Border Control: briefing by Chief of Joint Operations, South African National Defence Force (SANDF)

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Defence and Military Veterans

16 February 2010
Chairperson: Mr M Booi (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Chief of Joint Operations and the Chief Director Operations, South African National Defence Force, briefed the Committee on Operation Corona, the Defence Force’s plan for safeguarding South Africa’s land borders.

The South African National Defence Force will protect South Africa’s borders with reference to Section 18(1)(d) of the Defence Act. Its role and functions will include patrolling the land borders by foot and mobile patrols, establishing observation and listening posts, operating vehicle control points, providing a reaction force and follow-up operations which would include the extended border area, conducting road blocks 20 kilometres to the rear of the borderline in conjunction with the South African Police Service, and collecting information by conducting intelligence operations.

Operational issues include the need to follow a phased approach; the requirement of new generation vehicles; the transfer of operational bases from the South African Police Service, and the requirement for command and control systems. Infrastructure presented challenges, including refurbishment of bases and major repairs to the 200 km NABOB border fence and sections of border access road.  Communication infrastructure needed to be re-established, and a new generation vehicle developed. Two operational bases in the Eastern Cape were not deemed appropriate in respect of the distances and the new operational concept of high mobility. At least one new operational base was to be established in the Free State in order to maintain strategic mobility in future. The equipment for individual soldiers was to be reviewed.

Priorities for protecting land borders were indicated by means of maps. The first priority was the east of South Africa; the second priority the North West.  Landward force requirements were indicated.  Provisional cost estimates were given for the borders of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho, and for equipment cost overheads. The South African National Defence Force recommended that four companies be deployed on 01 April 2010 at Pontdrift, Beitbridge, Macadamia, and Ndumo. Establishment of high site and communications infrastructure and acquisition of 4x4 vehicles shall begin. The NABOB fence will be repaired. The South African Army shall prepare its 3rd Battalion for possible deployment in April 2011. Further deployment should not begin until additional funding could be provided.

Members asked about time frames, and requested the Department to inform the Committee about sea borders and to what extent Southern African Development Community members were involved in protecting those borders. Questions were asked about whether the South African Police Service had handed over any functions yet, preventing the trafficking of stolen cars and atrocities committed on the borders, refugees crossing at places where there were no controls, infrastructure challenges, transformation, and the need to handle sensitively allegations of rape. Specific questions were asked about the allegations of rape, in particular, the case of the Zimbabwean woman, where it was important to locate her and ask her to identify her assailant. The Democratic Alliance commended the return of the military to South Africa’s borders as a good decision, but the rollout was too slow with less money apparently available under the new arrangements than under the previous. Assurance was requested that the levels of force promised by the Defence Force would ensure that the borders would be secure, since border security meant more than ‘boots on the ground’; more information was required on air and sea patrols. Given the number of companies that the Defence Force had undertaken to deploy, there was doubt that the military could actually achieve the mission. A Freedom Front Plus Member remarked that it was ironic that South Africa found itself required to deploy its Defence Force to protect its borders, while illegal immigrants were ‘flooding’ South Africa. He would have liked to ask the Minister for Police why bases formerly used by the South African Police Service had deteriorated.

The South African National Defence Force responded that the SANDF would be guided by Cabinet as to the length of its border deployment. ‘We will be there as long as Cabinet wants us to be there; we must have the go-ahead from the Commander in Chief.’ If it was to be on the borders after 2011, more money and personnel would be required. The rollout would take four years altogether. The Defence Force assured Members that maritime patrols were already being conducted by sea and by air. The Defence Force emphasised that that it did investigate allegations of rape and other incidents in collaboration with the South African Police Service. With regard to the Border Management Agency and co-operation with other role players, the Defence Force would take the lead in the protection of the borders. There was thus ongoing liaison between South Africa and its neighbours. Currently there was one SANDF company in the Musina and Beitbridge area. It had been strengthened since it protected the Home Affairs processing facility near Musina, close to the Zimbabwe border. Asset registers had to be transferred from one department to another in the process of taking over from SAPS, with which the Defence Force had a good working relationship.  The Defence Force required special vehicles for use in the mountainous areas, such as the Lesotho passes. Such special capability vehicles would include ambulances. The running costs of such a vehicle were a huge cost driver. The Police would continue to maintain a presence in the border areas since crime could be expected to continue, and would remain a Police responsibility. The Defence Force would undertake search, seizure and arrest, but would not want to be involved in legal processes. After arrest, suspects would be handed over to the Police. All South Africa’s borders had a fence of some kind; however, to maintain a physical barrier was very costly. One of the ideas discussed was to lay sensors. Reaction teams could be deployed in response to warnings from them. The Defence Force was confident that the borders would be sufficiently protected. It apologised for not including the sea borders in the presentation. However, details were available and could be made available to the Committee. Current patrols were aimed more at maintaining a presence at sea. It admitted that a greater presence was needed there, and the Navy was requesting more vessels. The Defence Force lacked up-to-date equipment for aerial reconnaissance, and relied on the pilot’s eyes. The Defence Force did not own or use satellites for real-time observation the borders, but did obtain images for particular areas. Such satellite images had indicated that roads through the Kruger National Park continued across the border.


Meeting report

Introduction
The Chairperson welcomed Lieutenant-General Themba Matanzima, the Chief of Joint Operations, and Rear-Admiral Philip Schoultz, the Chief Director Operations, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who were to brief the Committee on Operation Corona, the Defence Force’s plan for safeguarding South Africa’s land borders.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima conveyed the apologies of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the South African National Defence Force, and the Acting Secretary of Defence.

Mr D Maynier (DA) complained that the Committee had existed in its present form for ten months but had still not met the Chief of the SANDF and the service chiefs. He asked how long this situation was going to continue. He also said that the Chairperson had previously confirmed that he had received quarterly reports of the SANDF; however, Members had not received them. Did this mean that their content was ‘dodgy’ and that the Chairperson was not prepared to hand them out.

The Chairperson replied that arrangements were in progress for a meeting with the Chief of the SANDF and the service chiefs. He added that the quarterly reports were available, but that he was awaiting a clear mandate from the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the Chair of the Committee of Chairpersons. 

Mr P Groenewald (FF+) asked if the ANC had withdrawn from the Committee. It was heavily outnumbered by opposition Members at that stage of the meeting, and would be outvoted if there should be a vote.

The Chairperson replied that he did not anticipate a problem since other Members would join the meeting in due course.

South African National Defence Force (SANDF) presentation
The South African National Defence Force would protect South Africa’s borders with reference to Section 18(1)(d) of the Defence Act. Its role and functions would include patrolling the land borders by foot and mobile patrols, establishing observation and listening posts, operating vehicle control points, providing a reaction force and follow-up operations which would include the extended border area, conducting road blocks 20 kilometres to the rear of the borderline in conjunction with the South African Police Service (SAPS), and collecting information by conducting intelligence operations. Operational issues included the need to follow a phased approach; the requirement of new generation vehicles; the transfer of operational bases from the SAPS, and the requirement for command and control systems (COMMS). Infrastructure presented challenges. For the most part, the operational bases to be transferred from the SAPS were in good condition and would require only refurbishment, with particular attention to water and sewerage systems, the kitchens and messes.

The NABOB fence required major repair. Rear Admiral Schoultz indicated that the fence between South Africa and Mozambique was an electrical fence with a choice of lethal and non-lethal modes, but those not used since 1990. Four years ago the SANDF had transferred it to the SAPS, but it had been largely removed and needed refurbishment. The SANDF saw it as a barrier fence and as a cost driver.

Sections of border access road required major repair.

Three operational bases in the Kruger National Park (KNP) were no longer available. The SANDF had proposed temporary bases outside the Kruger Park.

Communication infrastructure needed to be re-established, and a new generation vehicle developed. Two operational bases in the Eastern Cape were not deemed appropriate in respect of the distances and the new operational concept of high mobility. At least one new operational base was to be established in the Free State in order to maintain strategic mobility in future.

The equipment for individual soldiers was to be reviewed. Rear Admiral Schoultz pointed out that cold weather gear was needed for the Drakensburg region on account of the low winter temperatures.

Priorities for protecting land borders were indicated by means of maps. Rear Admiral Schoultz pointed out that the first priority for border control was the eastern side of South Africa; the second priority was the North West. (Slide 5). Landward force requirements were indicated for phase one - Pontdrift, Beitbridge, and Macadamia; for phase two - Piet Retief, Madimbo, and Skukuza, and Ndumo; for phase three - Zonstraal, Pongola, Himeville, and Phlaborwa; and phase four - Base TBD Eastern Cape, Fouriesburg, and Cedarville. (Slides 6-9). Provisional cost estimates were given for the borders of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho. (Slides 10-12). Rear Admiral Schoultz indicated that there might need to be reliance on reserve forces.

Provisional cost estimates were given for equipment cost overheads. (Slide 13).

The South African National Defence Force recommended that four companies be deployed on 01 April 2010 at Pontdrift, Beitbridge, Macadamia, and Ndumo. Establishment of high site and communications infrastructure should begin. Also acquisition of 4x4 vehicles should begin. NABOB fence should be repaired. The South African Army should prepare its 3rd Battalion for possible deployment in April 2011. Further deployment should not begin until additional funding could be provided. (Slide 14)

Discussion
Mr L Diale (ANC) asked if the Department of Defence had thoroughly considered the time frame.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that the SANDF had tried to present this matter to Cabinet. He said that if the SANDF was allowed to take on ‘this mammoth task’, it would take up its role from 01 April 2010. However, the SANDF would be guided by Cabinet as to when it should withdraw. ‘We will be there as long as Cabinet wants us to be there; we must have the go-ahead from the Commander in Chief.’ If the SANDF was to be on the borders after 2011, more money and personnel would be required.

Ms H Mgabadeli (ANC) observed that the Department had not mentioned the sea borders in its presentation, and requested it to examine the subject. Secondly she asked where the borders were located, to what extent Southern African Development Community (SADC) region members were involved in protecting those borders, and for further information on co-operation with neighbouring countries in that regard.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that the South African Navy covered the oceans. The SANDF would be returning to the areas indicated in the presentation. The SAPS would still be involved in co-operative role.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz added that the Department had participated in regular forums with neighbouring countries with regard to border protection. These forums were continuing on two borders; however, the SANDF had handed the Chair of the tactical headquarters to the SAPS when SANDF had withdrawn previously and would reassume it when SANDF re-entered the field. There was thus ongoing liaison between South Africa and its neighbours.

Mr Groenewald commented that the tax payer would have to foot the bill. It was ironic that South African found itself required to deploy its Defence Force to protect its borders. He asked how many personnel and companies were involved, and about the present situation at present. He asked for more detail on the four phases and the rollout over a period of four years. Illegal immigrants were ‘flooding’ South Africa. He asked how the transfer from the SAPS would be managed. He would have liked to ask the Minister for Police why those bases mentioned in the presentation had deteriorated.

Mr Groenewald asked if the Department had any plans to complete all four phases in one year.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied in the negative. The rollout would take four years altogether.

Mr Maynier said that he was happy that the military was back on South Africa’s borders. It was a good decision. He asked Lieutenant-General Matanzima what level of force was required to secure the borders. It seemed that the rollout was too slow. Also it seemed that less money would be spent under the new arrangements than under the SAPS in the financial year 2008 to 2009. South Africa’s borders were not secure if there was only one soldier guarding a long stretch of border.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied that the SANDF had made provision to deploy 7 000 members for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. The SANDF had two battalions ready for deployment within the current financial year. It wanted the Army to prepare a third in readiness for the next financial year. This background might assist Members to understand the SANDF’s modest approach to the deployment. The SANDF had the forces available, should the need arise, but did not have the funds available to deploy them at the present time. The subsequent rollout had been planned to take place over four years.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz added that it was difficult to answer the question on the levels of force required to fulfil the mission. He lacked exact statistics on how many used to be deployed on the borders historically. There had been a reduction in the levels deployed since the 1980s until the SANDF had at first taken over. This did not include the commandos.

Bishop L Tolo (COPE) said that the SANDF’s soldiers were doing a good job for South Africa. It was also necessary for the Committee to make an oversight visit to Beitbridge.

The Chairperson indicated arrangements for the Committee’s forthcoming oversight visits.

The Chairperson sought assurance that the SANDF would be responsible for border arrangements in full.  He said that the role of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) was to collect taxes and customs dues, not to command. He agreed with Mr Diale that it seemed like a long process.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that the military had specific tasks to perform in areas where others, including the Department of Home Affairs, could not work. There was no clash. In terms of the Constitution, the SANDF would not ‘be sitting on those border gates’.

Mr E Mlambo (ANC) asked if the SAPS had handed over any functions.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied that the SAPS would continue to maintain a presence in the border areas since crime could be expected to continue, and would remain an SAPS responsibility. He said that asset registers had to be transferred from one department to another in the process of taking over from the SAPS.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz explained that Parliament had been appraised with regard to the establishment of a national Border Management Agency (BMA), with which the SANDF was involved. It was clear that there were two important but distinct aspects – border control and port of entry control. Currently, role players such as the Department of Home Affairs were focusing more on the port of entry, while the SANDF was more concerned with the borders. However, the SANDF was concerned to ensure communication between the two groupings. The Department of Defence would take the lead with regard to the protection of the borders. The Department recognised the need for collaboration with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, since livestock was liable to stray across borders.

The Chairperson asked about preventing the trafficking of stolen cars from South Africa to Mozambique. He asked about the many atrocities committed on the borders and refugees who crossed at places where there were no controls. He also asked whether SADC was involved. It was important that South Africa’s neighbours be involved.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that investigations had been conduced into some soldiers accused. He remembered that there was such an allegation recently. A woman from Zimbabwe had been unable to identify her assailant. He emphasised that that SANDF did investigate such allegations in collaboration with the SAPS.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima said that the Air Force would always be ready to support the ground forces. Commands were issued from the ground forces. If naval or air assets were required, the ground forces called for them, and the SANDF was keen to enter the field as soon as it was authorised. The SANDF was ready to deploy with effect from 01 April 2010.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz explained the way in which the Department of Defence had structured itself, specifically with regard to the Navy and Air Force. The Navy and the Air Force received budgets, from which there were allocations for utilisation according to the number of hours of use required. Within that allocation, the SANDF could use ships and aircraft. There was a subtle difference in regard to internal structuring.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz assured Members that maritime patrols were already being conducted by sea and by air. There were offshore patrol vessels, and every month it was endeavoured to conduct a patrol of one week. Also every week a maritime patrol by air was operated by means of aged Dakota aircraft. These patrols had limited capability, but were flown regularly. All shipping seen was logged. On average 35 ships a day were logged. SAPS reservists had been deployed on the patrol vessels, and there had been co-operation with Marine and Coastal Management (MCM).  

Rear-Admiral Schoultz said that as far as the land borders and integrity of South Africa’s air space was concerned, the intention was that after the 2010 World Soccer Cup resources would be released to operate ad hoc border patrols. Also flying border patrols would be to gather intelligence. Such patrols were seen as part of an inclusive role in the protection of the borders.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz said that currently there was one company in the Musina and Beitbridge area. It had been strengthened to 187 members since it protected the Home Affairs processing facility near Musina, close to the Zimbabwe border.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz explained the difference between the SAPS system of scheduling duties and the SANDF system. The SAPS used ‘a rostering system’, whereby only one third of the personnel would be in the area while on duty. When their eight hour duty finished, they would return to their home base. However SANDF personnel assigned to an area would remain there all the time. He said that the SANDF had a good working relationship with the SAPS. He referred to Section 18(1)(d) of the Defence Act and Section 13 of the Police Act and replied that the SANDF would undertake search, seizure and arrest, but would not want to be involved in legal processes. After arrest, suspects would be handed over to the SAPS. He emphasised that there would be a continuous cooperation with the SAPS. He apologised for any shortcomings in his replies.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz said that the SANDF had specific design requirements of a vehicle specifically for border patrols. The SANDF required vehicles that could carry five or six people and venture into the mountainous areas, such as the Lesotho passes. Such special capability vehicles would include ambulances. The running costs of such a vehicle were substantially more than those of an ordinary 4x4 vehicle. It was a huge cost driver.

The Chairperson said that the delegates had omitted to answer a question on the border fences.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied that all South Africa’s borders had a fence of some kind. The Lesotho and Namibian borders had the normal cattle fence. The borders in the corridor area had the ‘veterinary fence ‘to keep out livestock. On the Mozambique border there was a double military fence with barbed wire in the middle. Part of this fence had been removed. There was a similar fence on the Zimbabwean border. He could not give the exact date of their erection but it had been some time in the late 1970s or early 1980s. There had been a sisal fence in the Kruger National Park, but it had been eaten away by the animals. To maintain a physical barrier was very costly. One of the ideas discussed with regard to the return to border patrols was to go mobile and put sensors, in response to warnings from which reaction teams could be deployed.

Mr Maynier asked Lieutenant-General Matanzima to confirm ‘the capability gap’ on the figures which he had given the Committee, which would be 3 000 solders short of the number needed to achieve border security. He asked if that was correct or incorrect.  Secondly, in terms of the SANDF’s proposal, he asked if fewer soldiers and less money would be devoted to border security than in the previous financial year – ‘yes or no’. He asked Lieutenant-General Matanzima if, in his professional opinion, given the level of force that the SANDF proposed or intended to dedicate to border patrols, he could assure the House that the borders would be secure.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that as far as the first phase was concerned, the SANDF was happy with the money at its disposal. It would be sufficient for the first phase, and no shortages were indicated with regard to the number of soldiers. However, if the deployment would be continued into the following financial year, more money would be required. The SANDF would definitely need additional funds for subsequent years of the deployment. Money would be needed to sustain developments. He said that from previous experience the SANDF was confident that the borders would be sufficiently protected; with the co-operation of the SAPS illegal trafficking would be stopped.

Bishop Tolo asked when and where the incident involving the Zimbabwean woman had happened. He asked where she was. It was important to find her and ask her to identify who caused that problem.

Ms Mgabadeli said that when one talked of rape it was a pity that one could not understand what it was to be raped. It was a sensitive issue. Too many people went free. She asked if perpetrators realised the pain that they caused.

The Chairperson said that he would not allow a debate on Ms Mgabadeli’s last question.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that the rape enquiry was a process led by the SAPS. The SANDF co-operated fully with the SAPS but would not be at the forefront of investigations. Military police could co-operate with the SAPS. Every allegation was reported, and the SANDF did not hide anything under the carpet; it did not want its image to be tarnished by the allegations of some women who crossed the borders. He suggested that the SAPS could trace her. The SANDF had completed its role in the matter.

Bishop Tolo asked about the cattle fence, and how border patrols could distinguish cattle fences erected by farmers from border fences. 

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied that the Department of Defence had raised the matter of the fences with the Border Management Agency (BMA). The Department did not know who owned all the fences. The ownership of the foot-and-mouth fence was easy to determine. Large tracks of fences might belong to farmers. It was a matter that needed to be debated.

Ms Mgabadeli said that the nation had to be educated about the SANDF. She wished to hear about the sea boundaries, since constituents asked about them. The SANDF should be frank.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz apologised for not including the sea borders in the presentation. However, details were available and could be forwarded to the Committee. Current patrols were aimed more at maintaining a presence at sea. Within the territorial waters which extended to 12 miles off the coast, crime prevention was an SAPS function. Beyond the territorial waters, within the exclusive economic zone it was the responsibility of the National Department of Transport to monitor pollution, and the responsibility of the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs to monitor marine resources. Resources under the ocean floor were the responsibility of the Department of Mineral Resources. There were many role players. The SANDF conducted patrols of those areas on the basis of at least one week per month. The SANDF would like to do more, but these patrols were resource driven.


Ms Mgabadeli said that with regard to infrastructure, she had not observed information about the number of personnel to be deployed.

Mr Maynier said that border security meant more than ‘boots on the ground’ as Rear-Admiral Schoultz and Lieutenant-General Matanzima had pointed out. He asked specifically how many hours would be allocated to air and sea patrols. He felt that there had not been sufficient detail thus far. The National Commissioner of Police had confirmed candidly before the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts on 07 October 2009 that the South African Navy, the SAPS, and Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) together had not sufficient capacity or resources to patrol the coasts of South Africa. He asked Rear-Admiral Schoultz and Lieutenant-General Matanzima if they agreed. He asked if the Navy's requirements would be prioritised. He also asked to what extent the SANDF would use satellites. 

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied regarding the prioritisation of off-shore patrol vessels; he admitted that a greater presence was needed there, and the Navy was requesting more vessels. The SANDF lacked up-to-date equipment for aerial reconnaissance, and relied on the eye of the pilot. He could not give the exact number of hours for patrols, but in some months the SANDF achieved as many as two weeks of patrols.
He said that the SANDF did not use satellites to observe the borders, but did obtain satellite images for particular areas, more for Geographical Information Systems (GIS) information. Such satellite images had indicated that roads through the Kruger National Park continued across the border. The SANDF did not own its own satellites, nor have the use of them in any way for real-time observation. However, it rented satellite time from other sources for GIS purposes. The SANDF would examine the possibility of unmanned aircraft (drones).

Bishop Tolo asked about infrastructure challenges. Why were there problems with water?

Rear-Admiral Schoultz apologised for any inadequacies in the briefing. He gave details of medical support to personnel who would be engaged on border duties. With regard to infrastructure, some of the bases had been unoccupied. Bottled water had been used. Header tanks had not been used for four years, so that seals on the tanks and the pumps would have to be replaced. Also the infrastructure needed repair, together with the sewerage system. Some wells had dried up. Also informal settlements had been established at some points on the Mozambique border over the past five years. These had contributed to the drying up of wells. 

Ms N Mabedla (ANC) asked about the abbreviation ‘Coy’. (Slide 10).

Rear-Admiral Schoultz apologised for the abbreviation. It meant ‘company’, a unit of about 150 to 160 persons.

Ms Mabedla also asked about transformation.

Rear-Admiral Schoultz replied that he did not have an analysis of gender. The breakdown varied from one company to another. The percentage of women could hardly be more than 20%. Joint Operations did not prescribe to the Services.

Mr Maynier asked if the constraint was simply one of funding, or if there were other constraints. To understand the military position, it was necessary to be aware of all the constraints. He asked if the SANDF actually had the capacity to deploy the number of companies promised onto the borders in 2010.

Lieutenant-General Matanzima replied that to answer this question would take much time. He admitted that there would be a challenge with regard to the budget for the later phases of the deployment.

The Chairperson dissuaded Members from beginning a political debate about the budget.

Mr Maynier said that he agreed with the Chairperson on the responsibility for the budget and under funding, and noted a tendency to displace responsibilities. If there was an under funding of the Defence Force, this was not the fault of the general staff. His question to Lieutenant-General Matanzima was essentially about military preparedness, and if there were constraints other than the budgetary constraint. Given the number of companies that would be deployed, Mr Maynier’s argument was that the military would not achieve the mission.

The Chairperson said that it was the responsibility of the Ministry and the Department of Defence to provide the Committee with the information to this broad question. The Committee had long awaited the broader picture of the SANDF. The Committee hoped to meet again the following week with the Chief of Defence.

The meeting was adjourned.

Appendix:

18. Employment of Defence Force

1)        In addition to the employment of the Defence Force by the President as contemplated in section 201(2) of the Constitution, the President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force for service inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to-
a)        preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations;
b)        ensure the provision of essential services;
c)        support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; and
d)        effect national border control.


Appendix 2:

Section 13 of South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995)

(1) Subject to the Constitution and with due regard to the fundamental rights of every person, a member may exercise such powers and shall perform such duties and functions as are by law conferred on or assigned to a police official.

(2) Where a member becomes aware that a prescribed offence has been committed, he or she shall inform his or her commanding officer thereof as soon as possible.

(3)(a) A member who is obliged to perform an official duty, shall, with due regard to his or her powers, duties and functions, perform such duty in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances.

(b) Where a member who performs an official duty is authorised by law to use force, he or she may use only the minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances.

(4) Every member shall be competent to serve or execute any summons, warrant or other process whether directed to him or her or to any other member.

(5) Any member may in general or in any particular instance be required to act as prosecutor, or in any other respect to appear on behalf of the State in any criminal matter before any magistrate's court, any magistrate holding a preparatory examination, a court of a special justice of the peace or any other lower court in the Republic.

(6) Any member may, where it is reasonably necessary for the purposes of control over the illegal movement of people or goods across the borders of the Republic, without warrant search any person, premises, other place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or any receptacle of whatever nature, at any place in the Republic within 10 kilometres or any reasonable distance from any border between the Republic and any foreign state, or in the territorial waters of the Republic, or inside the Republic within 10 kilometres or any reasonable distance from such territorial waters and seize anything found in the possession of such person or upon or at or in such premises, other place, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or receptacle and which may lawfully be seized.

(7)(a) The National or Provincial Commissioner may, where it is reasonable in the circumstances in order to restore public order or to ensure the safety of the public in a particular area, in writing authorise that the particular area or any part thereof be cordoned off.
(b) The written authorisation referred to in paragraph (a) shall specify the period, which shall not exceed 24 hours, during which the said area may be cordoned off, the area or part thereof to be cordoned off and the object of the proposed action.
(c) Upon receipt of the written authorisation referred to in paragraph (a), any member may cordon off the area concerned or part thereof, and may, where it is reasonably necessary in order to achieve the object specified in the written authorisation, without warrant, search any person, premises or vehicle, or any receptacle or object of whatever nature, in that area or part thereof and seize any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of
1977), found by him or her in the possession of such person or in that area or part thereof: Provided that a member executing a search under this paragraph shall, upon demand of any person whose rights are or have been affected by the search or seizure, exhibit to him or her a
copy of the written authorisation.

(8)(a) The National or Provincial Commissioner may, where it is reasonable in the circumstances in order to exercise a power or perform a function referred to in section 215 of the Constitution, in writing authorise a member under his or her command, to set up a roadblock or roadblocks on
any public road in a particular area of to set up a checkpoint or checkpoints at any public place in a particular area.
(b) The written authorisation referred to in paragraph (a) shall specify the date, approximate duration, place and object of the proposed action.
(c) Any member authorised under paragraph (a) may set up a roadblock or roadblocks or cause a roadblock or roadblocks to be set up on any public road in the area so specified or set up a checkpoint or checkpoints or cause a checkpoint or checkpoints to be set up at any
public place in the area so specified.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), any member who has reasonable suspicion to believe that-
(i) an offence mentioned in Schedule I to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, has been committed and that a person who has been involved in the commission thereof is, or is about to be, travelling in a motor vehicle in a particular area;
(ii) a person who is a witness to such an offence is absconding and is, or is about to be, travelling in a motor vehicle in a particular area and that a warrant for his or her arrest has been issued under section 184 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, or that such a warrant will be issued if the information at the disposal of the member is brought to the attention of the magistrate, regional
magistrate or judge referred to in that section, but that the delay in obtaining such warrant will defeat the object of the roadblock;
(iii) a person who is reasonably suspected of intending to commit an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) and who may be prevented from committing such an offence by the setting up of a roadblock is, or is about to be, travelling in a motor vehicle in a particular area;
(iv) a person who is a fugitive after having escaped from lawful custody is, or is about to be, travelling in a motor vehicle in a particular area; or (v) any object which- (aa) is concerned in;
(bb) may afford evidence of; or (cc) is intended to be used in, the commission of an offence referred to in subparagraph (i), whether within the Republic or elsewhere, and which is, or is about to be, transported in a motor vehicle in a particular area and that a search warrant will be issued to him or her under section 21(1)
(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, if he or she had reason to believe that the object will be transported in a specific vehicle and he or she had applied for such warrant, and that the delay that will be caused by first obtaining an authorisation
referred to in paragraph
(a), will defeat the object of the roadblock, may set up a roadblock on any public road or roads in that area for the purpose of establishing whether a motor vehicle is carrying such a person or object.
(e) For the purposes of exercising the powers conferred by paragraph (c) or (d), a member shall display, set up or erect on or next to the road or at the public place such sign, barrier or object as is reasonable in the circumstances to bring the order to stop to the attention of the driver of a vehicle approaching the roadblock so as to ensure that the
vehicle will come to a stop or to the attention of a person approaching he checkpoint.
(f) Any driver of a vehicle who approaches a roadblock or any person who approaches a checkpoint and who refuses or fails to stop in accordance with an order to stop displayed as contemplated in paragraph (e), shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months.
 (g) Any member may, without warrant- (i) in the event of a roadblock or checkpoint that is set up in accordance with paragraph (c), search any person or vehicle stopped at such roadblock or checkpoint and any receptacle or object of whatever nature in the possession of such person or in, on or attached to such vehicle and seize any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, found by him or her in the possession of such person or in, on or attached to such receptacle or vehicle: Provided that a member executing a search under this subparagraph shall, upon demand of any person whose rights are or have been affected by the search or seizure, exhibit to him or her a copy of the written authorisation by theCommissioner concerned; and
(ii) in the event of a roadblock that is set up in accordance with paragraph (d), search any person or vehicle stopped at such roadblock and any receptacle or object of whatever nature in, on or
attached to such vehicle and seize any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, found by him or her in, on or attached to such receptacle or vehicle: Provided that a
member executing a search under this subparagraph shall, upon demand of any person whose rights are or have been affected by the search or seizure, inform him or her of the reason for the setting up of the roadblock.
(h) For the purposes of this subsection "checkpoint" includes any barrier set up under an authorisation referred to in paragraph (a) in order to control the movement of persons.


(9) The provisions of sections 29 to 36 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of a search conducted under subsections (6), (7) and (8) and any object seized during such a search.


(10) The National or Provincial Commissioner may, in the exercise of any power or the performance of any function referred to in section 215 of the Constitution, publish or cause to be published, or in any other manner display or cause to be displayed any information, photograph or sketch of any person.


(11)(a) A member may, for the purposes of investigating any offence or alleged offence, cordon off the scene of such offence or alleged offence and any adjacent area which is reasonable in the circumstances to cordon off in order to conduct an effective investigation at the scene of the offence or alleged offence.
(b) A member may, where it is reasonable in the circumstances in order to conduct such investigation, prevent any person from entering or leaving an area so cordoned off.


(12)(a) If the National Commissioner deems it necessary for the purposes of performing the functions of the Service, he or she may, with the approval of the Minister, direct any member to perform service at any place outside the Republic.
(b) A member in respect of whom a direction has been issued under paragraph
(a), shall perform service in accordance with such direction and shall, while so performing service, remain, unless the Minister in a particular case otherwise directs, subject to the provisions of this Act as if performing service within the Republic.


(13) Subject to the Constitution - (a) this section shall not be construed as derogating from any power conferred upon a member by or under this Act or any other law, including the common law; and (b) the powers conferred upon a member by this section shall not be limited by any other law, including the common law.

 

Appendix 3
Standing Committee on Public Accounts. 07 October 2009. Hearing on Report of Auditor-General on performance audit of handling of
confiscated abalone by Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism.

"Mr D Maynier (DA) was pleased at the mention of coastal patrols. However, he felt that the South African Navy, the South African Police Service, and Marine and Coastal Management did not have sufficient resources to effectively patrol the coastline of South Africa. There were not enough platforms available and in many cases, the wrong platforms were used. Frigates cannot do inshore patrol; and he suggested that all three Departments concerned were under-funded.  He asked if the Departments concerned agreed with his position.  He wanted to know what platforms were available for coastal patrol, how many were deployed and if they were adequate to effectively patrol the coastline.

The representative from SAPS responded that different sea board units for the coastal patrol were in the process of being built. It was futile to allocate resources without proper development.  SAPS had a presence at the ports of entry and along the coast between the ports of entry. SAPS could provide a list of resources deployed to the Committee.  However, SAPS could do with more platforms and more specialised units along the coastline.

Ms Nosipho Ngcaba, [Director-General; Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA)]agreed with Mr Maynier's hypothesis.  South Africa had a long coastline and an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from the coast. She doubted that the Department would ever obtain the desired resources.  Some resources had been provided by Government and the Department had a number of patrol vessels.  However, the vessels could not be used to their full extent because of high running costs. Over and above that, the Department had invested in electronic equipment, such as cameras. She conceded that existing resources could be better but more platforms and more resources were necessary."

"Mr Maynier was astounded that the SAPS could not tell the Committee how many platforms they had available on any given day to carry out coastal patrols. The DEA had agreed with his statement that the South African Navy, the SAPS, and the MCM did not have sufficient resources effectively to patrol the 3 000 kilometre long coastline of South Africa. He asked the Commissioner and the Divisional Commissioner of Police if they agreed with his statement. He wanted a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer.

Mr Bheki Cele (National Commissioner SAPS) replied that there was no simple 'yes' or 'no' answer.  He emphasised that he was clear about that point, unless the Committee was to tell the SAPS what to say. He and his colleagues had answered the questions. The answer was that there were no adequate resources across all spheres of Government.

The Chairperson inferred that the National Commissioner's answer was a
'yes'."

 





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