposition parties had been blamed for using the term “amphitheatre,” while the report of the Public Protector had quoted Mr Makhanya using the term “amphitheatre” and highlighting that this feature would be used as an amphitheatre for functions. The Minister of Police had exposed himself to a potential risk of conflict of interests, and this was precisely the reason why some Members felt that there was a need to call the Public Protector, or the Head of SIU. If the swimming pool had been designed as a fire-fighting mechanism, then the shape would have been completely different, as it would have been larger and in the shape of a rectangle.
The Chairperson said that most of the matters that had been raised by Members were matters to be discussed by the Committee, and therefore it was not expected that the Minister should reflect on each and every point that had been raised.
Mr Nhleko responded that most of the issues that had been raised did indeed venture into the realm of deliberation and an expression of views, and he did not want to be tempted to join in discussions that were based on opinions and views, as this was the privilege of the Committee. He wondered whether there was any particular reason Members seem to draw a thick wall between the mandate of Parliament and the expression by the Public Protector. The two reports needed to be read together and it was impossible for them to be separated. Security was not determined by expenditure, but by a need. Therefore it was a need that had to be costed, and there was work by the SIU and the DPW on the cost inflation, the recoveries that would have to be effected and the legal measures that would be taken. There was a general consensus that there were issues concerning cost inflation and value for money for the security upgrades. The question of the location of the swimming pool was a matter of opinion, but the determination of the location of the swimming pool had been done by experts. Members needed to remember that there had already been discussions on the outstanding work and the work that had already been completed, and some of the work had had to be halted because of on-going investigations. It was difficult to determine at this particular stage if more money would be needed for the outstanding work to be completed -- this would be determined after an assessment which was still to be done.
The report of the Public Protector had requested the President to file a response to Parliament within a period of 14 days and this had happened. It was completely untrue to say that the President had not filed a response to the report of the Public Protector. It was the Cabinet policy of 2003 that had been relied upon, through various investigative arms, to deal with the security upgrades, and the National Key Points Act was not the one that had been relied upon. The President had already denied that he had had any discussions with the Public Protector on financing the extension of the kraal, and therefore it was not helpful to comment on hearsay reports. There had been an effort to link the R135.2 million in relation to the 21 houses, while forgetting to include the question of the helipad, clinic and consultation fees as part of that R135.2 million. The Public Protector had no authority to comment on whether the “firepool” needed to be constructed or not, as this was the responsibility of the people who were doing security evaluations, including architects and engineers. The SIU did not conduct security evaluations and therefore the competence here was the SAPS to conduct the security assessment.
Mr Nhleko said the question of obtaining the asset register should be directed to the Minister of Public Works. He urged Members to deal to the issues based on facts, and not on hearsay. It was not helpful for Members to insult one another. It must be placed on record that the decision to come to Parliament had been based on the resolution by the previous Ad Hoc Committee. The assumption that it was nearly impossible to get an opinion from the Minister of Police, as he was controlled by the President and defended by the ruling party, assumed that the Minister had nothing to do with the SAPS. This was a very strange analogy and approach. It was important to once again remind Members that there was an estimated figure of R31 million in the R246 million for the security upgrades, and an estimated cost could not be counted as an actual figure, even if one were to follow the report of the Public Protector. It was difficult at this stage to know the conclusion that had been reached for the estimated cost of R31 million that would still be required, and it was also difficult to see the source of that amount.
Briefing by Department of Public Works
Mr Thulani Nxesi, Minister of the DPW, said that the purpose of the presentation would be to deal with matters concerning the security upgrades at the private residence of the President and the recommendations that had been made by the Department and the Ad Hoc Committee. It was important to place on record that the SIU report had started as a result of recommendations from the task team of the DPW which had been appointed 2012. The report of the Public Protector had been released after the report of the task team of the DPW, and therefore it was impossible that the DPW could have rehashed the report of the Public Protector. Therefore, the view of Adv Braytenbach that the Ministers of Police and the DPW were just rehashing the reports of the Public Protector and the SIU were misplaced and unfounded. It was correct to say that the DPW was implementing all the recommendations that had been made in the Ad Hoc Committee.
There had been a project on the security upgrades for the Presidential homestead, and there had also been a project that was on state land. This project covered 5.1 hectares of land for the facilities of the SAPS and the Defence Force to be able to perform their duties. This project dealt with a number of facilities, including the helipad, clinic and barracks, which were outside the precinct of the President on Ingonyama Trust land. This clarification was very important, as there seemed to be confusion on the Ingonyama Trust issue. The initial report had separated the estimated money still to be spent on the security upgrades at the private residence of the President. The DPW had had to revise the previous lease agreement and sign a new lease agreement, and the signing of the new lease had taken place even before the release of the report of the Public Protector. All the reports had confirmed that the project for the budget of the security upgrades had not been properly budgeted for, and due processes had not been followed in the appointment of the contractors. The supply chain management prescripts had not been adequately followed, and the DPW had had no policies to refer to the management of this prestige project. Variation orders should not exceed 20%, but in this project three of the four variation orders had exceeded 20%. The task team had recommended that the report should be referred to the law enforcement agencies including the SIU, the Auditor-General (AG) and SAPS with a view of looking at the criminality that was unacceptable in the project.
Mr Nxesi said that the DPW was very clear about the need to develop a policy on the management prescripts, and to identify any professionals who may have acted unethically on this project. The project had been a victim of poor systems and a lack of controls within the DPW. The Department had already begun with internal disciplinary processes. This was one way of making sure that those who had been involved were held accountable. A total of 12 officials had been involved in the project and charged with the irregular appointment of contractors. One junior official had pleaded guilty and been given a three-month salary suspension, and had been suspended from participating in any supply chain processes until he had undergone training. There had been delays in finalising the hearings of the 12 officials who had been involved in the project and charged with the irregular appointment of contractors. Disciplinary processes had been delayed due to the pending court application by the media, as it wanted to have access to the hearing of the employer and the employee. The DPW was still waiting for the judgment of the court.
The SIU had instituted a high court action against the architect, Mr Makhanya, in terms of declaring his appointment to be inconsistent with the provisions of section 217 of the Constitution and the supply chain management policies and procedures of the DPW, and directing the architect to pay the National Treasury (NT) an amount of R155 million, which represented the financial loss that had been suffered by the Department as a result of negligent conduct in the project. There were three senior officials of DPW and one contractor that had been referred to the prosecuting authority, and the Department had also referred 13 consultants/providers to the South African Revenue Service (SARS) for fraudulent activities. Poor systems had impacted on all of the DPW’s work on the security upgrades. The Department had now taken a bold action by reforming the entire supply chain management system, by putting qualified officials and controls in place to reduce and detect fraud and corrupt practices. The Department had also implemented a prestige policy to guide the implementation of the security measures at the private residences of political office bearers, but this was subject to the Cabinet process.
Mr Nxesi said that the Department had been talking about the need to reconstruct the asset register of the DPW. The DPW was also particularly concerned about the fact that the professional fees had reached 40% of the cost of the project. This issue had been one of the findings of the task team and there were people who were being charged for such an offence, as the maximum cost of professional fees should be 18%. This formed part of the wrongdoing by those who had been entrusted to handle the project. The calculation of R6 million per house that had been bandied about in the media was totally wrong, as it had simply divided the total of R135.2 million by the 21 houses and had failed to take the helipad and clinic into consideration. The DPW had a number of facilities that were used by many Departments which were part of the asset register.
The fact that the security upgrade project was incomplete, despite the fact that an amount of R206 million had already been spent, pointed to the problem of the shoddy work that had been done. The amount of R206 million had been based on the initial report that was released by the DPW, and the latest figure was now R215.9 million, based on the invoices received. He assured Members that the situation might have been worse if he had not instructed that the project should be halted until investigations were concluded.
Mr V Smith (ANC) said that even before the presentation, the Committee knew that the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the Supply Chain Management Act had been disregarded, and this had been confirmed by the presentation. It had also been confirmed that value for money had been totally ignored, and the incompleteness of the project had been picked up during the oversight visit to the private residence of the President. The time-frame for the completion of the investigation and the resolution of matters of corruption was too long. The PFMA made it very clear that any accounting officer who was guilty of wrongdoing must be fined or imprisoned. The work of the security upgrades should be completed, as it had become evident that the security of the President had been compromised. The 12 months that it had taken for the SIU and other law enforcement agencies had been too long, and there should be urgent action on the possibility of recouping the money that had been lost. It was confusing that there was only one cost centre, as there should had been at least three cost centres so that the SAPS and the SANDF could carry the cost. What was the logic behind the combination of all cost centres into one centre?
Mr Maimane said it would be unwise not to take into consideration that the Ministers were appointed by the President and therefore are liable to defend the President. The Committee should give serious consideration to the call to bring the Public Protector to the Committee, as she was independent. The Public Protector would be able to act in defence of the Constitution, not in defence of the leader of a political party. The SIU report had highlighted the segregation between the Executive and the Administration, and it should be accepted that there were officials who had been charged because of the shoddy work on the project. However, the Committee needed to know whether there had been any grand collusion of theft by those officials, or if a form of political pressure had been applied to them. The SIU report had also warned against names being used by over-zealous officials and in such circumstances, perceptions were just as important as the reality. It was a known fact that the President had facilitated a meeting between his architect and the DPW, and therefore the architect was speaking on behalf of the principles of the President.
Mr Maimane said that the report of the Public Protector had described the transaction with the architect was a “licence to loot” more resources. There was now particular interest on the court process involving Mr Makhanya, and he was hopeful that this would reveal more about what had given him the licence to loot. How was it possible for an independent contractor, who was not even working for government, to instruct a whole government department to deviate funds that had exceeded all the regulations?
The President had previously complained that the project had been a bit slow and needed to be expedited. Why had the President been absolved of all wrongdoing on the project, while he had facilitated a meeting with his architect? The President was the key beneficiary in all the security upgrades at his private residence, and the fact that shoddy work had been done should not detract from the fact that this was a benefit that he had derived. What strategies were in place to ensure that this problem was not repeated again, especially when dealing with the security upgrades of other office bearers? He asked that the Committee be provided with a document that highlighted the processes that had been introduced to ensure that this problem would be prevented in future, so that it could interrogated by Members.
Mr Singh said that credit should go to the whistle blowers who had reported and published a report highlighting the possible corruption in the security upgrades. The DPW should be given credit for the work that had been done so far, as there were concrete steps that had been taken to ensure that those who were found of wrongdoing were adequately disciplined. He hoped that the SIU would succeeded in the civil suit against Mr Makhanya so that the R155 million could be recovered. The media had requested certain documents, and the DG of the DPW had declined this request, stating that this would prejudice the SIU’s case against Mr Makhanya. What had informed the decision not to make the documentation public? The DG had also said that the release of the document could endanger President Zuma and his family -- how was this possible? What progress had been made in investigating the role of the then Minister and the Deputy Minister of DPW in the project?
The Minister of Police had been saying that he could not respond to “hearsay allegations,” and therefore it would be appropriate for the Committee to invite the people who had been making these allegations. If there were allegations that the Public Protector had misled Parliament, then surely she should be given an opportunity to explain whether she had indeed misled Parliament.
Mr Swart commented that perhaps the Minister of Public Works should be commended for halting the project, as a further R31 million had been saved from corruption. However, this again begged the question of why senior officials would carry out all these corrupt practices, and the conclusion to be reached was that they had all disregarded the PFMA and the supply chain management processes because they had been directed to do so by the President. It had also been reported that some senior officials were terrified that they would be fired if they did not follow the orders that they had been given on the project. The report of the Public Protector had said that the DGs in the DPW had misled Parliament in their responses on the project, and that the President was liable to pay a portion of the amount that had been spent on the security upgrades. It was shocking to discover that the architect had been sued for R155 million while he had never pocketed a cent, as this entire amount had gone to the contractors. Essentially, the main argument should be focused on the fact that the President had been involved in this project going wrong -- whether directly or tacitly -- and this was the question that needed to be answered.
Mr Nxesi said there was a sentiment that the processes of the SIU were going to be long and dragged out, and it was unfortunate that this was part of the system that had been adopted by the country. The DPW could not control the fast-tracking of court orders, as doing so could be interpreted as interfering with the judiciary. As much as the PFMA was critically important, it was also crucial for the DPW to deal with its own internal disciplinary processes, especially in dealing with criminal actions. The DPW could not presume that the officials who had been charged were guilty until this had been proven. To make matters more complicated, even if there was prima facie evidence against a particular individual, this still be handled in the context of labour relations. The issue that made it even more difficult to deal with the three officials was the fact that they had left the Department, so the DPW had had to go follow the criminal prosecution route. The main issues surrounding on the project had been the poor planning and the budgeting of the amount to be spent, which were serious problems in many government departments.
The security cluster, together with the DPW, would have to come up with a plan to deal with the fact that the security of the President had been compromised, and make recommendations. The issue of a conflict of interests between the Minister of Public Works and the President was without substance and was based purely on opinion. The Committee had recommended that the two ministers should come before the Committee. The previous reports from the SIU, the previous Ad Hoc Committee and the Public Protector, had also reached the same conclusion, and this confirmed that the claim of a conflict of interests needed to be rejected.
Mr Makhanya had not been the only person who had deviated funds, as this had been done internally by senior DPW officials. The legal basis of everything should be based on facts, not on rumours or hearsay. He said it was not government that had been opposing media access to the documents on the project. This had been done by the officials who had been charged. This was an appropriate measure, as the allowance of such access could compromise the internal disciplinary processes. There was nowhere that the President had been implicated of any wrongdoing in the report, and therefore it was logical to absolve the President in this instance.
Mr Nxesi said that the lease agreement had not been signed, as the Department had needed to revise that particular agreement so that it was complementary. The matter of releasing the documents was now before the court, so the DPW could not comment on the matter, as this could be construed as undermining the court. The recommendations by the task team in relation to the previous Minister and the Deputy Minister of the DPW had been referred for further investigation, and the SIU had later not found any substance to the allegations of political interference. It would be incorrect to assume that a politician had been behind the failure to comply with the supply chain management processes, as there were a number of projects that had gone horribly wrong.
The main part of the problem seemed to be the fact that many qualified built environment officials were allowed to be involved with outsourcing. The built environment specialists went into the private sector and came back to the Department as consultants. The Minister was now given the huge responsibility of supervising a whole construction company, and this was a recipe for disaster. The main focus should be on how to reconstruct the DPW and bring back the scarce skills, so that an engineer could be monitored by another engineer. The literature showed that in most construction projects the prices were always inflated, and this was happening in many countries. The legal strategy that had been adopted by the SIU made it difficult for the Minster to comment on the issue. The focus should rather be on how to ensure that this mismanagement of funds in the construction industry did not happen again.
Mr Kwankwa said the problem with not allowing the Public Protector to appear before the Committee to speak on the reports simply meant she had not been offered an opportunity to defend herself against the accusations that she had misled Parliament. This also showed that there was a political strategy to discredit the report of the Public Protector to the point where it meant absolutely nothing. The memo of the Minister of Police, which spoke about the appointment Mr Makhanya, showed that his appointment had been based on the fact that he had already been doing work on the private property. However, the report of the Public Protector had made it very clear that it was almost impossible to call Mr Makhanya to account without getting President Zuma to account for the decision to introduce him, as Mr Makhanya had derived his power from the President.
Adv Breytenbach, opening discussion after the luncheon adjournment, asked why the acting Director-General of the Department of Public Works had appointed Mr Makhanya to be the architect, when he was not in the database of service providers for the Department. She wanted to know if this was a normal practice, because it was difficult to do that in government. She quoted documents that pointed out that the SIU and the Task Team had found that the upgrades were not security related -- but now they were -- that the report of the Public Protector had indicated that the Department of Public Works should apportion the amount of money to be repaid, and that a private residence of the President had been built on public land.
The Minister of Public Works said it was not normal practice to give work to a non-registered service provider, and that was why the Task Team had found his appointment irregular. It was not in line with supply chain management practices. He disagreed with the notion that the President had had an influence on the appointment of Mr Makhanya. Even the report of the Public Protector had not found any influence by the President on his appointment. There was no evidence of this.
The Minister said that the documents Adv Breytenbach had been quoting were notes prepared for him by his staff on the differences in the three documents dealing with Nkandla. Those documents were just pieces of analysis.
Ms Maseko pointed out that some Members had not been in the previous Committee, and that was why they read the recommendations selectively, because they kept on repeating the same questions. The President had not imposed Mr Makhanya, or appointed him, but had introduced him to the team and had said that the team should make use of his expertise and ideas. The recommendations were clear on who had to shoulder the responsibility -- the twelve officials, including Mr Makhanya. Members should read the report, as it would put the issue to rest. The Minister of Public Works needed to institute disciplinary measures against those who had appointed Mr Makhanya.
Ms Mahambehlala said the mandate of the Committee was to deal with the resolutions of the House. That was why the two Ministers had appeared before the Committee. She found it absurd to claim that the President had facilitated a meeting to have Mr Makhanya appointed. Mr Makhanya had a license to practise, but Mr Maimane did not have one to keep drugs in his church. There was no reason for the Public Protector to come to the Committee. The opposition parties should rather focus their energies on the City of Cape Town, which spent millions of rands on the poorly attended Cape Town Cup, instead of calling the Public Protector to come to Parliament. The Public Protector did not account to Parliament, but only submitted written reports. The SIU report had not found any executive involvement in Nkandla. She asked the Minister of Public Works when the costs of accommodating government personnel at Nkandla would be carried out by SAPS and Department of Defence (DOD).
The Minister said that the Director-General of the Department had quantified the costs to be paid by SAPS, but the SIU had indicated that the amount to be recovered would not be acceptable to taxpayers, and that was why the process had been stopped.
Adv Breytenbach asked Ms Mahambehlala to withdraw her statement about Mr Maimane.
Ms Mahambehlala withdrew her statement.
Dr C Mulder (FF+) felt it was strange that the Public Protector had not been given an opportunity to come to the Parliament to defend her report, because the two Ministers had been given the privilege to account on their reports and to defend themselves. The Public Protector had put 29 questions to the President in writing. The President had chosen to ignore pertinent questions from a Chapter 9 Institution. To say the report had not found any influence by the President on the appointment of Mr Makhanya had no basis, because it was the President who had introduced Mr Makhanya to the Department, and it was strange that no one had taken note of that.
Dr Mulder expressed concern that the whistle had been blown on Nkandla three years before the appointment of the Minister to his portfolio of Public Works. Three hectares of state-owned land had been used for building the private residence of the President and, on top of that, additional land had had to be acquired for this mammoth project. He wanted to know what SAPS and DOD personnel were going to do when they were housed at Nkandla. Why had the expenditure on Nkandla been hidden from Parliament when the Department had presented its budget to Parliament?
The Minister said that the Public Protector had not found any influence by the President on the appointment of Mr Makhanya. The President had only “introduced” Mr Makhanya. That was what the Public Protector had said. He said failure to develop policies for prestige projects, supply chain management, and budgeting were irregularities that had come out of the reports. Those involved were going to suffer the consequences. Pertaining to the hidden Nkandla budget, he said the shifting of those funds had been an irregular process. There were mechanisms that should have picked that up.
Mr Ntshayisa appealed to the Committee to have the Public Protector appear before the Committee so that they could hear her side of the story.
Ms Dlakude said that the Committee was not reviewing a report or conducting an investigation, but was dealing with recommendations which some Members had missed in the previous Committee. The current Committee was talking about what it had seen at Nkandla and read from other reports. It was clear everything had been concluded. Members needed to understand the rationale for calling the Public Protector.
Ms Kubayi said it was wrong to insinuate that the two Ministers had not been honest in the writing of their reports because they were employees of the state. It was creating a wrong precedent if the Committee treated them with doubt when they were accounting to Parliament, and called them dishonest because they were political appointees. This matter needed to be addressed appropriately. The calling of Mr Makhanya to appear before the Committee would compromise the work of the courts, because he was already before the court. She had initially agreed with the idea of calling the Public Protector to the Committee, but had now changed her mind because there had been an article in the media which had stated that this Committee was not legal and had a short life span, so there was no need for her to appear before it.
Mr F Beukman (ANC) said the Committee was not reviewing reports or doing any enquiries. It had already deliberated on the reports and made recommendations. It needed only to consider the resolutions of the reports. The Committee had already visited Nkandla and needed only to indicate if it agreed with the assessment reports of the two Ministers. From what it had seen at Nkandla, the report of the Minister was fair. There was no need to call on the Public Protector.
Ms Ngcobo wanted to know why such a prestige project had been handled by a provincial department.
The Minister said delegating to a region was irregular. That was why people were going to be charged.
Mr L Mbinda (PAC) remarked that a report became hearsay until it was interrogated. That was why the Committee was saying the report of the Public Protector was hearsay. The Public Protector needed to come to Parliament and have her report interrogated just like others, because the authenticity of her report was being challenged by the other reports. She needed to defend her report.
Mr Singh said the Opposition had supported the proposal by the Deputy Chief Whip to consult on the people to invite, but the majority in the ruling party did not want certain individuals to appear before the Committee. If they wanted to make use of their majority, they could do so. As opposition parties, they would reserve their position.
The meeting was adjourned.
- Minister of Police and Minister of Public Works on Nkandla security upgrades 2
- Minister of Police and Minister of Public Works on Nkandla security upgrades 1
- Minister of Police and Minister of Public Works on Nkandla security upgrades 3
- Minister of Police and Minister of Public Works on Nkandla security upgrades 4
No related documents
Frolick, Mr CT
Beukman, Mr F
Breytenbach, Adv G
Dlakude, Ms DE
Kubayi-Ngubane, Ms M
Kwankwa, Mr NL
Mahambehlala, Ms T
Maimane, Mr MA
Maseko, Ms LM
Mbinda, Mr LR
Mulder, Dr CP
Nhleko, Mr N
Ntshayisa, Mr LM
Nxesi, Mr TW
Singh, Mr N
Smith, Mr VG
Steenhuisen, Mr JH
Swart, Mr SN