Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [B41-2010]: Department's response to public submissions

Meeting report

Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [B41-2010]: Departmental responses
Chairperson’s Opening Remarks
The Chairperson noted that several comments and submissions had been made in relation to the Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [B41-2010] (the Bill). The Department of Correctional Services (DCS or the Department) would be submitting responses to these submissions.

The Chairperson said that the comments made by Advocate B Smith, at the meeting of 25 January, had been of concern to the Committee since these were contradictory to what the DCS had presented. Furthermore he stated that Advocate Smith and the team from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) would be withdrawing the presentation made on that day, to be dealt with later in the meeting.

Ms W Ngwenya (ANC) expressed her concerns that there was no quorum.

The Chairperson responded that there was no need for a quorum since no decisions would be taken.

A Parliamentary Legal Advisor said that the Chairperson was correct.

Responses to public submissions: Department of Correctional Services
Mr Tom Moyane, National Commissioner of Correctional Services, DCS, thanked the stakeholders for their valuable submissions. He added that their inputs had been taken on board.

In relation to the submissions from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) he said that the Department was waiting for responses to get clarity. It was said that there had been a wide Constitutional process following on this in the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster, and the NPA had been a party to the process. He added that not all role players would agree to the process, but the fact that one party did not agree with the Bill did not mean that the Bill was not given due consideration. Mr Moyane said that the submissions by the NPA should not be viewed as an impediment to the process of the Bill, and reiterated that a response was awaited.

He noted that the submissions indicated an overall support of the new medical parole system.

Ms Lirette Louw, Legal Advisor, Department of Correctional Services, gave a summary of the submissions that had been received and the Departmental responses.

Clause 1
Ms Louw noted that the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) had submitted that the purpose of identifying specific sections to which the definition applied was not clear and it created confusion as to what applied to sentenced and unsentenced individuals. Furthermore it was submitted that sections 6 to 24 of the Correctional Services Act (the Act) had been omitted from the list therefore the definition of “inmate” would be sufficient without listing these sections in the Act. The DCS was in agreement with that submission and the definition of “inmate” would be amended by the deletion of any reference to those sections in the Act. Furthermore, Clause 46(3) would be omitted from the Bill since the sections included a reference to “inmate”.

The Judicial Inspectorate of Correctional Services (the Inspectorate) had questioned why certain provisions were referred to in the definition of “inmate” and not others. Furthermore the Inspectorate questioned, in relation to the remand detention facility, whether its mandate extended to inspections of police cell or lock-ups, and noted that the reference to Sections 115 and 117 in the definition were unclear. The Inspectorate also submitted that the amendment of Section 5 of the Act by the substitution of sub-section (2) required clarity on the Inspectorate’s jurisdiction to monitor police-cells. The Inspectorate further submitted that it seemed as if its jurisdiction had been amended, although no provisions of the legislation relating to it had in fact been amended.

The DCS responded that the Inspectorate never had jurisdiction to inspect police cells since the investigation of any abuse in police cells was under the jurisdiction of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). In relation to the submission on Sections 115 and 117, the DCS responded that the sections created offences for people who aided escapees and for any people who escaped, and these provisions also applied when an escape took place from police cells. There was nothing new in this position as articulated as it had always applied.

The Chairperson noted that there was clarity under the definition, but it still was not clear as to what facilities were referred to.  He asked what guarantee there was that an individual in a police cell was not treated differently from one who was in the custody of the DCS.

Mr L Max (DA) stressed that the ICD would only take reactive steps after receiving a complaint. He felt that there should be some responsibility on the part of the DCS to ensure that detainees were treated correctly in both DCS and South African Police Service (SAPS) cells.

Ms Louw responded that it was the way the system functioned and had always functioned. She further added that if an inmate was handed over, in terms of the system, to the SAPS, then that person was out of the control of the DCS.

Ms Louw said that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) had submitted that the wording of the definition of “remand detainee” was suggestive of a person who had been convicted and was awaiting sentence, rather than the usual meaning of “remand” and had submitted a substitution of the wording. The DCS agreed with the submission of the NPA, and the provision would be amended in line with what had been proposed by the NPA, with some further refinement, so that it referred to “a person detained in a remand detention facility awaiting the finalisation of his or her trial, whether by acquittal or sentence…” and with the inclusion of “…if such person has not commenced serving a sentence or is not already serving a prior sentence”.

The Chairperson asked whether the term remand detainees covered everyone.

Ms Louw agreed that the term covered everyone.

The Chairperson asked where individuals who were found guilty were housed.

Ms Louw responded that that was the reason why the DCS were no longer referring to “Awaiting Trial Detainee”(ATD) but to “Remand Detainee”. She added that the person would only be placed in a correctional services facility once the Court had handed down a direct incarceration sentence, and up to then the person would be kept in the remand detainee section.

Mr Loyiso Jafta, Representative of Task Team, Department of Correctional Services, responded that for the purposes of the Bill “sentence” meant a person who was serving a custodial penalty.

Ms Louw continued that National Institute for Crime and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NICRO) had questioned, in relation to the definition of “remand detention facility”, whether the reference to police cell or lock-up meant that DCS would be assigning a DCS remand detention official to these facilities. The DCS responded that this would not be the case; the reference to police cells and lock up facilities was made only in so far as it related to the offences created in Sections 115 and 117 of the Act.

Clause 2
Ms Louw noted that the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) submitted that subclause (d) failed to promote the rights of remand detainees adequately, and recommended a revision by using the words: “manage remand detainees where such detainees will be placed in conditions and be allowed to exercise their rights save for those limited lawfully”. Ms Louw stated that the DCS had rejected the proposal since the addition of such wording would in actual fact limit the management of remand detainees.

The CSPRI had submitted that it was not clear what was meant by “manage remand detainees” since the DCS always had the responsibility. The DCS responded that the inclusion of a reference to “management of remand detainees” in the founding principles underlying the Department’s work was aimed at acknowledging the fact that the management of remand detainees was a function distinct from corrections, and it should receive such attention.

The Chairperson asked whether there was no discrimination between detainees in DCS cells, where, for instance they might have television sets, and detainees in SAPS cells where there were no TVs.

Ms Louw responded that it was important to identify when people would be in the custody of the SAPS. She gave three instances. These would be: (i) when detainees were being transported to court, (ii) for further investigation and (iii) when the DCS did not have facilities nearby. She added that the Court would weigh whether it was a reasonable and justifiable decision. Discrimination did not mean simply that people might be treated differently, but it referred to people who were treated differently when there was no justifiable reason for doing so.

Ms Ngwenya asked whether the SAPS was going to accommodate sick inmates.

Clause 3
Ms Louw noted that the CGE submitted that a positive obligation was supposed to be placed on the Executive to place remand detainees in conditions commensurate with the right to dignity and security, as set out in the Constitution. Accordingly, the CGE recommended that paragraph (a) should be amended to read “the Minister must…”. The DCS responded that it was not clear how the creation of remand detention facilities, which was clearly at the discretion of the Minister, could influence the conditions in which remand detainees were detained within such facilities. Section 4 of the Act already addressed the DCS’s obligations with regard to the safe custody of inmates, both sentenced and unsentenced. DCS therefore rejected the proposal. It was added that the DCS could not write legislation that compelled the Minister to do certain things.

The CGE further submitted that it supported paragraph (b) “because it limited the period for which a remand detainee could be held in a police cell.” The DCS responded that the period stipulated for detention in a police cell had not been amended. The new amendment merely inserted a new terminology for the future.

Mr Mike Ramagoma, Advisor to the Minister of Correctional Services, stated that the reason for the Bill being drafted was to address the lack of adequate legal provision for remand detainees. He added that the question was whether the manner in which police cells were managed was in compliance with the law and the Constitution.

The Chairperson agreed that it was a Cluster matter. He added that the question would be raised in the correct forum.

Ms Louw added that Clause 3 basically was dealing with new terminology.

The Chairperson asked how, if there was no remand facility, the DCS would manage the situation. It was undesirable that people coming from DCS cells would be housed with those who had not been in DCS cells. He also asked whether there were time frames applying to those who were in facilities close to DCS.

Ms Louw responded that an inmate would be detained in police cells for no longer than a month.

Mr Willem Damos, Deputy Commissioner: Remand and Detention Security, Department of Correctional Services, stated that the Bill attempted to set out specific periods. The period was also determined by the finalisation of an investigation, so the DCS did not have any control over how long inmates stayed in police cells.

The Chairperson asked whether there was a way in which individuals could be kept separate, even if they were no longer under the authority of the DCS.

Mr Damos responded that it was possible that they could mix.

The Chairperson asked whether the situation could be dealt with.

Mr Max stated that he was sure that different categories of inmates were put together in cells. He questioned the practicality of separating convicted inmates from detainees.

The Chairperson accepted that the situation was outside the hands of the DCS, but said the issue would always be flagged for further discussion.

Mr Moyane stated that when detainees went to court they wore plain clothes.

The Chairperson said that the Committee would argue differently. It was meaningless that inmates should wear a uniform in an area where inmates hardly escaped. He stressed that law should be applied in a practical way, and where it was not possible to apply it in practice, then citizens should be made aware of the truth. He added that Mr Max was correct that this matter was a police matter.

Ms Louw agreed with the Chairperson, and added that the DCS could only legislate in the area of its own responsibility.

Mr Ramagoma stated that the issue of a uniform was a matter of balancing issues of security against a person’s identity and dignity.

Mr Jafta stated that it was difficult to draw a line between a SAPS mandate and a DCS mandate when the inmate was going to return to the DCS. He added that the issue could be resolved if it was enacted either in legislation or in regulations applying to the departments.

Ms Louw stated that the Inspectorate had asked who monitored the conditions of detention of remand detainees in police facilities. The DCS responded that the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) had the mandate to investigate police conduct.

Clause 4
Ms Louw stated that the CGE submitted that remand detainees were entitled to be detained in such a  way that their rights would not be unfairly infringed. CGE argued that the requirement would be compromised with the proposed deletion of the provision allowing remand detainees to acquire appropriate clothing and bedding, that this would be untenable, and that this provision must be retained. The DCS rejected the proposal because the provision had been deleted in Section 10 of the Act, and pointed out that a new provision making it compulsory to provide clothing to remand detainees had been inserted in Section 48, which in fact was now more favourable than Section 10(2).

Clause 5
Ms Louw stated that the CSPRI submitted that the phrase “opportunities and facilities to prepare their defence” was supposed to be described in regulations, within one year of the amendments coming into force. The regulations should prescribe that all inmates have access to the Act, regulations, the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) and relevant international instruments such as the United Nations (UN) standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. The DCS responded that the section had merely been amended by the addition of new terminology.

Clause 6
Ms Louw noted that the NPA submitted that the restorative justice was victim-driven, and that sentencing plans should not be pre-emptive. The DCS responded that restorative justice was defined in the Department’s Restorative Justice Policy and could take various formats, and therefore the assessment was merely aimed at identifying the requirements of a particular inmate. It did not think the comment by the NPA was clear.

Clause 7
Ms Louw said that the CSPRI had said that the proposed deletion of the reference to the Extradition Act was not clear. The DCS responded that the amendment was intended to correct a previous oversight, now adding absconders from the system of community corrections. The DCS had therefore decided to retain the reference to the Extradition Act in case there should there be such cases in future, and said that there was no harm in keeping it in the Act.

Clause 8
Ms Louw reported that NICRO had submitted that subparagraph (iv) should be amended to include a reference to the victim. The DCS answered that subparagraph (iv) already made reference to “risk posed to the community”, and the victim formed part of the general community and the general consideration.

Clause 9
Ms Louw said that, in relation to amendments to Section 46, the CGE had submitted that Section 46(1) was in conflict with the Constitution “because the rights of remand detainees cannot be restricted save for that of freedom”. The CGE argued that the proposal that remand detainees be afforded amenities suggested that they were being treated as inmates. The DCS rejected this comment, since the wording of Section 46(1) had not been amended. No legal challenges had been made to the existing wording since 1 October 2004, when it had come into operation.

In regard to amendments to Section 47, the CGE indicated that remand detainees were supposed to receive proper amounts of food in accordance with their dietary needs. The DCS pointed out that the new Section 47 was merely a repetition of the existing Section 48 of the Act.

CSPRI said that it would support the Section 48 provisions, as long as these were implemented to ensure that remand detainees would be provided with adequate clothing. CSPRI said that remand detainees should not be compelled to appear in court in the specified uniform, because it created an impression of guilt. The DCS responded that remand detainees would not appear in uniform in court. It might be necessary to insert an additional subsection that stipulated that “no remand detainee is to appear in any court proceedings dressed in a uniform referred to in subsection (1).” Remand detainees who did not have private clothes would be provided with “court clothes”.

Ms Ngwenya stated that the issue of uniforms still needed to be debated, to ensure that, before money was spent in buying full uniforms, there was clarity on why a uniform was needed.

The Chairperson asked whether the DCS was going to have a storeroom full of uniforms that may or may not be used, and whether the Department had thought about the cost implications.

Mr Ramagoma stated that it was important to resolve the issue of principle, and then look at the operational principles. He stated that remand detainees were supposed to have a distinguishable set of clothing for security and management purposes. He added that during visitation times remand detainees would not otherwise be distinguishable from the visitors, if all were wearing civilian clothes.

In relation to the Section 49 provisions, CSPRI submitted that the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) must be used to access information kept by the State, and it was not intended to regulate the right to freedom. It felt that the DCS proposals were unworkable, pointing out that PAIA processes took very long and involved complex procedures to access information. The DCS responded that PAIA already regulated access to information relating to both sentenced and unsentenced inmates, as well as general information residing within DCS. PAIA was already applied within DCS. The provision would be deleted from the Bill.

In relation to Section 49A provisions, CSPRI raised various concerns. DCS answered that Section 20 already dealt with mothers and babies, and the provisions of Section 49A would not necessarily be applicable as a whole to all remand detainees. The Department of Social Development would not be involved until the child was two years of age, and this would only apply if the mother of the child was sentenced. However, the situation would be clarified by inserting the words “with such changes as may be required by the context”.

Ms Ngwenya asked who was responsible for a detainee who might be injured in a police van, and who would be responsible for and pregnant women. She also asked what would happen to a woman who delivered a baby while she awaited trial.

The Chairperson asked if the SAPS or DCS dealt with the matter. He further asked how the DCS handled detainees with children who were younger than three years.

Ms Louw responded that the DCS would not be liable if a detainee was injured while in a police van. She further stated that if a woman conceived while she was in custody, the child would not be taken away until it reached the age of two. She added that a woman who had delivered a child whilst in custody would be able to attend the court together with her baby.

Mr Frankie Gordon, Corrections Administrative Officer, Pollsmoor, Department of Correctional Service, agreed that the DCS took charge of women who gave birth.

In relation to Section 49B provisions, the CGE had submitted that the obligations placed on the National Commissioner should be compulsory, otherwise it feared that the DCS would fail to give priority to the needs of disabled remand detainees. The CGE therefore recommended the following wording for subsection (1): “The National Commissioner must take necessary steps towards placing remand detainees with disabilities in separate detention facilities which are specifically designed to accommodate persons with disabilities”. The DCS responded that it could not give effect to the proposals because this provision was supposed to be read together with Section 12 of the Act, which compelled DCS to provide basic primary health care. Furthermore, one of the basic principles in drafting legislative provisions was that the line function Department should be able to implement the provisions once they were enacted.

The CGE also submitted that subsection (2) should be amended to read: “The Department must provide, within available resources, additional health care services, based on the principle of primary health care, in order to allow the remand detainee to lead a healthy life”. The DCS responded that the provision of health care was one of the rights that even the Constitution acknowledged should be attained through progressive realisation, given available Governmental resources. IT was thus appropriate that the wording remain as “may” and not “must”.

In relation to this Section, Ms Louw advised that there had also been a submission from the Inspectorate. Although the Inspectorate welcomed the attention given to vulnerable groups it advised the DCS rather to consider enacting a specific regulation for such cases. DCS did not support the recommendation because there was currently no legislative provision dealing with the vulnerable groups, and this was the first step in that direction. Ms Louw noted that there was no guarantee that DCS would have more resources to deliver on a plan if it was stipulated in regulations rather than referring to “within available resources”. Again, she referred to progressive realisation of socio-economic rights, within the resources available.

Mr Max suggested that the wording “within available resources” should also be applicable to the provisions on clothing.

Mr S Abram (ANC) asked who determined whether resources were available or not.

The Chairperson suggested the removal of the word “must”.

Mr Ramagoma agreed with the Chairperson.

The Chairperson noted that in the previous Act this situation was not provided for and the Department was creating impetus to provide for vulnerable groups. He did not think that the inclusion of this clause meant that the DCS was absconding from its responsibilities.

Ms Louw continued that in relation to the proposals around Section 49C, the CGE had proposed that subsection (1) should read “must” instead of “may”. The DCS again stated that it could not support the recommendation.

In relation to the proposals on the new Section 49D, CGE felt that subsection (3) was not currently acceptable, because DCS could fail to provide the requisite standard of support. Once again it proposed the substitution of “may” by “must”. DCS responded that if this were amended, it could not be implemented in practice. DCS also added that the term “mentally ill” was used in the broadest sense possible and it did not limit the application of the provision to remand detainees who were detained under the Criminal Procedure Act Section 77(1) warrants, who were awaiting bed space for mental observation. The Ministerial Task Team, when it visited all the Correctional Centres last year, had found that in many centres the staff were able to point out cells where they incarcerated inmates who, although not classified as “mentally ill” in terms of any legislation and who also were not awaiting classification under the CPA, nonethess, for a variety of reasons, could not cope with the rest of the remand detainee population and therefore were kept separately. This provision was aimed at providing guidance on the treatment of inmates who were currently falling “between the cracks” of being protected by the law. State patients were supposed to be kept in facilities administered by the Department of Health, but the Criminal Justice System was trying to address problems in that area.

The Chairperson asked whether it would be possible to have mentally ill or vulnerable people kept in single cells. He added that, for instance, a male inmate known by a female name would be vulnerable.

Mr Max asked what the Department was doing to address the situation.

Mr Abram cautioned that any legislation the DCS enacted would be applied for a very long time, given the difficulties of amending legislation.

Mr Ramagoma agreed with Mr Abram. He added that the DCS was trying to avoid creating a law that it could not implement. He agreed that vulnerable people needed care, whether or not they had committed a crime. The DCS needed to liaise with the Department of Health, but this was at the moment still in the initial stages.

The Chairperson stated that for the record the NPA would be allowed to talk to the matter.

Ms Nomvula Mokhatla, National Deputy Director, National Prosecuting Authority, stated that the NPA regretted the effects of its earlier submission in relation to policy issues. The DCS representatives had been consulted and knew what the NPA would be saying. The NPA would no longer be engaging in any further debates.

Ms Louw then moved on to the submissions in relation to the provisions of the new Section 49E. The NPA had submitted that this should be deleted since such instances were adequately catered for in current legislation dealing with remand detainees, and that the right to be released from detention was adequately provided for by the provisions of the CPA dealing with bail. The DCS responded that the amendment had been proposed to address the practical realities found within the centres, where the medical conditions of remand detainees who had been awaiting trial for a considerable period of time were often not brought to the attention of the court during the postponements.

The Chairperson asked why DCS was using the term “physical” as opposed to “mental”.

Ms Louw responded that there were two different tests applied. A medical practitioner would tell the court of the conditions, and the court would apply the test to the remand detainee. That test, however, was different from the test for medical parole. The court had three options;  namely to place a person on bail, or to issue a warning, or to dismiss the charges. She stressed that remand detention was different from medical parole.

Ms Louw then moved to the comments on the new Section 49F. The CSPRI submitted that it was commonly acknowledged that suspects in police custody were at an increased risk of torture and ill treatment, and thus proposed that all transfers to the police should be authorised by the relevant court, specifying the purpose and aims of the transfer, and that these transfers should also be reported to the Office of the Inspecting Judge and the ICD, noting the name of the person, the officials from SAPS and where the person would be detained. It also submitted that all inmates, on their return, should be seen by the Independent Correctional Centre Visitors, within seven days of returning to the correctional centre. In addition all such remand detainees should undergo a thorough medical examination immediately prior to being handed over and immediately upon return to the DCS. The DCS rejected these proposals. The purpose of the provisions was to regulate the current practice whereby remand detainees were surrendered, on a daily basis, to the SAPS for further investigation if that detainee was a witness in another case, or to attend an identification parade or an inspection in loco.

Mr Max asked how the Department would apply Section 49F in practice. He asked what measures had been put in place to ensure that there would be no abuse of the provisions.

The Chairperson asked whether the DCS understood Section 49F in the same way as Mr Max. He understood this section to mean that a detainee who was accused of murder could not be taken out by SAPS if SAPS was investigation a rape charge elsewhere.

Ms Louw agreed that it was a mistake and it would be corrected.

Mr Jafta stated that SAPS, during the consultation process, were keen to improve the level of authority, because of the level of abuses.

Mr Gordon explained that in practice the Head of a Correctional Centre would be telephoned to be told that a police officer (who was named, and who must bring his identity card) would be sent to get the Form 127. That Form had to be signed by a station commander. The SAPS officer’s particulars would be verified when he arrived at the correctional centre. The process was the same when an inmate was released.

Ms Louw then turned to the comments on the proposed Section 49G. CSPRI welcomed the amendment but submitted that a further amendment to the CPA was required to establish the appropriate mechanism and guiding principles for presiding officers in dealing with such matters. It urged the Committee to liaise with its counterparts in the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development. The DCS responded that the section was developed in consultation with other role players in the JCPS cluster, so there was no need to insert a provision into the CPA. 

The NPA had submitted that the proposed subsections (1), (3), (4) and (5) be deleted. The DCS responded that the inclusion of these provision was motivated by the need to finalise criminal trials speedily, by bringing to the attention of all role players the length of time spent by individual remand detainees.

Clause 12
Ms Louw noted that the CSPRI supported the repeal of Section 73(6)(b)(vi) of the Act, which related to the minimum sentences provision requiring offenders to serve four-fifths, instead of half, of their sentences before qualifying for consideration for parole
Clause 13
Ms Louw reported that the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) had noted, with reference to subclause (4), that parole boards had limited resources, making it unlikely that they would have the capacity to identify and inform complainants. The DCS had agreed to withdraw the amendment, since the matter was adequately regulated in practice and the process was spelled out in Section 299A of the CPA.

Clause 14
Ms Louw reported that the CGE believed that the proposed changes relating to medical parole were reasonable.

However, in relation to the provisions of Section 79(1), CSPRI had referred to the High Court decision in 2003, in the Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others, and submitted that the risk of re-offending was irrelevant, and the decision whether to release a person on medical parole must be taken on medical considerations only. DCS responded that the decision of the Stanfield case was based on the wording of Section 69 of the Correctional Services Act of 1959. DCS said that in the application of medical parole, a balance should be struck between, on one hand, the need to ensure that seriously ill offenders be treated with dignity, and, on the other hand, ensuring that the release of the offender did not pose a significant risk to society.

In relation to Section 79(3)(a), CSPRI submitted that the establishment of medical advisory boards was unnecessary and therefore recommended that the DCS should rather request the medical profession to develop guidelines for medical practitioners who must assess applications under the Act. The DCS responded that a medical advisory board was viewed as an important oversight body.

CSPRI had submitted that Section 79(4), should be removed, as it was irrelevant what had caused the incapacitation. The DCS responded that it could not give effect to the proposal, because the examples that were quoted by the CSPRI were not situations that this provision aimed to address.

The Inspectorate submitted that mentally ill offenders should be included in the definition, so that they could be placed on medical parole, since they too could be worthy of empathetic consideration. The Inspectorate proposed that the Mental Health Care Act be aligned with the DCS Act. The DCS responded that it could not support the proposal, and that it was not possible to consider mentally ill inmates for medical parole since they could pose a real risk to society. In terms of Section 50 of the Mental Health Care Act, they should be referred by the head of the Correctional Centre for a psychiatric assessment.

The Parliamentary Research unit questioned whether the Department could provide statistics of how many offenders could qualify for medical parole under the new wording, and proposed that subsection (2)(a) be expanded, to allow more role players to bring applications for medical parole. The DCS responded that, on average, it placed 180 inmates on medical parole per year. IT was in agreement with the suggested expansion of the subsection and proposed that the words “offender or a person authorized by him or her ’’ be used.

Clause 17
Ms Louw reported that DCS would support the CSPRI recommendation that timelines should be added for the development of regulations.

Other Comments
Ms Louw reported that OMEGA Research Foundation and the ISS gave a very detailed submission dealing with the use of less lethal restraint equipment. The organisations urged further amendments to the Act, saying that the regulation of remand detainees should also deal with aspects of the use of force. The DCS stated that many of the proposals were addressed in some other sections, such as Section 31 (mechanical restraints), Section 32 (use of force), Section 33 (non-lethal incapacitating devices), Section 34 (firearms) and Section 35 (other weapons).

The Chairperson asked whether less serious offenders and dangerous criminals were put in the same cells, and whether information on remand detainees did not limit other departments who legitimately needed information on remand detainees.

Mr Ramagoma responded that the relevant provisions should be deleted because if all the information was subjected to PAIA then there would be problems.

The Chairperson stated that the Committee would not be making final decisions in this meeting, but would be considering matters before next engaging with DCS.

The meeting was adjourned.