Stakeholder submissions on the implementation of the Jali Commission recommendations by the Department of Correctional Services

Correctional Services

23 August 2011
Chairperson: Mr V Smith (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) noted that the Jali Commission had found evidence of corruption, maladministration and the ill-treatment of prisoners. There was a toxic environment in which service delivery in accordance with the White Paper on Correctional Services was difficult to achieve. Inmate-on-inmate assaults and staff member-on inmate assaults had escalated. The Commission had found a lack of accountability and discipline in the Department of Correctional Services.  The current prison system was not open to external scrutiny

The ISS suggested that the Jali recommendations be converted into performance indicators. A set of core indicators had to be developed and agreed upon by the Department, oversight structures and civil society.  The Institute advised a comprehensive change management process, starting at the Department’s Head Office and regional offices. It was recommended that a compliance monitoring tool was employed to enforce compliance with the Correctional Services Act.

Members were concerned over the lack of progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Jali Commission.  Members asked for suggestions on how the situation could be improved.  Members queried the suggestion from the ISS that the powers of the Judicial Inspectorate were expanded to include investigations into allegations of corruption.  The Inspectorate had inadequate human and financial resources to undertake additional responsibilities and was controlled by the Department.  Other questions concerned the practice of appointing external consultants rather than developing internal capacity and the lack of managerial capacity within the Department.  Members asked for information about the monitoring tool that was developed by the Department to track the implementation of the Correctional Services Act.  The tool was considered to be confidential and the information could not be provided to the Committee.

The Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) pointed out that the Jali Commission had found evidence of corruption, maladministration and human rights violation at the management area level. There was a loss of State control in certain areas within the DCS. Head Office was not investigated by the Commission. It was argued that corruption occurred when there was a monopoly on certain activities, when officials could use their discretion to act and there was a lack of accountability for actions. Officials tended to treat prisoners as if they had no rights. Evidence of torture, assault and abuse was found. The lack of prosecutions for abuses fostered a culture of impunity. There was a lack of transparency and discipline. Dismissal for abuses was rare in the DCS. It was currently not known which of the Jali Commission recommendations had been implemented by the DCS. The DCS had to explain why some of the recommendations had not been accepted.

Members queried the link between the loss of State control to the establishment of privately managed prisons and independent parole boards. Members agreed with the suggestion that the Inspecting Judge reported on a quarterly rather than on an annual basis.  Members were concerned over the incidence of violence towards prison officials.  Questions were asked about the activities of gangs in prisons and the difficulty to provide humane detention in overcrowded conditions. Other questions concerned the outsourcing of kitchen services and the measures taken to combat sexual violence against inmates.

NICRO reported that the Jali Commission had found a culture of lawlessness in the DCS. There was a poor work ethic and frequent violation of the constitutional rights of prisoners. A lack of discipline prevailed. The White Paper objectives were not adhered to in day-to-day operations. There was a communication gap between senior management and junior staff members. Gangs were powerful and there was insensitivity on the part of officials to victims of sexual violence. NICRO saw overcrowding as a cluster issue. Affordable bail and a review of the sentencing regime had to be considered. The Department neglected reintegration and rehabilitation of prisoners. The Commission had reported that a negative institutional culture in the DCS would have to be rooted out, before real progress would be possible.

Members asked questions concerning the impact of the seven day work week establishment and the resulting staff shortages.  Other questions concerned the master key system, the transfer of prisoners without consultation and CCTV surveillance in communal cells.

In conclusion, the Chairperson listed the issues that would be discussed during the Committee meeting with the Department, scheduled for 7 September 2011.  The Chairperson and the representative from the Ministry urged the media to present a balanced report on the proceedings.

Meeting report

In his opening remarks, the Chairperson said that the Committee was committed to change and had identified seven pillars to guide the process of improving the situation at the Department of Correctional Services (DCS).  The purpose of the meeting was not to re-hash the findings and recommendations of the Jali Commission. The Committee required clarity on the action that had to be taken.  

The Committee had conducted oversight visits to correctional centres over the preceding two years, had dealt with a large volume of correspondence and had engaged with stakeholders and inmates. He asked the stakeholders present at the meeting to assist the Committee in formulating the issues that had to be addressed by the DCS during the forthcoming meeting with the Committee on 7 September 2011. The Committee wanted a progress report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Jali Commission to date.

The merits or demerits of the Jali Commission report were not at issue. Stakeholders had to indicate what action could be taken by the DCS that was both measurable and achievable. He invited comment from the stakeholders on the progress that had been made and on what remained outstanding. The Committee was required to submit a report at the end of its term of office, which would serve as a record of what had been achieved in improving the lives of the inmates of correctional centres. The Jali Commission report was submitted a few years ago and it was essential that the Committee determined to what extent the issues that had been raised had been resolved.

Submission from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
Ms Tizina Ramagaga, Junior Researcher, ISS presented the briefing to the Committee (see attached document).

The Jali Commission had identified shortcomings in the DCS, such as corruption, maladministration, ill-treatment of prisoners and dysfunctional relationships between staff and inmates. The Commission described a toxic environment in which it was practically impossible for staff to deliver the service required by the White Paper on Correctional Services. Fundamental change was necessary to overcome a subculture of corruption and human rights abuses.

Correctional Services personnel wielded enormous power over inmates and what took place inside prison walls was not open to scrutiny. The post-apartheid transformation of the DCS, particularly its de-militarisation, had been poorly executed. New methods to maintain order and discipline had not been developed. Both inmate-on-inmate violence and staff member-on-inmate violence had increased from 2008/09 to 2009/10. Individual staff members were not being held accountable. The Commission had found that employees consciously and deliberately flouted regulations relating to security and other matters.

It would be useful to hear from the DCS how the Jali recommendations had been converted into performance indicators. A set of core indicators had to be developed and agreed upon by the DCS, oversight structures and civil society. Fundamental change would require a comprehensive change management process, starting at the DCS head office and the regional offices. Prison staff had to be involved in articulating a vision for facilities.  The DCS was committed to using the compliance monitoring tool that had been developed to monitor and track the implementation of the Correctional Services Act. The tool was currently not publicly available. The DCS must be commended for the conclusion of a series of contracts with the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to investigate corruption. As the prison system was largely closed to external scrutiny, whistle-blowers had an important role to play in bringing incidents of corruption and human rights abuses to the attention of the authorities. The DCS had to report on the encouragement and protection of whistle-blowers since the closure of the Department’s anti-corruption hotline.

Discussion

Ms W Ngwenya (ANC) agreed with the ISS’s concerns over the discipline of DCS staff members and the corruption in correctional centres. During an oversight visit to the St George centre, the Committee had spoken to an inmate who had been arrested along with his brother. The brother had been killed by prison staff. The matter had not been reported. When questions were asked about the incident, the Committee was told that that an investigation was underway. DCS personnel appeared not to have been trained to cope with their duties.  There was a lack of discipline among DCS staff members. Officials had been caught smuggling dagga into centres but were not prosecuted. Drug smuggling was a criminal offence but the officials concerned were merely given a written warning. She felt that things were being swept under the carpet. She agreed that the DCS still had a long way to go and needed guidance.

Mr J Selfe (DA) referred to change management, mentioned on page 7 of the briefing document. The ISS suggested that there had to be a performance agreement contract at the centre level. He asked for clarity on the suggestion. The DCS was constricted by labour relations requirements applicable to the public service sector. There had to be clarity about what was possible in practical, legal terms. He asked for more details of the comprehensive change management process proposed by the ISS.

Ms Ramagaga replied that the ISS would prefer to forward a detailed written summary about the change management proposals. The correctional centre personnel had to be involved in the process to address the abuse of inmates. The Judicial Inspectorate had reported that staff did not know how to deal with issues concerning discipline.

Mr Lukas Muntingh, Project Coordinator for the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) remarked that private prisons could serve as laboratories for change management. The DCS had appointed controllers at those facilities and the same principle could be applied on a more general basis. It was essential that responsibility was devolved to the heads of centres and that they were allocated a specific budget. It was most important that there were clear and precise standards regarding the responsibilities of heads of prisons. Heads of prisons did not have a clear idea of what they were supposed to deliver. There was managerial confusion, for example differing and varying views on how to handle children in prisons.

Mr L Max (DA) referred to paragraph 3 on page 6 of the briefing document. His own experience had highlighted the difficulties of achieving fundamental change in a large and complex organisation such as the DCS. He had experience at the operational level and had been promoted to a senior managerial position. The recruitment of external specialist consultants by the DCS was problematic. In his experience, the placing of such specialists in charge of standing operations was disastrous. He was of the opinion that discipline in the DCS was non-existent.  He suggested that a survey was undertaken to determine how many senior managers had operational experience. The basic managerial principles had to be in place in order to implement the Jali Commission recommendations.

Ms Ramagaga replied that the DCS had to undertake an internal survey of work experience.  The Committee should approach the Department to obtain the necessary information.

The Chairperson asked for comment on the issue of internal capacity development and promotion versus the recruitment of external expertise.

Mr Max said that he was not opposed to the employment of outsiders but new recruits should not be employed in operational management positions.
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Mr Muntingh responded that the issue of policy had to be considered as well.  The DCS pursued policies that were inappropriate and not achievable. The question arose whether the objectives of the White Paper on Correctional Services were achievable.  Any transformation process benefited from “new blood” but the significant contribution of experienced staff must not be disregarded.  There should be no ceiling placed on the promotion prospects of experienced personnel.  The issue was not limited to the employment of new staff.  Existing personnel were sorely in need of re-training.  Inexperienced new employees could be undermined by the incumbent staff and any efforts to manage the centres more effectively could be hampered.

The Chairperson asked who should be doing the training and retraining. The Committee needed practical suggestions that could be implemented without delay. For example, the Committee could consider a proposal that 10% of the Department’s budget was allocated to training.  The training provided had to include the upholding of human rights.

Mr S Abram (ANC) referred to paragraph 2 on page 6 of the briefing document.  The statement was made that it was difficult to determine to what extent the DCS had implemented the Jali Commission’s recommendations concerning corruption and maladministration. The Commission had recommended that the Correctional Services Act was amended. The question was whether the office of the Inspecting Judge should be extended to include instances of corruption and maladministration in addition to human rights abuses. He asked if the Judicial Inspectorate had the necessary human and financial resources to undertake the additional burden.

Ms Ramagaga replied that the current mandate of the Judicial Inspectorate was to report on conditions in correctional centres, not to investigate officials.  The Inspectorate would require additional funding if the mandate was extended to include the investigation of officials for corruption as well as violations of human rights.

Mr Muntingh pointed out that Section 90 of the Act provided for the reporting of incidents of corruption.  Section 5 granted investigative powers. Over the preceding four years, less emphasis had been placed by the DCS on investigating allegations of corruption. He supported the suggestion that the investigative powers of the Inspectorate were extended.

The Chairperson remarked that civil society supported the increased level of independence for the Inspecting Judge. He asked for comment from the stakeholders on the powers of the Judge to investigate allegations of corruption. The Committee undertook to include stakeholders’ opinions in the debate with the DCS.

Ms Venessa Padayachee, National Manager: Advocacy and Lobby, NICRO, said that judicial enforcement of the Jali Commission recommendations was in order. The confidence in the system was undermined when reports by prison visitors (for example) were ignored and no action was taken.

Mr Abram said that the judicial Inspectorate could not execute action within the existing legislative framework. The Jali Commission had recommended that the Correctional Services Act be amended to provide teeth for the Inspecting Judge. It was essential that the Commission’s recommendations were implemented. He asked what the shortcomings and legislative impediments were concerning the power to conduct investigations and what corrective measures could be taken.

Mr Muntingh reported that the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations was actively monitored. The Judicial Inspectorate could develop its own monitoring capacity or cooperate with other entities involved in the investigation of corruption. It was important to increase the level of transparency. More information had to be provided by the DCS and the responsible authority had to be held fully accountable.

Mr Selfe was of the opinion that the Judicial Inspectorate required far more resources. There were insufficient resources to meet the current mandate of the Inspectorate. The Amendment Bill had to define the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Judge and take into consideration when actions taken impacted on the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the Police. A good working relationship between the Judicial Inspectorate and the prison management had to be in place to allow the effective inspection of the conditions of inmates.  The relationship would be compromised if the Inspecting Judge was perceived to be a “super policeman”.  He wondered what the alternative was if the Inspecting Judge was not the enforcer.  The issue of corruption remained a problem.  He asked what alternative approach could be followed to deal with allegations of corruption if the mandate of the Judicial Inspectorate was not extended.

The Chairperson remarked that there was a strong argument to grant powers of enforcement to the Inspecting Judge.  However, such provision would undermine the authority of the DCS.  The powers of the Judicial Inspectorate were similar to Parliament in the sense that Parliament also did not have power to enforce legislation. The Judge could report to Parliament, but could not instruct the authorities on what action had to be taken.  He agreed that the management of correctional centres should not be outsourced.

Mr Muntingh pointed out that the annual budget for the Judicial Inspectorate amounted to R17 million, which was 0.5% of the total DCS budget.  The funding allocation was insufficient if the Inspectorate had to investigate allegations of corruption as well.  A strengthening of the resources available to the Inspectorate would allow more transparency.

Ms Ramagaga suggested that investigations were not outsourced but were dealt with by the DCS internally. The issue was whether the DCS would enforce the recommendations of the Inspecting Judge, which was currently not the case.  It was debatable whether the Department had the required internal capacity to implement the recommendations.

Ms Padayachee said that the current system was not working because nobody was held accountable.  The DCS ignored the recommendations that had been made. There was no attempt to monitor and to hold people to account. However, the lack of accountability was not confined to the DCS.

The Chairperson observed that it was fruitless to make recommendations that were not implemented.  The responsibility of the DCS had to be clear.  The Committee would consider spending more time on oversight visits.

Mr Muntingh responded that more Committee visits might not be necessary.  Section 93 of the Act required the Inspecting Judge to report on each inspection. He questioned whether that was indeed happening. More detailed inspection reports would enable civil society to monitor the performance of the Department. The Inspectorate could do more research than what was reported in the previous Annual Report. More research was necessary on the health of inmates and on incidents of corruption. The DCS needed more guidance. Consideration had to be given to the expansion of the mandate of the Inspecting Judge by the Independent Complaints Directorate.

The Chairperson remarked that it had become necessary for the Inspecting Judge to report on a quarterly basis.

Mr Umesh Raga of the Judicial Inspectorate stated emphatically that the Inspectorate did not have the capacity to enforce the Commission’s recommendations. The Inspectorate had started to increase its capacity in order to become more inquisitorial. The quality of oversight had been improved. He agreed with Mr Muntingh that financial resources should be adequate. In terms of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) the DCS was responsible for providing resources to the Inspecting Judge. The Committee had an important role to play with regard to the budget. The DCS paid all expenses incurred by the Judicial Inspectorate but the administration of the entity was linked to the Department.  The Inspectorate could not increase the number of positions without the approval of the DCS and had to comply with the DCS PERSAL (personnel salary system) process. The Inspectorate did not have control over its own personnel management and was dependent on the DCS systems. Discussions had been held with the Commissioner in an attempt to resolve the issue.

Mr Raga was of the opinion that it would be beneficial if the Inspectorate was granted enforcement powers. If any infringement came to light, the Inspectorate should be able to issue an instruction to the Head of the facility to take corrective action.  However, the labour relations process could inhibit the Inspectorate from exercising its enforcement powers in matters concerning maladministration, financial mismanagement and corruption.  The Inspectorate could not be equated to a court of law. The management of the DCS had to be improved. In the previous year, the Inspectorate had looked more closely at the death of prisoners whilst in custody. The Inspectorate followed up on matters that were internally investigated by the Department.  The DCS collaborated with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and shared information. The relationship between the Inspectorate and SAPS had to become more transparent. However, inquests were held in camera and dockets were often not opened for cases involving DCS personnel. He suggested that the Committee engaged with SAPS on the issue of dockets for cases involving the death of prisoners whilst in custody.

Ms M Nyanda (ANC) asked if the DCS management structure was considered to be unstable and if the Department lacked adequate management capacity.

Ms Ramagaga replied that the Jali Commission had indeed found a degree of management instability in the DCS. Unfortunately, the Commission’s mandate excluded any investigation of maladministration at the Head Office.  The Commission assessed the regional offices and investigated nine management areas. She referred Members to the comprehensive change management process mentioned on page 7 of the briefing document.  Prison staff had to be involved in the development of a vision for the facilities.

Mr V Ndlovu (IFP) asked about the compliance monitoring tool developed by the Department to monitor and track implementation of the Correctional Services Act. The tool was not publicly available. He asked for details of the tool and how Members could obtain a copy.

Mr Muntingh explained that he had been the project manager appointed to develop the Correctional Services Act monitoring system. The tool had been developed over a period of 6 years. The Committee would have to raise the matter with the DCS as it was confidential matter.

The Chairperson asked if the tool was being used by the DCS.

Mr Ndlovu remarked that if the tool was not available to the public, the DCS was unlikely to divulge more information to the Committee.  It was not acceptable that the Committee had no knowledge of the tool.

Mr Raga remarked that Mr Muntingh should not enter into confidential agreements and argue for transparency at the same time.

Submission from the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI)
Mr Muntingh presented the briefing by the CSPRI to the Committee (see attached document).

The Jali Commission had found evidence of corruption, maladministration and human rights violations at the managerial level. The Commission’s report did not contain a specific chapter on the Head Office of the DCS. The CSPRI submission focused on the results (outcome indicators) that had been achieved rather than on the action taken by the Department to address the problems (input indicators). The Jali Commission had expressed dissatisfaction with the Department’s response to the recommendations that were made.  The prevailing attitude was that outsiders should not tell the DCS how to run prisons.  The Department’s attempts to consult with stakeholders on the implementation of the recommendations were sporadic and isolated.

Corrupt activity tended to occur in an environment where accountability was lacking and where officials had the discretion to use power as they saw fit. Corruption had to be treated in a holistic manner.

The Commission had found that officials treated prisoners as if they had no rights. Prisoners were subjected to torture, assault and abuse. Prisoners had lost faith in the Judicial Inspectorate and Independent Visitors complaint system. The most recent report of the Judicial Inspectorate detailed 55 unnatural deaths in prisons during the 2009/10 financial year. DCS officials were directly implicated in ten of those deaths, but had not been prosecuted at the time of publication of the report. In the preceding three years, there had been a slight but steady increase in the rate of unnatural deaths of inmates of prisons.

The lack of prosecution for criminal offences fostered a culture of impunity as it suggested that nothing would happen if the rights of prisoners were violated. There was an utter lack of transparency in respect of human rights violations. Disciplinary action against DCS officials in the form of dismissal remained a rare event in the DCS. Reporting on the investigation of allegations of corruption in the DCS was scant. A Special Investigating Unit (SIU) report on tender corruption in the DCS, issued in September 2009, had not resulted in any action to criminally prosecute the implicated officials.  It had been established that Head Office staff had been implicated in the allegations of fraud and corruption.

It was not known which of the Jali Commission recommendations had been accepted by the DCS and which were rejected. The reasons why certain recommendations had not been accepted had to be communicated to Parliament and to the public. It was important that petty corruption involving prisoners and human rights violations against prisoners were properly investigated and that corrective action was taken by the DCS to prevent further incidents.

Discussion
The Chairperson observed that the core business of the DCS was the humane detention of prisoners.  However, attention had to be given to the rehabilitation of prisoners and their reintegration into society as well.

Mr Muntingh replied that humane detention was a prerequisite for reintegration and rehabilitation. One could not tell an inmate to become a law abiding citizen if he was assaulted and mistreated and who regarded an official as “a crook in a uniform”.

The Chairperson noted that the Jali Commission had questioned whether the State was in control of the prison system. He asked why it had been necessary to privatise the correctional centres.  Mr Muntingh had advised that much could be learnt from the Public/Private Partnership (PPP) centres, but the Committee had found that that there was a lack of control at the Mangaun and Limpopo centres. It would appear that the current scenario was conducive to corruption.  The policies of the DCS had to be investigated.

Mr Muntingh replied that corruption continued to flourish despite State control. There were certain undisturbed areas in the DCS where officials were not held accountable. The Jali Commission had reviewed the human relations management and the appointment of officials.

The Chairperson recalled that it was intended that the Parole Boards were independent and that representatives of the DCS were excluded from serving on the Board.  There had been instances in the Eastern Cape where different Parole Boards handed down different decisions.  The lack of consistency demanded a political discussion.  The issue needed to be addressed by the DCS, the Committee and civil society.  In paragraph 21 of the submission, it was stated that a lack of prosecution for human rights violations fostered a culture of impunity. He suggested that the Inspecting Judge reviewed the action taken by the DCS and that the reports on investigations were issued on a more regular basis.

The Chairperson pointed out that DCS personnel were often attacked by inmates. He recalled the discussions held by the Committee with staff members at the St Albans facility.  DCS staff felt that the Department was only concerned with the treatment of inmates but failed to address the abuse that staff were subjected to.  The abuse of power that led to assaults by officials on inmates had to be balanced against the fact that inmates were also abusive towards officials. It was not an easy environment to work in. Gangs had a great deal of power in prisons and measured their success in blood. There had to be more concern over the well-being of officials and their employment conditions.

Mr Muntingh agreed that assaults by inmates on officials were cause for concern.  However, if the conditions of inmates were better, there would be less incentive to resort to violence. Inmates regarded a good warden as one who listened to them. He questioned the manner in which junior officials were treated by senior management. Research on HIV/Aids in the DCS had revealed that HIV-positive members of staff were marginalised. The Head Office lacked legitimacy in the eyes of junior personnel.

The Chairperson remarked that the Committee should be briefed on the issue of gangs in prisons.  It was difficult for officials to see gangs in a humane light. Gang members had no respect for human rights. The spilling blood was regarded as progress to them.

Ms Padayachee added that the basic tasks of heads of centres were complex. A correctional environment had to be created around respect, unity and integrity. People had to be taught by example on how to respect others. It was not only a matter of knowing the constitutional rights of people. Respect had to be lived but that was currently not happening. Officials were people too and the people issues had to be resolved.

Mr Selfe noted the reference to the assessment of performance indicators in the submission. It was possible that additional performance indicators were necessary. If he had to play the devil’s advocate, he could point to the power relationship between gangs and the DCS. He asked if inmate assault on officers might be underreported. There was an intelligence service operating in jails that could anticipate problems.  Mr Muntingh had urged that the DCS got the basics right, which he saw as keeping inmates under humane conditions. The problem was that correctional facilities situated close to major urban centres had to accommodate the inmates who were sent to them. Overcrowding made it extremely difficult to provide optimum conditions. He asked Mr Muntingh what he would do if he was the head of centre at Johannesburg Medium D prison, where 5 new truckloads of inmates arrived every day. The question was how conditions could be kept humane and what managerial tools were necessary.

Mr Muntingh responded that he had provided some examples of performance indicators in the presentation. Ultimately, there had to be a comprehensive view of what the Correctional Services Act required of the DCS. With regard to the overcrowding in prisons such as at Johannesburg, he said that management had to deal with the fact that remand detention went beyond the confines of Correctional Services. 50% of people in custody would not go to a trial. If this category of inmates were not incarcerated, the numbers would drop by 25,000.  The admission of sentenced offenders had reduced by 50% over the last few years. That was partly due to the collapse of the criminal justice system but the reduction had provided a breather for the DCS. Intra-sector solutions had to be sought between the DCS, the Department of Justice and SAPS.

Mr Max asked if the statistical data on assaults referred only to court complaints, or if it included justifiable acts committed in self defence.

Mr Muntingh replied that the statistics included in the DCS Annual Report over recent years had been combined. The State could not guarantee the safety of inmates.

The Chairperson noted that a conference was held at the University of the Witwatersrand on 10 August 2011 on the Dewani case.  He deplored the actions of journalists, who undermined the efforts of Parliament by infamously tweeting “Papa is waiting for you”.

Mr Muntingh explained that gangs were formed in prisons for reasons of protection. People felt unsafe. Where inmates were protected and kept busy, gangs were less prevalent. There were currently prisons in which gangsterism was not allowed. There had to be a consistent managerial approach that addressed the issue of human rights. It had been reported that officials had beaten up prospective gang members as part of their initiation ritual.

Mr Max recalled that during the Committee’s oversight visit to St Albans, a junior official had provoked an inmate and told him to “f… off”. The lack of discipline was apparent. Mention had been made of a task team to develop a national code of conduct.  He wanted to know if the code of conduct was being cascaded down to the junior levels. Discipline had to be managed in the workplace.

Mr Muntingh advised that the DCS statistics did not indicate which party had initiated the assaults.  The DIU and SIU had to investigate the incidents and it was not the responsibility of the head of the facility or the unit managers to undertake investigations.  Discipline could not be maintained solely by rules and overall performance was necessary.

Ms Ngwenya remarked that the policy of keeping remand detainees close to home could contribute to the overcrowding in prisons. Oversight visits had revealed that people who could not afford to pay bail of as little as R300 remained in detention for 6 months or longer. It cost the State R3,000 per month per inmate to keep them in prison.  She wanted to know how the DCS could be assisted in addressing such waste of money.

Mr Muntingh replied that the Criminal Procedure Act did not adequately protect the right of liberty. Heads of prison could make use of existing mechanisms provided for in the Act to oblige such a person to go back to court. If bail was set at only R300, the offender was not regarded as a serious threat to society.

Ms Nyanda recalled that officials had participated in fights among rival gangs at the Barberton prison.  Members of one of the gangs had been transferred.  It was reported that certain officials were members of the prison gangs and certain officials sported gang tattoos.  It was disturbing to note that the “26” and “28” gangs had recently become more active in certain prisons.

Mr Ndlovu asked about the Commission’s recommendation that kitchen services were outsourced.  The recommendation had been implemented in certain prisons but this had been very costly.

Mr Muntingh responded that it was difficult to determine the extent of implementation as civil society was not informed.  The previous Minister had stated that 60% of the Commission’s recommendations had been implemented but information on which recommendations was not available. His guess was that it had been the easy ones. Interested parties could peruse a 1,800 page report on the matter.  It had been reported that the companies that provided the kitchen facilities to prisons used the inmates to do the work.  The inmates were not protected by labour legislation.  It was uncertain whether the inmates were paid a proper wage or only received a gratuity.  Whether or not the outsourcing of kitchen facilities was justified was a managerial issue.

Mr Abram referred to the Commission’s recommendation that victims of rape and sodomy were treated with sensitivity by the authorities.  He asked if the research undertaken by the CSPRI had indicated that the recommendation had been implemented.

Mr Muntingh replied that there was a post-exposure prophylaxis protocol in place. The DCS had a long-standing policy framework to prevent sexual victimisation in prisons. However, the policy had only recently been implemented.

Mr V Magagula (ANC) asked if there were mechanisms in place to prevent sexual violence in prison.  Two incidents were reported in Boksburg but it was unclear if the inmates concerned were male or female.

Mr Muntingh responded that it was important for officials to be well-versed in the Sexual Offences Act. There were instances where rape attacks were not prosecuted. He doubted whether the DCS had a mechanism in place to prevent sexual violence. Incidents involving transgender persons had to be assessed on a case by case basis. The dignity of the individual had to be preserved.

Submission from NICRO
Ms Padayachee presented the briefing by NICRO to the Committee (see attached document).

The Jali Commission had encountered resistance from the DCS during its investigations.  The Commission found a culture of lawlessness in many areas of the Department. Corruption and maladministration was rife in all of the management areas investigated. Investigations revealed that many DCS staff members disregarded Department rules and regulations. Investigations found a poor work ethic and a general culture of violating prisoners’ constitutional rights. The lack of discipline was a key finding by the Commission. Lawlessness and the failure to respect authority was not confined to officials but included the Commissioner and the Minister of Correctional Services. There was a failure to respect Court orders. There was abuse of power by officials and a high staff turnover rate.

With regard to management, the Commission had found a lack of synergy between day-to-day operations and the visions and objectives of the White Paper on Correctional Services. A lack of visionary leadership was noted. Communication between senior management and junior members of staff was a problem.

Gangs were a powerful force in prisons. It had been suggested that gangs were in fact running certain prisons. The Commission report stated that DCS members ignored or lacked sensitivity to sexual violence in prisons. DCS officials were occasionally the perpetrators of violence against inmates. Overcrowding was a major challenge for the Department. A prison in Bizana was 400% full, while another prison 80 km away was only 7% full. NICRO was of the opinion that overcrowding was a cluster issue and suggested that the Committee engaged with the cluster on issues such as affordable bail and a review of the sentencing regime. Imprisonment and remand detention had to be a last resort. The judiciary was hesitant to exercise alternative options. Justice had to be seen as restorative, rather than punitive. The DCS neglected its responsibility for reintegration and rehabilitation. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act could be used to address gang corruption.

With regard to health care, NICRO noted that there was a shortage of prison medical staff. The Jali Commission had raised important legislative issues concerning the Inspecting Judge and gang management strategies. NICRO recommended that the management of information was upgraded. The Commission believed that unless the negative institutional culture of the DCS was rooted out, it would impact negatively on the aims and mandate of the DCS. The Commission recommended the use of cameras to monitor communal cells.

Discussion
Ms Ngwenya referred to the comment concerning the general culture of violating prisoners constitutional rights (see page 5 of the briefing document). She asked what the impact was of the seven day work week. Oversight visits by Members had indicated that the seven day work week had resulted in staff shortages and a lack of capacity to attend to all the needs of prisoners.

Ms Padayachee replied that the seven day establishment had caused problems from a service provider perspective. A service provider would travel to a centre only to find that certain sections were closed or that there were inadequate personnel available to secure an area.

Ms Ngwenya said that prisoners could not be assisted after lockdown when a prison was locked with a master key. She asked what NICRO’s view was on the issue.  The master key system was not new but had been linked to escapes, i.e. when inmates were helped by officials to escape. Escape became easier when there was a shortage of staff.  Inmates were adept at observing which official would be on duty over the weekend.  Assisting escape was a form of corruption.

Ms Padayachee explained that the master key system was implemented to avoid the need for large numbers of keys that had to be used in an emergency. She agreed that the system created problems for the management of the facility after lockdown.

Mr Abram asked for clarity about the transfer if inmates. An inmate had been transferred from Pretoria to Waterval.  The head of the facility had declined to provide any reason for the transfer and had said that he did not have to explain his actions. When that kind of attitude prevailed among officials, negative reactions could be expected. There had to be a humane approach and the matter should be taken up with the Inspecting Judge.

Mr Muntingh confirmed that the heads of prisons could indeed transfer inmates without consultation.  However, transfers should only be made it there was a security issue.

Mr Magagula remarked that closed circuit television (CCTV) systems could be used to prevent escapes but could also intrude upon privacy. Such intrusion became a human rights issue.

Ms Padayachee replied that the idea was not to have CCTV in every cell but in areas where sexual violence would most likely occur.

Mr Muntingh added that a gang management strategy policy framework had been circulated between late 2010 and early 2011.

Mr Raga suggested that mechanisms were put in place to allow communication with Parliament. He appealed to the media to not create a skewed impression of what was presented to the Committee. The transcript of what the Judge in the Dewani case had said in London read differently from media accounts. He implored civil society to report incidents to the Judicial Inspectorate. There were 239 prisons in the country and the nature of incidents differed widely.  The conditions in certain prisons were very bad but reports had to be based on factual evidence.

The Chairperson concluded the meeting by summarising the matters that would be discussed with the DCS at the meeting scheduled for 7 September 2011.  The following matters would be discussed:

The achievement of a balance between internal promotion and external appointments.
A commitment to re-direct the budget of the DCS. The Jali Commission had pointed out that there were inadequate resources for service delivery.
The possibility of granting powers of enforcement to the Inspecting Judge, versus restricting the mandate of the Inspectorate to reports and investigations.
Access to the monitoring tool developed by the Department.
The possibility that the DCS had been hijacked by corrupt elements and that groups of inmates and officials were running the show.
The DCS attitude to recommendations, that amounted to a refusal to take outside advice.
The mass assaults at St Albans. The DCS had to explain what happened there.
The training of staff to eradicate torture and to assist with de-militarisation.
Regular reporting of human rights violations, whether by the Inspecting Judge or the DCS.
Anti-gang strategy. The question would be whether it was in place, or still a conceptual idea.
The issue of gang management.
Retaining the master key system, versus the need for responses to emergencies.

Mr Sam Mahlodi Muofhe of the Ministry noted that unnatural death was not necessarily always caused by officials. Some inmates had died as a result of violence between inmates or from injuries suffered before admission. He made a plea that the term “prison” be abandoned and the name “correctional centres” used instead.  He said that a mind shift was necessary.

The Chairperson cautioned the media to avoid presenting a skewed picture of the matters that had been discussed during the proceedings. It was inaccurate to assume that no progress had been made in implementing the Commission’s recommendations.  He advised that the Committee would meet with the Minister during the following week.

The meeting was adjourned.

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