The National Commissioner of the South African Police Services (SAPS), accompanied by several of his general officers, briefed the Committee on the state of readiness of SAPS to ensure a safe World Cup. International counterparts were satisfied that there were no credible threats to security but all necessary security precautions would be put in place. There would be delegations of foreign police services in an advisory capacity although they would not have powers of arrest. There would be close co-operation with neighbouring countries. Various command structures would be in place at national and provincial level. There would be Venue Operations Centres at stadiums and at team hotels. Members were briefed on the detailed security arrangements at some of the stadiums.
Units of the South African National Defence Force would assist by providing specialised services. The airspace and territorial waters would be monitored. Special medical units would be on standby in case of a biological or chemical attack. One challenge was that North Korea would be basing themselves in Zimbabwe during the warm-up phase. The Police would be providing protection at the official Fan Fests as well as at public viewing areas. The number of the latter was still not known. The Committee undertook to correspond with the Departments of Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs and the Department of Trade and Industry to set a deadline for applications. This would enable SAPS to follow the procedures required to prepare security arrangements.
SAPS gave a separate briefing to the Committee on the interventions in relation to human trafficking. This was a growing problem that particularly affected women and children. Many foreign women found themselves forced into the sex industry. There was also an amount of human trafficking between rural and urban areas. While the applicable legislation had still not been passed, SAPS were able to prosecute some of the offences under the common law. An increase in human trafficking into South Africa was anticipated during the World Cup.
Members raised questions over the legacy aspects, over whether the training, structures and international co-operation would benefit the Police in the future, and the effects on the security of the borders. It was noted that this would be enhanced to counter the possibility of weapons being smuggled into the country. FIFA regulations regarding media would have to be respected although it was not clear if these could supercede the law of the land. The Special Measures Act was in force. Special procedures were in place to prevent rival fans being locked up in the same cells after earlier misbehaviour.
Presentation by South African Police Services (SAPS) on State of Readiness for 2010 World Cup
Gen Bheki Cele, National Commissioner, South African Police Services (SAPS), said that events had pushed the SAPS to share its plans with the world before it was entirely ready to do this. SAPS had received an emergency call from FIFA, and was annoyed at the manner in which this had been done, since it had been called to appear before FIFA “like a naughty schoolboy”. SAPS had met with the Secretary-General of FIFA at OR Tambo International Airport. Some people had been pushing for the tournament to be moved from South Africa, particularly when the Togolese team was attacked on 27 January 2010 in Cabinda while preparing for the African Cup of Nations. This incident had helped the SAPS in its preparations. One lesson learned was that police had to listen to all information, no matter how insignificant it might seem. The Angolan authorities had received some information about a possible attack but had ignored it.
Gen Cele said that the SAPS had to address the world. A meeting was called in Zurich, on 4 and 5 March, where all participating countries were invited. The meeting was attended by police chiefs and the chief security officials for the teams. One of the issues was on policies regarding soccer hooligans. Only three countries had not attended. Chile had just been hit by an earthquake, and Ghana and North Korea had also not attended. Following the meeting the SAPS team criss-crossed Europe. Fifty media houses had been in attendance. They did not ask security related questions but rather were interested in various other issues such as hotels. He was very satisfied on how it had progressed.
Gen Cele said that from there, the team had gone to Berlin. Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) had been very critical of the efforts, although not of government and the police. German players had been instructed to wear bullet-proof vests on and off the field. Their police had distanced themselves from that instruction. Visitors from the UK had been advised to wear protective vests and to take plenty of condoms. While the SAPS were collecting guns from the public, in the UK the police had a campaign to collect knives after many stabbing incidents. The next stop was Lyons where the team had met all representatives of Interpol. The SAPS was congratulated on its work to date. In London it had met with the Deputy Commissioner of the London Metropolitan police. In the UK, as in most of Europe, there was no national police force. Policing services were provided at a county or metropolitan level. The Europeans were very envious of the national organisation in South Africa.
Gen Cele said that there had been a lot of interaction with the media. The meeting in London had been attended by 123 journalists. Once again, no questions regarding security were posed. The situation since then had really changed. The murder of Eugene Terre'Blanche had been a step backwards. The SAPS was in constant contact with most of the European countries and the United States of America (USA). It had met with the second-in-charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as the intelligence chiefs of the UK and Germany. The SAPS was in a position to check on any reported threats. Most of these were only rumours.
The Commissioner said that an Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (ICC) had been created. All five bodies responsible for intelligence gathering in the country were involved and were co-operating with international agencies. The briefing on threats was more concentrated on terrorism. The SAPS was satisfied that there was no credible threat to the World Cup. The general crime situation was leading to extra preparation.
Gen Cele said that security preparations were linked to the infrastructure. The SAPS would only see the results of its efforts on 15 July 2010. However, the world concurred that there was no threat. The World Cup would be an international event staged in South Africa. This was why the world had to help with the protection, under South Africa's leadership. The only real problem was that the North Korean team would be staying in Zimbabwe. Some juggling would be needed to secure them, but he thought that the SAPS would find a solution.
The Commissioner said that the SAPS had held three meetings with its counterparts in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A structure had been created with Interpol to identify those who were considered undesirable. The Department of Police was working closely with sister departments. Some serious equipment had been procured and was still arriving. The ICC was meeting twice a week. From 24 May preparations would be in full swing.
Gen Cele said that the SAPS had invited six to eight police officials from each participating country. Some had requested to send more. He emphasised that foreign policemen would only act in an advisory capacity and would have no powers of arrest.
The Chairperson interjected that the Commissioner had requested a meeting in April. This had to be postponed as the Committee was not available to meet with the SAPS. The police had to go ahead with their plans as evidenced by the launch in Cape Town a week or so previously.
Lt-Gen Andre Pruis (SAPS) said that there were three plans in one. These were national security elements, law enforcement and event specific safety. In this last regard, private security companies had been contracted by the local organising committee (LOC). These companies would be responsible for normal security at the points of entry and the stadiums. The SAPS would provide specialised services in conjunction with elements of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The South African Air Force (SAAF) would monitor the airspace. Units of the South African Medical Health Services (SAMHS) would be in position to deal with any chemical or biological hazards.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the focus of the ICC would be to co-operate with other intelligence agencies. The SAPS would pay attention to domestic extremism, disruptive events such as protests, policing the 10 km safety zone and the security of ports of entry. Tactical information was flowing continuously. There would be a focus on threats to the participating countries by international terrorists. The SAPS was also mindful of any threat which may impact on the event. There would be an analysis of any threat which could be imported during the event. There would be a high, medium or low assessment of the risks to specific matches.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that there was co-operation in the region through the activities of the Southern African Regional Police Co-Co-ordinating Committee (SARPCCO). Three elements were receiving attention. These were an international terrorism risk assessment, the security of South Africa's borders and the role of organised crime. Some projects had been identified regarding the latter. There was a focus on terrorism, border integrity and national key points. Operation Protect had been set up after the 9/11 disaster. It was based on intelligence gathering, control of ports of entry, target protection and contingency plans.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that a major part of security was the country's airports. There were nine international airports, eight domestic airports and a number of military airports that would be used for very important persons’ (VIP) movements. Three major sea ports would be covered where a number of cruise ships were expected. There were 54 land ports of entry.
Some dedicated ports of entry had been identified.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that a number of SANDF units had executed training exercises in preparation for their roles in borderline security. The South African Navy (SAN) had conducted Operation Prosper with the use of a frigate. Operation Shield VI had enabled the SAAF to ensure air safety by the monitoring of restricted areas. Plans were in place for the SANDF to protect the land borderlines. A 10km zone from the border would be patrolled by the SANDF. Satellite imagery would be used to monitor crossing spots. Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) would be established in each neighbouring country.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the SAPS would be in charge of security for all very-VIPs (VVIPs) and for 35 FIFA VIPs. The SAPS would establish protection teams. They would co-operate with embassies. The SAPS would be fully responsible for the base camps and surrounding areas. Of these, 19 were in Gauteng, one in Mpumalanga, three in North West, one in the Northern Cape, five in KwaZulu-Natal and three in the Western Cape. Area profiles had been compiled and risk assessments had been made. Operational plans had been set up for inner and outer perimeter zones.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that team movements would be escorted by visible and unmarked vehicles. Primary and secondary routes had been planned. Safe havens had been identified on each route. Movements would be tracked at the National JOC (NATJOC). Long distance movements would be by air with some land transport. SAPS members would co-ordinate each separate team. Special skills would be utilised. Arrangements for practice matches would depend on whether the match was open or closed to the public. A transport security plan was in place for air and rail transport as well as cross border transport. Transport hubs would be protected. Emergency points would be established in SANDF bases, health facilities and SAPS bases. Security risks within cities had been identified. Three teams would look at crimes related to stadiums, accommodation and other areas. Trial runs had been held for the special courts.
Lt-Gen Pruis showed Members the detailed security plans for stadium perimeters. The Venue Operations Centre (VOC) commander would be in charge of security inside the stadium while a Reaction Force would be on standby to deal with any problems outside the stadium. Many evacuation areas had been identified. The venues for the Fan Fests and public viewing areas (PVAs) had been identified. These would enjoy the same security provisions as the stadiums. The fan miles leading to the stadiums were a major responsibility but would be more of a challenge. There were contingency plans for security-related incidents as well as man-made or natural disasters.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that there were three response groups. The North Korean team presented a problem. While they could not base themselves outside the country during the competition, they would be doing so during the warm-up phase. The SAPS was co-operating closely with the SADC and Zimbabwean authorities.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that various structures had been created or were already in existence, ranging from the Cabinet to the VOCs which would be located at each stadium and team hotel. Airports would be run at a national level. The airspace would be monitored. Other sectors would be under provincial command.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that there would be a lot of international co-operation. Interpol officials would be present together with members from other countries. There was a detailed deployment plan. High-ranking military and police officers would be playing leadership roles. A media plan was in place.
Gen Cele said that the SAPS did face a few challenges. The number of PVAs was not yet finalised. Originally metropolitan and district councils had undertaken to operate 46 of these venues. One provincial member of the Executive Council (MEC) had suggested that there should be a PVA in every corner of his province. The Commissioner understood that there would now be 77 or more PVAs and the number was growing. He thought that the issue with the German team had now been resolved. The hotel they had chosen as a base camp was not licensed. It had been reported as a security risk rather than an occupational risk. This had put the SAPS on the back foot. He asked how the SAPS could make the Germans secure in an illegal structure. He had discussed this issue with the Department of Co-operational Government and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). A liquor licence had been granted to the hotel.
The Commissioner said that there was a huge potential hiccough. It was expected that the President of the USA would attend but the chance of this was still 50/50. He privately hoped that the USA team would not qualify for the knock-out stage of the tournament. To date 43 heads of state had indicated provisionally that they would attend. The security arrangements for all of these would be equal to that of President Obama. At present the FBI did not know if President Obama would come to South Africa. The Commissioner found this hard to believe.
Gen Cele said that problems relating to overtime payments for SAPS members had been sorted out.
The Commissioner said that there was an ongoing schedule for provincial launches. The launch in Gauteng and North West would be on 10 May, Eastern Cape on 12 May, KwaZulu-Natal on 14 May and Limpopo and Mpumalanga on 15 May. The launch in KwaZulu-Natal would include a demonstration of airport security readiness. The details of these plans were not for public knowledge. Officers from Brazil would be present in preparation for the 2014 World Cup in their country.
SAPS Presentation on Human Trafficking
The Chairperson asked the SAPS delegation to continue with the presentation on human trafficking. One omission by the Department of Police was failing to invite the Committee to attend the national launch.
Lt-Gen Anwar Dramat, Deputy National Commissioner, SAPS, said that human trafficking was a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa. There was an increasing awareness campaign which was deepening the knowledge on the subject. Human trafficking was a serious activity for organised crime. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) estimated that the crime generated $32 billion annually.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that human trafficking was a dehumanising activity. The UNO had defined human trafficking, with three elements being incorporated, of recruitment, transportation and exploitation. The global picture was that an estimated 600 000 to 800 000 people were trafficked annually. Of these, 80% were female and 50% were minors. Most of the victims were taken into the sex industry while others were used for cheap labour. For the criminals, it was a very profitable pursuit with low risk. Most victims were taken from poor countries and transported to rich countries.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that there had been no significant increase in human trafficking during the 2006 World Cup in Germany. There were a number of push and pull factors, mainly of a socio-economic nature. The main drivers were organised crime and profit. Most of the locations for the crimes were in the red light districts. The South African profile was that human trafficking was a growing phenomenon. There was some trafficking from South Africa to other countries. There was also a great deal of in-country trafficking with people being lured from the rural to the urban areas. There was a strong link to organised crime. Thailand was the most common source of women being trafficked into the country. Most of these women ended up in brothels or strip clubs. The crime was spreading to the outlying areas.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that combating human trafficking was a crucial part of the plans for 2010. Training had been carried out. The SAPS would partner with government. It was a major focus area. Provincial co-ordinators had been appointed. The organised crime units had trained members to conduct investigations. There were ongoing operations during the month of May. Information was being received from embassies and local sources.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that the SAPS had placed a special emphasis on training in the last few years. The SAPS were providing training to officials at the points of entry. A thousand policemen and women had been trained in the last two years. There were now 341 investigators. There was a special concern for child trafficking. The SAPS could not operate against human trafficking alone. The SAPS were an integral part of an inter-sectorial task team. The SAPS was involved with several organisations both internationally and locally, including embassies, Interpol, the UNO, SARPCCO and some non-government organisations.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that cases were handled by means of a systematic process. Special prosecutors were appointed. The Department of Social Development was involved. The SAPS had to be mindful of the rights and dignity of the victims. A witness protection scheme was needed. Shelters had to be provided. Various initiatives would be brought into play during the World Cup.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill had not yet been passed. Some of the criminal activities associated with human trafficking could be prosecuted as common-law offences such as kidnapping. The instructions were to go to grass roots level. He went through a case study which had started as a pure brothel investigation in KwaZulu-Natal. In 2007 there had been no legislation in place. In 2010 operational expenses were available for the Hawks.
Lt -Gen Dramat listed the challenges. Legislation was needed. There were language barriers. It was difficult to arrest and prosecute the actual traffickers. Victims were afraid of retribution. There had to be some direct contact.
Gen Cele said that a legal framework would help a lot. He would soon be meeting with his counterpart in Mozambique as there seemed to be a serious corridor linking the two countries. A big problem was that some of the victims entered the country willingly, only to find themselves victims later.
Mr G Schneemann (ANC) asked if Members could be invited to attend the provincial launches to observe what was happening. It would be instructive to witness the capability of the SAPS at first hand. The Committee had carried out oversight visits. The World Cup would leave a lot of legacy issues. In terms of transport, the bus rapid transit (BRT) system would be a legacy. The SAPS was receiving equipment, setting up operational centres, training members and co-operating with international bodies. He asked what legacy issues would result. The SAPS would be better trained after the World Cup and would be better equipped. He asked if the structures established would disappear of if some would be preserved. The fight against crime was one of five national priority areas. The fan park in Durban would be on the beach. The SAPS had raised this as a concern because it was so close to the ocean. Fans could wander into the water. On the maritime front a lot of work was needed to secure the ports. He asked if this sector was ready. During a visit to Port Elizabeth Members had been told that a lot of boats were still on order.
Gen Cele replied that the Members had not been available. SAPS had invited the Committee to Bloemfontein. It would love to work with the Committee to promote a better understanding. He noted that the Chairperson had attended many SAPS funerals. It would help Members if they could also attend these occasions where they could see the solidarity of the SAPS under tragic circumstances.
The Commissioner said that policing would be kept at the same standard after 2010. Much of the equipment belonged to the SANDF. Joint networks would remain in place. Training would help considerably. Equipment such as water cannons could be used in future operations. The SAPS had learnt a lot about crowd control methods. Investigation capacity would be boosted with 27 teams being put in place. These investigators would play a major role in combating the wave of cash heists and bank robberies which often occurred just before Christmas. There had been seven raids in as many days. Some malls had been covered.
Gen Cele said that international relationships also would be maintained. Some good relationships had been started. Networks at national and provincial levels would be kept at a high standard.
The Commissioner said that another aspect of the PVA requirement was a contract between FIFA and the Virgin Active group of gymnasiums. Players would be able to train at branches of Virgin Active. This would place an extra burden on the SAPS who had not been informed of the offer. Crowd control would have to be maintained as people would be flocking to the gymnasiums where their heroes were training.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the maritime plan was to protect a region stretching twelve nautical miles into the sea. The SAPS would also be monitoring slipways. It would be using all available platforms. Multi-disciplinary teams had been established. Reservists had been recruited. This was also part of the plan. The SAN would deploy equipment that could detect submerged dangers.
Lt-Gen Pruis added that Durban had proposed that a retractable fence be erected at the beach PVA. This would the responsibility of the host city but they would have to follow the SAPS proposals.
Ms D Schafer (DA) asked what was being done to protect fuel supplies. She would understand if the answer was confidential. She asked why it would be necessary to close off the roads for seven hours before a match. This would cause a major disruption. She asked how many private airfields would be monitored. She was happy to hear human trafficking being discussed for the first time. The Committee knew nothing about this as there had been no communication. She asked if there was a central telephone number so that people could report suspicious behaviour such as strangers taking photographs of children. She asked if there was any provision for rapid response. She knew about the human trafficking desk, but there was only one person manning that desk and that was only during office hours. There was a complaint that senior officials from the Department of Justice did not attend meetings. There had been a media exposé on corruption at a border post. She asked what was being done. She asked if these efforts would continue after the World Cup.
Lt-Gen Pruis replied that the road closures were necessary as part of the security sweeps at the stadiums and their surrounds. Traffic free zones would be declared. After the roads were closed then delivery vehicles would have to go through the search stations. The bigger the stadium the longer this process would take. He added that there were over a thousand private airports. There would be monitoring of both ground and air activities. The SAAF would deploy mobile radar stations. South Africa would have the co-operation of neighbouring countries to monitor cross-border flights. The protection of fuel supplies was part of the plan. Detailed plans were in place. This was not just at the airports. Each stadium had to have a big generator to be independent in terms of power. These would consume lots of fuel. The supplies would be protected in the same manner as aviation fuel.
Lt-Gen Dramat said that the help desk for human trafficking had been set up to look at the threat broadly and to consult with embassies and other bodies. It was not a reporting channel. Suspicious activities should be reported to the nearest SAPS station. Members had been trained in the investigation and reporting of human trafficking. There was also an Organised Crime Unit. There were provincial co-ordinators and those numbers could be published. The SAPS were also interacting with non-government organisations. There had been some media attention. The SAPS were busy with an investigation of the alleged corruption at the Lebombo border post.
Ms Schafer asked what the outcome of the disciplinary process was.
Maj-Gen BC Mgwetha (SAPS) said that the disciplinary action was still in progress.
Gen Cele said that the SAPS would do everything in its power to combat corruption. It was fully prepared to handle complaints. There had been a recent police killing in Mpumalanga and the SAPS had not hesitated to arrest its own members who stood accused. SAPS was serious about all forms of police misconduct across the board. He added that of course there was corruption in private business as well. The person receiving the bribe was often punished but not the person accepting the bribe. He had issues with media reporting.
Rev K Meshoe (ACDP) noted that metal detectors had been introduced at ports of entry. These would detect people attempting to carry in weapons and bombs. In the presentation on team movements the concept of safe havens had been raised. He asked if these would always be buildings and if these buildings would be kept empty in case of an emergency. He asked if there was any guarantee that the PVAs would not be the target for terrorist attacks. He asked what the relevance of the human trafficking desk was. This crime was happening currently. He asked how the desk could help.
Lt-Gen Pruis replied that existing buildings belonging to the SAPS and SANDF would be used as safe havens. In some cases the safe haven might be a formation of armoured vehicles.
Ms D Kohler-Barnard (DA) had seen e-mails threatening that whites and farmers would be slaughtered. The SAPS had clamped down on the ultra-right. These people were dangerous. She asked what the media strategy was. There were perceptions overseas about racial violence in South Africa. There had been a march in Sweden organised by ultra-right groups in protest at an alleged genocide in South Africa. While it was easier to ignore such wild stories, she asked what strategy was in place to counter these perceptions. It was good to focus on the security of ports of entry but she was concerned about South Africa's long borderlines. It would be easy to bring in chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction. She wanted an assurance that there would be cameras in the holding cells at the stadiums. She did not want to see drunken groups of fans fighting with each other in the cells. She asked if SAPS members would be instructed to deal with unruly fans with kid gloves no matter how drunk or obnoxious they might be. There would be huge negative publicity if any harm came to visiting fans while in police custody.
Gen Cele assured her that there would be no kid-glove treatment. Thugs were thugs, and would be dealt with firmly enough, although the SAPS would not break the law. Offenders would be treated as lawbreakers. Cells had been identified for different nationalities in identified police stations. Offenders could still be taken to the nearest cell or to a central point. Harsher measures would be taken with those accused of serious offences. All cases would be tried within 31 days of the end of the tournament. The journalist who had made a bomb threat during the draw at the Cape Town International Convention Centre was still in the country. Justice would be dispensed in a tough but human way.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the borderline would be covered by satellite imagery. He was proud of the quality of the equipment. It produced excellent imaging. Information would be shared with the neighbouring states. Butterfly operations would be carried out where there was no fence. Patrols would be deployed by helicopter.
Ms Kohler-Barnard asked what would happen if a team insisted on staying at an unlicensed hotel. She asked if the SAPS could force them to move and if they were still obliged to protect the team if they insisted on staying there. There had been huge complaints from the local media due to FIFA structures. She asked if FIFA's rules would override South African law on press freedom. She asked if the SAPS would have to arrest journalists who contravened FIFA regulations. She asked if FIFA rules or the law of the land would have preference.
Gen Cele replied that he had attended a briefing in Germany. An opinion had been expressed that the Nazi rule under Hitler had been a more liberal government than living under FIFA's rules. The journalists there had been driven to despair. The SAPS was working closely with the Secretary General of FIFA. He could not say who would have the final world. The South African Government had signed guarantees on safety. The successful delivery on these guarantees depended on the availability of resources. The SAPS had acted on the problems surrounding the retail centre at the stadium in Durban. When the stadium had been handed over to FIFA the retailers trading there were instructed to clear their shops over a three day period. The city of Durban had refused to evict the traders.
The Commissioner said that he did not think that it was a SAPS responsibility to fight for the rights of journalists. FIFA had gone a long way with its regulations. Even big business was told what it could do. He believed that FIFA would dictate to journalists. Already advertisements had been banned and the media had retreated in the face of this ban. There had been an interesting incident in Zurich where FIFA President Sepp Blatter had refused to speak to the media because he was angry. He had no direct answer to the question.
Maj-Gen JT Molefe (SAPS) added that the Special Measures Act made provision for various restrictions. The SAPS would enforce criminal law.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that teams had been given a list of hotels by Match. The SAPS then conducted a risk assessment on the chosen hotel. At one hotel the gate was too small to allow a bus to enter with the result that players would have to leave the hotel premises in order to board the bus.
Ms A van Wyk (ANC) could feel the passion and commitment in the presentation. She had some issues. There would need to be interaction regarding all developments at ports of entries. There might need to be new police stations. As an area developed there was no communication between the community and the SAPS. She had heard that there were plans for another four PVAs in the Pretoria area. The organisers were expecting the SAPS to work miracles to protect all these sites. She asked if best practice was being followed. Certain problem nightclubs in Durban were being targeted by the SAPS. This was a positive move. It was an example of proactive policies. The SAPS had raised a concern over the PVA venue in Durban. She understood that there would be designated cells for citizens of designated states. People might be arrested at other venues. She asked if the police would be briefed on how to treat these people. She added that it seemed that journalists would not be arrested if they broke FIFA regulations. It would be an issue between FIFA and the media.
Gen Cele said that the SAPS had written to the Board. SAPS had been forced to take over the security functions at one of the stadiums as the security company employed there was doubtful. The SAPS wanted to take control of the resources there. He did not know how many PVAs had been planned. There was a need to agree on the final number as these sites were mushrooming. The use of liquor was a problem. PVAs could not be located at national key points.
The Commissioner said that SAPS would support the security companies at airports. Cabinet had ruled that SAPS should play a priority role. The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was highly co-operative. SAPS would be ready to the extent of buying a machine which could detect fake clothing.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the SAPS had no responsibility to install cameras in the holding cells at stadiums. Their proposal was that arrested fans be removed from the holding cells to the dedicated stations as soon as possible. There was a procedure in place. He agreed that certain types of crime should be dealt with in the special courts.
The Chairperson asked if the SAPS had any deadline in knowing the final number of PVAs.
Gen Cele replied that SAPS already needed this information, in order to make a physical evaluation of the site and determine what resources were required. SAPS had invited all host cities to a meeting. It had written to all the premiers and mayors, but no-one had attended. Politicians were making popular statements that there would be plenty of PVAs. The Minister of Police had written to the Minister of Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs.
The Chairperson was prepared to write to the Minister with a deadline for the submission of the locations of PVAs.
Lt-Gen Pruis replied that the Department of Trade and Industries (dti) was also tasked to look at PVAs. He knew of at least seventy. Coca-Cola was planning to operate a number of mobile PVAs. Each branch of McDonalds would be used as a PVA.
Ms van Wyk said that legislation was still awaited to combat human trafficking. This would be the answer. Up to now most of the trafficked people were being channelled into the sex industry. In the past sex workers had always been treated as the perpetrators of crime. A change of mind was needed. A prostitute might be a victim as well. A paradigm shift was needed. Immigration officers should be trained to recognise certain signs as the victims might well be entering the country legally. They were often lured in under false pretences.
Lt-Gen Dramat replied that work was being done on seeing a prostitute as a victim and not just as a perpetrator of crime. SAPS had gone to ports of entry with training interventions. He agreed that there was a need to upgrade procedures.
Rev Meshoe asked what the role of metropolitan police would be.
Lt-Gen Pruis replied that the metropolitan police would be used to escort vehicles to their destinations after they had been searched. They would enforce the vehicle-free zones. They would act together with the SAPS on security teams.
The Chairperson asked if everything would be in place by 24 May. She pointed out that the international arrivals counter at the airport was not working. It was a South African Revenue Services (SARS) responsibility, but an SAPS problem.
Lt-Gen Pruis said that the PROVJOCs would become operational on 15 May.
Ms van Wyk said that in cases of corruption there was a selective focus on the recipient of the bribe. She asked why action was not taken against the person paying the bribe.
The Chairperson asked the SAPS delegation for closing remarks.
Gen Cele quipped that he had spoken too much already. The SAPS and all sister agencies would do their best to ensure a safe World Cup.
The Chairperson noted that the SAPS had asked for support on private security companies. She supported that call. The Committee would support the SAPS fully provided the procedure was followed properly. The process had to be credible. The learning curve being followed would make the SAPS experts on some issues. SAPS would be fully consumed with the World Cup duties from 24 May. She would check on the Committee's programme. Some changes might have to be made to allow the SAPS to focus on their task. The Committee would remain just a phone call away. The Committee would write to the Ministers of COGTA and Department of Trade and Industry. The deadline for applying for PVAs would be set at 14 May 2010. No more applications would be considered after that date.
The Chairperson was satisfied that the Department was ready. There was overwhelming passion and commitment. There was a sense of patriotism. She wished the SAPS all the luck that it needed. SAPS carried the pride and future of the country. She was confident that it would always rise to the occasion and would be there when Bafana Bafana lifted the trophy. This had been an important briefing. She was satisfied that the World Cup would be hosted in a safe manner.
The meeting was adjourned.
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