The Ad hoc Committee had been re-constituted, by resolution of the National Assembly, until 24 June 2011, and Mr C Burgess (ANC) was appointed as the Chairperson.
The Ministry of State Security gave a briefing on international best practices around protection of information, which not only answered Members’ specific queries, but also addressed some of the issues raised during the public hearings. It was emphasised that protection of human rights in
It was explained that classification was based on deciding what would be classified, who would classify it, when and where it would be classified, and in what manner. The main trends under each of these headings were described. International instruments dealing with information all required that any restrictions on the right of access to information must be prescribed by law, in a clear and precise manner, with legal certainty and foreseeability, and that any restriction must be genuinely directed to legitimate interests. Social need and proportionality of limitation were important. Two main tests were applied; the “harm test” investigated the gravity of and likelihood of harm through disclosure, and the “public interest test” would assess what was in the interest of the public, and would require a weighing up of competing interests. A number of international decisions relating to what could fall within “in the public interest” were outlined. The need for review systems, driven by four main drivers, and the outcomes of reviews, were set out. It was noted that most information would be protected for certain periods of time only, with shorter periods applying to information held by international bodies. It was also noted that those having access must continue to protect information, and this was linked to classifications, which were briefly explained.
The second part of the presentation presented case studies for specific countries. The presenter detailed the position in the
Mr C Burgess (ANC) advised that the House had resolved on 17 March 2011 that the ad hoc Committee was now reconstituted, and may proceed with its work. It must report back to the National Assembly by no later than 24 June 2011.
Dr M Oriani Ambrosini (IFP) believed that a new Chairperson needed to be formally appointed. He nominated Mr C Burgess (ANC).
Ms M Smuts (DA) seconded that proposal.
Mr Burgess thanked Members and said that he had understood that his appointment had been confirmed.
International Best Practice on Protection of Information: Ministry of State Security (MSS) briefing
The Chairperson noted that the Minister of State Security, Hon Siyabonga Cwele, had given his full support to the presentation, but was unable to be present as he was at a Cabinet meeting.
Mr Dennis Dlomo, Advisory Services, Ministry of State Security, tabled the presentation, and noted that this was prepared as a follow up on the Minister’s offer to the ad hoc Committee, on 22 October 2011, that the Ministry present a study on international best practices. He said that this study also attempted to deal with some issues raised during public hearings, and had been adapted also to take account of Members’ queries, especially those around timelines relating to protection of information. He pointed out that many of the protection of information regimes that he would describe were brought into being prior to the 9/11 attacks, and some countries had found it necessary to amend their laws to address them. He emphasised that protection of information in
Mr Dlomo reported that more than 86 countries already had “right to information” or “right of access to information” laws, which went hand-in-hand with protection of information. Most recently, former Eastern Bloc countries seeking to join the European Union (EU) and African countries had been putting them in place. Academic work was also being done, leading up to the adoption of the Johannesburg Principles, which essentially distilled court decisions and best practice worldwide, and conferences were also being held on these issues.
Mr Dlomo noted that his presentation would look at various aspects. The first related to what had to be protected. Various dispensations classified things associated with the generation, development, storage, transfer, copying, conveying, protecting, processing and using of information. There were three main approaches, informed by each government’s policy around national security. Some countries adopted a narrow definition of national security, some had a broad definition, and others adopted a broad definition of national security, but limited the role of intelligence and security structures in issues of national security, and brought non-traditional bodies into advancement and protection of national security. For example, prior to 9/11, institutions dealing in commerce and finance were not traditionally at the core of protection of information, but the need to address the financing of terrorism resulted in financial intelligence centres becoming more involved. Elsewhere, departments dealing with protection of the environment had to be included to address environmental disasters.
In every country, no matter what approach was adopted, there must be a legitimate public interest in providing a higher level of protection to sensitive information held by public bodies, which constituted a restriction on the right of access to information. Protection of this type of information was couched in the form of exceptions in freedom of information (FOI) regimes. Some core elements used to justify limitation of the right of access were always present, such as national security, defence, foreign relations, public safety, or public order. In the United Kingdom of England and Wales (UK), the “interests of the country” were defined by the economy, the country’s ability to make sovereign decisions and to be able to defend itself, and advancement of values. Other countries might focus on public interest, and view provision of security as a public interest, or focus on the right of access to information. Other countries emphasised a “vital interest”, which was the continued existence of State, its economic wellbeing, safety of people, or the ability to exercise foreign policy without undue pressure. Other countries referred to “permanent interest”, and this would usually apply in a bi-party system, where the two leading parties would define the interest, so that no matter which party was in power, those interests would be applied consistently. Other possibilities were to define “fundamental interests”, “interest of importance” or “essential interest”. In most countries, the key issue was to ensure that there was a balance. Mr Dlomo said that when he dealt with the individual case studies, he would indicate which definitions were used in the selected countries.
Most countries were guided by a number of international and regional instruments that provided for protection. National security protection emanated from the International Universal Declaration on Human Rights and African Charter for Human and People’s Rights, but other grounds were indicated (see attached presentation for details).
The essence of every secrecy law was that some sets of information had to be protected in the interests of the public, country and nation, to avoid threats or harm caused by disclosure to unauthorised persons.
The second question to be answered related to who classified the information. There were three main trends. The first was the “Prior Classification System”, under which the classifying authority would determine the categories or file series in advance, balancing harm and public interest. Once those were set, a manual would be compiled and its procedures must be followed. The second system was the “Originator Classification System”. Here the author of the document would do the classification. In some dispensations, this would need to be confirmed by a senior person. After this, anyone else using the information to compile a new product must derive the classification from the original classification which was found in source documents. The emphasis was on classifying the individual piece of information. The third system was the “Classifying Authority System”, where a certain person would be given the power to classify certain information, and the person could then either delegate to a limited extent, or create manuals with derivative authority to classify.
The third question to be answered related to when the information was classified. The Constitutions in most countries provided that any information held by the State would be classified until a request was made to de-classify it. This was a Classification by Default System. At the point when the request was made, a decision would be taken whether the information could be revealed. The Multiple Layer Dispensation provided for different categories of information, setting out what had to be disclosed, what may be disclosed and what had to remain fully protected. In all systems, including Classification by Default, the need for the information to be protected had to be proved.
The fourth question related to where information was to be classified. In all systems, information would be classified at the venue of its creation. In the Classification by Default System, the decision would be taken as soon as the information was created, and this would apply, for instance, to cases involving field agents, defence intelligence agents on the battlefield and crime intelligence agents, to ensure that they could have access.
The fifth question was how information would be classified. Mr Dlomo reiterated that various instruments, international law and jurisprudence would provide guidelines for how information would be protected. This would further be set out in Constitutional provisions, national laws, subordinate legislation a supportive activities and documents, including training and advisory services, security audits and manuals. He emphasised that these systems could only apply properly if there was proper training, usually done by a State’s security body, who would establish manuals.
Mr Dlomo then discussed the provisions of international law, highlighting some of the international treaties, which included International Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter for Human and People’s Rights, and other regional documents. Any restrictions on access to information must be prescribed by law, in a clear and precise manner. There must be legal certainty and foreseeability, and any restriction must also be genuinely directed to achieving a legitimate interest. Two main elements to be proven were social need, and proportionate limitation.
International best practices provided for tests to be applied to information needing to be classified or declassified. Not all dispensations applied both criteria. The first was the “Harm Test”. This had two main aspects: namely, gravity of harm, and the probability of harm resulting from unauthorised disclosure of information. There must always be justification of the reason for non-disclosure. In rare cases, the information was so sensitive that the information officer was permitted neither to confirm nor to deny the existence of the information. This had been criticised as a “double-bind” provision.
The second test was the “Public Interest Test: Mr Dlomo stressed that this did not mean interest to the public, but in the interest of the public. This test would arise when access to information was required, and there was a need to weigh the factors in favour of or against disclosure. Once again, there must be justification for the decision. Mr Dlomo said that restrictions did not necessarily apply only to information held by a public body, but could also cover other matters, such as weapons. A number of Court decisions had established what could be included in the “public interest”. In the Spycatcher case (
Mr Dlomo then examined elements of review systems. He noted four main drivers. Regular reviews would be set in the legislation. Random checks would be used to ensure that information was being kept properly. A Self-tasking Review would apply when there had been a failure of the system or some breach. Reviews on request would follow requests for access to information. Post-review obligations would apply to the originators of documents, who would have to inform relevant persons of any changes.
Mr Dlomo emphasised that classification was a restriction of the right to information. In order that the right to information should not be an empty right, there must be a certain period of time at which the information would become available. There were two main drivers for review – the first being the end of the period specified, and the second being a time when the probability and gravity of harm had reduced to such an extent that the information no longer needed to be protected, in which case the information would be downgraded or declassified. He provided some examples of varying time frames, from
Mr Dlomo noted that some information was protected for ever, typically information about sources, methods and security services. Exceptions were found in the former Eastern Bloc countries, as during the German reunification process a number of former East German sources were exposed as the archives were opened up. Generally release of this kind of information would be linked to human rights violations that took place prior to the new systems. He mentioned that the recent dissolution of the State Security service in
When information was classified, there was a requirement that those who had access would continue to protect the information. Access was generally linked either to election to a public office, or to security clearance. He noted that Members of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence in
Professor L Ndabandaba (ANC) asked for more clarity on concepts of traditional and non-traditional protection, the interest of the country versus public interest, the rights of the country, and relationships with human rights in general.
Mr Dlomo said that the traditional or narrow definition of security would pertain to military defence of a country. However, a wider approach would include environmental security, food security, human security and similar concepts. This wider approach was adopted by a panel chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. “National security” had traditionally been utilised in repressive societies to deny rights to individuals, and the mere description of something as “national security” meant that no further information would be given. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights did provide for limitation of rights, but initially there had been no clear guidance on this. Documents such as the Johannesburg Principles had later attempted to set clearer parameters, correlating international jurisprudence, and the issue of “public interest” was then brought to the fore. Mr Dlomo reminded Members that national security was part of the public interest. However, there was a need to weigh and balance all rights, so that information would find its way into the public domain if the benefit of doing so outweighed the need to keep it secret. Chapter 11 of the South African Constitution obliged the Security Services to do their work in the context of international and South African law, and expressly provided that no illegal instructions could be accepted. If something did not comply with human rights perspectives, it would be contrary to the Bill of Rights and would not be permitted. That was the reason for the emphasis on the human rights context.
Ms M Smuts (DA) referred to slides on page 4, and asked about the reference to “demonstrable social need” and “good morals”, and why it was necessary to include these. ICCPR and other instruments noted that right of access to information should only be limited when this was necessary for national security.
Mr Dlomo responded that the issue of “social need” flowed from the original provision in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which provided for restrictions on “moral grounds”. Some countries took the approach that security was a service provided to society. Social Contract theorists would argue that the whole basis for the existence of the State was to provide security, and were therefore opposed to privatisation of security, which they believed gave rise to unequal treatment and denied people their right to life.
Ms Smuts noted a reference on page 5 to the public interest test that must be applied at the point when access to information was requested. She asked whether any other jurisdiction had encountered anything over and above the public interest defence that could be used in Court.
Mr Dlomo said that this would be dealt with later in the presentation, when he presented the case study on
Ms Smuts referred to the slide listing the time frames, and asked whether the last four time frames mentioned (of five down to two years) applied to any countries in particular.
Mr Dlomo said that he would also deal with this later in the presentation.
Ms M Mentor (ANC) asked for confirmation that the “originator” was not an individual, but an office or the title, so as to avoid any problems when it came to declassification.
Mr Dlomo confirmed that it generally referred to the originating office. However, as long as the incumbent with the power to classify still held the post, and was not disabled, the responsibility would stay with that one individual, to avoid the situation where conflicting decisions might come from more than one individual. Once that individual no longer held the office, the responsibility would be transferred to the successor. He noted, however, that in some dispensations the authority would continue only if other preconditions – notably training or renewal – were also present. In America (USA), a person who did not have at least two years’ training would lose the right to classify, and Top Secret classification depended on attendance of annual training.
Ms Mentor thought that whilst it was useful to have international benchmarks, she asked whether comment could be made on the proposed definition of “national security” in
Ms Mentor noted the differing lengths of classification in various countries, but felt it would be useful also to know whether longer time frames might lead to hampering of human rights. For instance, she wondered if development and stability in
Ms Smuts raised a point of order. She had thought that the purpose of this presentation was to present international best practices. Mr Dlomo had not been asked to comment on, and she therefore did not believe that it was appropriate for him to deal with, any of the Bill’s content or definitions. She was also not sure whether he would be able to answer the questions on links between time frames and stability.
The Chairperson believed that the question on time frames was useful, although he would not have limited the answer to the example given. However, Mr Dlomo would not be required to answer any question calling for his personal opinions.
Mr Dlomo said that there had been some studies on the links between national security laws and stability. Researchers had indicated that there had never been any famine in open, democratic societies where information was freely available. That, from a food and human security perspective, was quite telling. In addition, before the government of India had adopted a right to information law, there were numerous problems in indigent people getting access to basic rights and services, but once the right to information laws came into effect, marked improvements were noted, particularly at local government level, in access to services and the ability of non government organisations to get people registered for social security. There was therefore demonstrable evidence to support a balance between protection of national security and access to information. He added that further research on intelligence oversight had noted that if democratic Parliamentary oversight structures did not have adequate access to information, they were not able to carry out their work effectively. For instance, despite the existence of oversight committees in both houses of Parliament in
Specific Case Studies : Part II of presentation
Mr Dlomo’s first case study related to the
There were four tiers of the SPF. Firstly, security was now looked at as a business enabler. Mr Dlomo noted that during the early days of democracy in
The second case study examined
Mr Dlomo stressed that it was common practice to look at the minimum security required. This would enable a balance between what needed to be in the public domain and what needed to be protected.
At this point the Chairperson interjected and noted that the House would be sitting shortly, and several Members needed to make statements. He therefore asked that the presentation stop at this point, and resume at the next meeting, in the following week, probably on Friday, to cater for Members’ attendance at other meetings.
The meeting was adjourned.
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