Madagascar situation since elections: Deputy Minister and Department's briefings

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International Relations

06 November 2013
Chairperson: Mr T Magama (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Chairperson, in his opening remarks, briefly detailed the recent developments within the SADC region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and noted that peaceful resolutions were sought. He noted the developments in Syria and said it seemed unlikely that the Geneva Conference could take place, in view of the rebels’ refusal to negotiate with President Assad, or deal with Iran. This Committee should lend its support to efforts to find a peaceful resolution. He also noted that ACDP Member Ms Dudley had submitted a written apology in respect of a meeting on 11 September, which he appreciated as being given in the spirit of cooperation.

The Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation briefed the Committee on the situation in Madagascar, briefly summarising the historical background, and the progress of the mediation process. He had been the President’s special envoy, working with AU and SADC mediators and former Namibian President Mr Chissano, to try to engage with all parties, including giving asylum to the recently embattled President Ravalomanana, and organise a credible and incident-free first round of elections in that country. The agreements, the adoption of the “ni-ni” option where neither of the former presidents would stand, the engagement with the military to try to avoid coups d’état, and the challenges likely to happen in moving towards the run-off election, were described in detail. He commented further on the role of the military, and the fact that it had now chosen to place the country’s interests over political and personal interests, so South Africa was hoping that there should not be military challenges. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and SADC had realised that it was important to build institutions, including civil structures, and was engaging with and supporting NGOs as well. There was a government of national unity, and lessons could be learned from other countries who had achieved relative stability. The Deputy Minister stressed that one of the lessons was that Africa, with assistance from outside, should be encouraged to solve its own problems. He also stressed that it was not only the election process, but achievement of stability and recognition of that process in the long term, that were particularly important.

Committee Members questioned whether the differences between the two major oppositions in that country were ideological, or built around personality cults, given the history over several decades of immediate coups and former presidents having to flee into exile. They asked what the current military position had been leading up to the first round of election, towards the processes that were currently taking place over there, in the light of its propensity to actually undermine any democratic outcome. They also discussed whether a government of national unity might be a possibility in that country. The Chairperson reiterated his view that Parliament needed to review its role in Africa’s regeneration project, and consider how it could support and assist those processes, in view of the ideal position in which MPs were to defend, protect and advance institutions supporting democracy.

The Committee discussed and adopted its draft Report on the processes leading to the dialogue on Cuba, and noted that IDC and ABSA had been unable to transact the economic assistance package because one of the principal shareholders in the bank’s subsidiary was American, who was prevented by the US embargo, from transacting with Cuba. The Committee resolved to support the national government in its call for the lifting of the embargo on Cuba and the release of Cuban prisoners.

The Committee recommended that there needed to be a dialogue on the Western Sahara issues, and would try to arrange a day’s meeting for this.

Members adopted minutes, without amendments, of meetings on 14 August, 9 October, 16  October, 30 October. The minutes of the meeting on 11 September were adopted with amendments, after discussion on one sentence relating to the State’s in-principle non-support of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns.  
 

Meeting report

Chairperson’s opening remarks
Prior to the presentation, the Chairperson briefly detailed the recent developments within the SADC region, starting with the recent developments in the Great Lakes and particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He said the SADC summit had noted the partial capitulation of the M23 rebels, and also the fact that the other group of rebels had apparently fled to Rwanda. Those were encouraging developments because they created the opportunity for the peaceful resolution of at least that part of the conflict. The State hoped for peaceful resolutions to conflict as a matter of principle, although there were exceptions where action had to be taken. The Chairperson said that the country’s hearts went out to those men and women in uniform who were serving in that part of the Continent completing a very important mission. 

The Chairperson also noted his disappointment at the developments in Syria, and the fact that despite all the efforts made, it did not look like the Geneva Conference was going to take place. Presently, all indications were that the Syrian rebels were not prepared to negotiate with President Assad, which was unfortunate. All parties had called for unconditional negotiations to find a peaceful resolution to the hostilities in that country, but it was disappointing that the rebels were refusing to speak with President Assad, and were even insisting that he step down before negotiations could be considered. Additionally, the rebels said that they did not want Iran around the negotiation table, which was a player in that conflict, which posed a challenge given Iran’s position as one of the powers within that region. The decision was furthermore unfortunate as it meant that the war would go on indefinitely. The Chairperson pointed out that the rebel forces were not unified, and there were splinter groups like the extremist Jihad elements that would be remain outside any negotiations that might eventually transpire. The Coalition of Syrian Rebel Fighters (CSRF) had no jurisdiction, hold or control whatsoever. Despite these unfortunate circumstances, efforts still had to continue to find a peaceful resolution; in fact, Syrians had admitted that only a peaceful resolution was needed, but at the moment all indications were that there was a stalemate. The Chairperson said that perhaps the Committee should lend its support to push for efforts to find a peaceful resolution in that area.

The Chairperson then noted that, in a meeting of 11 September, there had been an issue where the Committee thought that Ms C Dudley (ACDP) had acted unreasonably. She had subsequently been requested to submit an apology to the Committee, and had done so. The Chairperson said that her written apology pertained to the document that she had shared with the Committee explaining the background leading to the ACDP submission on the then Palestine-Israel visit. He noted that this Committee prided itself on working well together, putting political party differences aside, and understanding that foreign policy was one of those issues that should not be subjected to party politicking. To the extent that it was possible, this Committee always tried to present a unified stance, and this was partially because the Committee was the face of the country, with keen interest shown by ambassadors, consul-generals and others in its work. Members had not been afraid to differ, sometimes quite vehemently, but had always presented a united stance at the end of the day. Since 2009, there had not been any reason to vote in the Committee, but a fully-accommodating position was taken. He wanted to thank the Committee Members for their unity. He accepted and expressed appreciation for Ms Dudley’s apology as having been given also in that spirit.

Situation in Madagascar since elections: Briefing by Deputy Minister and Department of International Relations and Cooperation
The Chairperson then welcomed the delegation from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and, in particular, the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Marius Fran man, who, having been deployed to Madagascar, would brief the Committee on the developments in that country since the elections, and would also note the position of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The Chairperson reminded Members of previous engagements with DIRCO around the mediation process in Madagascar. For this reason, he requested Mr Fran man to not review the entire history of that mediation process, as the Committee was quite well aware of it, but to focus rather on updating the Committee on developments since the last meeting. When the issue was last discussed, there had been differences around candidates, and an examination of the decisions and reasons of the electoral court for disqualifying some candidates.

Mr. Fran man said that the presentation document set out some matters more fully, but he would take advice from the Committee where to pick up the presentation from the last meeting. In essence, the presentation document (supplied to Members) said that after the initial coup d’état, which was referred to as the start of the Arab Spring (although there were differences of opinion), the SADC had declared that there needed to be a roadmap. That was instituted. At the time that South Africa had taken chairmanship of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Deputy Minister’s own involvement in the mediation process had become intensified. After the signing of the roadmap for Madagascar, the position was to proceed to an election in an environment of relative calmness, stability and communication in a democratic fashion.

Mr Fransman said that through the Malagasy community consultations, there was then an agreement to support the “ni-ni” option, which was neither Ravalomanana nor Rajoelina, but instead former heads of State of Madagascar should contest the elections. That position was supported by the roadmap signatories, and civil organisations in Madagascar and the international community. Mr Fransman believed that the Madagascar situation had showed that it was usually most appropriate to channel work through a regional or a sub-regional body, to ensure long term sustainable peace.

He said that DIRCO had seen relative calmness in the last three years since its involvement in the Madagascar mediation process, and any sporadic crime in that country was not related to the political situation. DIRCO had started to pick up was that the political issues there related to political players specifically, but that communities on the ground just wanted to move on with their lives. There was a slight hitch earlier in 2013 where Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, as well as former President Ratsiraka reneged on the roadmap agreements, and the two former heads of State and the interim one had submitted themselves and candidate proxies for Presidential candidacy. That created a delay and uncertainty of whether the election would occur in 2013. SADC had subsequently met and pronounced on that matter. The AU, through its Commissioner for Peace and Security, and the SADC Mediator on the Madagascar crisis, former President Chissano, had visited Madagascar. There was agreement to invoke the “ni-ni” option, and eventually 33 candidates submitted themselves to the laws and normal electoral processes of Madagascar.

SA had, in preparation, sent approximately 50 observers, and on the ground, there were about 700 to 800 observers in total from the SADC, the AU and EU. There had been regular interaction there. In the last two months, the Senate had asked for the South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to assist with technical strategic levels, which had been done. SADC had committed some funds towards that election and member States had to also make some contribution to ensure that that election could be credible and fair.

Mr Fransman said that the reality of holding an election in Madagascar was similar to the first democratic election in South Africa, in terms of the facilitation, logistics and access for everyone’s participation, no matter how remote their areas. The infrastructure issues had to be considered, so the baseline for countries with infrastructure difficulties was followed, without undue complications.  

DIRCO was impressed with the Senate over the fact that it had kept things very credible for a long period of time. The first round of elections had taken place with relative calmness, even in the hotspot areas, with all the observers out in the field. Mr Fransman said that there were approximately 20 000 voting stations in Madagascar and the Senate would be pronouncing the first results on 8 November 2013. 17 000 stations had finished counting by 6 November 2013. At the moment, there seemed to be seven front runners, with one who was publicly declared by Rajoelina as his choice, but there was a subtleness of understanding, as well as a frontrunner supported by Ravalomanana. A lot of work was done on the technicalities. President Chissano was going to visit Madagascar to hear the outcome of the voting on 8 November 2013.

Mr Fransman said that the DIRCO's biggest concern was what happened between the first round and the actual run-off. He recalled that in Guinea Bissau a while ago, after the first round of elections, when one candidate clearly emerged as a frontrunner, the then Prime Minister, there had been a military unseating. DIRCO was watching the space after the election.

Mr Fransman said that the actual run-off was in December, and that between November and then it had been clear there would be a bit of jockeying, and the normal political alignment issues would arise. South Africa and the SADC remained concerned, for although the first round and its preparations had gone relatively peacefully, the actual run-off remained. There was concern that if any of the two candidates perceived as proxies for Rajoelina and Ravalomanana went through to Presidency, there might be a risk of vindictiveness shown. DIRCO was not actually able to predict what might happen either between the first round of elections and the run-off, nor what might happen after the election.

Mr Fransman said the Madagascar mediation process had been an experience of how diplomatic forces could stand together, and how those not from the African Continent could still understand, appreciate and give support to the integrity of an African process. The continent would be able to succeed. However, Madagascar had, since its independence in the 1960s, faced challenges of coups, so part of the effort must not only be directed to delivering a good election now, in Madagascar, but  trying to achieve at least a 20-year sustainable trajectory, to honour the election process and not resort to coups and illegal takeovers. That became a different strategic responsibility, and SADC and its countries might do well to look into how to deepen democracy and institutionalise the democratic and sustainable model. He suspected that the number of coups were a pointer to something wrong in the way that powers and functions ran. It was not limited to certain individuals only, as three had been involved over the last twenty years. The institutional makeup needed to be considered.

Discussion
Mr M Booi (ANC) firstly wished to commend Ms Dudley on her apology, and her positive response to the Committee’s caution.

M Booi wondered if the Deputy Minister was saying that South Africa was succeeding in bringing the Continent together, apart from Madagascar, and whether it was making an impact in its approach in other conflict-torn countries like Mozambique and the DRC. He wondered if the government would be able to learn more from these developments.

Ms H Mohamed (ANC) said that it was very gratifying to see that the SADC programme had been respected, under these elections, and commended the work done. She wondered if Mr Fransman could shed some light on the post election challenges, and asked whether the TROIKA had thought what type of leadership it could give should there be a challenge.

The Chairperson followed up on that question asking whether SACD would stay engaged in Madagascar after its elections, although he understood that mediation was a process. After the Zimbabwean elections, the role of South Africa was regarded as essentially finalised, and he wondered if a similar approach would apply in Madagascar.

The Chairperson also referred to Mr Fransman’s remark that Madagascar had traditionally faced coups, which were not a new phenomenon, but wondered what new role South Africa, in its democracy, might bring to play a more constructive role in the SADC. Part of the response to getting Madagascar out of a cycle of coups lay, in his view, with institutional building. He would image that would involve substantial effort. In Madagascar, many institutions were built around personalities rather than institutions. In South Africa, for instance, it did not matter who held the office of Public Protector; the institution was strong and had a constitutional role to play, but the same did not pertain to Madagascar.

Ms M Kubayi (ANC) expressed the view that it would not be easy helping Madagascar get out of its current situation. There was no clear majority, with no one favoured candidate, and that was probably where the crisis emanated. There did not seem to be a problem in the run up to the first round of elections, but towards the run off the incumbent realised that, should he not be successful, he may well have to go into exile, as the presentation indicated. The main challenge for the SADC and AU would be to ensure that there was stability and peace in that country, as that impacted on the whole continent. This Committee should urge government to continue supporting that country.

Ms Kubayi wondered if there was any possibility of persuading the antagonistic parties to form a Government of National Unity in Madagascar. This did not always work, and although other countries liked to benchmark themselves against South Africa, she was aware that the environment and context were not always the same. Zimbabwe was one example where a government of unity was imposed and worked for a while, but when it fell apart it paralysed the country. A one-size-fits-all approach was not helpful. She hoped the leaders of SADC would not forget such lessons from the past.

Mr E Sulliman (ANC) said that coups in the past, in Madagascar, had always been supported by the military. He wondered what SADC had planned should he military again attempt a coup. The body had spent around R60 million assisting with the elections.

Mr I Davidson (DA) asked if the historical differences between the two antagonistic sides in Madagascar were based on ideology, or if personality cults were driving the wedges.

Ms J Ngubane-Maluleka (ANC) said that she wanted to know what roles Mr Ravalomanana and Mr Rajoelina were going to play post-elections, as they seemed to be important to peace or violence post elections.

Mr M Mncwango (IFP) wanted to know what the attitude of the Madagascan military was at the moment, given the propensity for military coups.

Mr Fransman said that the military had actually played a constructive role in the first round of elections and that had not come about suddenly. DIRCO had found that any mediation process had to try and engage all the relevant parties in a credible way, so that there would be no feeling of bias towards the process. However, in Madagascar there had been a view at some stage that because President Ravalomanana had visited South Africa, South Africa would be bound to support him in the medicate process.  On the contrary viewpoint, because South Africa had not flown him back to Madagascar in the last two years, with the potential for another crisis, the Ravalomanana faction felt that South Africa was taking sides against him. South Africa was actually taking the blame from all sides – and Mr Fransman described it as “a good space” for the country.

He added that DIRCO had consistently engaged the military and the security structures. The military was in a very different place in 2011 to what it was in 2012 and 2013, largely because DIRCO understood the need for engagement with the military in a longer-term process. Development patterns were needed, with an examination of what role the military could fulfil in a country – was it to  safeguard the interest of an individual, or to safeguard political interests or the interests of a country? DIRCO could safely say that the military had as agreed, by staying away from violence. DIRCO did not foresee any post election challenges, particularly since the military apparently signalled that it did not want elections to cripple the country or the political parties, whatever the outcome. DIRCO had to also ensure that there was some form of guarantee, which was institutionalised. Madagascar had been advised of a possible ten-year option, but was hopeful that the military would keep to its end of the deal, as it had not been doing the last three months, when it had been very difficult.

Mr Fransman said DIRCO was aware that it could not simply export the South African model just anywhere. This came with a particular quality of party and national leadership at that time. He emphasised that, in the abstract, a government of National Unity was not always the best answer, and he agreed with Ms Kubayi that there were no foregone conclusions. DIRCO had tried to  ensure, since October 2011m when government had to be reconfigured, that there was at least a government of interim unity (GIU) which accounted for the signatories of the roadmap and proportional representation of the political parties. There was a Prime Minister from the opposition parties (not Rajoelina’s party)  and the two Vice-Prime Ministers were drawn, one each, from the Ravalomanana  and Rajoelina  parties. Similar configurations were used for ministerial portfolios.

Mr Fransman said that that governing structure had worked fairly well until the beginning of 2013, when there were issues that caused some instability, including whether there would an election, whether a Minister who was not part of the transitional structures could claim that higher salaries could be paid. Fortunately, the GIU had held up until after the first round of elections. He said that the DIRCO did not necessarily foresee that this institutional governing structure of GIU had to continue; that would depend on the leadership that was currently being elected, without SADC enforcing it. There were lessons to be learned from other countries who had achieved relative stability in the region, including  Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. Apart from Madagascar there were no other countries in conflict except the DRC, on which the SADC and South Africa were working, and the Chairperson had noted that there were positive signs there. SADC could be proud of stability in SADC and the honouring of election values.

He said that the essential lesson throughout that process, which countries beyond Africa needed to understand, was that Africa could solve her problems, with their assistance. This was important, because one of the key areas of concern in the north of Africa and the Arab Spring was the question of not listening to what the regional strategic body was saying. Africa was currently seeing the consequences of that. South Africa and the SADC had to try to guard against that, and make sure that they could both advise and enforce. The Madagascar file had shown that in the early stages of that three year process, when the SADC Troika had to advise France and a few other countries with interests in Madagascar to move away, because the mediation in Madagascar had to be a SADC-led process. It had been important to engage and to not second guess what other countries would do.

In regard to the mandate of the mediation process, DIRCO needed to hand over a credible election outcome, and then Madagascar would have a leadership where bilaterals and the SADC support mechanism would operate in the normal way. That led to the question that Mr Davidson had raised. Mr Fransman thought that the differences in the Madagascan political arena were not ideological or personality-cult based, but probably for years there was a combination of both. In Madagascar the country had come from a colonial past, but not respected the new dispensation of a Government. Unless there was respect for the institutional build, there would be not be a proper party orientated structure but a mobile structure. It could be seen that from week to week the general secretary of party A would move to party Z, so the whole matter was about individuals, and not necessarily about policy direction. Mr Fransman had done some research with the Norwegian Government, and had interviewed President Zafy in the 1970s, and believed that was the case even then. The decision making process was linked to the way the institutions and decision-making processes happened, whether the President had more power than the Constitution and whether there were enough checks and balances. The crux was for South Africa to contribute in terms of a post-election and long term sustainability of stability, and creation of a legacy initiative.

Mr Fransman confirmed that the two opposition heads, Mr Rajoelina and Mr Ravalomanana, would just have to play reconciliatory roles in that country because the “ni-ni” option had ensured that Madagascar could not be beholden to two individuals. DIRCO believed it was a concern that could be overcome. After the election, former President Ravalomanana would return, but DIRCO was hopeful of the entire mediation process, believed that Madagascar was maturing, and understood that the SADC, and hopefully also this Committee, would continue to give its support. There were some blind spots, and they must be monitored.

Discussion
The Chairperson said that he was certain that the question that had not been asked was where President Ravalomanana was.

Mr Davidson said that people often saw democracy as an event when actually it was a process. He asked whether the Deputy Minister was confident that that process was on its way, involving civil society and civil society organs. He pointed out that a democratic process also would see the emergence of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and bodies similar to South Africa’s Chapter 9 institutions, which kept the Constitution in place and guarded. He wondered if Madagascar was moving in such a direction.

Mr Booi asked whether DIRCO had a strategy of how to communicate such positive lessons and messages, stemming from the process in Madagascar, to South Africans.

The Chairperson asked if there were transitional measures, over the long term, to curtail the military from staging a coup if they became unhappy with the newly elected President, after the run-off. It would be critical for South Africa’s Fifth Parliament to ensure its MPs were hands-on, especially in the case of Madagascar where new institutions had to be set up, and could readily share their own experiences and engage more closely with other countries, especially in the SADC region. Up to now, there had been State initiatives but not very much Parliamentary involvement, except perhaps in observer missions. DIRCO would have to apply its mind to that. He knew that in other countries institutions such as the IEC were being used to impart their experiences and knowledge. He mentioned the work that was going on in the DRC, where South Africa had sent both technical and observer support for the DRC elections on the ground

The Chairperson agreed fully with Mr Davidson’s questions and noted that institutions supporting democracy were key to the process.

Mr Fransman said that the roadmap spelled out, and would monitor, the role of civil society for the transitional period up to the elections, and this was an important component of the DIRCO approach. NGOs, Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and a range of other institutions had been brought together into a national reconciliation body, which was predominantly led by the religious sector in Madagascar. DIRCO felt that the mediation had tried to impart a particular methodology and approach to building civil society institutions, since historically that had never happened, which was probably why people changed political parties often. Eighteen months ago, DIRCO had agreed with the Norwegian Government that they would then put a project to start helping to build civil society institutions. Different institutions were supported with funding from the EU and SADC, to attend conferences, roundtables and workshops, to further the institutional building. That was an interesting aspect to the mediation, which was thus not solely focused on the election. That work needed to continue and to be strengthened, and DIRCO took the message that Madagascar would require support. Hopefully, in future, the South African and SADC and other global development agency structures could assist. One of the DIRCO's advisory supporting initiatives led to the gazetting of the Civil Society Bill in Madagascar. DIRCO would stress the practical position of having post-election engagements over lessons learned in State building.

Mr Fransman said that it was difficult, at such an early stage, to answer whether there was enough safeguarding of Constitutional imperatives from the military. That was the blunt reality and the difficulty of moving from a country with regular coups to one which aimed not to have them. After every election until Ravalomanana’s ascendancy, the former President had to go into exile, so even having a former President still in Madagascar was already a step in the right direction. Mr Fransman added that the fact the President Rajoelina had decided voluntarily not to contest the election was a substantial break from the vicious cycle of Madagascar’s history, and the fact that he was able to lead a transition process, and had discussed an exit process, had changed things. DIRCO believed it needed to build on that model. It could say with authority – though never with absolute certainty – that for the first time in Madagascar, the military complied with its mandate in the run-up to elections. DIRCO also believed that through the Troika defence and security mechanism, there would be consistent linkages to make sure of that. He told the meeting that during September 2011, when military, intelligence and party political heads were meeting with the mediation unit, one military head had objected to South Africa sending “a Frenchman” (Fransman) to the meeting! However, the roadmap sorting out some difficult issues was signed at the end of that meeting. SADC had emphatically stated it would not support a military general as Prime Minister of the GIU arrangements. President Rajoelina and the military had been told that if they forced the issue, SADC would disown the whole mediation process outright. It was made clear to President Rajoelina that if he chose the SADC position, then he would be standing without any guarantees, as he would be disowned by the military, but he had stuck fast and decided not to appoint a general as a Prime Minister. He had shown strategic leadership. DIRCO and SADC needed to build on that.

The Chairperson commended the Deputy Minister, noting that there had been some concerns for his safety, but he had put huge effort into this work. South Africa and SADC should be grateful for these kinds of people, the unsung heroes, as it was normally the heads of State who took the credit.

The Chairperson remained concerned with the involvement of former colonial masters in affairs of African States, saying that while it was important to seek and build partnerships to work together to deal with conflicts ravaging the Continent, they were not always constructive. The Madagascan issue had been seen in certain quarters as the France-Afrique foreign policy to reset French relations with the African continent. The December Conference in Paris would review French relations in Africa. The ANC had been keen for this to happen, in light of the Socialist French President whose view differed from past presidents. South Africa had good strategic relationships with countries such as France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, who were Africa’s former “colonial masters”, and those had to be extended to working together on the African continent. Resolution 2033 must be continuously reinforced, but the AU and SADC needed to do so by assuming leadership of the African continent. That had been a problem in the past; in the north of Africa the AU had been reluctant to take charge, because of the notion of shared jurisdiction with the Arab league of States. That was one point, but then it must also be remembered that the rule of subsdiarity related to the regional bodies, so AU, as a Continental body, had a responsibility to assume leadership on some of those issues. Regional and sub-regional bodies could not fight for resolutions that gave the AU or SADC a strategic initiative to engage and intervene, whilst on the other hand ceding leadership to sub-regional bodies. Currently,  Libya was literally falling apart, because in the east of Libya and Benghazi, an independent State had been declared by a secessionist movement. Little leadership was being shown by the AU there, but it would be important if Africa wanted to be taken seriously and respected.

The Chairperson reiterated his view that Parliament needed to review its role in Africa’s regeneration project, and consider how it could support and assist those processes. This was because MPs were ideally placed for the establishment, defence, protection and advancement of institutions that supported democracy. He urged MPs to step out of their comfort zones and to follow the example set by government to ensure the sustainability of the work it had done.

The Chairperson thanked the Deputy Minister for the briefing.

Other Committee business: Adoption of Minutes of 11 September
The Chairperson tabled a set of minutes, and said that although they were wrongly dated as 14 August (a duplication), they actually dealt with the meeting on 11 September, when the Palestine-Israel conflict was discussed. He reminded Members that Ms Dudley had objected that her recommendation had not been properly captured and this would need to be done.

Ms C Dudley (ACDP) noted that what was attributed to her was not what she had actually said.

Mr Davidson asked for exclusion of the suggestion that the DA wanted South Africa to align itself with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns.

The Chairperson agreed that BDS was indeed not Government policy. He did not want the Committee to re-state the whole discussion, but there was a formulation dealing with that issue in the Palestine-Israeli conflict report, and the Committee agreed to use that wording. Much as he understood Mr Davidson’s point, he did not want the minutes merely to re-write a report.

Ms Dudley asked if it was possible that, at that point, the DA and the ACDP had raised concerns over wording suggesting support of the BDS campaigns.

The Chairperson replied that this did not really assist. Nobody had raised concerns about the wording of the agreed reports at the time, which had been published in the ATC, and reports could not be rewritten when dealing with minutes. The Chairperson understood, and was not dismissing, the Members’ concerns, but the report had captured the work, and he suggested that the sentence be removed, as suggested, from the minutes.

Mr Davidson said that there was a critical difference. Pivotal to that clause was his question as to whether that included BDS. If the clause expressed support, and did include BDS, then Mr Davidson had said he would not support it. He had bent over backwards to be supportive so that the Committee could present a united front, and he believed the Chairperson should accommodate him in this respect. He thought it should be indicated that a concern was noted, and the Chairperson had responded.

Ms Dudley said that the ACDP had read the report as the Chairperson recording what had been said to him, and not as expressing an agreement. The reason that her party had voted against that BDS issue was that it had felt that that particular wording was not yet satisfactory, although the DA had felt that it was. Both the DA and ACDP had raised concerns; the DA was later satisfied, but the ACDP was not.

The Chairperson reiterated that BDS was not part of State policy and that Parliament did not formulate State policy. He believed it had been captured correctly, as the minutes recorded that the DA had accepted, but the ACDP had recorded its objection to the report.

Members adopted the minutes, with amendments.

Adoption of minutes of 14 August, 9 October, 16  October, 30 October
All these sets of minutes were adopted without any amendments.

Draft Committee Report on processes leading to the end of the dialogue on Cuba
The Chairperson said that the Committee needed to discuss what it was going to do in the future. He reiterated that the assistance package had been difficult to approve, and those difficulties had been recorded. The assistance package transaction could not be completed through the Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC) and ABSA, because Barclays Bank was partly owned by a US concern. Under US law, no person or institution could not be allowed to transact with Cuba, under the terms of the embargo codified in US legislation.

DIRCO and the IDC had then agreed to find alternative ways to give effect to the State’s decision in terms of the agreements between Cuba and South Africa. He was currently awaiting a report from the two institutions, which should be tabled in the next two weeks. Another issue was how to deal with the embargo issue.

Ms Ngubeni-Maluleke asked if there were any recommendations from the Committee.

The Chairperson said that one of the reasons the Committee had called that meeting was to give the Americans a chance to contribute reasons on why the embargo was ongoing but, sadly, they had flatly refused to participate, which partially defeated the purpose of the dialogue.

Mr Sulliman said that he would like the Committee to submit a resolution to the House on that matter.
 
Ms Ngubeni-Maluleke supported Mr Sulliman and suggested that the Committee should continue to support the State on its call to have the US lift the embargo on Cuba and for the release of the Cuban prisoners.

Ms Mohammed said that perhaps the Committee’s recommendation should be along the lines that it should consider leading the efforts to strengthen and coordinate Parliament’s efforts in multilateral forums, the lifting of the embargo and the release of the Cuban five.

Mr Davidson said he was recusing himself from this discussion on the report, because he had not been part of the deliberations.

Ms Ngubeni-Maluleke felt that civil society needed be mobilised around that petition as well.

Ms Mohamed said that it would be useful to look at a recommendation that would call and support the implementation of the full economic support package for the Cubans.

Ms W Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC) pointed out that the report said that the Speaker of the legislature from the Free State House would finalise the document, and when it had been completed in the House, a letter would be sent to the Free State legislature that the Committee had discussed the report.

The Chairperson then said that indeed this had come as a request via the National House Speaker, and therefore it was only correct for the Committee to give a response to the Free State as to what the Committee had done up until that point. He said that the Committee would recall that it had taken a decision, specifically around Western Sahara, to call a National dialogue around that region, following the engagements the Committee had had with the embassies from states in that region.  The Parliamentary programme was quite fluid, but he was hoping to have a day’s event on the following Wednesday, if this was to be done before Parliament rose.

Members adopted the Committee report, with amendments.

The meeting was then adjourned.
 

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