Public service corruption trends: briefing by Public Service Commission

Meeting report

Introduction
The Chairperson welcomed all present and restated the Committee’s commitment to the fight against corruption in the public service. She expressed the Committee’s displeasure at the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA)’s failure to submit its presentation ahead of the meeting; hence the DPSA was not allowed to make its presentation. The Chairperson invited the Public Service Commission (PSC) to make its presentation. 

Public Service Commission Trends Relating to Corruption in the Public Service presentation
Mr Ben Mthembu, PSC Chairperson, began by reiterating the mandate of the Commission as a custodian of good, ethical government in the public service and promoting a higher standard of ethics.

Prof Richard Levin, PSC Director-General, gave a brief introduction and historical perspective on the South African public service. Ensuring ethical professional conduct in the post-apartheid public service was a major challenge. Because the Black population was historically prevented from accumulating wealth legitimately, many people (especially aspirant entrepreneurs) now relied on the state for access. Intense poverty, unemployment and systemic, structural inequality further exacerbated these challenges. In the post-apartheid context, there was great reliance on the state, not only for welfare but also for contracts and patronage. The post-apartheid public service was constructed out of the various apartheid administrations. Apartheid’s bureaucratic, authoritarian state was fundamentally immoral, and explicitly organised around the delivery of a repugnant social project and shrouded in secrecy. Changing this institutional culture was a long term endeavour, still only partly addressed.  One of the consequences of South Africa’s troubled history was the growth in parasitic forms of accumulation that currently plagued the procurement of goods and services by the state. As a result, supply chain management, for example, had become a very strategic and sensitive area of public administration.

In response to these challenges, Government had developed a broad suite of integrity-promoting instruments and processes, including: a number of progressive laws and policies; a Code of Conduct; a Financial Disclosures Framework; dedicated anti-corruption agencies and inter-agency cooperation; requirements that departments had anti-corruption strategies forums, capacity, data-bases and investigative capacity; whistle blowers protection; and the National Anti-Corruption Hotline. In order to assess the extent to which the public service implemented the various integrity promoting instruments, the Commission undertook on-going research in provinces, considering their performance against certain indicators.  So far, research indicated that development of anti-corruption strategies was uneven in departments; some provinces had  only draft anti-corruption strategies; very few Departments had standardized investigative procedures in place or received training in the area of investigation; promotion of the Code of Conduct for the public service was inconsistent; many officials did not possess a copy of the Code; the consequences for non-performance in terms of the various mechanisms were inadequate; systematic monitoring of corruption was poor, only 50% of departments had data-bases on corruption; most departments had not signed protocols with specialist agencies to assist with complex syndicated crime; few departments complied with 100% filing of financial disclosures to the Commission by the due date of 31 May each year; minimum anti-corruption capabilities were not put in place and there was insufficient resourcing at a personnel and budgetary level.

The Commission’s analysis indicated that doing business with the state was a key strategic area for consideration so it closely monitored adherence to the Financial Disclosures framework. There was a need to manage potential conflicts that the senior managers might have between their private business interests and their official responsibilities. The Commission further provided detailed statistics on financial disclosure compliance rates per province and in some key departments, the National Anti-corruption Hot line (NACH) feedback per province, and reporting on financial misconduct and management of discipline (see document). Financial misconduct was under-reported, and there had been a decline in the number of cases, while the cost of financial misconduct had increased. It was of concern to the Commission that over the years there had been a steady increase in the number of senior managers charged with financial misconduct and departments consistently failed to demonstrate commitment by instituting criminal charges where appropriate. Discipline was not managed effectively due to inadequate capacity to chair disciplinary hearings and represent departments. This resulted in long periods of precautionary suspension. The Commission recommended that public servants, particularly senior managers and officials in supply chain management, be prohibited from doing business with Government.

The major challenge which the Commission faced was building leadership that was exemplary, oriented towards the public interest, inspirational, authoritative and innovative. Ensuring professional ethics in the public service was an on-going priority but required dedicated capacity and so resources were needed. It was clear that the perpetrators of corruption were increasingly at a more senior level and this highlighted the need for better, more ethical leadership.

Recommendations from the Commission included: promotion of the Code of Conduct, risk assessments and development of tailor-made anti-corruption strategies, development and implementation of internal policies on whistle-blowing and access to information, commitment to address valid complaints and promotion of a culture of reporting, ensuring sufficient investigative capacity was in place, resolution of allegations of corruption emanating from the NACH and feedback provided to the Commission, charging transgressing head of departments and senior managers with misconduct for failure to disclose conflicts of interest, conducting life-style audits of key staff, and audits into the indebtedness of employees.

Discussion
Mr D du Toit (DA) remarked that the lack of effective management, supervision and leadership direction were all off-shoots of the growing greed in the system.

Mr Du Toit agreed with the suggestion by the Commission to prohibit Government officials from benefitting from Government sponsored tenders in order to stem corruption, even though there seemed to be a constitutional angle to this. A decision needed to be reached.

Mr Mthembu replied that, in the fight against corruption, the state must not be seen as the only source for the accumulation of wealth. Part of the solution was in general economic development and there must be a concerted effort between the state and private institutions.

Mr Du Toit asked how much was spent on the anti-corruption campaign across the board in percentage terms of the national budget.

Mr Du Toit referred to the Commission’s proposal for creation of work opportunities by the state as a means to curbing corruption and asked whether growing the state’s complement of staff or making staff complement leaner and smarter was the way to go. What model was the Commission considering?

Mr J Marais (DA) noted that this aspect of the Commission's presentation seemed to be a justification for criminality or unethical behaviour.

Prof Levin replied that, through history, successful developmental states established key institutions and focused on capacitating these institutions. For instance, in Japan the key institution had been the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The state through interventions had always been at the forefront of driving economic change as it had levers at its disposal in terms of ensuring economic growth and redistribution. The point was to identify and find remedies through history, and part of the remedy was to deal with pressing challenges in the society.

Mr Mthembu added that it was not the intention of the Commission to justify unethical conduct or blame it on history. To solve complex issues, different approaches needed to be considered. The historical injustices of the past needed to be addressed as they were a reality, albeit not a justification, for unethical conduct.

Mr L Ramatlakane (COPE) remarked that, without the Department’s presentation, the Committee was short-changed in getting a clearer picture of the situation.

Mr Ramatlakane asked what consequences had been imposed by the Commission on persons implicated in corruption or financial misappropriation.

Mr Ramatlakane remarked that, beyond corruption, the supply chain management system also faced the challenge of deployment of incompetent staff to areas of key responsibilities.

Prof Levin responded that the supply chain management process had been highlighted as an area of intervention by the Minister of Finance, to develop a procurement system that provided value for money. Getting the supply chain management system right was of extreme importance. It was true that challenges existed with regard to the quality of staff deployed to key responsibility areas and this further lead to escalated corruption and a lack of value for money.  The role of the National Treasury and Parliament could not be over emphasised in helping to minimise corruption and getting better value for money.

Mr Ramatlakane commented that the historical context of corruption in the Commission’s presentation seemed to suggest that corruption was driven by all citizens regardless of societal class, whereas in reality it was the well-educated and middle class that were the drivers of corruption.

Prof Levin responded that it was true corruption was not driven by the poor and in fact the poor were victims of corruption. At the same time, the state must continue to foster economic inclusion as economic disparity was an ethical issue in itself.

Mr Ramatlakane referred to the 76% of cases where no criminal cases had been opened over alleged corruption and asked why criminal cases had not been pursued. Were the allegations baseless or was it an issue related to capacity?

Prof Levin replied that capacity and political will needed to be examined hand in hand, and, moreover, it was necessary that sanctions and consequences followed corrupt or unethical practices. Trends, however, showed that there was no political/administrative will.

Mr Marais remarked that it was clear there had been a fragmented approach to discipline, corruption and implementation. Decentralisation of the Commission further supported this approach. There was no commitment from the departments, heads of department and ministers, as well as no political will to ensure that corruption was stemmed.

Prof Levin responded that it was difficult to generalise that there was no political will at the leadership in the fight against corruption as responses differed across board. The Commission could, however, make changes through the amendment of relevant legislation to make recommendations of the Commission on implicated staff a legal directive, and in turn force the hand of the executive. Furthermore, there were pros and cons to both the centralised or decentralised approaches. However, recentralising every aspect of the Commission’s activities may not be an option. A better balance might be through the initiatives taken by the executive.

Mr Marais asked which party was responsible for implementation - the DPSA, Minister or the Commission. Was there a need for the creation of a public service police force to ensure implementation?

Prof Levin responded that the mandate of the Commission clearly made it the responsible authority. Further, the Minister of Public Service and Administration was responsible for implementation of all international treaties to which South Africa was signatory.

Mr Marais asked whether the Commission had carried out a cost benefit analysis to consider how much was saved in the long run by the Commission as a result of its anti-corruption campaign. This was the only way to justify the request for additional funding.

Prof Levin committed to forwarding a report on this at a future date to the Committee.

Mr Marais asked for clarification on conflicting statements in the Commission’s presentation with regard to the rise in incidences of corruption.

Prof Levin replied that, although the increase in the value of financial misconduct pointed to an escalation in corruption within the public service, there was need for conclusive evidence on this.

Ms M Mohale (ANC) queried the contents of financial disclosure forms and highlighted that proposed reviews covered incidences of public officers with connections to persons who bided for tenders.

Ms Mohale asked what measures the Commission had put in place to help Government departments detect acts of corruption.

The Chairperson in closing remarks stated that the Committee understood that corruption was a complex, multi-faceted issue and the Committee intended to focus on the issue in a consistent manner until it was resolved. Greed underpinned the majority of the issues discussed in the Commission’s presentation. The Chairperson agreed with the Commission’s view on acknowledging the injustices of the past, without seeing it as a justification for corruption. Diverging interests of public officials was a critical issue that needed to be addressed along with other issues identified in the Commission’s presentation.

The meeting was adjourned.