Information Technology Challenges: briefing by Department of Correctional Services & SITA; Use of Closed Circuit Televison (CCTV) in correctional centres: interaction with civil society organisations

Meeting report

Introduction by the Chairperson
The Chairperson noted that the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) could no longer be “paper- driven.”  It had to deal with 160 000 inmates, yet was unable to send him an email.  There had been R700 million spent on Information Technology (IT) over the preceding two to three years, and there was still no workable system.  There had to be an achievable and affordable road map for the State Information and Technology Agency (SITA) and the DCS to build IT capacity.

Briefing by the Department of Correctional Services
Ms Nthabiseng Mosupye, Chief Deputy Commissioner, Government Information Technology Officer (GITO), identified challenges in the areas of disaster recovery and backup; lack of server rooms and old switches; connectivity and access control.  The Remand Detainee and Offender Management System (RDOMS) had been delayed due to contract problems.

Ms Mosupye took the Portfolio Committee through the management of its IT consultants. Thirty consultants had been released in June 2011, another 11 had resigned before the end of the year, and 26 had been released in April. There were currently 14 consultants on a month-to-month agreement basis. Consultants were paired with business officials for skills transfer.

Ms Mosupye indicated which funded vacant IT posts had been advertised or filled. She gave an outline of payments made to SITA, and projects undertaken with them over the preceding five years, and IT governance processes in the DCS.

Briefing by the State Information Technology Agency (SITA)
Ms Febe Potgieter-Gqubule, Chairperson of the SITA Board, said that as a service provider of ICT to government, SITA was in partnership with the DCS.  The DCS’s core business of managing its facilities presented challenges.

Ms Mmakgosi Mosupi. Executive: ICT Service Delivery at SITA, noted that Service Level Agreements (SLAs) had been signed with the DCS and negotiations were underway to renew the underpinning business agreement.  SITA would assist with Wide Area Network (WAN) and Internet for access and connectivity services.  Mainframe hosting would provide the DCS with access to and migration of the transversal systems BAS, PERSAL and LOGIS on the mainframe. Other services were the provision of locations for the housing of application servers, decentralised support services and annual software licence renewals.

The DCS IT environment had experienced problems of continuously unavailable email services and a very slow network. Following an assessment, SITA had proposed email hosting and the Virtual Private Network (VPN).  The DCS had opted to stabilize the email services internally as SITA sorted out the network services through the deployment of the VPN.  Agreement between SITA and DCS had been reached, that upon the improvement of the network services through the VPN, SITA would propose additional mechanisms to optimise the applications and email services

The DCS owed SITA R47m, and had not yet accepted the close-out of the RDOMS system, as it had been adopted by the SAPS and would lead to duplication.

Discussion
Mr J Selfe (DA) referred to slides that indicated projects undertaken over the preceding five years. He asked for specific details about which projects had been implemented, and which not. He asked how much wasteful expenditure there had been over the previous five years.

Mr Selfe asked about the RDOMS programme.  SITA and the DCS were contradicting each other.  A “close-out” had been mentioned -- what did this mean?  His suggestion was that the DCS should decide whether to fix it or abandon it.

Ms Mosupi replied that SITA wished to apologise for the error made with RDOMS.  SITA and the DCS would try to correct it together.  Initially there had been a one-year agreement, but the system could not be implemented during that time. The contractor had needed an extension, which had not been granted.  However, Dimension Data had continued with the project. It had been placed on hold in June/July of the previous year. The first phase had been tested for errors and gone to the service provider. She suggested that the whole system be tested, not just Phase 1.

Mr Selfe asked if the first year had been 2006.

Ms Mosupye replied that the service provider had talked to SITA and the DCS in 2008, and when they had seen that they could not finish, had asked for a one-year extension. User acceptance testing had been done, and R80m had been paid to Dimension Data.

Mr Selfe asked what was supposed to have been achieved in terms of value for money.

Ms Mosupi replied that a breakdown would be given of what had been done and what had been paid for. It could not be known if there had been fruitless expenditure until the RDOMS had been tested. The National Contact Centre (NCC) had never been launched. The Lesedi 3 integrated legal system, to coordinate visits by families, had cost R36m. The SAS system could be classified as fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Too many Granite firewalls had been installed. The virtualisation architecture had been flawed, as it was not possible to visualise. The backup software had not added value, and R90m was under forensic investigation.

Mr Selfe asked, in terms of naming and shaming, who had been responsible.

Ms Mosupye responded that it had been various entities, not a single provider. The IT Granite firewalls had been procured through SITA.  Virtualisation had been done by a third party company.

The Chairperson asked why the major task of forensic auditing had been given to the internal audit section of the DCS.  The Portfolio Committee had insisted that it be done by an independent body. The Minister had to be told. It was unacceptable for the DCS to do an investigation of itself, when R90m was involved.

Ms Mosupye responded that the DCS internal audit section was only for support. Documents had been handed to the audit consortium.

The Chairperson said that the Committee would write to the National Commissioner.  Someone had to be fired.  It had to be confirmed who the lead investigator was.

Ms W Ngwenya (ANC) asked when positions had been advertised, and when the date of appointments would be.  What was being done to ensure that consultants did not sabotage the DCS?  She asked about the shortlist for DCS infrastructure for 2011, and whether it had been advertised at that point.

Ms Mosupye replied that a shortlist had been compiled in July 2011, but no suitable candidate had been found. The same had happened in March 2012. The DCS had then embarked on a head-hunting process.  The target was to appoint a candidate by 1 August.  She said that there had been no sabotage by consultants. There had been a letter to consultants to inform them that they had to surrender all documents when they left the employ of the DCS.  If they failed to do so, they would not be paid.

Ms Ngwenya asked when there would be a consolidated written report on how many consultants had been used. It seemed to her that the filling of advertised posts was not taken seriously.

Mr V Magagula (ANC) remarked that the DCS and SITA were in agreement, and that there were things that SITA did not want the Committee to know about. The question was why SITA had not been involved with procurement. The DCS and SITA were protecting each other.

The Chairperson said that there had to be a move away from appointments for their own sake. Appointments had to be made for the sake of service delivery. Posts were sabotaged by management when people were appointed because management wanted, for instance, a Christian or a fat person. What mattered was competence. He said that the Member had been right about things being kept from the Committee. He advised the entities that they had to be upfront and tell the truth or shut up. Some of the Committee members had come a long way as activists, parents or community members and could see through things.

Mr Magagula asked what a head-hunt entailed, and whether that meant approaching specific targeted individuals. He asked if that was in keeping with the Constitution.

Ms Mosupye replied that it was a formal process, backed by the Constitution.

Mr L Max (DA) asked about a time frame for disaster recovery. Had it been the DCS or SITA that had been responsible for delays over the preceding five years?  Had  the DCS not been capacitated to implement programmes?

Ms Mosupi responded that SITA would go through a procurement process in the current financial year to cover their 500 sites. Key areas were being identified in the second quarter.

Mr Max asked if the R47m owed to SITA was from the previous financial year, or the preceding years.

The CEO replied that it had occurred over several years, with R30m from 2007/08, R9,9m from 2010/11, and R6m from 2011/12. The DCS had been engaged about the debt. There had been disputes about services rendered. A task team had worked with the CFO. The older a debt became, the less chance of recovering the money. It was a matter of urgency.

The Chairperson remarked that the DCS had to have sight of the external audit report. The Minister could not embargo it.  Even external people were protected. He asked about the cost of delays, and the R47m owed by the DCS to SITA.

Ms Potgieter-Gqubule responded that it had not been the intention to pull the wool over anyone’s eyes.  SITA did not want to use the Committee as a bargaining platform. The presentations had given blame without saying what was wrong.  Committee Members had long memories and an ear to the ground.  The entities did not have that.  The RDOMS system had been adopted more completely by the SAPS.  It had started off three years before with DCS as the lead client, but things had gone wrong on the SITA side. To get back on track, there had to be the ability to say what went wrong.

SITA would cooperate in the conduct of a forensic audit, seeing as they had been involved in the procurement stages of some programmes.  SITA would compile a sample of procurement over the preceding five years. SITA information would be made available.

Ms Mosupi noted that there were also non-mandatory services that the client could procure on its own.  SITA was a procurement vehicle which arranged a contract with the service provider.

The Chairperson asked if the DCS or SITA had signed the contract. He thought it easier if SITA signed. SITA was the expert. He asked who signed the contract with IBM for a DCS laptop.

Ms Potgieter-Gqubule replied that there were difficulties due to the Act.  For transversal BAS and LOGIS, it was mandatory to use SITA.  SITA provided the contract.  With non-mandatory procurement, the Act stipulated that the DCS could choose between SITA and the open market. In the latter case, the contract would be between the DCS and the service provider. When it had to go through SITA, they would advertise, adjudicate and recommend to the National Commissioner, and provide background.  The Commissioner, as accounting officer, could decide to accept or not. Then there would be a contract between the Department and the service provider. The exception was where there was a full house service, as for the SAPS.  Departments had the choice to use SITA or not. SITA would assume a more supportive role in future with the DCS.

Mr Magagula noted that the DCS had highlighted the issue of technical assistance on joint projects with SITA, the year before. He asked if the matter had been resolved.

Mr M Cele (ANC) asked if the case had been re-opened on connectivity.

Mr S Abram (ANC) said he detected that the DCS and SITA did not talk when it came to planning. He asked if there was a model for planning together. RDOMS should not have been introduced. It had to be admitted that the job had not been done properly. When entities came to Parliament, they had to cross their “t”s.  A forensic audit was being done, but more than five years had elapsed.  He asked if SITA would have allowed R90m to be wasted if they had owned the business.  It was a Committee injunction that inmates had to be properly cared for. There were still no records for remand detainees who had been transferred somewhere else, and they could not be tracked.

Mr Max remarked that he was cautiously optimistic. The previous time nothing had been in place. The DCS GITO knew what she wanted, and SITA knew its mandate. Shortcomings had been identified. The Committee wanted to see a plan.

The Chairperson advised with regard to the forensic investigation that the entities did not have to commit themselves yet.  Tenders would not be allowed to defraud.  Names of those who did so were needed, to blacklist them. He said that the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) had reported the previous week that the audit consortium appointed by the DCS had failed in their task. If it turned out that the same auditors would be used, there would be trouble. If there were overlaps, he would advise them to stop the process. He asked about the qualifications of Ms Mosupye’s newly-appointed colleague. The last acting GITO had been a mechanic. One could not have a mechanic or medical doctor doing one’s IT.

Ms Mosupye responded that there had been unsatisfactory service delivery from SITA the previous year. In the beginning there had not been good relations between the DCS and SITA, and it was not known who had to do what. There were problems on both sides, and a relationship had to be built. Projects were currently managed together with SITA. There were formal minutes that had been signed off. The two entities were currently formally in business and they might have covered for each other in the past. For planning together with SITA, a need had to be identified first. After that, planning could commence. She would discuss the sensitivity of the forensic issue with the National Commissioner.

Her newly appointed colleague was a graduate in computer science with long experience of IT systems. He had worked in other government departments, as well as for SITA.

Mr Magagula indicated that he was satisfied with the response, and willing to withdraw his earlier objections.

The Chairperson announced that he had just received news that the auditors were the same that the CFO of the DCS had complained about the previous week.

Mr Selfe remarked that an audit was as good as the briefing received by the auditor. There had to be specifications. It was a reputable company, and their reputation had been placed on the line.

The Chairperson advised that gaps needed to be covered. The Portfolio Committee had to be convinced of that. What had to be avoided was for government to be used as a milking cow.

Ms Potgieter-Gqubule said that SITA was committed to working with the DCS. The entities had to eradicate waste and move forward. There were always complaints about the same systems. A joint plan had to address departmental needs. The same things could no longer be rehashed.

The Chairperson noted that the DCS had received a qualified audit for some 16 years. The DCS talked to the Committee on a quarterly basis. He requested that someone from SITA be a standing member at such discussions.

Briefing by Sonke Gender Justice Network and Just Detention
The Chairperson introduced the discussion about Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring in correctional facilities. Abuses were occurring after shutdown in centres, and there was a lack of manpower to cope with it. There was resistance against CCTV from officials themselves. They did not want to be monitored.

Ms Sasha Gear, Programme Director for Just Detention International, said that her organisation had first been approached by DCS officials, who had requested help to stem rampant sexual violence in prisons.

A Sonke Gender Justice Network delegate told the Committee that CCTV could be efffective, but there were pitfalls. It could only be complementary to other methods.

Ms Gear welcomed the interest of the Committee in CCTV. She remarked that staff was the lynchpin for violence reduction.  Staff had to be improved, to become more vigilant. There had to be increased staff patrols and surveillance.  It took an hour for staff to open a cell at night. Facilities were in a state of disrepair.  Important questions were how cameras would be placed to prevent vandalism.  CCTV had to be part of a holistic strategy.  Appropriate measures could be taken to ensure that privacy was violated as little as possible.  She recommended that cameras not be placed at showers and toilets.

Discussion
The Chairperson remarked that it was not only a matter of sexual harassment and violence.  At St Albans, officials had acted violently against inmates, and there was no evidence to prove it. The DCS had not been able do anything about this, or about human rights violated through sexual abuse. After hours, inmates took over. There were never enough warders to patrol. The Committee could not fold its hands when people were being abused. If nothing was done, government opened itself up to court cases.

Mr P Mnguni (COPE) remarked that the ideal situation would be where two or three warders could be watching the CCTV, and respond to an alarm button.  Evidence could be gathered for a conviction. There could be intervention in the form of medical help or counselling.  It could not be a substitution, it could only be complementary to direct monitoring. He had recently lost two cellphones at the airport, and with the help of CCTV, officials had been able to identify the person who took them.

Mr Max remarked that the only way to know, would be to try. Technology could be a source to assist warders. Assaults by members on inmates would decrease, as suspects could be identified.  So-called suicides in front of 30 people would be eliminated.  Crime was caused by a combination of desire and opportunity. Desire could not be eradicated, but opportunity could be blocked.  He suggested that there be a pilot, on which a solid case could be based to convince Parliament for a rollout.

Ms Ngwenya suggested that the 1999 Act should be reviewed and developed to allow for CCTV. On oversight, one could see two officials looking after 1 000 inmates. The master key system was a problem. A person could be killed during the night and it would only be discovered the next morning.

Mr Selfe said that cynicism regarding CCTV as a panacea was justified.  Everyone knew that devices like turnstiles did not work. The question was what else could be done.  He agreed with Ms Ngwenya that CCTV could give evidence, but the master key system prevented putting a stop to abuses. He did not agree that CCTV should not be in showers. That was where sexual abuse was most likely to occur.

Ms Venessa Padayachee (NICRO) said that there were problems of sexual violence, threats and illness at night. There had to be a comprehensive management strategy. The question was where to place the cameras, and whether they had to be placed randomly. The shower issue was tricky.  It impacted on dignity.  CCTV was not new.  It had to be managed properly.  It could not work if officials fell asleep in front of it. That problem was linked to the shift system. Corrupt officials could be expected to resist CCTV.  There had to be pre-testing. The Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) was suggesting distress monitors, panic buttons and the employment of an emergency response unit.

A Sonke Gender Justice Network delegate remarked that there was a shortage of staff, and the need to use existing staff optimally.  When inmates escaped, they were brought back within hours. The question was how staff were used.  People in centres resorted to gangs for safety. CCTV could minimise gang activity. It could prevent knives and guns being brought in by staff. Aspects like members falling asleep on duty had to be addressed. The quality of service rendered had to improve. He advised that CCTV be considered.

Mr Abram pointed out that there was a convergence of ideas.  Everyone wanted a solution. His problem was that it was the human being who had to change psychologically for the better. There was a constitutional promise to the country that people would be safe, including inmates. Facilities left much to be desired. They had to be improved.  Money was needed for that. Facilities had to be equipped to make the inmate’s stay productive. There were excellent DCS officials, but also corrupt ones.  Drugs in centres did not fall from the sky.  Officers themselves ferried them in.  Officials who guarded inmates had to be guarded themselves.  If officials transgressed, there had to be a set of rules, to ensure absolute integrity.

Mr Abram continued that there had to be a passion for the job among DCS officials.  If the bad officials were watching the CCTV, it was of no use. The value system of officials had to be intact.  He suggested that the proposed pilot study be tried at the worst facility. There had to be a totally holistic approach. There had to be thinking out of the box. Where legislation was an impediment, it had to be changed.  Inmates had to be seen as fellow human beings who had erred. They were coming out worse than they went in. Something was lacking in the system.  DCS members had to approach their work as a calling.

A Sonke delegate said that he worked in prison.  There were terms of confidentiality.  He had heard an inmate say to another that there would be sex that night. Officials would overhear such remarks and say that it was confidential. They would allow the situation. The 28 prison gang was trained for sexual abuse. It was to be expected that there would be internal resistance to CCTV. Only first level warders would know what had happened.

Mr Magagula noted that female officials exposed to camera images of naked inmates, would also be violated.

A Sonke delegate remarked that the master key system not only affected inmates, but also warders.  Warders were also victimised.  CCTV was only planned for centres, but was also necessary for inmates transported from one point to another, who were at risk.

Ms Venessa Padayachee of NICRO said that there had to be a risk management plan. If inmates blocked a TV camera, there had to be a backup plan. It had been mentioned that CCTV was needed during transport, but also in court cells.  A lot of contraband was transferred there. There were health issues in the DCS.  A lot of inmates suffered from deep psychological trauma because of sexual violence.

The Chairperson concluded that the Committee had started to ask about objections to CCTV, but no one had done so. He received calls every day from people who thought it could be done.  It did not have to be the responsibility of DCS people.  When equipment became obsolete or had to be maintained, people from outside could be brought in to do it.  Members had supported the proposal for a pilot project.  The National Council for Correctional Services (NCCS) could assist. They were part of the solution. Technological experts had to comment on difficulties.

The Chairperson adjourned the meeting.